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The Unity of Political Principle 
Luke MacInnis 
The aim of this project is to argue that practical reason governs our normative responsibilities in one 
voice.  There are no genuine conflicts within law, none within morality, and none between law and 
morality.  On the contrary, there are single right answers to questions about what law and morality, 
considered separately or together, demand.  I try to show that this claim, which I refer to as the “Unity 
Thesis”, is both ordinary and deeply valuable.  It concerns the correct way to understand, judge, and 
reason about the normative principles our political, legal, and moral practices establish.  The Unity Thesis 
holds that we ought to, and that we already tacitly do, regard these principles as constituting an integrated, 
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The disconcerting realization that I am very bad at writing freestanding chapters might also, I hope, 
suggest the unity of the subject matter.  I have tried to include brief summaries and several cross-
references within the text relating sections that bear on one another.  The detailed table of contents might 
also serve as a guide to topics of potential interest and to the project’s overall structure. 
Columbia has been an ideal setting in which to learn and write about the issues that arise in this 
project.  I am grateful to Kevin Elliott, Brett Meyer, Maria Paula Saffon, Michelle Chun, Rob Goodman, 
and Ben Schupmann, who each at some point commented on and improved different parts of the 
argument.  Through the Inter-University Doctoral Consortium, I had the good fortune to enroll in seminar 
courses with two political philosophers, Ronald Dworkin and Joseph Raz, whose ideas have tremendously 
influenced my understanding of law and ethics.  I am very lucky to have had that opportunity. 
I am particularly grateful to my two advisers, Nadia Urbinati and David Johnston, who both from 
the outset supported my interest in writing on Kant and Dworkin.  Nadia offered valuable comments on 
substantially the entire project, and has greatly assisted me in navigating the stressful period leading up to 
the defense.  David is partly responsible for inspiring my critical interest in value pluralism, and I suspect 
he is entirely responsible for my getting into Columbia in the first place.  Both of these mentors facilitated 
my academic development by supporting, and often creating, many invaluable teaching and research 





Introduction: The Unity Thesis 
 
A. The Unity of Principle 
The aim of this project is to argue that practical reason governs our normative responsibilities in one 
voice.  There are no genuine conflicts within law, none within morality, and none between law and 
morality.  On the contrary, there are single right answers to questions about what law and morality, 
considered separately or together, demand.  I try to show that this claim, which I will refer to as the 
“Unity Thesis”, is both ordinary and deeply valuable.  It concerns the correct way to understand, judge, 
and reason about the normative principles our political, legal, and moral practices establish.  The Unity 
Thesis holds that we ought to, and that we already tacitly do, regard these principles as constituting an 
integrated, mutually supportive practical system—a unity of principle.   
The expression “pluralism” signifies many different things to contemporary political, legal, and 
moral theorists.   One sense of the term, which I isolate and distinguish below, opposes the Unity Thesis.  
According to this sense of pluralism, practical reason is essentially fractured: goodness, rightness, justice, 
democracy, law, and law-like institutions collide irreconcilably in a way that precludes our acting 
consistently in our lives or through political institutions.  Pluralism, so understood, is a very prominent 
idea at the moment.  I believe it rests on implausible assumptions about the character of law, morality, 
and practical reason in general.  In defending the Unity Thesis I will try to expose these assumptions by 
carrying the question of pluralism’s plausibility to a higher level of abstraction than that to which political 
theorists normally seem to attend.  That investigation will suggest that pluralism rests on a clandestine 
philosophical framework that seems to distort central features of our understanding of law and morality.  
I assume a fundamental distinction between facts and principles.1  Facts, as understood here, are 
any non-normative, contingent truths about what is, was, will, or might be the case.  Facts impinge on us 
                                                          
1 The basic distinction is probably ancient, but the terminology here is stipulated as there is no settled use of the expressions “principles” and 
“facts”.  I mainly follow G.A. Cohen’s clear account, though my account of facts is narrower in specifying that facts are contingent truths known 
a posteriori, and I also do not intend to endorse Cohen’s central claim that there are “basic” principles. See Cohen “Facts and Principles”.  See 
also Raz’s related discussion of operative and auxiliary reasons in his Practical Reason and Norms, 15ff.  For illuminating discussions of the core 
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through experience of how things are: we come to know them either directly or indirectly through 
experience, or generalizations from experience, or deductions from generalizations from experience.2  I 
propose to leave open what might count as an “experience” so that it may include not merely 
sensory experience, but also possible forms of experience that might engage some faculty of moral 
intuition, if there is such a thing.3   
Principles, by contrast, are objective normative imperatives that require, permit, or forbid forms 
of conduct.  I argue, in Chapter 3, that principles, unlike facts, are not truths that we come to know 
ultimately through experience of any kind, but rather express what ought to be or happen through or as a 
consequence of our actions.  A central theme of this project is that the identification of principles as types 
of contingent facts is an illegitimate reduction, and also a primary source of resistance to the idea of unity.  
As will become evident in this introduction, I believe pluralism depends on a category mistake.  Pluralism 
conflates two conceptually, epistemologically, and metaphysically distinct and basic notions: what is, and 
what ought to be.  We find within the world contingent facts about what is the case, but we act on the 
world according to representations of what ought to be the case.  We can make sense of the pluralist claim 
that normative requirements can just happen to conflict only by ignoring that distinction and by 
conceiving principles as describing brute, contingent forces that act upon us in conflicting ways, rather 
than as proceeding from within us, under our rational control.  One way to understand this project is as an 
attempt to demonstrate that the tendency to ignore the gap between “is” and “ought” infects and corrupts 
our thinking about the character of values, practical reasons, law, and political institutions.4  This project 
tries to describe what a political theory free from these confusions might look like. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
features of principles, see Ronald Dworkin’s MR1 and  MR2, along with Raz’s “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law”, and Thomas Scanlon’s 
What We Owe to Each Other, 197-202, 299 
2 I include facts about mental content (for example, about what someone believes or desires) in the broad category of facts because we can 
understand them descriptively without presupposing any commitment as to their truth, normative or otherwise.  
3 I believe there is not such a thing, though, as we will see, the assumption that there must be seems to be widespread among many moral realists 
and pluralists who do not explicitly profess the assumption. 
4 We would misconstrue Hilary Putnam’s important observations that our scientific theories depend on value judgments and that value concepts, 
most obviously the so-called “thick” ethical concepts, have descriptive components if we inferred that these observations dissolve the distinction 
between facts and values, is and ought. See Putnam’s The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. As we will see in this project, 
very important differences survive that demonstration of interdependence, in particular the role of perception and experience in our acquisition of 
knowledge about facts, which renders facts, unlike principles, contingent truths.  Putnam is right to be weary of sharp dichotomies.  But 
interdependence does not necessarily erase difference. 
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The distinction between facts and principles is not a distinction between objective and non-
objective truths.  In this project, both facts and principles have objective standing.  If the term “facts” 
sounds more objective than the term “principles” sounds, then readers may feel free to substitute, more 
awkwardly, the expression “normative facts” for what I will call “principles”, and “non-normative facts” 
for what I will call “facts”.  In saying that principles are “objective”, I mean that it is not sufficient for a 
standard of conduct to count as a principle merely that it is believed or accepted or practiced.5  Instead, to 
count as a principle a standard of conduct must direct us to do what we really ought to do in a particular 
circumstance.  Principles should not be confused with statements or propositions that have the 
grammatical form of an imperative.  Orders, commands, and intentions that are simply uttered, recorded 
in ink blots, wished, willed, or thought do not express principles unless they express imperatives that 
really ought to be followed. 
Statements about what morality, or law, or political institutions require are statements of 
principle, not factual statements about what someone has commanded, said, thought, or willed. In 
discussing morality and law, I generally avoid the terms “rule” or “norm” because these expressions have 
become associated too closely with certain linguistic or mental entities (pronouncement, edicts, or 
intentions), which are kinds of facts, rather than the objective directive, or principle, these entities 
represent.6  Anyone can utter or think a directive, but only directives, moral or legal, that must be 
followed are principles.  Moreover—and this is crucial—even if a principle’s content might depend on a 
fact of some kind (e.g. what a sovereign has said or willed), it does not follow that what that principle 
requires is a strictly factual matter.  Principles are functions of facts, but they are not identical to facts.  In 
particular, principles are not just bare facts about what people happen to will, order, prescribe, or wish, 
but are rather rationally determined, ultimately, by other principles. 
                                                          
5 See section C. in this introduction, “The Meaning of Moral Objectivity” 
6 See for instance Hans Kelsen’s identification of the content of a legal norm with the content of a sovereign’s will. Kelsen, Pure Theory, “Norm 
and Norm Creation”, 4-6.  Kelsen is right to distinguish the fact of the will’s content from the norm that fact creates.  But, as I will argue, it does 




The idea of unity in the Unity Thesis refers to three connected ideas.  First, it is a normative claim 
about the proper direction of practical inquiry, about how we ought to argue toward conclusions about 
what our normative responsibilities, in interpersonal morality and politics, are.  Good practical inquiry is 
oriented toward unity; it presupposes that there are single right answers to normative questions, that 
practical reason ultimately speaks in one voice, not many inconsistent voices, and that practical 
deliberation gropes, though often unsuccessfully, toward those answers using different strategies for 
refining principles in order to resolve apparent conflicts among them.   The Unity Thesis does not assume 
that this process ever achieves closure, or that reasoning finally discovers or comes to rest upon 
unshakeable normative bedrock.  On the contrary, it holds that we should not expect to overcome the 
uncertainties that compel inquiry, and that the search for single right answers remains a work in progress.  
However, the Unity Thesis holds that if practical reasoning proceeds in the right way, then we may be 
warranted in assuming our efforts bring us nearer the truth than if we had not inquired at all or just relied 
on instinct. 
Second, the idea of unity refers to an account of what successful practical inquiry—sometimes 
called the truth—consists.  A principle we find compelling is true only if what that principle requires is 
consistent with the demands of other principles that are also compelling.  If, in a particular circumstance, 
our principles dictate that we both must and must not perform some action or, what amounts to the same 
thing, that we must fail to extend a certain principle to similar occasions on which it applies, then our 
principles are in some respects defective.  Of course it may be unlikely or even impossible that people 
will always or even often agree or be able to demonstrate to other people’s satisfaction that some 
contested principle is correct.   But that fact, on its own, does not undermine the view that practical 
thought aims at deciding which principles are the correct ones.  There can of course be a plurality of views 
about true principles, but no genuine plurality in the truth about principles. 
Third—and this is the project’s central normative claim—the idea of unity is a constitutive aspect 
of respect for human dignity. This claim might strike some as strange. How can an idea as formalistic-
sounding as “unity” constitute something as substantive and controversial as respect for human dignity?  I 
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argue, following what I interpret to be a crucial Kantian insight, that there is fundamental, necessary value 
in acting, so far as possible, only on principles that fit into a mutually supportive scheme because only 
that condition ensures that the supreme value of our rational agency is not subordinated to some 
contingent end we can pursue only through our agency.  Treating persons as ends in themselves, rather 
than as mere means to particular ends we happen to have, requires, indeed just means, acting on a unified 
scheme of principles (in a sense of unity to be specified later).  In that way, moral form and moral 
substance merge. Though we may never fully realize unity among our principles, striving to constrain our 
acts by the demands of unity expresses a kind of impartiality and freedom from prejudice and 
unconstrained self-interest.  Moreover, the recognition of this unity in another’s moral personality can 
inspire moral feeling, and for that reason has social and political value.  On this view, since there is an 
internal relation between morality and unity, the idea of “moral pluralism” is not merely a conceptual 
confusion, but also a moral mistake. 
I believe the Unity Thesis applies generally to all types of principles, not just political principles.  
Philosophers distinguish conditional, hypothetical, and categorical principles, ethical principles 
concerning how to live, moral principles concerning what we owe to others, and principles of political 
morality concerning what political communities owe their members. Unless I specify otherwise, I will 
refer to all but the last, collectively, as “moral principles”.  Although in ordinary language the adjective 
“moral” attaches to the narrower class of interpersonal responsibilities between individuals, I adopt it here 
as a general term mainly for convenience.  I will refer generally to the last class of principles in the above 
list as “political principles”, and later distinguish different types of political principles—institutional and 
ideal—that allegedly conflict, and discuss how they might instead relate and indeed interlock.   
I argue that reasoning about political principle, in particular legal reasoning, is a species of moral 
reasoning; it is not sui generis.  My overall strategy will be to argue for the unity of political principle by 
defending the unity of moral principle in general.  By showing that the Unity Thesis holds at the more 
general moral level, it will be easier to show why it also hold in politics. Thus the two chapters 
comprising Part I introduce the unity of principle, first, as a thesis about moral principles in general and, 
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second, as a special thesis about political principles.  Parts II and III offer a case for the unity of political 
principle by extending and defending the moral model as the correct model for politics.   
This introduction presents the project’s central claims, identifies rival positions, and anticipates 
and begins to address certain threshold objections to the Unity Thesis.   Although my remarks here are 
fairly substantive, I do not offer them as complete arguments for my thesis, but rather in order to highlight 
the many issues and complications to which the thesis gives rise, and to forestall suspicion that this 
project ignores them, though despite my efforts I am sure it ignores many.  More fully developed 
arguments are in the chapters that follow. 
 
B. The Unity of Principle Is Not Value Monism 
Some readers familiar with the large and growing literature on so-called “value pluralism” might wonder 
what if any difference there is between the Unity Thesis and what is sometimes called “value monism”, 
which is often contrasted with pluralism.  Indeed, like monism, the Unity Thesis does oppose value 
pluralism.  So what is the difference between, on one hand, a value and a principle and, on the other hand, 
unity and monism?   
Despite its emphasis on moral and political “principle”, this project is also about moral and 
political value, and in fact proposes a particular theory of value that emphasizes the close relationship 
between values and principles.  In ordinary language the term “value” applies to a range of ethical, moral, 
and political ideas, such as right, wrong, good, evil, courage, generosity, fidelity, justice, equality, liberty, 
and legality, as well as to various non-moral ideas such as aesthetic and natural qualities, artistic 
excellence, intellectual accomplishments, and more. This project focuses primarily on ethical, moral, and 
political values. I present a conception of value, for which I find support in Aristotle’s and Kant’s 
writings, according to which our various concepts of values each collect certain kinds of principles that 
share what Wittgenstein called a “family resemblance”.7  On this view, when we think or talk about a 
value concept such as “good” or “liberty” or “democracy”, for example, we use it to name certain acts, or 
                                                          
7 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, S. 66-68. See the discussion below in Chapter 4, Section 5, “The Meaning of Value Concepts” 
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ends, or dispositions that not only have features our language recognizes, roughly, as belonging to a 
particular family (the family of liberty-related acts or relations, for example), but also that we have 
objective reason to perform, pursue, or cultivate.  In other words, value concepts do not pick out some 
core, fixed aspect of these families, but those parts of these families to which we really have reason to 
conform our conduct.  And since, I argue, to say one has reason to do something is just to say that there is 
a principle that marks it out as something that ought to be done, it follows that values stand for types of 
principles, and that we can understand values only in terms of principles.  This understanding of value is 
not universally granted, and I contrast my understanding with that of others who invert this order of 
explanation, who assume that principles guide us toward values that are just simply there, the way rocks 
are simply there. 
One reason the Unity Thesis refers to “principle” rather than to “value” is to emphasize a 
difference between, on one hand, facts and, on the other, the domain of value.  The vocabulary of value 
concepts, and in particular the naturalist rhetoric that (I suggest below) pluralists use to describe values, 
can obscure or conceal the distinction between facts and values.   In making judgments of value we say, 
for instance, that a rescue is courageous, or that a policy is unjust, or a person is generous.  Since these 
value predicates seem to make existential claims in the same way judgments about natural events or 
objects make existential claims, there is a risk of a surface-grammar confusion that might lead us to think 
the value of our acts, ends, and dispositions are in some sense analogous to natural objects, as if they were 
properties that inhered in our acts, attitudes, states of affairs themselves, or ways the world might go.  
This may encourage a pseudo-naturalistic understanding of values as essentially properties “out there” for 
us to discover or intuit.  I argue in this introduction and throughout this project that this understanding of 
values is pervasive in moral and political theory, and also underwrites the appeal of pluralism in both 
morality and law.  But talk of the “existence” of values is really a misleading shorthand for the idea that 
there are ways we ought to respond to our circumstances.  Value predicates do not make existential 
claims, but rather prescriptions. To say that something is a value is not to report some independent value-
bearer to which principles guide us.  It is rather to say that there is something we should do, that a 
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principle applies to our situation.  Once we understand that values must be understood in terms of 
principles, it is easier to see that principles, not facts, have the last word in normative justification, and the 
idea of pluralism then becomes much harder to defend. 
For similar reasons, I use the expression “unity” to dissociate my thesis from monistic moral 
theories.  In general, value monism is the view that there is one thing that is intrinsically valuable or 
normative, and that the value or normativity of all other valuable or normative things is reducible to that 
one thing.  Hedonistic utilitarianism, according to which acts are morally good which maximally 
contribute to the greatest surplus of pleasure over pain, is a paradigm of this kind of axiomized moral 
monism.  Analogously, John Austin’s conception of law as the command of a habitually obeyed 
sovereign is a monistic theory of sovereignty.8  But, as I will argue, monistic theories like these may often 
be pluralistic because, although they are perhaps internally consistent,9 they are nevertheless inconsistent 
with their own presuppositions. There is, I argue following Kant, an a priori limiting condition on all 
normative conceptions that filters out certain ends and principles as inconsistent with the ultimate 
presuppositions of normativity itself.  If we accept that we can be normatively bound to seek certain 
contingent ends, such as pleasure or a state of compliance with the edicts of an authority figure, then we 
must also assume that there are categorical requirements to respect and preserve our capacity to observe 
those contingent requirements.  Monistic theories notoriously justify principles that do not cohere with 
these categorical constraints, but rather subordinate these constraints to the pursuit of some contingent 
end:  the fulfillment of some particular desire or inclination, or state of affairs, or compliance with some 
set of commands, and so on.  The idea of unity, by contrast, does not hold that there is some intrinsically 
valuable end or state of affairs that confers value on all acts that might bring it about.  Unity is relentlessly 
anti-pluralistic because it assumes that principled consistency itself is intrinsically valuable, indeed it is a 
formal aspect of the dignity of moral self-legislation, which is not an axiomized, contingent end to be 
effected at all.  I develop this point throughout the project, but especially in Chapters 1 and 5. 
                                                          
8 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 9-15, 193-196 




C. The Meaning of Moral Objectivity 
The Unity Thesis accepts that normative requirements are real.  This is a controversial assumption. It 
rejects, for instance, the skeptical claim that value judgments are essentially subjective, or merely forms 
of emotional exhortation, or expressions of habit, or desire, or self-interest, or really mean “I approve of 
this action”, or “boo rape!”, and so on.10  These revisionist, non-cognitivist interpretations of value 
judgments seem incompatible with our everyday moral thoughts and practices.  In particular, they seem 
incompatible with the face-value of moral argument. People who engage in moral disputes assume, or are 
committed to assuming, that those with whom they disagree are mistaken because the values about which 
they disagree can be objectively true or false.  
Many pluralists also accept that values are objective.  However, as I later show in this 
introduction, both value and legal pluralists seem to assume—they must assume—that if values and 
principles are in some sense real or objective, then they must be real in the same way we might think of 
stars and trees as “real”, as something that is really there, perhaps not as belonging to the physical world, 
but nevertheless as belonging to some non-natural normative world or realm of some kind.  Pluralism, in 
some of its forms, seems to be an unhappy and implausible consequence of this pseudo-naturalistic 
worldview. This naturalist-inspired normative ontology is perhaps to be expected in an academic culture 
that educates that the real domain of truth is the domain of scientific fact and logic, whereas morality is 
one of mere opinion or emotion.11  A naturalist conception of the world has apparently been so irresistibly 
attractive (or perhaps ingrained) that it has come to dominate so fully our ideas of what counts as 
objective truth that attempts have been made to smash everything into its shape and deny the reality of 
anything that cannot be discovered through its methods.  But the approach to studying morality or law 
must be tailored to those subjects.  If these subjects cannot be studied in a scientific way, then we should 
not insist on studying them scientifically.  We can learn from morality and law themselves how they 
                                                          
10 A useful survey of the varieties of status skepticism is in James Rachels’ The Elements of Moral Philosophy, Chapter 3. 
11 I share many of the sentiments expressed by Feyerband, “How to Defend Society Against Science” in Introduction to Philosophy: Classical 
and Contemporary Readings (6th Edition), Perry et. al (eds) (New York: Oxford, 2013) 
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should be studied, but we cannot stipulate that they must have a certain character simply because we want 
to study them in a particular way. 
This scientistic outlook has understandably led some to different kind of moral skepticism. John 
Mackie influentially denied the reality of values, not by rejecting their claims to objectivity, but rather on 
the grounds that objective value properties are “not part of the fabric of the world.”  Mackie said that “if 
there were objective values, then they would have to be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange 
sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.”12  Mackie was correct that there is a strong 
tendency to attribute “out there” objectivity to moral and legal truths.13  Less plausible is Mackie’s 
assumption that a central thesis of moral intuitionism—that moral truths really do exist in some way and 
interact causally with us to cause our beliefs in them—is a thesis “to which any objectivist view of values 
is in the end committed.”14  On the contrary, this projects maintains that values and principles, and the 
arguments we make for them, do not even purport to be about spooky properties “in the world” that 
comprise part of the “furniture of the universe”.15  To say that a principle is objective is not to identify 
principles with real entities.  That is an inappropriate metaphysical picture for values and principles. 
There is no social or moral universe of moral entities that impinge on our moral sense the way light rays 
impact our optical nerve.  It seems as though, like Mackie, many political and legal theorists who endorse 
pluralism overlook a particular sense of truth and objectivity that has nothing to do with what can be 
demonstrated either empirically, or intuited through some occult moral sense. 
What is this other sense of objectivity?  Claims of objective knowledge would seem to have to 
meet a fundamental condition: there must be a difference between the claim’s being true and its being 
thought or practiced.16  If there is no logical space between these two conditions—if simply believing p 
                                                          
12 John Mackie, Inventing Right and Wrong,38 
13 See the list below of all the theorists, especially pluralists, who assume this. Ibid.  Mackie cites rationalist Samuel Clark, and sentimentalists 
Francis Hutcheson and Richard Price, who Mackie reports as having said that right and wrong are “real characters of actions,” not “qualities of 
our minds”.  
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 
16 See Raz, Engaging Reason, 200, 123, who analyzes the idea objectivity into several additional parts.  See also Nicos Stavropoulos 
“Objectivity”, 316; and generally Stavropoulos’ Objectivity in Law 
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constitutes p’s truth—then there would be no possibility of error.  Can we draw this distinction with 
respect to morality without assuming that moral truth must be grounded in objects “in the world”?   
Yes, it seems we can.  Compare the following two arguments:  A. “All men are mortal; Socrates 
is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal”; B. “One should make people happy; smiling makes people happy; 
therefore, one should smile”.  A is an empirical argument, not a practical argument.  All of its premises 
state natural facts that can be tested directly or indirectly against experience.  B, by contrast, is a practical 
argument.  Although the minor premise makes an empirical claim, both the major and conclusion are 
deontic statements (principles) that do not refer to any natural objects at all.  The empirical claim in the 
minor is normatively relevant only because the major principle selects its features as normatively 
relevant, and then reason guides the inference to the conclusion.   In other words, the practical argument 
is, at bottom, not empirical, but normative, a matter of what ought to be, not of what is. In a practical 
argument like B, principles, not facts, seem to have the last word. 
Now if “subjectivity” means that the justification at bottom depends on some contingent fact 
about our attitudes, or beliefs, or social practices, or historical circumstance, and if we understand 
objectivity as simply non-dependence on these contingent conditions, then the conclusion of B is clearly 
objective because the argument neither begins nor ends with a contingent fact, but rather with a principle. 
This is, of course, a different sense of objectivity than the sense we might associate with empirical facts, 
but the latter sense need not be the only sense (it does not seem to capture the sense in which 
mathematical or logical claims are objective, for instance). We do not have to show that there are moral 
objects or properties that interact with our sensibilities in the way natural objects might be thought to 
interact with our nervous system.  The practical argument is enough, without anything “out there” to 
ground it.  We do not need such metaphors to explain normative objectivity because principles do not 
even purport to match the world.  To the contrary, they state what the world should be like.   
I anticipate an objection. Could we not grant this analysis and yet still maintain that principles 
themselves are merely social “constructs”, inventions human beings developed, or perhaps evolved over 
time to accept?  We should take care to distinguish two different ways of interpreting this kind of 
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question.  On one hand, if the question is meant to suggest that principles are justified by the fact that they 
are practiced or believed, then the question suggests an ordinary moral claim: namely, that we ought to do 
whatever is practiced or believed to be good.  That is a very implausible moral claim, but it is not a 
skeptical claim because it is itself practice-independent, belief-independent, and therefore entirely 
objective.  
On the other hand, we might interpret the question as an attempt to remind us of the historical, 
cultural, or even biological contingency of the principles we happen to accept and might not have 
accepted if our history, culture, or biology had developed differently.  If we interpret the question this 
way—as a claim about the genesis of our moral beliefs—then this account still does not in any way call 
into doubt the objective status of the principles themselves.  To assume that it does would be to conflate 
the explanation of a belief in a principle with the justification of that belief.17 To illustrate this important 
distinction, consider the different ways we might study a principle such as “Slavery should never occur.” 
Have all societies at all times accepted this principle?  If not, how greatly do people disagree about it and 
in what cultures and in what places and what times have people held this view?  What explains these 
differences?  How quickly have their views changed?  What environmental, genetic, or evolutionary 
factors explain why some people accept or do not accept this principle?  Do biological or psychological 
processes explain why some people accept it?  Can methods of brainwashing cause people to believe such 
things? What about hypnotism or indoctrination?   
Questions like these raise problems within sociology, moral anthropology, evolutionary biology, 
and moral psychology. They share a feature:  each asks for an empirical account of the prevalence of a 
belief about a principle or the causal-historical processes by which a person or group comes to accept that 
belief.  They are questions about the genesis or the explanation, not the justification, of belief in the 
principle.  They are all distinct from another way we might study the principle, which is by asking 
substantive normative questions: Should slavery never occur? Do we really have reason to criticize those 
who practice it?  Or is slavery permissible under certain circumstances, perhaps when there is a special, 
                                                          
17 See Joseph Raz “Introduction” to Practical Reasoning, 2-4  
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temporary need for it?  If slavery is wrong because it is dehumanizing, what does it mean for something 
to be dehumanizing?  Why should we condemn dehumanizing behavior?   These questions—the 
normative questions—are conceptually distinct from the causal-historical set.  There is no conceptual 
error in thinking that slavery is almost universally rejected, that its rejection is explained by (for example) 
economic developments, that humans possess genetic aversions to it, and that it nevertheless should 
occur.  If the last judgment—a substantive normative judgment—is mistaken, it is not a mistaken answer 
to an empirical question, but rather is a normative error concerning the reasons we have not to enslave 
people.   
Here is a useful analogy to mathematical truth. Suppose evolutionary biologists were to show that 
the universal belief that 2+2=4 is caused by an accidental, heritable mutation that humans developed on 
the Savannah roughly thirty thousand years ago.  Would that explanation of the origins of that 
mathematical belief impeach your view that 2+2=4?   Of course not, because you have independent 
mathematical, not causal-historical, reasons that justify your belief that 2+2=4 (you understand the rule of 
addition).   Similarly, if I ask someone why he thinks capital punishment is morally permissible, and he 
answers “because I grew up in West Texas”, then he clearly misses the sense of my question.  I am not 
asking for the genesis of his belief, but rather for reasons and arguments that justify his belief. Yes, 
maybe he would have accepted other reasons if he had grown up in Massachusetts instead, but the causal-
historical explanations is not pertinent to my question. 
Perhaps we didn’t have to be self-conscious beings with the ability to recognizing reasons that do 
not merely explain, but rather justify our actions, to form intentions, and act.  But we do have these 
abilities.  We are prudent, we reflect, and we can ask whether what we are doing is really worthwhile.  It 
is part of what makes us persons, and distinguishes us from things that do not act at all, or act purely from 
instinct.  The objectivity of these reasons is crucial to that self-understanding, and this project takes the 





D. The Plurality of Principle 
The unity and the plurality of normative truth are contradictory notions:  neither can be true at the same 
time, and since I assume there are some normative truths, then necessarily either unity or plurality is 
true.18  What I have been calling “pluralism” is, in general, the view that there are in some sense many 
practical principles.  In certain respects, this is obviously true.  So what understanding of “plurality” does 
the Unity Thesis deny?  It is worth clarifying at the outset what the Unity Thesis does not deny.  First, the 
Unity Thesis does not deny that, since what we should do depends on context and circumstance, there are 
many principles that apply in different circumstances.  The principle that one should keep one’s promises 
usually has no direct bearing on my behavior when I have not promised anything to anyone.  A multitude 
of principles that hold in different circumstances may form a unity if, as the Unity Thesis holds, they 
relate to each other systematically rather than antagonistically. 
Second, the Unity Thesis does not deny what we might call “sociological pluralism” about 
normative principles, by which I mean the undeniable fact that there is a likely permanent plurality of 
viewpoints or beliefs among or even within individuals, across cultures, and through time, about what 
principles are correct.  The fact that two or more people may disagree about whether, for example, telling 
a lie would be wrong in a particular situation does not necessarily imply that there is no single right 
answer whether it really is wrong in that situation. 
Third, the Unity Thesis does not deny that there are, in a sense, many ways in which actions can 
be right or wrong, good or bad, or that there are many distinct kinds of normative values.  What is good 
about promise-keeping may not be identical to what is good about generosity because, on the conception 
of value defended here, different types of values collect different kinds of normative instances. The Unity 
Thesis does not claim that there is a single, irreducible property we call “goodness”, in which good acts of 
fidelity or generosity each “participate” or to which they can be reduced. There is no Platonism in the idea 
of unity. However, as I explain in Chapter 1, the Unity Thesis does accept that since principles can be 
described in highly general and abstract terms that subsume more concrete principles, then there is a sense 
                                                          
18 I assume there are moral truths.  See the previous section, “The Meaning of Moral Objectivity” 
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in which certain valuable acts (like fidelity or generosity) might collectively be justified by a single more 
general principle these acts all presuppose.  But this does not imply that there is a “super value” or 
“property” of goodness that inheres in all good acts, or at which all good acts aim. 
The kind of plurality the Unity Thesis rejects holds that in a given circumstance there are many 
things we must do, and that no matter what we do in that circumstance, we do something wrong.  At the 
heart of this kind of pluralism is the notion of an irresolvable conflict among principles.   Pluralism, as 
understood in this project, makes the positive assertion that sometimes there is no principled resolution of 
some conflicts among principles. This is not an epistemological thesis that our limited ways of getting at 
normative truth sometimes preclude certain resolutions of moral dilemmas. That kind of epistemological 
uncertainty is consistent with the idea that principles do not actually conflict, but rather unify.  Instead, 
pluralism is a thesis about the character of principles themselves:  it says that principles are, in their 
“nature”, inconsistent with each other so that in some situations we necessary fail to comply with some in 
order to comply with others.  According to pluralism, there is no way in principle to resolve all conflicts 
when they arise.  As Isaiah Berlin has expressed the point, “one cannot have everything, in principle as 
well as in practice.”19 
Understood this way, pluralism asserts a certain kind of skepticism about right answers to moral 
questions.  But unlike the skepticism discussed in the previous section, which hold that sometimes there 
are no right answers at all, that there are gaps of indeterminacy such a that, for example, it is neither true 
nor false that I should keep my promises, pluralism holds (for example) that it is true both that I should 
and that I should not keep my promise.  Pluralism does not claim that there is no moral truth in a 
particular circumstance, but rather that sometimes there is too much truth, and that this truth is 
inconsistent with itself.20  Its skepticism is not about right answers, but about single right answers.  
As I hope to show, it seems that many moral, political, and legal theorists either reject or are 
committed to rejecting the unity of principle in favor of some version of pluralism.  References to “value 
                                                          
19 Berlin, “The Pursuit of the Ideal”, 17; “that we cannot have everything is a necessary, not a contingent, truth.” See also Berlin, “Two Concepts 
of Liberty”, 215 




pluralism”, “political pluralism”, “legal pluralism”, and moral or legal “indeterminacy” seem to be almost 
reflex in theoretical discussion of politics and law. “Legal pluralism”, which is a term that now enjoys 
considerable popularity among political and social theorists, is used to describe the existence of multiple, 
overlapping, and often inconsistent normative frameworks within and across political communities.21 The 
expression is meant to capture the idea that people act within and are subject to the constraints of different 
normative structures that share some kind of a resemblance with what, in ordinary language, we call 
“law”.  There are state, district, regional, national, transnational, international, customary, indigenous, and 
religious laws of various kinds.22  We are worshippers, atheists, citizens, friends, colleagues, students, 
volunteers, employees, and persons.  These institutions and roles we occupy are reason-giving; they make 
normative claims on us.  They do not always compete—sometimes they can agree and then over-
determine our duties, just as both morality and law over-determine our duty not to murder—but 
sometimes they do compete and, according to legal pluralists, when they do there may not be a principled 
resolution to these conflicts.   
In a recent comprehensive survey of the development of legal pluralism in social theory, Brian 
Tamanaha writes that  
[w]hat makes this pluralism noteworthy is not merely the fact that there are multiple 
uncoordinated, coexisting or overlapping bodes of law, but that there is diversity among them.  
They may make competing claims of authority; they may impose conflicting demands or norms; 
they may have different styles and orientations. This potential conflict can generate uncertainty 
or jeopardy for individuals and groups in society who cannot be sure in advanced which legal 
regime will applied to their situation…this state of conflict, moreover, poses a challenge to the 
legal authorities themselves, for it means that they have rivals.  Law characteristically claims to 
rule whatever it addresses, but the fact of legal pluralism challenges this claim.23 
                                                          
21 A formative piece in sociological approaches to the field is John Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?”.  A useful recent survey is in Brian 
Tamanaha’s “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global”; and Tamanaha’s “The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of 
Legal Pluralism”   





Legal pluralism’s characteristic claim that legal demands, as a matter of “fact”, “compete”, “conflict”, and 
are “rivals”, and that this rivalry creates “jeopardy” that demands one prevail over the other, is an instance 
of the more general pluralist thesis that practical reason and value are essentially conflicted.  Berlin, who 
is probably the most famous, and certainly the most quotable proponent of this thesis in the last half-
century, said that it is in the very nature of certain normative reasons and values that they pull in opposite 
directions so that we can never realize one of them without cheating on the other.  He said that “the 
necessity of choosing between absolute claims is . . . an inescapable characteristic of the human 
condition”.24  Individual liberty, he held, in its nature conflicts with other values like social equality and 
even itself, and that the choice of one must always imperil the other.25  Berlin thought that negative liberty 
just is the freedom from interference by others in doing whatever one might wish to do.   Of course, 
understood in this crude way, his conception of liberty indeed ensures that its fulfillment will make the 
fulfillment of others ideals impossible; it guarantees that total liberty for the wolves is death for the 
lambs.26  Similar alleged conflicts—between, say, the demands of justice and democracy, law and 
morality, community and individuality, the good and the right—seem to pervade political and legal 
theory.   Of course not everyone accepts that each of these alleged conflicts is irresolvable.  Still, many 
do.27  They assume, with Berlin, that some political, moral, and ethical values just are naturally at war 
with one another because values just are, in their nature, some particular way.    
 
E. The Pretensions of Pluralism 
Michael Stocker claims that the plurality of values is “obvious”, “the rule rather than the exception”, 
“commonplace and unproblematic”, and he demands “an explanation of how any theorist could be a 
                                                          
24 Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 214 
25 Ibid, 212-218. 
26 “Both liberty and equality are among the primary goals pursued by human beings throughout many centuries; but total liberty for wolves is 
death to the lambs, total liberty of the powerful, the gifted, is not compatible with the rights to a decent existence of the weak and the less gifted.”   
Berlin, “Pursuit of the Ideal”, 12-13 
27 See, for instance, Sidney Hook’s Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life, especially Chapter 5; Gregory Vlastos’s “Justice and Equality”, 76-
95; and John Gray’s, Two Faces of Liberalism, 34-69 
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monist”.28  I must confess that I do not see anything obvious about pluralism.   In fact, I find arguments 
for both value and legal pluralism unconvincing and the discourse surrounding pluralism in general, and 
value pluralism in particular, unfair and possibly pernicious.  
The rhetoric of pluralism seems to have taken on a life of its own.  Much of pluralism’s appeal, 
particularly as a theory about political values and competing ways of life, derives from its supposed status 
as the alternative to a kind of conceited assurance in one’s normative convictions, or to an 
uncompromising attitude in politics.  Robert Talisse accurately describes this phenomenon when he 
suggests that pluralism has become a label one should want to have for one’s theory because it possesses 
a “built-in halo.”29  I would add that this halo is often used to deflect argument or to belittle others’ 
aspirations to moral knowledge, or to stigmatize the idea of unique right answers as an expression of a 
provincial outlook, not by showing that the outlook is mistaken, but as a way of discrediting the whole 
project of developing general theoretical systems of practical knowledge.  Berlin, in contrasting pluralism 
with theories that suppose that there are single right answers, wrote that the “faith in a single criterion” 
has always “proved a deep source of satisfaction both to the intellect and to the emotions”, and is also 
symptomatic both of “a deep and incurable metaphysical need” and “of an equally deep, and more 
dangerous, moral and political immaturity.”30  He remarked that “[t]hose who know there is only one true 
answer to all questions and have metaphysical a priori guarantees of it are always wrong and often 
dangerous.”31  He also wrote that “monism”, which he assumed is the opposite of pluralism, is a belief in 
a “final solution” and is, more than any other theoretical outlook, “responsible for the slaughter of 
individuals on the altars of the great historical ideas.”32  These are ambitious and scathing claims intended 
to embarrass substantially the entire history of ethical thought.  
Berlin’s worries about monistic ideologies, which fuelled some of the twentieth century’s worst 
violations of individual liberty, were understandable especially at the time he wrote at the end of the 
                                                          
28 Michael Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values, 174, 168, 178, 175, cited in Robert Talisse, Pluralism and Liberal Politics, 92 
29 Talisse, Pluralism and Liberal Politics, 2, 5 
30 See Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 216-217. 
31 Letter to Beata Polanowska-Sygulska, April 22 1987, in Unfinished Dialogue (Amherst: Prometheus Books)  
32 Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, 212 
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Second World War and the start of the Cold War.  But as a thesis about the implications of theoretical 
systems in general, his concerns were overstated and unfair, for Berlin insufficiently acknowledges, 
indeed ignores, the political dangers of pluralism itself.  “The consequence of monism,” Berlin warned, 
“is that those who know should command those who do not.”33   But there is nothing in the idea of 
pluralism that guarantees toleration or open-mindedness, no reason why value conflict should make it less 
likely that any particular value or way of life would be seized upon and conformity enforced through 
oppressive means. Pluralism does not hold that we are often uncertain about how to resolve conflicts, but 
rather that it is certain that sometimes there is no principled way to resolve conflicts. Unless states 
disappear altogether, the coercive imposition of some values and ways of life is inevitable, and pluralism 
seems to have the distinctive moral disadvantage of ruling out the possibility that the choice of such of 
values and ways of life could be made on principle, and in a way that is rationally intelligible to those 
who do not accept it but are nevertheless bound by it.  That possibility alone—of rationally intelligible, 
rather than arbitrary normative decision-making—has enormous social and political value. Unity allows 
and insists on it. Pluralism makes it impossible because it leaves us with nothing substantive to argue 
about, nothing beyond self-interest, whim, dogma, and prejudice to recommend any political program 
over any other. 
Indeed, the idea of irresolvable conflicts, if taken seriously, allows careless and capricious 
normative decision-making.  It would preclude as impossible the type of argument that might attempt to 
interrogate whether we really interpret our value concepts and practices properly when we interpret them 
in a way that produces conflict.  There may be more to say to someone who thinks, for example, that gun-
control violates liberty than simply that liberty must yield to security.  Our concepts enable us to say 
something more powerful, which is that when we understand liberty as a value, as something that really is 
good, then some restrictions on liberty are not really violations of liberty at all.  Similarly, there may also 
be more to say than that we must sacrifice religious allegiances to the demands of liberalism, or that the 
whole truth must be kept out of democratic politics.  Our concepts of authority, liberty, democracy, and 
                                                          
33 See Berlin, “Isaiah Berlin on Value Pluralism” 
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religion enable us to say something more powerful and deeper, which is that when we study, reflect upon, 
and understand these value concepts properly, they may actually cohere, and together comprise parts of 
the whole truth.34 
But since pluralism asserts fixed points in our moral reasoning, it treats our values and political 
institutions like embattled sovereigns bent on tearing their adherents apart, and can encourage a 
perception of politics as commerce (or war) by other means.  If pluralism were correct, then an 
appropriate attitude for us as individuals and communities to take toward serious practical dilemmas and 
disagreements would not be to debate, reason, or seek common presuppositions behind the ideals that 
seem to divide us, but rather to pick sides, to become political cheerleaders who stand arbitrarily and 
rigidly on either (or both) sides of a contradiction, rooting for our favorite moral or political ideal. This is 
fanship, not citizenship.  There is no political partnership in a community where ideals are first strictly 
defined so that they conflict and then relentlessly defended.  In such a community, ideals are viewed as 
either instruments or obstacles to be used or overcome as individuals and factions maneuver to advance 
their particular interests. 
This is the kind of politics that pluralism, taken seriously, may really sponsor.  It is not obviously 
a morally responsible way to understand the values and ways of life that seem to compete in the political 
arena.  It leads, moreover, to indolent moral argument.  I agree with Talisse that pluralism “invites us to 
regard such choices as beyond the scope of argument and rational justification.”35  It supplies an escape-
hatch from all the hard questions.  The pretext that there are no single right answers allows us to isolate 
our convictions from criticism.  Ronald Dworkin has noted how often it is said, in response to the charge 
governments must spend more on social programs that might lead to more just society, that we cannot tax 
too highly because greater social equality necessarily conflicts with liberty.36  That kind of argument is 
available only if we accept a simplistic understanding of liberty as simply the ability to do whatever one 
might want, regardless of one’s moral obligations.  But when that kind of argument is given 
                                                          
34 An important recent contribution to this project is Dworkin’s Religion Without God  
35 Talisse, Pluralism and Liberal Politics, 105 
36 Dworkin, “Value Pluralism”, in JR, Chapter 6. 
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thoughtlessly, as it usually is, it becomes dangerous.  It behaves not as a principle that reflects our 
considered convictions about value, but rather a political basket term to be deployed in denying the 
legitimate moral claims of others.   To adopt Bertrand Russell’s remarks from a different context, that 
kind of pluralist thinking has all the benefits of theft over honest toil.37 
Despite its apparent innocence, pluralism may be a wolf in sheep’s clothing. It is not, after all, a 
clear alternative to moral conceit.  The alternative to moral conceit is recognizing one’s fallibility in 
ascertaining right answers, remaining open to objections, being prepared to alter or abandon our theories 
and convictions if good counterarguments come to our attention and, within reasonable limits, being 
willing to argue and compromise with others who in good faith see things differently.  But all of this is 
compatible with saying, politely, that at the end of the day we believe we are right.  Humility does not 
require pretending there are multiple right answers.  In fact, as Kant and Dworkin suggested, and as I will 
argue, a culture of argument toward single right answers, even where there is little hope of agreement, can 
itself be unifying.38  In particular, I suggest that if we come to a better understanding of what value 
concepts and principles are, and especially of how they function dynamically as platforms for genuine 
argument and interpretation aimed at refining or synthesizing values, then we may be able to improve the 
quality of current political debate.  Perhaps this could happen at first only within academic discussions, 
but ideally, over time, pluralism might lose whatever traction it might have in the broader political 
culture.  That may be unlikely, but then again so is most of what normative political theorists recommend.  
One can still hope. 
There is also a kind of inequality in disputes about the idea of single right answers that places 
pluralists at a rhetorical advantage.  A sufficiently persistent critic, like Berlin, has an easier time than a 
defender of unity does.  The critic can content himself, and impress observers, with the same all-purpose 
argument, saying the same simple thing over and over, demanding demonstration of right answers in 
every hard case (every clash of liberty and equality, for example) that might arise. The defender of unity 
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38 Dworkin, DPH, 6 
22 
 
has the more difficult task of resisting with something much more complicated, namely a thoughtful 
resolution of conflicts.  Pluralists seem to pass unflinchingly from observations that moral judgment is 
often hard to conclusions that they therefore must, by default, be irresolvable.  Consider William Galston:  
It is not at all clear what the value that overarches loyalty to one’s mother and fighting for the 
freedom of one’s country may be. Here again, the burden of proof falls on would-be monists to 
move beyond the abstract possibility of common values, that is, to specify such values and show 
how they do justice to the moral experiences they seek to redescribe.39 
Galston assumes that pluralism best accounts for certain familiar kinds of moral phenomenology40, which 
include prima facie conflicts among reasons, the obvious fact that sometimes we feel paralyzed in making 
moral decisions, or that people disagree about moral or legal requirements.  Unity, he implies, is an 
unnecessary addition to moral theory, the monist’s phlogiston invented, despite clear evidence to the 
contrary, for the sole purpose of preserving some rarefied notion of single right answers.   
But even if we grant Galston’s problematic assumption that moral theory aims to “describe” 
moral “experiences”, might we not need the idea of single right answers just to make sense of the familiar 
phenomenology—the uncertainties, disagreements, and so on—that pluralists  themselves emphasize?  
Couldn’t the central features of our moral phenomenology presuppose unity as a working ideal, 
something we have to accept if we think our moral struggles are not just delusions?  Indeed, a defender of 
unity might reply to the pluralist that moral conflict supplies what Charles Sanders Peirce identified, in 
connection to scientific inquiry, as the “irritation of doubt that causes us to attain a state of belief.”41  
Conflict catalyzes inquiry, and without it there would be no inquiry at all.  “The feeling which gives rise 
to any method of fixing belief,” Peirce said, “is a dissatisfaction at two repugnant propositions.”42  Our 
awareness of inconsistent propositions provides the occasion for, not the conclusion of, inquiry.  In the 
                                                          
39 Galston, “Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory”, 771.  Galston’s reference is to Sartre’s famous example of conflict, which I discuss in 
Chapter 3.  
40 Throughout this project by “phenomenology” I do not specifically mean the approach to some philosophical issues pioneered by Edmund 
Husserl who conceived philosophy as the study of phenomena as revealed to consciousness.  I mean it in the loose sense to indicate a range of 
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moral case, this might mean that the phenomenology of conflict, far from marking the end of the story, 
may actually vindicate the idea of unity. 
But the pluralist can still ask: if there are single right answers, where are they? Where do they 
come from? Why haven’t anti-pluralists offered “proof” for their “existence”?  I try to develop several 
answers to this criticism.   One is that, in my view, some of the most important conflicts—between 
liberty, equality, democracy, and justice, for example—have been mainly resolved, or at least general and 
persuasive strategies for resolving them have been articulated, and the best explanation why this is not 
generally realized seems to be that pluralism and the cold fact construal of value that underwrites it, have 
overwhelmed the current intellectual landscape.43  Second, the critique seems to assume that proof or 
demonstration are appropriate goals for normative thought and argument.  But moral justification 
fundamentally involves argument about matters of principle. There are no moral or legal axioms or 
objects “in the world” that we might intuit or experience and that might ground the truth of moral or legal 
propositions. I argue that practical arguments, unlike empirical arguments, are not sound in virtue of valid 
logic and true premises that can be confirmed by or inferred from observation or evidence.  Rather we can 
think of practical arguments as sound to the extent that they rely upon compelling facts and principles that 
cohere with and are justified by other compelling facts and principles that arise at varying levels of 
abstraction.  Third, conflicts arise in different cases and for different reasons, and part of the process of 
resolving them involves attending to the particularities of our circumstance, distinguishing some features 
as normatively relevant or irrelevant, and drawing upon other values and principles that might arbitrate 
tensions .  It is actively holistic and context-sensitive, and for that reason we cannot solve all problems in 
advance because we have to wait until they arise in order to see what challenges they actually pose. 
What we can expect, however, is to try to demystify the idea of single right answers by 
suggesting some general methods and techniques for solving conflicts when they arise, but more 
importantly by showing that, far from being an abstruse meta-theoretical position, unity is a rather 
ordinary assumption underlying our moral and legal practice. In its least ambitious form, which is false if 
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pluralism is true, the Unity Thesis holds merely that we are not justified in holding that there are no single 
right answers; we are at best entitled to hold that we are uncertain about what these answers are, that we 
cannot expect to find them in the time we have, that we are of course fallible, and that even if we do find 
them we may not be able to demonstrate to other people’s satisfaction that we are right.  But even after all 
of these concessions there is still the inescapable necessity of deciding what to do, and trying to do what 
is right.  Our uncertainty may burden us all the way through these decisions, but we are not justified in 
saying, finally, that there simply is no single right answer.   
 
F. Value Pluralism, Legal Pluralism, and Cold Facts 
A challenge one faces in assessing a position as broad as pluralism is to describe the position in a 
sufficiently abstract way to capture its basic structure and assumptions without diluting it to a position no 
one holds.  This is particularly difficult with pluralism because it comes in a variety of forms and also 
because its most influential proponents do not offer systematic arguments for it.  But it is difficult also 
because some of the positions that seem to assume or entail pluralism, such as positivist theories of law 
and purely procedural conceptions of democratic authority, are not presented or intended by their 
advocates as pluralist theories.  So even identifying the target will take some construction.  
As I suggested earlier, I contend that both value and legal pluralism in general presuppose an 
illegitimate reduction of the normative to the existential, of values and principles to cold facts of some 
kind.  Pluralism supposes that values and principles can just stubbornly happen to demand what they 
demand with no further justification why they do so, just as the number of hairs on your head can just 
happen to be odd or even.  I show that this assumption is both structurally and rhetorically prevalent in 
pluralist conceptions of law, democracy, and morality in general.  I also argue that this assumption must 
underwrite these pluralist conceptions because the only alternative, which is that our responsibilities are 
necessary truths, supports the contrary view that our normative responsibilities cohere.  I will present 
many reasons to reject this assumption.  I have already alluded to some of the philosophical objections.  
But others are phenomenological.  Pluralism is not consistent with the face-value of ordinary ethical, 
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moral, and legal reasoning.  The terrible burden ordinary people and public officials feel in making 
difficult practical decisions would make no sense unless those individuals assume that there are single 
right answers to the difficult questions with which they struggle.  If pluralism—the idea that there is no 
unique answer—were correct, then our struggles would be pointless.   
Pluralism’s reduction of principles to facts seems most obvious when pluralism is offered as a 
social thesis about legal institutions, where it usually rides on the back of another popular contemporary 
doctrine in political and legal philosophy, namely positivism.  Though it comes in many forms, in general 
legal positivism is the thesis that the existence and content of law is ultimately a descriptive or empirical 
matter concerning the beliefs, interests, utterances, preferences, or intentions of particular individuals or 
of members of social groups.  Joseph Raz, who is widely recognized as the most influential Anglophone 
defender of positivism since H.L.A. Hart, calls this central positivist idea the “Sources Thesis”, according 
to which “all law is source-based,” where a law is source-based “if its existence and content can be 
identified by reference to social facts alone, without resort to any evaluative argument.”44 Analytical legal 
positivists, legal realists, Critical Legal Scholars, legal sociologists, and anthropologists often characterize 
legal norms as logical derivations from empirical social sources like an Austinian sovereign command, or 
what Hart called a community’s a rule of recognition.45 In doing so, these theories reduce legal principles 
ultimately to brute, contingent social facts about individuals’ and groups’ moral and political histories.  
The American Legal Realists of the early twentieth century were preoccupied with empirical 
questions, and in particular with identifying the sociological and psychological factors that influence 
judicial decision-making. A central claim uniting the various strands of Realism is that legal “rules” and 
legal reasons generally have little or no effect on a judge’s decision, especially in appellate courts.  In 
deciding cases, judges respond primarily to the stimulus of facts and consideration of what seems fair or 
efficient, rather than to any applicable legal rule.46 In part this is because, according to the Realists, in 
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most appellate decisions the available legal materials are insufficient to produce a logically unique legal 
outcome.47  In those cases, the law is rationally indeterminate because there are too many “conflicting but 
equally legitimate ways of interpreting…” the law.48  The conflicting nature of rules renders them 
explanatorily indeterminate in accounting for the judge’s decision in these cases.49 
The Realists’ interpretation of the judicial decision sponsors their rejection of a rather cartoonish 
conception of legal reasoning they called “legal formalism” or “mechanical jurisprudence”, which, 
according to Realists, involves syllogistic reasoning that applies rules enshrined in legal texts to the facts 
of cases in order to deduce unique legal conclusions.  A characteristic complaint of the Critical Legal 
Studies (C.L.S.) movement of the 1970s and 1980s, which sought to renew and extend the empirical 
program begun by the Realists, is its rejection of formalism in favor of an account of an account of 
conflict and legal indeterminacy.  Formalists, as C.L.S scholars characterize them, insist that judges do 
not rely on value-judgments at all in making legal decisions, but merely interpret the words of the law.  
But since, as C.L.S. scholars announce, formalism is a false jurisprudential theory because legal rules do 
not generate logically unique conclusion, then legal decisions are no more neutral than the decisions of a 
legislature or an executive.  Political choices between conflicting rules are unavoidable.50 
 Both the Realists and C.L.S. scholars assume that formalism understates the power of the judge to 
“make” law.  This argument relies on the Realists’ tacit loyalties legal positivism.  Brian Leiter, a 
contemporary Legal Realist and metaphysical naturalist, writes that all Realists are tacitly committed to a 
version of positivism because legal positivism figures in the most fruitful scientific research programs 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
descriptive of what courts or people actually do, the distrust of the theory that traditional prescriptive rule formulations are the mainfactor in 
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47 Brian Leiter, “American Legal Realism”, 252-256 
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49 Jerome Frank is generally associated with the distinction he drew—first in Law and the Modern Mind—between “rule-sceptics” (who include 
Llewellyn) and “fact-sceptics” (among whom he counted himself), who wanted to uncover the unconscious forces that affect the interpretation of 
the facts of a case. For Frank, most realists missed the prejudices of judges and jurors, which include “plus or minus reactions to women, or 
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50 See Duncan Kennedy’s “The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction”, 1349 
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into the nature of law, namely, the Legal Realists’ program.51 Those research programs assume that while 
legal sources sometimes logically determine unique outcomes to legal disputes, these sources can also 
sometimes leave legal questions indeterminate.  In order for this claim to be true and explanatory, the 
Realist must posit a concept of law that is completely source-based; only in terms of a source-based 
concept would it possible to maintain the Realist thesis that law is sometimes inherently indeterminate.  
Like Realism and C.L.S. scholarship, recent theoretical discussions of so-called “legal pluralism” 
regularly take place within an empirical positivist framework.  Brian Tamanaha, in his recent survey, 
observes that Hart’s descriptive account of law as the union of primary and secondary rules is “perhaps 
the most widely invoked” basic approach to defining law used by social theorists.52  John Griffiths, in a 
formative essay that helped define sociological approaches to legal pluralism, writes that “a central 
objective of a descriptive conception of legal pluralism is…to break the stranglehold of the idea that 
what law is, is a single, unified and exclusive hierarchical normative ordering descending from the power 
of the state…”, and that breaking unity’s stranglehold involves “simple debunking, as a necessary 
prolegomenon to any clear empirical thought about law and its place in social life.”53 Griffiths also writes 
that “the ideology of legal positivism has had such a powerful hold on the imagination of lawyers and 
social scientists that its picture of the legal world has been able successfully to masquerade as fact and has 
formed the foundation of social and legal theory.”54  The positivist “ideology” he refers to, and criticizes, 
is the “centralist” notion that all positive law derives from the state.  But Griffiths and legal pluralists in 
general accept positivism’s more basic assumption that whatever law is, it is empirically known, or is 
source-based.  As Sally Falk Moore writes, the fundamental assumption of legal pluralism is that “not all 
the phenomena related to law and not all that are law-like have their source in government”.55  This 
assumes that law and law-like phenomena are essentially source-based and so positivistic. 
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Similarly, value pluralists appear to assume that values are stubborn facts about the world we 
know through some form of moral experience or intuition.  As I argue in Chapter 1, pluralism is 
committed to regarding values and principles as contingent, pseudo-naturalistic truths about the world that 
we come to know a posteriori through a moral sense of some kind.  Indeed, historically, many moral 
pluralists have held that the only way normative truths could be objective is if they are like objects that in 
some way exist in the world and explain our beliefs about them by acting on us.56  Moral or ethical 
intuitionism is the view that we can have some knowledge about right and wrong that is not acquired 
through inference, but that we can just “see” through some faculty of moral intuition.  G.E. Moore, an 
ethical intuitionist, was also a pluralist who wrote that  
we can have no title to assert that ethical truths are unified in any particular manner, except in 
virtue of an enquiry conducted by the method which I have endeavoured to follow and to 
illustrate. The study of Ethics would, no doubt, be far more simple, and its results far 
more systematic, if, for instance, pain were an evil of exactly the same magnitude as pleasure is 
a good; but we have no reason whatever to assume that the Universe is such that ethical truths 
must display this kind of symmetry...57  
On Moore’s view, we have no a priori guarantee that ethical truths cohere because ethical truths, though 
not the same as natural properties, are nevertheless like them in being features of the universe whose 
nature we discover through intuition.  
W.D. Ross, another ethical pluralist and intuitionist, also held that we come to know ethical truths 
through a faculty of rational moral intuition that forms the basis of ethical knowledge.  This faculty puts 
us in touch with several, irreducibly plural, prima facie duties of fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, 
beneficence, self-improvement, non-maleficence.58 When conflicts arise between them, we decide which 
represent our all-things-considered duty by considering the relative weight of competing duties to decide 
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which is “most incumbent” on us.59  But, says Ross, we cannot assume in advance that there is any 
principled criterion by which we might make such decisions, for “loyalty to the facts is worth more than a 
symmetrical architectonic”.60 
Isaiah Berlin suggested that the content of certain values is fixed by stubborn facts of some kind, 
including linguistic facts.  He said that “there is a world of objective values”61, that a value simply “is 
what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet 
conscience,” and that “nothing is gained by a confusion of terms.”62  Value conflicts, he contends, are 
“the essence of what [values] are and what we are,”63 and that monism is a “false a priori view of what the 
world…is like”64 and is “not reconcilable with the principles accepted by those who respect the facts.”65 
Pluralists often refer to values as kinds of objects, and use physical metaphors like confetti to 
describe conflicts among them, suggesting that they cannot “co-exist”, or “live together”66, and that they 
“collide”67.  Galston writes that value pluralism offers “an account of the actual structure of the normative 
universe,”68 that “pluralism is the most nearly adequate account of the moral universe we happen to 
inhabit”, and that “the difference between (say) saving innocent lives and shedding innocent blood is part 
of the objective structure of the valuational universe.”69  Although pluralists would probably deny that 
there is a single Platonic good that could commensurate all values, their rhetoric comes oddly close to 
suggesting that they share a Platonic moral ontology, that whatever values are, if they are real they must 
really exist as some property or quality “out there” in the some ideal realm of value.  
Robert Talisse distinguishes Berlin’s pluralism from a version of pluralism he finds in William 
James, and which he calls “psychological pluralism”.  James held that the only “habitat” of values is “a 
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mind which feels them”.70  Talisse reports that, for James, “the words ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ and ‘obligation’” 
refer not to “absolute natures” of acts but instead are “objects of feeling and desire” which “have no 
foothold or anchorage in Being, apart from the existence of actually living minds.”71  Since our minds 
contain conflicting feelings or desires, pluralism follows because, in yet another naturalist metaphor, 
“there is hardly a good which we can imagine except as competing for the possession of the same bit of 
space and time with some other imagined good.”72  Though James’s version of pluralism differs from 
Berlin’s conception in holding that there is an irreducible plurality, not of objective values, but of good 
psychological states, James and Berlin nevertheless share the assumption that the explanation of value is 
ultimately factual.  As James writes, “Goodness, badness, and obligation must be realized somewhere in 
order really to exist.”73 
Joseph Raz, a notable contemporary pluralist, holds that there is a close but asymmetric relation 
between our values and our reasons for action. Values are prior to reasons because they explain why 
something is a reason.74  The value of fidelity, for instance, does not tell anyone what to do, but instead 
“is the rock on which…both the promise-keeping principle, and the principle that one ought to have 
Fidelity Characteristics rest, and to which these principles respond.”75 The conflict among and 
incommensurability of our reasons, says Raz, follows from the incommensurability of these value 
“rocks”, whose existence and content “come into being” when social practices that instantiate them 
arise.76 On Raz’s view, there is no reason to think that these contingent practices will create values that 
are consistent with one another because there is no reason why these practices must establish any 
particular values.  It is just a social accident what our value-rocks demand, and how they relate or 
compete.      
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Each of these metaphysically ambitious conceptions of value supports the common assumption 
among pluralists that we can profitably theorize values by studying our intuitions in conflict situations.  In 
particular, they support the idea that we can interpret the absence or presence of normative intuitions as 
evidence of the further fact of some value’s existence or non-existence, just as we might interpret our 
visual observations (or lack thereof) as evidence for the existence or non-existence of a physical fact.  If 
that were true, then a hard moral case in which we felt the opposing tugs of competing principles might 
support the inference that there are conflicting principles “out there” as part of the “objective structure of 
the valuational universe”.77  For the same reason, our inability to intuit or experience an “overarching 
value” would supposedly suggest a lack of evidence for such a value.    
Similarly, if we assume this pseudo-naturalistic model of values, then another phenomenon that 
might be thought to support pluralism is the experience of remorse, or regret, or irreplaceable loss people 
sometimes feel after a moral decision, even when they believe they have acted in the right way.78  The 
sense of loss might seem to support the pluralistic view that some true principle that should have been 
acted upon was not acted upon and could not have been acted upon.  The idea of a “remainder” seems 
plausible, however, only if we come to know values as we come to know facts, namely through 
experience.  Only on that assumption would it follow the “experience” of regret should be interpreted as 
evidence of some further leftover value-fact.  
 
G. The Two-Stage Structure of Value and Legal Pluralism 
This factual construal of law and value matches another feature of pluralist theories, which is their claim 
to normative neutrality.  Pluralists seem to distinguish and answer two questions in two stages as if these 
questions were independent of each other.  First, there is the question of what principles or values are 
“really” like.  Pluralists do not approach this as a normative question about what is truly valuable or what 
we really have reason to do, but rather as a supposedly non-committed, non-substantive, descriptive, 
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“metaethical” problem about the structure of the “moral universe” as she herself just happens in fact to be, 
or possibly as a conceptual question concerning the very ideas or the words we use to think or talk about 
values.  Second, only after pluralism is established at this supposedly detached level, pluralists consider 
first-order substantive question: Given that principles and values are in fact irreducibly plural so that there 
is no hope of reconciling them, what implications does this have for how we should behave?    
Berlin, for instance, argued that the metaethical truth of value pluralism should lead us to reject 
certain first-order normative positions, including monism, and to embrace negative liberty.  He thought 
that whenever a political leadership claims to hold, in a monistic theory, the philosophical key to truth, 
this conviction will be used to justify oppressive means to enforce conformity to that particular monistic 
outlook.79 But according to Berlin, once we recognize that pluralism is correct and monistic ideologies are 
metaethically impossible, then we should be less tempted to pursue the destructive projects monism might 
seem to sponsor.   Berlin also argued that because value pluralism shows that we must choose between 
values, the freedom to choose between values and a liberal order that protects that freedom to choose 
should become very important to us.  In that way, value pluralism, Berlin seemed to think, sponsors 
liberalism. 
Other pluralists maintain that pluralism, still understood as an uncommitted metaethical position, 
supports very different first-order normative commitments.  John Gray, for instance, argues that if 
pluralism is true, then Enlightenment liberalism’s ethical commitment to the value of autonomy, is 
unjustified.80  Like Berlin, Gray’s argument has the two-stage structure I described.  He claims that, given 
the fact of value pluralism, “if liberalism has a future, it is in giving up the search for a rational consensus 
on the best way of life.”81  Gray advocates instead what he calls modus vivendi liberalism, which seeks 
merely “terms of coexistence between different moralities” among people who, owing to the fact of value 
pluralism, accept conflicting and irreconcilable values.82   
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Similarly, Joseph Raz emphasizes that his theory of value is engaged primarily in the 
“explanation of aspects of central concepts like that of a value, and not the enterprise of establishing what 
values there are, or what is of value and what is not.”83 The case for establishing that particular values our 
social practices create are good things is a completely distinct project.84  This supposed ethical neutrality 
also characterizes Raz’s highly influential positivistic approach to law, which joins the analytical tradition 
of Anglophone legal philosophy whose members include John Austin and Hart.   Analytical positivists 
argue that positivism rests on purely descriptive claims about the very concept of law.85  Hart in fact 
begins The Concept of Law, and later reiterates in his posthumous Postscript to that book, that his 
investigation is “an essay in descriptive sociology”, and denied that the explanation of the nature of law 
needed to be evaluative in any sense.86  This follows, Hart thought, from what a proper explanation of the 
concept of law requires, which is that we begin by asking whether there are features of law that are 
essential or necessary to it in the sense that, if a given practice failed to have those features, it could not 
count as law.  Similarly, for Raz, legal theory is an exploration of the nature of law that takes the form of 
“setting the conditions of the knowledge involved in complete mastery of the concept, which is the 
knowledge of all the essential features of the thing it is a concept of, that is to say, the essential features of 
law.”87  Identifying these essential features, he says, does require “evaluative judgment about the relative 
importance of various features of social organizations, and these reflect our moral and intellectual 
interests and concerns,” but these judgments do not morally commend or advocate any particular legal 
positions, but rather select features of law that we might have an interest in understanding, like we might 
have a moral interest in understanding climate change.88 
Accounts of legal pluralism also seem to possess an analogous two-part structure. The question 
“is law pluralistic?” comes first, and only after it is answered does any kind of normative question about 
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law’s desirability, so understood, enter the picture. Legal pluralists purport to study law through purely 
descriptive, empirical, or “conceptual” frameworks that reveal that law is pluralistic.89  This revelation, 
they claim, then raises normative puzzles about the potential conflict and uncertainty pluralistic orders 
can generate concerning which legal regimes will be applied to our situation, or might also create 
valuable opportunities for individuals and groups within society who can opportunistically select from 
among coexisting legal authorities to advance their aims, and so on.90 
 
H. Value and Legal Pluralism Are Not Prescriptively Neutral 
The Unity Thesis denies this two-stage framework.  If pluralism—the thesis that moral, political, and 
legal principles can conflict irreconcilably—makes sense, if it is even intelligible at all, it must be 
understood as a substantive, first-order normative thesis.  The answer to the question “do principles 
conflict?” does not ask for a detached, metaethical investigation into the very nature of our values or 
principles, or an empirical or conceptual investigation into the very nature of law.  It depends instead on 
how we answer the ordinary first-order questions, “what must we do?” or “what do our moral and legal 
principles require of us?”  On this view, we cannot even “see” our principles in order to decide whether 
they conflict without making normative judgments about what we have reason to do.   If pluralism is a 
correct account of morality or law, then that must be the result of, not a supposedly uncommitted prelude 
to, a substantive normative argument.  Pluralists must justify, not merely describe, their contention that it 
is normatively true that two or more permanently inconsistent principles apply to us in some 
circumstances.  
Some theorists who reject pluralism nevertheless seem prepared to grant it a special, 
uncommitted, metaethical status.  Talisse, for instance, holds that “metaphysical pluralism proposes a 
theory of the nature of value and the relations among values. Hence it is a descriptive theory. It is 
therefore difficult to see how any specific prescriptive content could follow from metaphysical 
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pluralism.”91  He adds that “pluralism is a theory about the nature of value, and the relations amongst 
values of different kinds; as such, it has no immediate first-order prescriptive implications,”92 that 
“pluralism as developed by Berlin and James is a thesis about the nature of value; it thus does not entail 
any particular view about what things are valuable,” and that pluralism is “prescriptively barren”.93   From 
these premises, Talisse argues that pluralism cannot justify any political program without flagrantly 
violating Hume’s Law.  Any attempt to explain why the state must respect, for example, negative liberty, 
or secure a modus vivendi, must rely on a value that defeats, and can therefore be ranked above, other 
values that oppose it.94   But that reliance would violate pluralism’s central claim that the key political 
values are incommensurate.  The basic problem, according to Talisse, is that pluralists cannot prescribe 
(say “ought”) without a commitment to a value they take to defeat other values. So value pluralism is self-
defeating.95 
I believe Talisse’s argument is valid and important. But his allowance that pluralism is a detached 
metaethical theory is puzzling and also inconsistent with his own account of what pluralism is.  It is 
instructive to look closely at the way he conceives of pluralism, because his conception expresses one 
way in which pluralists themselves might plausibly attempt to define it. According to Talisse’s “Pluralism 
Test”, “Whatever pluralism is, it had better be something that utilitarians must reject.”96  This implies that 
if pluralism were correct, then utilitarianism would be wrong.  But since, for instance, the utilitarian 
Greatest Happiness Principle and all subsidiary principles that follow from it are first-order moral 
principles, then if pluralism’s truth entails utilitarianism’s falsity, then it is difficult to credit Talisse’s 
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conclusion that pluralism is prescriptively inert.  How could value pluralism be metaethical and 
disengaged, yet still contradict a first-order theory?  
There is a more general issue here identified clearly by Ronald Dworkin who rejects the notion 
that metaethical, or what he sometimes calls “Archimedean” inquiry, could have any implications 
whatsoever for first-order normative theory. The supposed distinction between different “levels” of moral 
inquiry is a common assumption among moral theorists, in particular skeptics, who believe it is possible 
to make certain kinds of claims about morality that do not in any way commit them to any particular 
moral position within morality, yet which if true can somehow have skeptical or realist consequences for 
substantive moral positions.  John Mackie’s attack on moral objectivity, which I described earlier, begins 
with his claim that “what I am discussing is a second-order view, a view about the status of moral values 
and the nature of moral valuing, about where and how they fit into the world.  These first and second-
order views are not merely distinct but completely independent:  one could be a second-order moral 
sceptic without being a first-order one, or again the other way around.”97 
Dworkin has argued in many articles and books that this supposed distinction between levels is 
nonsense.98  Recently, he identifies two conditions that any supposedly metaethical position would have 
to meet if it were to have any skeptical implications at all.  He calls these the “twin conditions of semantic 
independence and skeptical pertinence”.99 The former requires that in order for a putative metaethical 
position, like value pluralism, to remain uncommitted, its claims must have some sense that distinguishes 
and insulates them from first-order competition with ordinary first-order substantive claims; they must 
have some meaning whose truth does not entail the negation or affirmation of any substantive moral 
claims, for if it did it would not be an uncommitted metaethical claim, but rather a committed moral claim 
that has a dog in the fight. The latter condition—skeptical pertinence—requires that in order for a putative 
metaethical position to have any skeptical (or realist) implications, it must contradict some feature of first-
order morality whose denial would have skeptical (or realist) implications for some first-order position. 
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Dworkin summarizes the challenge that faces any attempt to meet both conditions at the same time:  the 
metaethical or “external” skeptic “can remain both external and a skeptic only if he can find…something 
that is not itself a moral claim and yet whose denial has skeptical implications.”100 
We can apply Dworkin’s two conditions to Talisse’s interpretation of value pluralism as an 
uncommitted theory that utilitarianism must deny.  The metaethical value pluralist can remain both 
metaethical and skeptical of utilitarianism only if he can find some essential feature of utilitarianism that 
is not itself a first-order moral claim but whose denial would defeat utilitarianism. Dworkin, I think 
rightly, argues that these conditions cannot be met at the same time, that any skeptical thesis that is 
pertinent cannot really be external and uncommitted. Any feature of utilitarianism whose denial might 
have skeptical first-order consequences must be a first-order substantive claim, though it may be a very 
abstract one.  What else could it be and still hit its target?  The idea that there can be some claim about the 
truth or falsity of a moral position which is not itself a moral position is a mistake.   
Could the value pluralist (or Talisse) say that he is simply describing the “valuational structure of 
the moral universe”, which is essentially pluralistic, and that since utilitarianism is monistic it is false 
because it presupposes a false metaethical position?  No, because utilitarianism presupposes no such 
metaethical position.  Classical utilitarians, for instance, do not defend the Greatest Happiness principle in 
two stages, first by figuring out at an analytically prior, descriptive stage whether monism is true and then 
figuring out the Greatest Happiness principle.  Utilitarianism is thoroughly normative and first-order all 
the way down.  In Bentham’s version, it is the substantive moral thesis that right acts are those which 
contribute to the greatest surplus of pleasure over pain, period.  It does not presuppose any prior 
metaethical commitment to monism.  On the contrary, its monistic character derives from its first-order 
commitment to the idea that right actions serve happiness.  So if, as Talisse assumes, pluralism has 
substantive implications, then it is a substantive normative position, not a non-normative, metaethical 
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position about the structure of the “nature of value”.  Someone who accepts pluralism is committed to a 
first-order normative position that competes on the same level as other substantive claims.   
If Dworkin’s general argument against metaethics is correct, then much of the discourse 
surrounding the idea of pluralism already seems somewhat confused.  The pluralist faces a dilemma.  On 
one hand, even if there were such a level at which to study a moral theory, an anti-pluralist can effectively 
refute it, as Talisse does, by showing that it is prescriptively barren or self-defeating if it is offered as a 
premise in a first-order moral argument for some value as against others.  On the other hand, if, as 
Dworkin’s argument suggests, pluralism does have first-order implications on its own, as Dworkin says it 
must and as Talisse’s own “Pluralism Test” implies, then pluralism must be understood as the first-order 
moral theory.   
If understood as a first-order moral theory, perhaps pluralism might amount to the idea that the 
reasons for and against certain actions are exactly tied in conflict situations, or perhaps that more than one 
principle may be permissible.  But such a first-order pluralism theory seems very implausible. First, it is 
implausible that the arguments in favor of two or more principles might be exactly “tied” no matter how 
much information and reflection we bring to bear in deliberating about them.  Second, it is implausible 
that pluralism could mean permissibility of inconsistent acts, because permissibility is a single right 
answer, namely the answer that one may rightly do any of two or more actions.  Perhaps there is a third 
option.  The pluralist could maintain, as a first-order normative thesis, that we ought to identify our values 
and principles as if they conflict because when they are understood that way they are more valuable to us.  
That is not an incoherent possibility.  But it seems difficult to sustain the exceptionless idea that we are 
better off understanding values as if they conflict, come-what-may.  Moreover, this third option is only 
superficially pluralistic because it assumes that construing values as if they conflict enables a deeper 
cooperation in serving some more fundamental, unifying end. 
There are analogous barriers to understanding legal pluralism as a normatively uncommitted, 
purely descriptive theory of law. Sociologists of law seem to disagree at surprisingly close to a verbal 
level over which definition of “law” best describes and distinguishes that institution from other normative 
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institutions.  On one side of this debate is the legal centralist view that “law is and should be the law of 
the state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, administered by a single set of state 
institutions.”101 On the other side are pluralists who insist that customary and religious laws are also 
properly called law, and that this fact discredits the centralist account.102  But it is not clear whether any 
such definition exists because the sense of law that legal pluralists attempt to describe does not seem to 
possess any essential features that would enable us to demarcate law from other normative orders.   
To illustrate this difficulty, it useful to note another distinction Dworkin makes between two 
senses of the concept of law that figure in legal discourse.103  He calls these the “doctrinal” and the 
“sociological” concepts of law. We use the doctrinal sense when we make claims about what the law of 
some community requires, as when we say it is against the law to exceed 55 miles per hour on the 
highway, or that religious freedom is protected.  We use the sociological concept, by contrast, to name a 
particular type of institutional social structure.  We might speak, using the sociological sense, of ancient 
societies having “law”, or we might use it to study the historical relationship between commerce and the 
development of “law”.104 The sociological concept has outer boundaries: someone who said that a lollipop 
or Go Fish is an example of a legal structure either would not understand the concept or would be using a 
different concept.105  Nevertheless, we share only a rough sense of these boundaries:  it would not be a 
conceptual error to deny Max Weber’s observation that an essential feature of law is that it has 
institutions for coercive enforcement.106  To use Dworkin’s example, there would be no conceptual error 
in supposing that if astrozoologists reported that a group of intelligent non-human aliens governed 
themselves according to a set of public rules that were devised and enforced retroactively still had law in 
the sociological sense.107  Of course it may be useful, for classificatory purposes, to stipulate certain 
boundaries and core features of the sociological concept of law in order to facilitate a research project of 
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some kind, perhaps in order to study correlations among various social patterns, or to explain history.  But 
that is very different from supposing that such a definition would capture some essential features of the 
sociological concept of law as if there were natural distinctions between that concept and other normative 
orderings.  It would therefore be a silly verbal dispute to quibble over the right definition of the 
sociological concept, almost like disputing how best to formulate a descriptive definition of the normative 
institution of “etiquette” that clearly distinguishes it from “courtesy”.  There are rough boundaries 
between these institutions, but no natural distinction as there might be between biological kinds like lions 
and tigers, or natural kinds like water and other clear potable liquids that are not H20.108 
Some legal pluralists seem to recognize these limitations. “The question ‘what is law?’”, 
Tamanaha writes, “has never been resolved, despite innumerable efforts by legal theorists and social 
scientists.”109 If the legal theorists and social scientists Tamanaha has in mind are concerned with the 
sociological concept, then it is easy to see why they have not solved the problem. But it would be more 
accurate to say that the question “what is law” in the sociological sense has never been resolved, because 
there are no such definitions or natural boundaries of that concept to discover or describe. 
But is legal pluralism really a claim about the sociological concept of law?  Or is it better 
understood as a claim about the doctrinal concept? This is an important question whose answer seems far 
from clear.  Legal pluralists purport to describe normative structures from the outside, not as active 
practical reasoners making normative claims within legal practice about what the doctrinal concept of law 
requires, but instead as disengaged, neutral scholars who make only empirical claims, and are 
uncommitted to any particular doctrinal position.  But this supposed detachment is hard to attribute to 
them.  In what sense is their enterprise descriptive?  Pluralists cannot be describing the definition of the 
sociological concept of law because that concept has no natural definition.  Nor do pluralists seem to 
make empirical claims about law, for instance inductive generalizations from all the various occasions on 
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which people have made what we regard as claims about law.  Where is the laboratory data?  Where are 
the interviews, surveys, and so on?  That kind of empirical project seems nearly impossible. 
Moreover, look at the claims of legal pluralism itself.  Are they really descriptive?  Legal 
pluralists do not use their concepts of law merely as classificatory tools.  Legal pluralism is not just a 
taxonomical thesis about the variety of normative orders.  Rather, it derives much of its interest from the 
assumption that the apparent variety of normative orders suggests something of normative importance, 
which is that these orders subject individuals to many and often opposing normative demands.  Legal 
pluralism is essentially a thesis about the multiplicity and inconsistency of institutional requirements, 
about “coexisting, overlapping bodies of law with different geographical reaches; coexisting 
institutionalised systems; and conflicting legal norms within a system”.110  These jurisdictional problems 
are doctrinal problems about the objective normative requirements of social institutions, and so they 
depend on normative judgment about the practical reasons these various institutions supply, not solely on 
descriptive judgments about some impossibly sociological concept. 
So just as the value pluralist’s claims are difficult to classify as genuinely uncommitted, 
metaethical positions, it is also difficult to classify the legal pluralist’s claims as disengaged from 
doctrinal questions. This suggests a serious problem for legal pluralists who claim descriptive neutrality 
for their theories.  Legal pluralism seems to be a thesis about, and to derive much of its interest from, its 
conclusions about the doctrinal concept of law.  Yet if legal pluralists arrive at and study the doctrinal 
concept through a descriptive, socio-empirical method, then this already guarantees pluralism.  It is 
worth repeating Griffiths’ summary of the key aims of legal pluralism:  
A central objective of a descriptive conception of legal pluralism is therefore destructive: to 
break the stranglehold of the idea that what law is, is a single, unified and exclusive 
hierarchical normative ordering descending from the power of the state, and of the illusion that 
the legal world actually looks the way such a conception requires it to look.  In short, part of the 
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purpose of this article is simple debunking, as a necessary prolegomenon to any clear empirical 
thought about law and its place in social life.111 
 
But no normative system that is empirically understood could be unified because descriptive sociology 
grounds its results in the rabble of experience.  Socrates pinpointed the basic problem in exposing the 
fallacy in Euthyphro’s reductive conception of piety.112  If piety is what the gods love (a descriptive 
thesis), and if the gods quarrel over what is loveable, then the same things are both pious and impious, 
and therefore piety is pluralistic.  We can say exactly the same thing about reductive, positivistic 
conceptions of legality. If law or law-like institutions consist of sovereign edicts, and if those edicts 
conflict, then so must law.  If law is the coercive command of a habitually obeyed sovereign who 
habitually obeys no one else, and if the sovereign issues an ambiguous command, then law is 
pluralistic.113  If law is the union of primary and secondary rules that are ultimately accepted by most 
legal practitioners, and if most legal practitioners accept contradictory rules, then law is again 
pluralistic.114  These conceptions guarantee plurality because the sources of normativity they identify—
commands, conventions, wills, and rules—share a specific ontology:  they are all non-normative facts and 
so at best constitute prima facie reasons for action.  
Of course law is pluralistic if understood factually, for the same reason that a single edict can be 
normatively pluralistic when the linguistic conventions that express it are ambiguous.  But just as it does 
not follow that the meaning of a sentence is ambiguous if the literal meaning of its words seem to be, nor 
does it follow that the demands of law are pluralistic if the plain facts about legal practice are prima facie 
inconsistent.  Lawyers and judges, priests and rabbis, literary critics and high school English teachers all 
recognize that apparent inconsistencies among factual sources do not entail inconsistent meaning.  
Judaism is “pluralistic” if only the plain meaning of the Bible’s text (a set of conventional facts) and the 
intentions of the various sources and authors over time (an historical fact) are taken into account.    But of 
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course it does not follow that what Judaism means or requires is pluralistic.  The latter is an interpretive 
judgment, not a factual judgment about its literal content.   
If legal pluralists want to understand the normative demands of law and law-like institutions—if 
pluralism theorizes and answer the doctrinal question “what do all of these varying sources require of us, 
and how do we sort through the morass?”—then it is not clear what their descriptions are meant to 
demonstrate.   If law-like normative orders are not merely sets of facts (about the manifold of statements 
and intentions of different actors and groups), but rather consist in the normative meaning of those facts 
(i.e. principles), then pluralism seems to be at best a very small first step toward determining that 
meaning.   
Griffiths’ eventual worries about the tenability of the very idea of legal pluralism seem to reflect 
these problems. He eventually concedes that there is no useful way of distinguishing law from other 
forms of social control, and that “the word ‘law’ could better be abandoned altogether for purposes of 
theory formation in sociology of law”,  and that the expression “legal pluralism” should be re-conceived 
as merely “normative pluralism” or “pluralism in social control.”115  But even these revisions are 
problematic. First, the reason the word “law” is unsatisfactory for his purpose is, as I suggested, that legal 
pluralists seem to be trying to answer a doctrinal question through an inappropriate method.  But that 
method is what makes his answer to the doctrinal question pluralistic.  Second, the adjustments seem to 
render the idea of pluralism vacuous.  Every social institution is a form of social control.  The institutions 
of promising, and of language itself, are normative institutions.  To say there is “normative pluralism” is 
just to say that there are many, and sometimes conflicting, apparent reasons to act in certain ways or to 
believe certain things.  But what could be more obvious?  Perhaps Griffiths’ point is that we are 
permanently subject to many and conflicting reasons.  But then legal pluralism, as it is understood in 
sociology and political theory, seems to make a banal insight, which is that apparent reasons compete 
with one another.  
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I suggest that, just as value pluralism is most comprehensible as a first-order normative thesis, 
legal or political pluralism is most plausibly defended as first-order doctrinal position about what our 
political institutions require, that is, about what practical reasons they give us.  There are indeed theorists 
who defend it in this way, on normative grounds. The idea that the doctrinal concept of law is ultimately 
source-based, factual, and therefore pluralistic, follows from several influential normative conceptions of 
democracy, in particular deliberative conceptions of democratic legitimacy, including the conceptions 
espoused by Jürgen Habermas and Josh Cohen, and majoritarian conceptions of democratic authority, 
perhaps most forcefully defended in recent years by Jeremy Waldron.  These theorist offer their 
conceptions as normative political philosophies according to which the content of our institutional 
obligations ought to be traced to a social fact of some kind, such as the utterance of a deliberative body, 
the decision of majority, the manner or process through which a decision was reached, and so on.  Since 
these conceptions view our institutional obligations as determined by social facts, it is not surprising that 
these thinkers also identify conflicts in what our institutions require of us, in particular between our 
institutions and the values of justice and fairness we want our institutions to serve.116  But these theories 
defend these conflicts, not on empirical or conceptual or descriptive grounds, but on normative grounds. 
This normative defense of a source-based institutional political structure also seems to underpin 
John Rawls’s political liberalism, which contends that a political conception of justice is a freestanding 
“module” whose content must not depend on any “comprehensive” ethical or moral doctrine, but is rather 
constructed from sociological premises alone concerning what most people in liberal cultures in fact 
overlap in believing or accepting. It seems to me that the factual construal of principles implicitly 
underwrites all conceptions of “the political” which draw a sharp distinction between normative and non-
normative standards, and identify public standards with the latter.  I elaborate these points, in connection 
to both moral and legal pluralism, in greater depth in Chapters 2 and 7.  
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I. Making a “Case”: Analysis and Justification 
In Part I of this project, I present a formal characterization of the Unity Thesis and of its rival, pluralism. 
In Parts II and III, I present a case for the Unity Thesis through two separate methods, which I call the 
methods of analysis (Part II) and of justification (Part III).  What exactly these methods involve and my 
reasons for adopting them deserve some explanation, which I will now provide. 
This project must address several apparent methodological issues. One is that the Unity Thesis, 
which is in part a thesis about what good normative argument is like, is itself a normative thesis. How 
does one argue, without vicious circularity, for such a thesis?   It seems we need to invoke it in order to 
defend it. If I assume that in order for my argument to succeed it must be coherent and unified, then I am 
assuming what I have set out to show.  On the other hand, if I assume that I can settle for an incoherent 
argument that sits on both sides of a contradiction, affirms while denying itself, and concludes with an 
invitation for readers to flip a coin in order to decide whether or not to accept unity or pluralism, then I 
will have assumed in advance that pluralism is right and that the Unity Thesis is wrong.117 So there is a 
risk of begging the question in both directions.   
Is there any way to avoid this circularity?  I do not think there is.  But it also seems as though this 
circularity is not just a problem for this project, but for moral epistemology in general.  If what counts as 
good or bad normative thinking and argument is itself a normative question, then a moral epistemology is 
part of, not separate from, a substantive normative theory.  We cannot hope to find a method to justify any 
principle that is not itself justified by some other principle we take to be true.  As Peirce said in 
connection with methods of empirical inquiry, “the method and the conception [of reality] on which it is 
based remain forever in harmony,” and as Dworkin held in connection with moral inquiry, we should 
pursue an “integrated epistemology”: “we must make assumptions about what is true in order to test 
theories about how to decide what is true.”118   The basic point seems to be that all inquiry is ultimately 
circular because we need to begin somewhere, making at least some provisional assumptions about what a 
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proper normative argument is like. These initial basic beliefs are not infallible, but they do not necessarily 
have to be inferred from other beliefs in order to be justified starting points, or else knowledge could not 
get started. 
This circularity conveniently helps us to disqualify, at least provisionally, some methods of moral 
argument we might be tempted to use. No single method seems appropriate for every domain of thought 
and discourse, because plainly different domains deploy and assume different standards of truth and 
justified belief.119 A pragmatic approach seems unfitting in the moral domain, at least if “pragmatism” is 
understood in a crude instrumentalist way, whereby our moral beliefs are justified when holding them 
serves some contingent human interest of some kind.  For a central feature of some principles is that they 
hold true even when they do not satisfy contingent interest we might have, and our method should at least 
begin by attempting to accommodate this feature of those principles.  Could we instead collect and study 
evidence that might serve as clues to a moral reality to which our moral beliefs might correspond?  This 
also seems like an unfitting picture for moral justification because, as I will argue, there are no moral facts 
“out there” for which we might discover evidence to justify our beliefs in them. Like mathematical and 
logical beliefs, moral beliefs do not seem to be caused by any “external” objects.  What about a kind of 
foundationalism?  Can we derive moral knowledge from some fully abstract, indubitable moral 
proposition?  That seems at least rhetorically ill-advised, since it is probably difficult to establish to most 
readers’ satisfaction that some particular normative truth enjoys a privileged status over others.   
Moreover, it seems that an argument should do more than simply assert that certain truths are basic or 
self-evident.  It should also attempt, so far as possible, to justify them by showing how they fit with other 
convictions we find compelling. A coherentist approach therefore seems closer to the mark, but if it is 
understood as requiring merely logical consistency it is also inappropriate since there are formally 
consistent theories that are substantively wrong—a monistic ethic of maximal indolence, for example. 
I suggest that the method we need should aim at something slightly stronger than coherence. We 
need what we might call compelling coherence. We need a unified theory that brings moral convictions 
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that have a grip on us into a coherent relation.  I will therefore follow what I take to be the central idea 
behind Rawls’s conception of reflective equilibrium as a method for ethics, but I will try to organize the 
pursuit of coherence somewhat differently, and perhaps more traditionally, than Rawls did. 
Reflective equilibrium, according to Rawls, involves an attempt to seek a compelling coherence 
among our ordinary, unreflective moral beliefs and some theoretical structure that might unify and justify 
those unreflective beliefs.120  According to Rawls, we achieve this coherence in two ways.  First, we test a 
proposed theoretical conception against our considered moral judgments (our fairly sturdy convictions 
about what seems right or wrong in particular situations) and adjust its structure if it is inconsistent with 
those judgments.  Second, we are supposed to allow a more or less successful theoretical structure to 
guide us in cases about which we have either no convictions or weak or contradictory convictions. Of 
course, there might not be any coherent conceptual structure that supports all of our convictions.  In that 
case, according to Rawls, we must compromise in the other direction, by relaxing or abandoning certain 
convictions.  Practical deliberation would proceed back and forth, fiddling with each side, until we arrive 
at what Rawls calls a state of reflective equilibrium with which we are mostly satisfied. 
Nelson Goodman, who before Rawls proposed reflective equilibrium as a method of justifying 
our most basic rules of logic, observed the unavoidable circularity in this process.121  He noted that not 
only are principles of deductive inference justified by their conformity with accepted deductive practice, 
but also that we justify our practice of inference by appealing to those rules of deduction.  However, he 
called the circularity “virtuous” rather than vicious because the process works in both directions.122 It is 
not simply the viciously circular argument “p, therefore p”, but rather allows and requires us to check 
judgments at different levels of abstraction and in different directions, moving both “up” from the 
concrete to the more abstract, or “down” from the more abstract to the concrete.123 
In presenting what I will call a “case”, I will organize my argument in this project along these two 
“up” and “down” directions.  As reflective equilibrium assumes, principles appear at different levels of 
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generality, from the highly abstract to the fairly concrete.  The moral principles that Jones should repay 
Smith’s loan, or that the United States government is wrong to imprison terrorists merely on grounds of 
suspicion, are relatively concrete principles. The moral principles that people ought to keep promises, or 
that involuntary servitude is wrong, are somewhat more general.  The Greatest Happiness Principle, or 
Kant’s Categorical Imperative, or the Golden Rule, are highly abstract principles, perhaps fundamental.  
Analogously, we can distinguish institutional political principles at varying levels of abstraction.  A legal 
principle criminalizing robbery is more concrete than is a constitutional principle authorizing a legislature 
to enact criminal statutes, which in turn is more concrete than the highly abstract legal principle 
establishing the constitution’s authority to create legislative institutions, which itself is more concrete 
than the most airy principles of political morality (the ones we read about in introductory political theory 
courses) which attempt to justify the need for a system of political institutions. 
My strategy supposes that the Unity Thesis, which as I said is a normative thesis, falls somewhere 
in between these two poles.  It is itself a principle that, though clearly abstract, falls somewhere between 
great abstraction and concreteness. A “case” defends a mid-level normative proposition like this one from 
two distinct directions.  The first direction, which moves “inside-out” from the concrete to the abstract, I 
will call a method of analysis, adopting that term roughly after Kant’s understanding of an analytical 
method that moves regressively, extrapolating from certain propositions to the presuppositions that 
account for or justify them.124  Analysis relies on some belief or convictions that already seems somewhat 
dependable and ascends “upward” or “outward” to ideas that make sense of those dependable beliefs.125 
This kind of analysis is not “conceptual analysis”, the approach to ordinary language philosophy that was 
inspired by Wittgenstein and was especially prominent in the 1950s; it does not aim to expose through 
clever thought experiments the hidden analytic truths or concealed predicates already contained in subject 
concepts. It instead involves extrapolating justifications of what we do, think, and say in our normative 
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predicates.  Analysis also presumably includes inductive theoretical (and therefore synthetic) generalizations from particular to universals.  CPR 
A6-7/B10-1,  
125 Kant, PG, 4:275 
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practices in order to identify what we must accept in order for what we already accept to make sense. This 
method of analysis would attempt to show that the Unity Thesis best explains, accounts for, fits, or is 
presupposed by moral principles, ideas, and practices that are not more abstract that it is.  The ideas from 
which, in Chapters 3 and 4, I will extrapolate include familiar ideas about the structure of normative 
argument, conceptual barriers to grounding a normative argument on contingent facts, the “open feel” of 
value concepts, the phenomenology of moral dilemmas, and the essential contestability of moral concepts. 
The second direction, which proceeds from the “outside-in”, from abstraction to greater 
concreteness, I will call a method of justification, which is an essentially deductive method of inferring 
normative conclusions (principles) from more general  premises (including other principles).126 The 
method of justification would attempt to show that the Unity Thesis is a normatively attractive notion 
because it is entailed by some very general normative principle we might find compelling.  The most 
general principle from which I will, in Chapter 5,  derive the idea of unity is the Kantian injunction to 
value of humanity always as an end in itself rather than as a mere means. 
I do not assume that either the method of analysis or of justification enjoys primacy.  Any 
distinction between these “levels” seems to me a matter of degree, and no distinction implies their 
independence from or priority over each other.  Each direction might offer different advantages. The 
former—the method of analysis—has the advantage of making sense of familiar ideas in our moral 
thought and argument.  The latter—the method of justification—has the advantage of drawing out the 
implications of more general, and perhaps grander, normative ideals, and also offers the possible bonus of 
showing that what we might discover through analysis was actually an unsurprising or inevitable 
implication of what we believe at the highest levels of our normative belief systems.  My goal will be to 
locate the Unity Thesis in a web of principles at different levels of abstraction.  If the Unity Thesis can 
serve as a nexus or a hub for different kinds of principles at different levels of generality, both as the 
premise of some and the implication of others, then it seems that this equilibrium or integrity between or 
                                                          






among the concrete and the abstract is a compelling reason to accept the Unity Thesis, and that in turn 
might redeem our initial choice of this “case-based” approach through which to study it. 
 
J. The Main Argument 
The case I offer for unity has several parts, and it will help to provide an advance statement of its core 
structure. Analysis seems to show that our ordinary way of justifying moral and political principles 
involves making arguments that draw upon facts about our circumstance and other principles that make 
those facts normatively relevant. I argue that principles are more fundamental in normative justification 
than facts are, and that this entails that principles are rationally intelligible to us ultimately in terms of 
other principles.  This result has profound implications for the structure of moral and legal thinking in 
general.  First, it implies that we are not entitled to assume that principles conflict irresolvably. In part, 
this is because if we can articulate and defend a principle only by drawing upon other principles, then we 
have no warrant for thinking our principles just happen to be some way so that we would never be able to 
resolve apparent conflicts between them through reflection on higher order principles. Is this a necessary 
implication?  Can’t we reflect on higher-order principles without assuming they all ultimately cohere?  
No we cannot.  The intelligibility of principles implies that reflection must assume, at least as a working 
assumption, that principles do not conflict irreconcilably. I develop this point in connection with both 
moral and political principles in Chapters 1, 2, and 3. 
Second, the rational intelligibility of principles suggests their a priority and thus their necessity 
and universality. In deciding what one has reason to do, one adopts a universal standpoint. Even when a 
decision concerns purely self-interested choice, one tries to decide what, given the facts of one’s 
circumstance, which include one’s particular interests and desires, one should do in light of those facts. 
This does not mean just deciding what this person should do, but what anyone in the same factual 
circumstance should do.  If I judge that I have reasons to want or to do something, these cannot be reasons 
just for me, but for anyone in my shoes. The universality of reason implies that the aim of practical reason 
is to arrive at principles that are basically valid for everyone similarly situated.  But if practical reason is 
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general in this sense, then we also must suppose, at least as a working assumption, that there are no 
genuine conflicts among principles, that they relate in a way that is hospitable to the search for unity and 
universality among them. For to negate and affirm the same principle in the same circumstance, which is 
what a conflict among competing principles would mean, is just to deny that one always ought to do what 
reason demands in that circumstance. 
The universality of reason is not the descriptive or psychological thesis that, as a matter of fact, 
everyone will or can be expected to recognize the same principles.  Nor is it the claim that everyone has 
an ability to reason that is equal in degree.  People bring to bear different beliefs and intellectual 
capacities in making normative decisions, and these differences can be excellent grounds for distinctions 
that could justify differential treatment or exceptions to general principles.   So then why are reasons 
characteristically general and unified in this way?  I do not think this is a descriptive or conceptual point 
about the very idea of reason, but is rather a normative point about our own self-conception as persons 
whose decisions and actions matter.  Reason’s universal and systematic character lies in the supreme 
value of our rational capacity itself, or as Kant said, in its dignity.127 
The idea of dignity serves to justify the unity of both moral and political principle. Dignity refers, 
in part, to the unconditional value of our ability to recognize and respond to practical reasons; it is the 
value of our ability to set, revise, and act for purposes.  It is unconditional because it underpins the value 
of any particular, contingent end we might pursue through it. It is not conditioned by those ends, but 
rather they are on conditioned by it. That priority explains why, as Kant expressed in his second 
formulation of the categorical imperative, we must always treat this capacity as an end in itself, not as a 
mere means to some particular end.   
There is a deep justificatory connection between, on one hand, the Kantian prohibition on 
subordinating our ability to act for reasons and, on the other hand, the Unity Thesis. Unity requires that 
we apply principles of action in all cases where they are relevant, which is to say wherever reason 
requires them.  If I were to judge that I have reason to do some action in some circumstance in order to 
                                                          
127 Kant specifically held that it is not this rational capacity per se, but rather autonomous moral self-legislation that bears dignity. Kant, G 4:436. 
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achieve some purpose, then unity requires that anyone in my situation (or relevantly similar situations) 
also has that reason. (There is a useful, though limited, analogy to natural laws: “water boils at 100 degree 
centigrade” applies to all boiling water unless there is a relevant distinction, like perhaps the fact that 
water is mixed with alcohol). But suppose I fail to act on a unified set of principles: I make a false 
promise to you because doing so is convenient, even though I would not permit you to make one to me if 
we switched places. In doing so, I am acting on a principle that I refuse to extend to you.  How can I 
justify making that exception for myself?  If our circumstances are identical in all factual respects, then 
there has to be a non-factual difference that explains why different reasons apply to us. But the most 
plausible difference seems to be that I am assuming that your rational agency (your ability to recognize 
and respond to reasons) matters less than mine does (that it is less valuable), and in such a way that 
justifies subordinating your agency to whatever particular end or purpose that incentivized my false 
promise.  But that is equivalent to treating you as a mere means to a contingent purpose, and that is just to 
say that I have failed to respect your dignity.  On this view, a breakdown in unity just is the form of 
disrespect for dignity (i.e. subordination). Dignity and unity seem to be different ways of making a very 
similar, perhaps identical, ethical point.   
I argue, in Chapters 5 and 6, through an interpretation of Kant’s and Dworkin’s political 
philosophies, that the actions of both individuals and political communities are subject to the constraints 
of human dignity and that these constraints impose a consistency condition on all permissible acts of 
individual willing or public legislation.  Respect for human dignity demands that individuals and states 
strive to govern their acts by an integrated set of principles of political morality.  Unity is, ultimately, a 
constitutive aspect of political legitimacy. 
 
K. Unity in Kant and Dworkin 
My argument for the Unity Thesis draws upon two liberal thinkers who viewed systematicity and 
coherence as central features of moral argument and the structure of normative principles.  One is the 
foremost philosopher of the Enlightenment, Kant.  The other, Dworkin, is one of the most prominent and 
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important contemporary exponents of what John Rawls called a “comprehensive” moral and political 
theory. Both of these thinkers were prolific systems-builders whose practical philosophies ranged widely 
from very concrete, particular aspects of moral and political practice to very abstract philosophical 
regions of normative theory, logic, language, and aesthetics.  Both believed that these domains ultimately 
merge and depend upon fundamental practical questions about how we should think and act, and both 
refused to confine the role of political philosophy only to those areas of thought which are relatively 
uncontroversial.  They were both card-carrying comprehensive theorists. 
A secondary goal of this project is to demonstrate the remarkable congruence of Kant’s and 
Dworkin’s work, not only by drawing attention to similarities in their work, but also by showing how 
both reach something like the Unity Thesis through different types of arguments, Dworkin by focusing on 
quotidian features of our moral and political practices which seem to presupposes unity, and Kant in part 
(this is not his only argument) by deducing the idea of unity from abstract normative principles.  
Moreover, I hope to show ways in which their works complete and reinforce each other.  Only in his 
penultimate work, Justice for Hedgehogs, did Dworkin attempt to expose in some detail the Kantian roots 
of his moral thought.  In Chapters 2 and 5, I supplement Dworkin’s exposition by showing how Kant’s 
formulations of the categorical imperative are well understood as imposing a unity condition on 
permissible principles in exactly the same way that Dworkin’s conception of moral responsibility and 
theory of Law as Integrity require.  Conversely, in Chapter 6, I hope to show why Dworkin’s theory of 
Law as Integrity is a natural extension of Kant’s basic assumptions about what a system of equal external 
freedom, a condition of Right, requires.  In law, as in morals, we must interpret our political principles in 
order to seek consistency among them, not because doing so is the best instrumental way to achieve some 
contingent end, but because our self-respect, respect for others, and the justified use of coercive power are 
all constituted by principled, consistent actions. 
My discussions of these two authors together, I hope, represent a step toward unifying what I 
regard as the most relentlessly comprehensive, thoroughly philosophical, and normatively attractive 
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liberal political philosophies available. Here is a brief sketch of the role unity serves in Kant’s and 
Dworkin’s works.  I develop these readings in greater detail throughout this project.  
 
Unity in Kant 
Contemporary interpreters have attributed to Kant a commitment to a kind of moral and legal positivism 
that he could not have endorsed given the centrality of systematicity, coherence, and unity to his practical 
system.  In moral philosophy, he has been called a constructivist, according to whom moral judgments are 
true in virtue of our own acts of moral legislation, and in political philosophy, he has been called a legal 
positivist for whom conflicts between justice and law are genuine and irreconcilable. As I hope to show, 
there is no question that principled consistency is central to Kant’s practical philosophy.  For Kant, both 
ethical and juridical duties are species of moral duties, and Kant was clear that in his view moral duties 
cannot conflict with one another. In Chapters 1, 3, 5, and 6 I present further evidence for this, but for now 
it will suffice to record a few quotations.128  Kant said that a “a collision of duties and obligations is 
inconceivable”, that all ethical maxims relate systematically and indeed “harmonize with a possible realm  
of ends, as with a realm of nature” where a “realm” is “a systematic union of various rational being 
through common laws” and a “realm of ends” is “a whole of all ends in systematic connection (a whole 
both of rational beings as ends in themselves and of the ends of his own that each may set himself)”.129  
His most famous formulation of the categorical imperative states as a condition of the permissibility of an 
agent’s maxim that universal adherence to it not give rise to practical or conceptual contradictions with 
itself or with the idea of a world in which it is a universal law or with other maxims a rational agent must 
willing.  The Preface to the “Doctrine of Virtue” of the Metaphysics of Morals ask whether our duties 
comprise a system130, then, after defining a metaphysics as “a system of pure rational concepts 
independent of any conditions of intuition”, Kant begins the “Doctrine of Virtue” by saying that “The 
                                                          
128 I am indebted to Paul Guyer’s collection and discussion of the next three quotations and his excellent discussion of systematicity in Kant’s 
moral philosophy, particularly his discussion in “Kant’s System of Duties” in Guyer, Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom, 242-243. 
129 Kant, G 4:436, 4:433 
130 Kant  “A philosophy of any subject (a system of rational cognition from concepts) requires a system of pure rational concepts independent of 
any conditions of intuition, that is, a metaphysics.—The only question is whether every practical philosophy, as a doctrine of duties, and so too 
the doctrine of virtue (ethics), also needs metaphysical first principles, so that it can be set forth as a genuine science (systematically) and not 
merely as an aggregate of precepts sought out one by one (fragmentarily).” DV 6:375. 
55 
 
system of the doctrine of duties in general is now divided into the system of the doctrine of right (ius), 
which deals with duties that can be given by external laws, and the system of the doctrine of virtue 
(Ethica), which treats of duties that cannot be so given.”131  This implies that the duties of right, that is, 
those duties that may be coercively enforced through juridical institutions, comprise a system, that those 
of our duties, ethical duties, which cannot be so enforced also comprise a system, and that those two 
systems of duties in turn comprise a single system. Of course Kant recognized that no person is capable of 
integrating and acting from a fully consistent set of principles, and so held that notion of unity and 
coherence is something toward which we strive, though only approach asymptotically.  Ethical virtue, he 
insisted, “is always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning.  It is always in progress 
because, considered objectively, it is an ideal and unattainable, while yet constant approximation to it is a 
duty.”132 
For Kant, the idea of acting from a universal law is nothing other than the idea of acting from a 
principle that fits into a system of mutually supporting principles. It is precisely their membership in a 
system of principles that lend particular practical laws their necessity and a priority that Kant emphasized, 
and which removes the contingency and passivity he associated with heteronomy. A basic Kantian idea is 
that to think rationally is to think systematically. To think about nature rationally is to think about it 
systematically. To think about our own conduct rationally is to think about it systematically. He meant the 
type of systematicity and consistency that is reflected in very common childhood moral tests, such as the 
question: what if everyone did that?   For Kant, we act on a systematic, unified scheme of principles 
because that is the only way to live up to our self-conception as beings who are capable of recognizing 




                                                          
131 DV 6:379 
132 DV 6:409 
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Unity in Dworkin 
Often the first, and usually the last, of Ronald Dworkin’s ideas that political theorists encounter are his 
theories of rights, of distributive justice, and of the conceptual consistency of judicial review with 
democratic values.  His positions on these issues, combined with images of trump cards, extravagant 
thought-experiments involving clamshells and plovers eggs, and what may seem like procrustean re-
definitions of terms like democracy, liberty, and equality may give the impression that his political 
philosophy is idealistic, or utopian, and not really a political theory that is attuned to practical realities of 
political life, which includes the fact that people disagree about rights, justice, and the meaning of a 
constitution. Less often, however, are Dworkin’s ideas considered in the context of his moral and legal 
political philosophy as a whole. Of course, the same could be said of any systematic thinker whose work 
is sufficiently complex, but it is particularly unfortunate in Dworkin’s case because studying his work 
piecemeal, in particular without attention to his theory of law, obscures his central contributions to 
political theory.   
The centrality of unity, or what Dworkin calls “integrity”, to all of Dworkin’s moral and political 
writings is evident in an early essay on Rawls’s argument for his two principles of justice.133  Dworkin’s 
central thesis in that essay was that the two core elements of Rawls’s moral epistemology—the technique 
of reflective equilibrium and the Original Position device—are not stand-alone methods for ascertaining 
moral principles, but are themselves parts of a moral theory.  Our thought and deliberation are acts, albeit 
mental acts, and can therefore be done well or badly, and so the Original Position and the technique of 
reflective equilibrium are therefore subject to moral assessment. The Original Position, he said, is a 
“halfway point” between a “deep” egalitarian theory and Rawls’s two principles of justice, a way of 
modeling those deeper ideals for the basic structure of society.134   Similarly, reflective equilibrium and 
the coherence among moral judgments that it demands, though more fundamental to Rawls’s theory than 
                                                          
133 See Dworkin’s “The Original Position”, reprinted as “Justice and Rights” in TRS, chapter 6.  
134 In 2003, G.A. Cohen made a similar point, that Rawls’s characterization of his two principles of justice is a misnomer because the “Original 
Position machine” from which they issue is itself justified by the “free and equal” standing of members of society, which it models, and that 
Rawls’s theory of justice may rely on an unarticulated background principle of justice that might read: “One ought not to cause too much 
inequality”. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, 235-244 
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the Original Position, does not describe a fully abstract condition on moral knowledge, but rather itself 
must be understood to serve a moral purpose, which Dworkin postulated is an ideal of integrity that 
morally responsible people exercise in forming judgments.   Common to both of Dworkin’s points is the 
idea that every principle, even principles governing how we should decide what principles are true, must 
assume the truth of other principles.   Moral thought and argument continues indefinitely; there are no 
bare, foundational, non-normative grounds on which to base moral knowledge.   
I develop this point in Chapter 3, where I suggest that Dworkin’s basic point is an instance of a 
moral general epistemological position, which holds that there are important barriers to making certain 
kinds of moral inferences. The basic idea is as old as Plato’s Euthyphro, which puzzled over how we 
could ground an evaluative  truth in the bare fact of divine willing, is expressed in Hume’s law that 
empirical truths alone are not sufficient to derive normative statements, Kant’s “incorporation thesis”, 
which insists that empirical facts are only normative in virtue of being incorporated into a maxim which 
presupposes a tacit background principle, and G.E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy, which rejects reductive 
accounts of the value that equate goodness with natural properties. These examples all condemn attempts 
to introduce fixed points into moral reasoning.  All such attempts fail because they inevitably end up 
explaining the more fundamental in terms of the less fundamental, substituting minor premises for major 
premises.   
A central aim of my project is to criticize this pattern of inversion which seems so common in 
political and legal theory.  It has various manifestations which place different kinds of social facts where 
they do not belong, namely in the position of more basic normative explanations.  Dworkin has pressed 
this point thoroughly into every aspect of his philosophy—his critique of legal positivism, his interpretive 
theory of adjudication, his assertion that political concepts like liberty, equality, democracy, and justice 
must be mutually reinforcing rather than conflicting, and his conception of human rights as an attitude of 
respect, rather than as a mere bundle or catalogue of resources or opportunities.   In these respects, his 
work is unique and, I believe, misunderstood, and it has tremendous destructive implications for popular 
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contemporary approaches to political theory that attempt to ground principles on something other than 
principles. 
 
L. Theory and Practice 
I will end this introduction by trying to address, here and in the following section, two potential 
objections to the project.  Kant once dismissed the first kind of objection as “full of talk and empty of 
deeds”.135 According to this objection, even if the Unity Thesis is correct as a theoretical matter, it is at 
best practically irrelevant and at worst a distraction from real-world problems.   The Unity Thesis seems 
to ring of metaphysical abstraction.  The whole big-picture framework it apparently assumes is surely the 
wrong framework for studying morality and politics. How could such a theory possibly be useful to 
people and governments that face problems whose solutions obviously require close attention to empirical 
facts?  We should instead begin our normative inquiries with discrete phenomena, answer tractable 
questions, and formulate models piecemeal to form local insights into how things work, rather than 
assume that we can develop a unified normative picture.  
This objection assumes that moral unity is not at issue in concrete “real-world” problems. But that 
assumption is not warranted.  Kant also once wrote that “no one can pretend to be practically proficient in 
a science and yet scorn theory without declaring that he is an ignoramus in his field, inasmuch as he 
believes that by groping about in experiments and experiences, without putting together certain principles 
(which really constitute what is called theory) and without having thought out some whole relevant to his 
business (which, if one proceeds methodically in it, is called a system), he can get further than theory 
could take him.”136  He was right, and I think his basic point, that practice is theory-laden and that 
practical proficiency depends upon making systematic theoretical suppositions, suggests a powerful 
response to this “practical” objection.  
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We cannot rule out in advance the possibility that what would “work” given the empirical 
evidence in a particular case might be over- or under-determined by conflicting principles that demand 
reconciliation.  Of course we will not always feel the demands of normative unity because most cases are 
easy and do not usually require self-conscious normative reflection.  But the most important cases are not 
easy at all.  What amount of empirical research, for example, could settle apparent conflicts concerning 
the moral status of a fetus?  What “real-world” experiment could we conduct whose results could 
determine whether a fetus is more like person or more like an infected tonsil?  Or whether genetic altering 
of the human germ line, to prevent disabilities, is humane or rather dehumanizing? What could economic 
theory tell us about whether progressive taxation hinders or rather promotes individual liberty, properly 
understood?  Or whether a genuine democracy demands or merely permits universal healthcare?   What 
light could evolutionary psychology shed on whether subsidies for parochial schools violate some 
people’s liberty of conscience?  Or on whether gay marriage is a basic right or rather a privilege that 
political majorities should be allowed to extend if they choose to do so?   
None of these questions invites a piecemeal empirical approach that “works” because they arise 
precisely when we do not know what would count as working in particular cases.  We do not know what 
would work because we are divided either as individuals or as groups over essentially moral questions 
that call upon competing principles.  It is not helpful to shift focus to what works, because in these cases 
it is no easier to determine usefulness than it is to determine truth.  Could we simply set these hard 
questions aside and focus on other issues where what works seems clearer to us?  That is certainly an 
option, but it is not a default option.  Someone who wished to defend that option would have to contend 
with arguments on the other side that call for us to try to resolve the harder issues. But this is just another 
moral dilemma we would have to figure out how to deal with, and so the initial flight from moral conflict 
ends back in conflict.   
Focused empirical research is of course indispensable to normative judgment and theory because 
what we ought to do depends upon the context in which we act, the possible means to ends we might 
have, and the possible or likely consequences of our actions.  Moreover, it can play a role in helping us to 
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resolve normative conflicts by enabling us to distinguish aspects of our circumstances that might release 
us from competing principles. But without principles, these empirical results are blind: we need values in 
order to know which means to take, what consequences are valuable, and which distinctions are 
normatively relevant and which are not.   
When apparent conflicts among principles arise, then there is often pressure to take up 
incrementally more abstract philosophical issues in order to reach a satisfactory resolution.   The Unity 
Thesis does not hold that we must solve all of political problems by deriving their solutions from grand 
metaphysical theories.  It suggests only that there is interrelation among concrete and general normative 
values, and the unavoidable possibility that competition among these values might require a degree of 
reflection in order to resolve tensions when they arise, and that we cannot stipulate in advance how 
philosophical this reflection might need to extend.   
There is now a lively debate among political theorists about the role of “ideal theory”, of attempts 
to identify principles of political morality in abstraction from particular real-world facts about our 
circumstance, and then re-introduce facts in a way that draws out the implications of those more general 
principles for the here and now. Critics charge, along essentially Burkean lines, that facts about our 
circumstance “refract” abstract principles, like light rays through a dense medium, in a way that renders 
them utterly inapplicable to us.137  Defenders of ideal theory argue for the aspirational value of such 
approaches, that even if such principles do not apply to us now, they serve as ends we might strive for in 
the long run.138 
In my view, the lines in this debate are somewhat crude because a clear separation of “ideal” and 
“non-ideal” is not sustainable.  The idea of unity holds that any fact about our circumstance is at best a 
minor premise in a normative argument.  Whether and how any fact impacts what we ought to do always 
depends on more general, background values or principles that hold independently of those facts, and 
which pick those facts out as normatively relevant.  This function of abstract ideals serves not merely, or 
                                                          
137 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 61 
138 G.A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, Chapter 3; David Estlund, “Utopophobia: Concession and Aspiration in Democratic Theory” in 
Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework; A. John Simmons, “Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 38(1):5-36 
(2010); “Ideal vs. Nonideal Theory: A Conceptual Map,” Philosophy Compass 7 (2012), 654-64. 
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even fundamentally, an aspirational role, but an interpretive role in all normative reasoning.  This means 
that there is a real sense in which we cannot even “see” our “non-ideals” without making assumptions, 
perhaps tacit ones, about more general ideals those ideals serve.  And since this relation holds among 
principles at all levels of abstraction, there is no crisp boundary at all between the concrete and general, or 
the non-ideal and ideal.  We always need some more abstract normative premise, indeed an idealized 
principle that holds independently of our circumstances to even know how our circumstance is normative 
for us.  Even so-called non-ideal theory necessarily depends on idealization of some kind. 
So the Unity Thesis is not impractical.  On the contrary, it captures and attends to some of the 
most central, interesting, and practically important aspects of moral and political discourse and argument.   
Incidentally, it may be that advocates of pluralism are actually the ones who build moral and political 
philosophies around an abstruse meta-theoretical position.   Most people, including ordinary citizens and 
public officials who care about doing the right thing in their personal lives and within their communities, 
do not second-guess the idea that there are right answers because they are too busy trying to find them. 
They can struggle with moral problems, disagree, and argue with each other precisely because, and only 
because, they are not distracted by that rarefied issue.  From that ordinary point of view, one might think 
that it is actually pluralists, not right answer theorists, who are hung up on a useless and distracting 
theory.  
 
M. The Political Value of Comprehensive Theory 
The second objection I mentioned holds that the ideas on which this project relies cannot form the basis of 
a political philosophy because these ideas are simply too controversial.  The whole point of abiding by a 
distinct domain of public political institutions, this objection continues, is to promote stability, mutual 
accommodation, inclusion, and identification with one’s own community by requiring political reason 
and judgment to flow from standards that everyone can endorse and indeed agree to. A normative 
political theory grounded on controversial philosophical notions may do more to alienate than to unite, 
and may also seem to advocate that we conduct our coercive political practices in ways that may violate 
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some people’s liberty of conscience.  The whole truth, as some political theorists insist, must stay of 
democratic politics.139 
I believe this objection expresses a pervasive sentiment among political theorists.  But I have 
some difficulty understanding it because I do not know how to classify the claim that truth should stay out 
of politics as anything other than a substantive normative position that purports to be true.  It is itself an 
instance of the type of argument it claims to undermine.  But there seems not to be room for this kind of 
objection because there is no neutral space from which to formulate it without also undermining it.  The 
objection seems typical of a good deal of political theorizing whose form runs roughly as follows:  
“Because we can’t know, can’t prove, and disagree about moral issues of Type X, therefore we ought to 
pursue course Y” where Y is some decision rule, procedure, authority, convention, or area of agreement 
that can be justified, identified, interpreted, and operate without any reference at all issues of Type X. 
Somehow, inexplicably, this proposal (Y) escapes controversy and uncertainty.140 
Of course the objection’s less ambitious assertion, that in politics we should be willing to bracket 
controversial ideas that tend to divide us, is indeed a sensible proposal in many cases.  But it is not a 
default proposal for all cases in which people disagree.  Just like any other normative proposal, it faces 
the problem of explaining what reason people have to follow it.  It is therefore not normatively neutral: it 
takes a side in some of the most important moral debates a political community might have. It contradicts, 
for instance, the view of someone who says we must permit abortion because that is what respect for 
ethical independence requires, or the view of someone who thinks same-sex marriage should be outlawed 
if that is what a political majority wants. The aim to keep certain positions separate from politics 
competes on the same level as any other truth-claim, and therefore must survive in competition with other 
first-order normative arguments that draw upon substantive and potentially controversial values.   
I agree that among the values our political institutions serve are values such as stability, inclusion, 
order, and (when possible) agreement on otherwise controversial issues.  But it does not follow that 
                                                          
139 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded Edition, 43, 71, 216, 219, 242-243, 442, 447 
140 See Chapter 7 below in which I discuss consider three influential theorists—Waldron, Rawls, and Habermas—whose work takes this form. 
63 
 
factual convergence on some common set of principle is the best way to pursue those values, or that it 
serves them well at all. While a good deal of convergence is certainly desirable, this project argues that it 
is not indispensable to social cohesion.  On the contrary, convergence upon grossly unjust ideas would be 
normatively worthless and could not ground any kind of political obligation.  
Theories like, for example, John Rawls’s Political Liberalism are motivated by important and 
pressing problems arising from diversity and disagreement within complex cultures.  These theories 
respond to such problems by constructing proposals that attempt to transcend or “get behind”141 this 
disagreement, by finding principles that are common, or otherwise grounded in some determinate, 
demonstrable social fact of some kind (plus the logical entailments of those social facts).  One difficulty 
with this approach, however, is that in many of the most important areas of disagreement, there are no 
dispositive principles, at least none that are common or factually determined, which can “get behind” 
these disagreements.  These disagreements present hard cases precisely because the social guidance our 
“common” resources normally provide has run out.  I argue in Chapters 2 and 7 that although theories like 
Rawls’s are often presented as a solution to a problem generated by controversy, in fact they supply no 
theory of controversy at all.  There are limitations to the guidance social facts can provide, yet the need 
for guidance from a public scheme of principle often outstrips those limitations.  Moreover, the issues on 
which social facts are least capable of providing social guidance are precisely the issues on which it 
matters most that we reach a respectful social decision. If, in those cases, we are unable to raise our eyes 
to more abstract ideas, conflicts among our institutional standards become insoluble and we risk that our 
decisions about how power will be exercised will, at best, draw exclusively upon private views about 
justice and, at worst, self-interest, whim, or prejudice.  The Rawlsian solution to the problem of 
controversy, in cases like these, is therefore to ignore it.   
The alternative I defend offers guidance in hard cases: only by ascending, when necessary, into 
abstraction can we find an interpretation of the public record that can guide and constrain political power 
even when we disagree about what the best interpretation is.  Unity, in other words, extends the rule of 
                                                          
141 Josh Cohen, “Reflections on Habermas on Democracy”, 387.  Original emphasis. 
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public standards even when what are institutions require is unclear and controversial. This alternative 
supposes that politics presents us with novel, unexpected, and difficult cases whose characteristic feature 
is that common social resources are sometimes inadequate to guide us, and that often it is in the most 
important disagreements where this happens precisely because the gravity of people’s opposing 
substantive convictions exceeds the centripetal force of the values which justify our institutions—values 
like long term stability, inclusion, and rough agreement.  In these circumstances, the ideal of unity, or 
principled consistency, and the methods of reasoning toward it, offer a way to construct, and therefore to 
keep faith with, social standards without abandoning them entirely.   
Moreover, according to the unity of principle, political principles promote social cohesion not by 
supplying standards all recognize or accept and that limit our ordinary moral thinking to a search for 
standards others accept, but rather by supplying a set of public standard that focus our collective moral 
thinking, shift its subject matter away from strictly privately held beliefs by supplying a public basis for 
reciprocal accountability and justification, one that crystallizes and sharpens our legitimate expectations 
of others and facilitates a public demonstration of our commitment to equal concern for everyone.  This 
alternative picture of public reason does not reduce public justification to a search for reasons others 
endorse.  It rather provides an opportunity and a method by which individual citizens can merge their 
private moral judgments with the standards of their community as a whole, and in a way that protects 
each person’s independence from the private judgments of others, and which affords political actors an 
opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to one another by sharing in a good-faith effort to construct 
a coherent interpretation of their community’s public scheme of political principles. 
This means that some “comprehensive” notions that may not be acceptable to others should be 
allowed to infiltrate our political theory.142  Among the controversial notions considered in this project are 
the ideas of a reason, a principle, a value, a practical inference, rational nature, the value of autonomy, its 
close relation to equality, the concepts of humanity, of dignity, of a metaphysical system, the idea of 
                                                          
142 I try to interpret and assess Rawls’s criterion of reciprocity, which requires that only principles all reasonable members of a political 
community can reasonably accept are appropriate grounds for the exercise of public power, in Chapter 7.   
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interpretation, what it means to own something, the opacity of physics, and the intelligibility of morality 
and law. If unity is a virtue of normative systems, then a political theory cannot rule out in advance 
reliance on at least some controversial philosophical ideas like or related to these ones. 
The account I defend cannot be demonstrated to everyone’s satisfaction that it is the correct 
account.  But nor can anyone demonstrate non-controversially that a convergence theory is the correct 
account, and even if everyone thought it was the best account, that would not make it so.  At the risk of 
tedium: convergence is not a default; it is not self-justifying. And convergence around the wrong ideas 
would be morally worthless.  We must, so far as possible, try to construct a responsible and thorough case 
for our moral and political principles, and this requires allowing ourselves, when necessary, to ascend to 
some degree of philosophical abstraction in order to justify the program we advocate.   
For what it is worth, I for one would feel alienated if I were not permitted to argue for a theory I 
believe to be correct by attempting to master the case for it simply because that case fails a test (that it not 
be too controversial), which is indifferent to its cogency.  Stigmatizing arguments and theories as 
“politically unreasonable” because they try to get things right makes losing in the political arena much 
harder for everyone to accept. So rather than trying to abstain from contested normative and philosophical 
questions, this project is openly comprehensive, not because persuasion and agreement are not important, 
but because disagreement seems unavoidable in any case, and we can achieve coherent and responsible 
theories only by saying controversial things.  As I try to show in Chapter 7, theorists like Rawls and 
Waldron seem to rely in rather obvious ways on idealized background principles in their own theories, 
and this reliance can be explained by a strong tacit commitment on their part to the Unity Thesis.  My 
argument in that chapter is intended to suggest that political philosophers may sometimes encourage a 
mythology about the independence of politics from philosophy and truth that they do not actually accept 
in their own theories. There seems to be a striking disparity between, on one hand, the role our ideals play 
in understanding the institutions we have and, on the other hand, our ideals’ theoretical reputation as 
disruptive sources of disagreement that we should try to sidestep altogether.  Every theory relies at some 
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Part I.  Two Models of Principle 
Part I presents a more formal account of the Unity Thesis and its rival, pluralism, in order to show what 
each assumes and entails. I do not offer an argument either for unity or against pluralism here.  Part II 
begins what I called in the Introduction an analytical case to show that unity best fits several ordinary and 
compelling features of moral, political, and legal argument, conflict, and the social use of moral concepts.  
Part III argues that unity is well justified by very abstract and compelling normative principles.   
 
Ch. 1:  Two Models of Moral Principle 
1.1 Fundamental Questions 
Here are three fundamental and related sets of questions we might ask about principles, as about any 
purported truths.  One is epistemological.  How do we know them?  Are they known a posteriori, at least 
in part through our experience of the way things are?  Or are they known a priori¸ independently of 
experience? The second is metaphysical.  What kind of truths are truths about principles?  Are they 
contingent truths that might have been otherwise or not at all?  Or are they necessary truths that hold in all 
possible worlds?  The third is conceptual.  Are judgments about principles analytic judgments that are 
true or false in virtue of the meaning of the concepts we use to form such judgments?  Or are they 
synthetic judgments that are true or false in virtue of something beyond meaning, such as how the world 
really is or ought to be?   
Kant influentially argued that contingency and necessity are each, respectively, definitive marks 
of a posteriori and a priori knowledge.1  But philosophers since Kant contest the relationship between 
and boundaries separating these classes.  They disagree about whether all a posteriori knowledge is of 
contingent truths, or whether all a priori knowledge is of necessary truths.2  They also disagree about how 
to define analytic and synthetic judgments, and about whether the distinction between analytic and 
                                                          
1 Kant, CPR B4 
2 Saul Kripke, for instance, argues that that there are necessary a posteriori truths, like the proposition that water is H2O.   See Kripke’s Naming 
and Necessity, 116-144, especially 128. Philip Kitcher argues that there are contingent a priori truths, like the proposition that the standard meter 
bar in Paris is one meter long.  See Kitcher’s “A Priority and Necessity”. Their examples are supposed to show that a proposition’s being a priori 




synthetic judgments can be sustained at all.3  I am not competent to enter those debates here.  However, 
even if these distinctions and boundaries are not clear in all cases, they seem to be clear in some,4 and are 
in any case useful because they supply categories that help organize our thinking about certain types of 
propositions, including normative propositions.  Moreover, as we will see, these categories also helpfully 
organize different ways in which one might defend pluralism.  I will generally disregard complications 
concerning precise distinctions and relations between these categories, and will instead assume, as Kant 
did, a fairly neat correlation between, on one hand, a posteriority and contingency and, on the other hand, 
a priority and necessity, as well as a sturdy working distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments.  
I will also assume that a posteriori and a priori knowledge are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive 
forms of knowledge. 
 I will not directly consider the third set of questions—about whether judgments about principles 
are analytic or synthetic—until Chapter 4.  In this and the next chapter, I focus on the first two sets of 
questions concerning our ways of knowing, and the metaphysical status of, principles.  I present and 
contrast two opposing conceptions of principles, which I will call the Factual Model and the Principled 
Model.  According to the Factual Model, principles are contingent truths known a posteriori.  According 
to the Principled Model, principles are necessary truths known a priori.  The Factual Model, I will argue, 
is both necessary and sufficient for pluralism.  This means that if one accepts pluralism, then one is 
committed to the view that principles are contingent truths known a posteriori.   It also means that if one 
assumes that principles are contingent truths known a posteriori, then one is committed to pluralism.  The 
Principled Model, by contrast, is at least sufficient for unity.5 Therefore, since a posteriori and a priori 
knowledge exhaust the possible forms of knowledge, then if we can show that principles are not 
contingent truths known a posteriori, then the Factual Model is false.  That would provide at least a 
negative argument in favor of the Principled Model and the Unity Thesis.  
                                                          
3 See Quine’s attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, reprinted in From a Logical Point of View (Harvard 
University Press, 1953; rev. Edition, 1961).  An influential reply is H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson, “In Defense of a Dogma”, Philosophical 
Review, LXV 1956, 141-158. 
4 As I will argue throughout this project, they seem clear with respect to the difference between facts and principles. 
5 I argue later that it is also necessary.  As I suggest below, it may seem that it is not necessary because it might seem that judgments about 
principles are analytic and therefore can be true solely in virtue of the meaning of concepts used in making moral judgments.  In Chapter 3, I 




1.2 The Factual Model and Pluralism 
A principle, as described in the Introduction, is an objective normative imperative that requires, permits, 
or forbids forms of conduct; principles state what ought to be done.6  A fact is any non-normative, 
contingent truth about what is, was, will, or might be the case. Facts may include a person’s desires, 
inclinations, psychological commitments, interests, physical facts about our environment, or about how 
an action would likely alter the world in which we act.  
I assume that principles apply to agents in particular factual circumstances so that a full 
specification of a principle would relate at least three terms: an agent, a circumstance, and what an agent 
ought to do in that circumstance.  On this view, principles are essentially conditional propositions of the 
form:  if some circumstance obtains, then some action is required of an agent in that circumstance.7  
Given that form, we can say that principles express a type of explanatory relation, though in contrast to 
natural laws which govern causal relations between circumstances and events in nature, normative 
principles govern justificatory relations between the facts of one’s circumstance and the actions one ought 
to take in that circumstance. In other words, just as natural laws in conjunction with certain facts about the 
world explain why certain events happen in certain situations, normative principles in conjunction with 
certain facts about our situations in part account for—or justify—why we ought to do or not do something 
in those situations.   
How might we justify our beliefs in principles, so understood?   One possibility is that principles 
are always only known a posteriori through experience of how things are. 8  I will leave open what might 
count as an “experience” so that it may include not merely sensory experience, but also any experience 
that might engage some intellectual faculty of moral intuition.  By “intuition”, I generally mean a faculty 
                                                          
6 From here on, when I say that a principle “requires” an action, I am using that word as a catch-all for permitted and forbidden actions as well. 
7 This conditional structure of principles does not collapse the important Kantian distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives.  
The difference between these imperatives is not that one applies in a particular circumstance and the other does not, but rather that the ground of 
the former is a contingent end (such as happiness), whereas the ground of the latter is a necessary end (humanity as an end in itself).  See my 
discussion in Chapter 4. The specific requirements of categorical duties are still circumstance-sensitive.  See any of Kant’s many divisions of the 
moral duties, especially in the Introduction to the DV 6:375ff, 6:407, and G 4:421-422 on the division of perfect and imperfect duties to oneself 
and to others. 
8 I include truths about mental events (for example, about what someone believes or wills) in the broad category of facts because we can 
understand them descriptively and without any commitment to truth of their content. 
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that may lead us to assent to a proposition independently of argument or persuasion, as when we just 
“see” it to be true.  As Anthony Kenny points out, we often represent this kind of intellectual capacity in 
terms of bodily operations—“grasping” a concept, something’s “ringing” true, or “smelling” fishy.9  
These metaphorical representations in terms of sensory intuition highlight the close association we tend to 
make between intuitive knowledge and brute facts about the world. 
Now if principles are known intuitively through experience, then we would not infer beliefs about 
principles from any other knowledge, but would rather be struck by them as if they were self-evident, just 
as you might regard the proposition that you are reading this sentence as self-evidently true.  But this 
possibility seems much too limited since we often accept principles as true even when they are not at all 
self-evident: someone who concludes after much reflection that capital punishment is wrong need not 
view it as self-evidently wrong.   
A more promising account might hold that a posteriori normative intuition plays a fundamental 
role in justifying principles, but might add that principles may also be inferentially justified in different 
ways from those intuitions.  Which ways?  We should draw a crucial distinction between two 
fundamentally different types of inference, namely demonstrative inference and non-demonstrative 
inference.10  A demonstrative inference is an inference from premises that necessitate some conclusion.  
The conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true.  Valid deductive inferences are demonstrative: the 
conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true because the conclusion says nothing that is not already 
implied, or subsumed, by the premises.11  For that reason, deductive inferences are “non-ampliative” (they 
do not add to or “amplify” the premises) because it is impossible to deduce conclusions whose content 
exceeds the content of the premises themselves. (It is worth noting now that non-ampliative inference will 
be important later in describing and defending the idea of unity, because it implies that some conclusions 
                                                          
9 See Kenny’s magisterial A New Western History of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 378 
10 The following discussion of demonstrative, non-demonstrative, non-ampliative, and ampliative infereces follows W.C. Salmon’s classic essay 
“The Problem of Induction”, excerpted in Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings (6th Edition), Perry et. al (eds) (New 
York: Oxford, 2013), 216-238, 216-220. 
11 This does not mean that non-demonstrative inferences yield conclusions that are not synthetic.  A synthetic truth can follow demonstratively 
and non-ampliatively from synthetic premises. For example, the synthetic truth that the force of attraction between two objects is inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between their centers, combined with factual premises about the earth’s and my body’s mass’s and the 
distance between the earth’s center and my center of mass, necessarily entails (deductively) that the earth and my body will attract with a force 
inversely proportional to the square of the distinct between the center of earth and my body’s center of mass. 
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are statements of some particular already contained in a “whole”.  The necessity of the conclusion follows 
from the unified relation of premise and conclusion.)  
A non-demonstrative inference, by contrast, is one whose conclusion is not necessitated by its 
premises. The conclusion could be false even if the premises are true. Inductive inference is an inference 
from evidence to hypothesis, where the evidence does not entail or necessitate the truth of the hypothesis. 
The conclusion of an inductive inference can be false even if the premises are true because the conclusion 
says more than is already contained, or subsumed by, the premises. They are thus “ampliative” because 
they go beyond (“amplify”) what is contained in the premises.   
With these distinctions in hand, we can easily imagine how principles might be known a 
posteriori through some combination of intuitive judgments, non-demonstrative, and demonstrative 
inferences.  Just as empirical propositions might be justified through direct observation (e.g. “it is self-
evident that the cat is on the mat.  I just see the cat on the mat”12), inductive generalizations (e.g. “water 
always boils at 100 degrees”), and deductive inferences from theoretical hypotheses (e.g. “the Standard 
Model predicts the existence of the Higgs Boson”), normative propositions might be justified through 
moral intuition (e.g. “It is obvious that lighting this cat on fire in wrong”13), inductive generalizations (e.g. 
“Whenever one makes a promise, one should keep it”), and deductive inferences (e.g. “People should 
keep promises. I’ve made a promise. Therefore I must keep it”).  
This more complex, pseudo-naturalistic, a posteriori account of normative justification has 
important implications for the justificatory relation, which principles express, between the facts about our 
circumstance and the actions required of us in those circumstances (the “if, then” relation described 
above).  In particular, it implies that the relation between our circumstance and what we ought to do in 
that circumstance is entirely contingent.   
                                                          
12 Seeing that the cat is on the mat may not actually non-inferentially justify the belief that the cat is on the mat.  We may need certain concepts 
and assumptions even to make that judgment.  We must assume, for instance, that what our sight tells us is reliable. In short, self-evident 
empirical judgments might be rarer than I am suggesting, if they occur.  See, for instance, Wilfrid Sellars’ attack on the “myth of the given”, that 
on foundational judgments in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. I, H. Feigl & M. 
Scriven (eds.), Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1956: 253–329, Sections 36, 38.  In connection with moral judgments, see 
generally Ronald Dworkin’s J4H, Part I, “Independence” 
13 This example is Gilbert Harman’s.  See his “Ethics and Observation”, in The Nature of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977) 
excerpted in Perry et al. Introduction to Philosophy, 721-722 
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To see why, consider an analogy to natural causes known through experience. As Hume is widely 
regarded as having shown with respect to natural causes, we cannot infer any necessary causal truths from 
experience.  Since experience can tell us only about the actual world, in particular about what has been 
experienced so far and hence what is the case, it can say nothing about what must or must not be the case.  
As Kant similarly recognized, “experience would only enable us to know of such a connection that it 
exists, not that it necessarily exists”.14  According to Hume, the proposition “A causes B” amounts to the 
generalization that events like A are always succeeded by events like B.  But the succession is not 
necessary succession, but rather a “customary conjunction”.15  Our idea of necessity is simply a feeling of 
expectation we develop from habitually experiencing certain successions of events repeatedly.  An 
inductive generalization from past to future could be necessarily justified only if we could prove that 
nature is uniform, that the future always resembles the past, so that past observed uniformities will 
persist.16 But, as Hume famously argued, we cannot non-circularly establish any principle of uniformity 
from experience.  “It is impossible,” he said “that any arguments from experience can prove this 
resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that 
resemblance.”17 The problem, in other words, is that we could only argue for this principle inductively, 
and thus circularly, by inferring, inductively, from the fact that nature has been observed to be uniform in 
the past that it will continue to do so in the future.  In short, it would involve inductively justifying 
induction.   
Of course Hume had in mind in particular sensory experience, but his point stands even if, as I 
allowed earlier, we include not just sensory experience, but also sources like memory and non-sensory 
moral intuition, whatever that might involve.  I will leave these options available in order to make room 
                                                          
14 Kant, CPrR, 5:50-52; CPR, A24/B39, A47/B65.  Of course Kant rejected Hume’s assumption that there are no necessary principles of 
uniformity of nature.  But that is only because he located those principles a priori in the understanding.  See the “Second Analogy”, CPR 
A189/B233-A211-B256.  He had to because he agreed with Hume that such principles could not be induced from sensible intuition. 
15 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Eric Steinberg (Ed.) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 30, 33, 50, 52,61 
16 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 21:  “We always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret 
powers, and expect that effects, similar to those which we have experienced, will follow from them.”  Ibid, 28: “All inferences from experience 
suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities.  If 
there by any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and 
can give rise to no inference or conclusion.” 
17 Ibid, 24 
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for the possibility of the a posteriori mode of normative justification we are now considering.  Let us 
apply Hume’s point to that mode.  If the conclusion that some principle (P) applies to an agent in 
circumstance (C) is known intuitively through experience, or is non-demonstratively inferred from some 
facts about C along with some other facts about the past, then, given those facts, P follows only 
contingently.  This means that it could be that in C or C-like situations, both P applies and not-P applies. 
This is an important implication of the a posteriori mode of moral knowledge acquisition. 
So far, we have been considering forms of intuitions and inference as possible ways of justifying 
beliefs in conditional relations between facts and required actions (i.e. principles). These considerations 
are epistemological notions.   Let us call the metaphysical analog of these forms of justification “models”.  
A model is an account, not of how we might justify beliefs in principles, but rather of what principles 
are.18  According to what I will call the “Factual Model of Principle”, or the Factual Model for short, 
principles are types of brute facts that we might come to know through moral experience, much as 
physical causes are brute facts about the natural world that we come to know, directly or indirectly, 
through sensory experience.  Therefore, according to the Factual Model, principles are contingent pieces 
of reality. 
The Factual Model is both necessary and sufficient for moral pluralism.  On one hand, it is 
necessary because, as I suggest below, the only alternative model, the Principled Model, holds that 
principles are known ultimately not through intuition but through demonstrative inference from other 
principles, and this is not logically consistent with pluralism.   On the other hand, the Factual Model is 
sufficient for pluralism because the contingency of principles the Factual Model assumes expresses 
pluralism’s central claim.   
Let me try to explain this latter claim about the sufficiency of the Factual Model for pluralism.  
As I suggested in the Introduction, pluralism derives much of its plausibility from the idea that principles 
are just stubborn parts of reality, just as natural facts are.  It is a metaphysical view about the character of 
                                                          
18 I have adopted the term “model” from Mark Greenberg’s excellent “How Facts Make Law”, 157–198. What Greenberg calls a model accounts 
for the role of facts about a legal practice in determining the content of law.  I will use his terminology to make a more general point about how 
facts in general determine normative principles.  Similar terminology in legal theory is also in Dworkin’s attacks on positivism in his early essays, 
“The Model of Rules 1” and “The Model of Rules 2”, reprinted as Chapters 1 and 2 in TRS. 
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principles according to which they themselves are inconsistent with each other so that in some situations 
in which more than one principle applies to an agent, that agent must necessary fail to comply with some 
in order to comply with others.   But this is essentially what the Factual Model says.  It maintains that the 
relation between the facts that define one’s circumstance and any action required in that circumstance is 
entirely contingent, so that it could happen to be the case that a particular circumstance, or similar kinds 
of circumstances, require different and inconsistent actions.  That is, it could be the case that in C or C-
like circumstances, a principle P applies and not-P applies, which is just to say that one could be subject 
to inconsistent normative demands.  If, contrary to the Factual Model, the facts of one’s circumstance 
necessitated a particular principle, then since inconsistent necessary truths are logically impossible, then it 
would also be logically impossible for two inconsistent principles to apply to one’s circumstance.  But 
that is just to say that pluralism would be logically impossible.  Pluralists could not seriously countenance 
this latter possibility, so they must accept the Factual Model.19    
Furthermore, it seems that only the Factual Model makes sense of pluralism’s claims about the 
inescapability and necessity of conflict among principles.  Recall that Berlin says “that we cannot have 
everything is a necessary, not a contingent, truth,”20 and that “one cannot have everything, in principle as 
well as in practice,” that conflict is “an intrinsic, irremovable part of human life” and “the essence of what 
they are and what we are.”21  If principles are contingent truths, then necessarily some principles will 
eventually come into conflict because then there would be no reason why any particular circumstance 
would require only one action.  In general, if what principles require of us just happens to be some way, 
then whenever circumstances are arranged so that two or more principles give incompatible instructions, 
then practical reason could not speak univocally.  If it is just some brute fact about the world that 
homicide is wrong, then any compelling excuse we might imagine for sometimes committing homicide 
(for example, that it is justified in self-defense) would always represent, not a reasoned exception to a 
principle against killing, but an avoidable if sadly necessary compromise of that principle.  We could 
                                                          
19 I am assuming pluralists would balk at resting pluralism on a rejection of the law of contradiction. 
20 Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, 215 
21 Ibid, 172 
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never be satisfied in saying that a defense killing is the one right thing to do, but would have to describe 
the act as a regrettable choice between two warring principles.   
 
1.3 The Principled Model, Unity, and Systematicity 
The Unity Thesis rejects the pluralist assumption that principles are like facts that we come to know 
directly or indirectly through intuition, generalizations from intuitions, or deductive inferences from 
generalizations from intuitions. Since principles do not express what is the case, but rather what ought to 
be the case, intuitions of facts and inferences based on those intuitions are inappropriate ways of coming 
to know principles.   Instead, the Unity Thesis holds that principles are ultimately demonstratively 
inferred: from certain true premises, a certain principle must follow.  Among these premises are indeed 
facts about our circumstance.   But, the Unity Thesis holds, the inference from facts to principles does not 
yield a contingently true conclusion, but a necessarily true conclusion. Principles, according to the Unity 
Thesis, are rationally necessary. 
Let us call a principle’s content whatever conduct the principle directs or permits.  The idea that 
principles are rationally necessary concerns the relation between, on one hand, a principle’s content and, 
on the other, the reasons that justify the principle.  A principle is rationally necessary if its content does 
not just happen to be some way, but is rather sensitive to some argument that favors it and renders it 
transparent to reason.  The reasons for a principle (P) are considerations that count in favor of its content.  
On a standard analysis, these reasons include both facts and further principles that justify P through a 
sound practical inference from premises that can be represented in an Aristotelian practical syllogism.22 
On this Aristotelian scheme, the major premise, broadly speaking, is a general principle that 
states some end or action that ought to be realized or done, for instance that one ought to keep promises, 
                                                          
22 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1147a25-31. This standard model is still widely followed.  See Robert Audi’s Practical Reasoning and Ethical 
Decision, 96-97, 540-541.  Below I ignore the exegetical question whether Aristotle himself identified the conclusion of a practical inference with 
an action or with merely a deontic statement that an action should be performed (or perhaps with a statement of intention of performing it).  See 
David Charles’s Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), and Audi Practical Reason and Ethical Decision,16-
18.  Compare to Kant in CPrR, 5:90:   “…the division of the analytic of pure practical reason must resemble that of a syllogism; namely, 
proceeding from the universal in the major premise (the moral principle), through a minor premise containing a subsumption of possible actions 
(as good or evil) under the former, to the conclusion, namely, the subjective determination of the will (an interest in the possible practical good, 
and in the maxim founded on it).”  
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or that government should seek justice, or that sweet foods should be tasted.23 The minor premise is, 
broadly speaking, a means-end “linking” premise that indicates how, as a matter of fact, under certain 
circumstances (C), a certain action (A) relates to some end (E) as necessary or sufficient for realizing it.24  
The inferred conclusion states the principle being justified (P); specifically, it states that the action in the 
minor premise should be performed.  Any fact or principle that figures in the premises is a reason for the 
conclusion, and the conclusion follows through a rational, demonstrative, truth-preserving deductive 
inference from those facts and principles.    
So, for example, the principle that “I should eat this candy” may be justified through an inference 
from the further (major) principle that I should eat sweet things, along with the (minor) fact that eating 
this candy will be eating something sweet. This relation between facts and principles suggests the familiar 
pattern of means-end reasoning: if a (major) principle marks the goal towards which we strive, facts show 
us the way there.25  By “means-end ” I do not mean “instrumental reasoning” whereby our actions and 
means are mere tools for achieving ends whose value is entirely independent.  I intend to allow for cases 
in which our actions and means in part constitute the goodness of the ends they realize.  This picture also 
allows that, under some description of our actions, our ends might include our intentions, which could in 
part constitute or condition the goodness of the end of our actions, as may be the case in certain 
beneficent or supererogatory acts where it is “the thought that counts”.  So the relationship between facts 
and principles is not merely instrumental, though it is structurally means-end.   
This scheme assumes a specific relation between facts which figure in minor premises of a 
practical argument and principles that figure in major premises of practical argument. It implies that facts 
do not by themselves give practical reasons.  Facts are among the reasons we have to perform an action, 
                                                          
23 The last is drawn from Aristotle’s example that if everything sweet must be tasted, and this thing is sweet, then this must be tasted.  
Nicomachean Ethics, 1147a25-31   
24 Kant’s conception of practical rationality holds that these particular facts (Circumstance, Action, and Purpose) exhaust the types of 
considerations that describe an agent’s maxim. On Maxims, see G 4:420.  A “Practical law, insofar as they are at the same time subjective 
grounds of actions, i.e. subjective principles, are called maxims.”  Also, CPR A812/B840; and CPrR 5:19.  See also Chapter 4 below. 
25 As I suggest in the text, this sketch does not suggest that the relationship between facts and principles is merely instrumental.  While, as I said, 
the relationship is structurally means-end insofar as it supposes that facts about the effects of certain actions under particular circumstances are 
reasons only in light of principles which specify that certain effects ought to obtain, nothing in the formulation assumes that the actions and their 
effects themselves are not valuable for their own sake, nor that they are merely instruments for achieving some independently specified good.  It 





but they are never alone sufficient.  We always need a background principle to judge which facts are 
reasons and the way in which they are reasons. In other words, a fact is a practical reason only if some 
(major) principle selects that fact as a normatively relevant feature of our circumstances.  Therefore, to act 
for a reason is also to act for a principle. 
This latter point can be easily overlooked since principles are often, and understandably, 
presupposed in our practical thought and discourse rather than fully articulated or stated explicitly.  If I 
were asked about my reason for taking an umbrella, I would probably say something like “because it 
might rain”.  But I would be assuming that by taking an umbrella I will stay dry and that staying dry is 
something I should do.  These assumptions usually go without saying.  If the fact that the pen is on the 
desk is a reason to write the letter, that is because of some principle that I ought to write the letter 
combined the fact that I can do so by picking up the pen and writing with it.  Since facts are reasons in 
virtue of their role within the premises of a sound practical inference, they assume their role as reasons 
within the context of a practical argument.  This means that if some fact or principle is a reason to 
perform some action, it must be possible to construct an argument to show why that fact or principle is a 
reason.   
So on this scheme, principles and facts together constitute the reasons that justify the principles 
on which we might act, but, importantly, principles have the last word.  The justificatory buck stops, if it 
stops at all, with principles. This does not mean we always have a full articulation of our reasons in mind 
when we act or that we ever could completely articulate them.  It supposes merely that we keep further 
justification in terms of other principles always in the cards.  Justification does not end, finally, with brute 
moral intuition or perception. 
The Unity Thesis accepts this basic picture of justification.  The corresponding metaphysical 
position is what I will call the “Principled Model”, where a model, to repeat, is an account of what 
principles are.  According to the Principled Model, principles, unlike facts, hold necessarily under 
specified factual conditions.  Statements about what I ought to do are necessarily determined by some 
arrangement of facts and other principles.   
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The Principled Model raises an apparent puzzle.  Suppose we deductively infer some principle P1 
from some set of facts F and other principle P2.  This means that, relative to F and P2, P1 is a necessary 
truth.  But it does not follow that P1 is an absolutely necessary truth, since that would require that P2 is 
also necessary, not contingent.  The same would hold for some further principle P3 that determines P2.  
This seems to lead to a regress problem.  In order for this series not to continue infinitely (which may 
seem objectionable since the human mind cannot cognize infinitely many principles), it must either, a), 
begin with some contingent principle understood roughly according to the Factual Model, b), begin with a 
necessary principle that is not itself deductively inferred from some other necessary principle, or c), 
eventually circle back to its beginning and repeat itself. 
We might call a) and b) “foundational” explanations because they hold that some principle is in a 
sense basic, self-justified, incorrigible, or axiomatic, though they differ as to the modality of that principle 
(the former holds that it is contingent, the latter that it is necessary).  The Unity Thesis is not consistent 
with a), which consists of a foundational principle that is merely contingent.  On the other hand, b) 
initially seems inconsistent with the Principled Model because the Principled Model holds that principles 
can be deductively justified by other principles.   
This seems to leave c). I hope to show that the Unity Thesis is consistent with and may indeed 
entail some version of c), which could qualify as a type of “holistic” relation whereby principles comprise 
a “network” of lines of justification that connect, circle, and reinforce one another.  However, I believe 
the Unity Thesis gives a more complex and distinctive answer to the regress problem.  In Chapter 5 and in 
the Appendix, I argue, drawing on Kant, that a holistic understanding of principles (like c)) is itself 
justified by a yet more general principle, which is Kant’s principle of respect for humanity, which is 
necessarily true and has fundamental value. That is, there is no more basic principle than one that requires 
the most coherent and mutually supporting holistic relationship between all of our principle.  Therefore, 
there is a sense in which b) and c) may actually converge. 
The Principled Model is both necessary and sufficient for unity. In Chapter 4, I consider the 
possibility that some judgments about principles are actually semantically entailed by certain facts, so that 
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it might sometimes be true by definition that something ought to be done. I show that many political, 
legal, and moral theorists tacitly subscribe to such a view. If this were correct, it would imply that the 
Principled Model is not necessary for unity.  In Chapter 4, I offer reasons why this characterization poorly 
fits our ordinary understanding of what values and principles are and how we argue and deliberate about 
them.  Moreover, I suggest that if these supposed analytic truths are themselves fixed by contingent facts 
about the convergent use of language, then since those facts would merely add to the facts that comprise 
our situation, they cannot determine their own normative significance: we would still need the Principled 
Model to explain why those facts are normatively relevant.   
In the meantime, I will say something about the Principled Model’s sufficiency for unity.  The 
Principled Model holds that, given a certain factual arrangement of our world, necessarily a single 
principle applies to an agent.  Given the facts, it is not that a principle possibly applies to me, or even that 
it does apply to me.  Rather, it is that some principle must apply to me.  The principle applies in all 
possible worlds, and in all circumstances like mine in all relevant factual respects. Since principles are 
necessary in this way, there cannot be a plurality of inconsistent principles because there cannot be 
contradictory necessary truths.  Therefore, the Principled Model entails unity. 
Furthermore, the idea that a particular factual circumstance necessarily determines a single course 
of action implies that the principles which govern our actions on any particular occasion must also govern 
our actions in situations that are identical or relevantly similar to it. If an act ought to occur in one case, 
but ought not to occur in a similar case, there must be a relevant difference between the cases that justifies 
the different principles.   If, on the contrary, inconsistent principles applied on identical occasions, then 
this would contradict the Principled Model.  
This requirement of what we might call principled consistency is the requirement that the set of 
principles which might be said to govern actions must cohere and indeed comprise a system.  This is 
perhaps easiest to conceptualize if we imagine a world with only two actors.  The Unity Thesis holds that 
a single action is required in identical or relevantly similar situations.  Since two actors cannot 
simultaneously occupy the same space, they are, relative to their own points of view, acting in different 
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situations, and therefore, according to the Unity Thesis, may be subject to different principles.  
Nevertheless, since it is possible to describe both of their circumstances together from the third-personal 
perspective of neither actor, but just as a single circumstance involving two actors, the principles that 
apply to each of them must be consistent and indeed form a unity. Neither actor be subject to a principle 
that undermines the principle to which the other is subject because that is equivalent to saying that the 
circumstance, described as a whole, requires incompatible actions, which is what the Unity Thesis and the 
Principled Model deny. The Unity Thesis, therefore, requires interpersonal consistency of principles.   
But it also requires what we might call intrapersonal consistency of principles, by which I mean 
that principles to which each actor, taken singly, is subject on different occasions must be consistent with 
one another.26  Since our actions take place over time, this temporal dimension introduces the possibility 
that the principles that apply to a single actor at different times might conflict.  An actor could not be 
subject to a principle on one occasion that would undermine his adherence to a principle to which he is 
subject on a later occasion because that is equivalent to endorsing inconsistent principles on each 
occasion.  It would mean that one necessarily must do something now that will frustrate his doing what he 
necessarily must do later, and that is absurd. 
These ideas of inter- and intrapersonal unity entail the idea of a system of principles that holds in 
all contexts.  I will later argue, following Kant, that this system is equivalent to a familiar notion of moral 
equality according to which we must not claim any privilege for ourselves that we deny others in similar 
circumstances, nor impose burdens on others we would not accept ourselves in similar circumstances.   
 
1.4 Kant on Rational Systems 
I hope to forestall a potential misunderstanding of the conception of systematicity I am suggesting.  
Kant’s discussions of rational systems and reason’s function in both practical reason and empirical 
                                                          
26 Paul Guyer stresses the importance of intrapersonal consistency of the use of one’s freedom, and I adopt this term from him.  See Guyer’s 
“Kant’s System of Duties”, in Guyer, Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom (New York: Oxford, 2005), and his “Introduction” in Guyer, Kant 
on Freedom, Law, and Happiness (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000).  The idea of intra-personal consistency seems equivalent to 
Dworkin’s conception of ethical consistency, which I discuss in Chapter 4.  
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cognition are valuable because in them he isolates different varieties of systems, and singles out the kind I 
have in mind.  
The idea of rational systematicity is central to Kant’s theoretical and moral philosophy.  “A 
philosophy of any subject,” he said, is “a system of rational cognition from concepts.” 27   By a “system” 
Kant means  
the unity of the manifold cognitions under one idea. This is the rational concept of the form of a 
whole [through which] the position of the parts with respect to each other is determined a 
priori…The unity of the end, to which all parts are related and in the idea of which they are also 
related to each other, allows the absence of any part to be noticed in our knowledge of the rest.28  
 
On Kant’s view, what distinguishes a rational system from a “mere aggregate” or “heap” of cognitions is 
that a system is law-governed, in the sense that its parts relate to one another and to some common 
purpose, or “idea”, for the sake of which they might be thought to cooperate, and which serves as an 
organizing principle of their unity.  But although we often judge and understand certain systematic or 
functional objects or events, such as human artifacts or intentional human actions, in light of some 
tangible, empirical or material purpose that organizes them (e.g. for a watch, the keeping of time; for an 
action, the getting of cookies), we need not understand all systems in relation to such an end because, as 
Kant says, the concept of a system’s purpose includes more than merely empirical or material purposes.  
A purpose may also be understood simply as an idea that guides inquiry in systematizing certain 
provisional data we are given.   Indeed, sometimes we judge systematicity among parts using only the 
relation among these parts to one another as our guide.   Famous metaphors capture this notion of 
ungrounded coherence.  Otto Neurath compared the task of inquiry to that of sailors “who must rebuild 
their ship on the open sea, never able to dismantle it in dry-dock and to reconstruct it there out of the best 
                                                          
27 Kant, DV 6:375.  For an excellent discussion of Kant’s moral system, see Paul Guyer’s “Kant’s System of Duties”, in Kant’s System of Nature 
and Freedom. 
28 CPR, A832/B860 
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materials.”29  W.V.O. Quine similarly denied us any tabula rasa.  He held that it is only in the light of all 
of our beliefs, adjusted and understood as a systematic whole, that any particular belief should be 
accepted.30 
Kant’s conception of systematicity is thoroughly holistic in this way. 31  His holism follows from 
his conception of the function of reason in empirical and practical thought. Kant holds that all activities 
must have goals if they are not to be pointless, and the activities of our mental powers are no exception.32  
He divides these powers into the “lower”, passive power of sensibility and the “higher”, active power of 
the intellect, which is in turn divided into the powers understanding, judgment, and reason.33  Sensibility 
is the power to have immediate, particular “intuitions” of particular objects.34   Understanding is the 
power to formulate concepts, which are general “representations” of types of objects and include a priori 
concepts or “categories” such as “causation” and “substance”, but also empirical concepts such as “dog” 
or “collision.”35  Empirical Judgment is the power to subsume particular intuitions under concepts, as 
when one judges that this animal is a dog.36    
Reason is our highest cognitive power, and it has different functions.  Its “logical” function is 
simply to draw inferences from judgments that the other faculties construct.37  For example, various 
intuitions, concepts, and judgments contribute to formulating the two propositions that “Socrates is a 
man” and “All men are mortal”.  Reason deduces from these judgments that “Socrates is mortal”. But 
Kant says that reason is also a power to form what he calls “transcendental ideas” of the “unconditioned,” 
                                                          
29 Otto Neurath, Philosophical Papers 1913-1946, R.S. Cohen and M. Neurath, eds., (Dordrecht: Reidel. 1983) 91–99, 92 
30 Quine, W.V.O. Word and Object. (Cambridge: MIT Press., 1960), 3-4 
31 Kant’s fullest discussion of what a rational system involves is in the Critique of Pure Reason, in the section entitled “On the Regulative Use of 
the Ideas of Pure Reason”, CPR, A 642–68/B 670–96.  For fuller discussion of Kant’s conception of a rational system, see Paul Guyer’s Kant’s 
System of Nature and Freedom (New York: Oxford, 2005), in particular the essay entitled “Kant’s System of Duties”. 
32 CPR A68/B93, A108. 
33 CPR A15/B19, A131/B169 
34 CPR A 19-21/B 33-5, A 320/B376-377 
35 CPR A 128, A302/B359.  On the derivation of the pure categories of the understanding, see CPR “Analytic of Concepts”, A67/B92, and the 
table of the pure categories at A80/B106.  On the empirical concepts, see the CPRA137/B176, section “On the schematism of pure concepts of 
the understanding”, and the “Analytic of Principles” in general. 
36 CPR A132-133/B171-172.  In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant develops a much richer and more complicated conception of 
judgment.  Paul Guyer suggests that it is plausible that Kant may have entirely reassigned the search for systematicity in scientific knowledge 
from the faculty of reason to the faculty of judgment, more precisely what Kant calls in CPJ “reflecting judgment” (CPJ, 5:179-183), which is 
our capacity to search for a concept or universal when we are given a particular rather than the simple capacity to apply a given concept to a 
particular.  See Guyer’s “Kant’s Principles of Reflecting Judgment” in Guyer (ed.) Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 3 
37 CPR A131/B169, A547/B575, A302/B359 
83 
 
which are grounds or explanations that do not themselves require an explanation or ground.38 These ideas 
include the notions of God as an uncaused cause, of the unconditioned soul as the basic subject of all 
experiences, and of our freedom as the power of intentional action.39  Kant attempts to link these two 
functions—the logical and the transcendental functions—by arguing that the latter attempts to put an end 
to infinite regresses of inferences drawn by the former.40  
Why does reason do this?  Because, Kant argues, reason’s fundamental object is to provide unity 
among our cognitions and inferences,41 and the transcendental ideas represent goals and directions of 
inquiry through which we seek and organize these cognitions and inferences.  Kant describes how what 
he calls the “regulative use of reason” aims at unifying the concepts of the understanding in a system, 
arbitrating and resolving conflicts between them in order to achieve unity and law-likeness among them.  
Reason’s job is to transform indeterminate concepts and unprincipled distinctions into a unified whole, by 
knitting concepts and judgments together so that they cohere.  Kant says that “If we survey the cognitions 
of our understanding in their entire range, then we find that what reason quite uniquely prescribes and 
seeks to bring about concerning it is the systematic in cognition, i.e., its interconnection based on one 
principle,” and that “a certain systematic unity of all possible empirical concepts must be sought insofar 
as they can be derived from higher and more general ones”, and that while this is a “logical principle, 
without which there could be no use of reason, that such unanimity is to be encountered even in nature is 
something the philosopher presuppose.”42  Reason can achieve this unity only if the concepts or laws that 
are members of a system are understood as if they flow from common ideas, principles or sets of 
principles under which they cooperate.   
Kant stresses that this unity under principles or ideas is sought after; it is not necessarily 
something that is actually ever achieved.  Reason’s questions never cease: we approach unity 
                                                          
38 CPR A307-308/B364-365 
39 CPR A312/B368, A323/B379, A334/B391 
40 CPR A307-308/B364-365 
41 CPR Bvii, A834/B862 
42 CPR A 645/B673, A 652/B680 
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“asymptotically”.43  Reason “becomes aware in this way that its business must always remain incomplete, 
because the questions never cease.”44    He says of the ideas that we realize them “merely by 
approximation, without ever reaching them,” and that they serve “with good success, as heuristic 
principles”.45 
  Kant’s conception of reason thus allows for a kind of epistemological indeterminacy.  Unity is not 
a destination or a stopping point, but rather a working assumption. This is, I think, the right way to 
understand his notion of reason’s regulative use.  Science presupposes the goal of discovering the greatest 
possible completeness and systematicity of the laws of nature, subsuming objects and events under 
complete and coherent set of laws.  Reason’s ideas guide us in striving for knowledge, and help us to 
winnow out errors and arrive at more comprehensive sets of beliefs. But these ideas should not be 
understood as theoretical propositions of which we can have knowledge.46 We cannot know if nature is 
actually law-like, but the regulative assumption of unity forms (what Kant calls) a “maxim” or regulative 
principle of reason.47  By contrast, the claim that such unity does exist in nature would represent a 
“constitutive principle” that we cannot justify because it transcends the bounds of possible experience.48   
So for Kant, inquiry proceeds indefinitely. The idea of systematicity does not depend any brute 
axioms or on a foundational discovery, but is rather a rational ideal of management, of responsiveness to 
reason’s search for unity. We are not permitted to rest on our laurels, to take our current theories and 
arguments to be the end of the story.  As Kant said, we stand under an obligation always to reflect 
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1.5 Morality as a Rational System 
How does Kant’s conception of a rational system apply to practical reason? In this section I will draw an 
analogy between Kant’s system of science and his moral system.  But it is important to note that, as Kant 
recognized, the analogy is limited because there are major differences between these two domains—in 
particular science’s reliance on perception and intuition—that make scientific inquiry an incomplete 
model for morals.  Nevertheless, the rational, systematic structure of scientific reasoning is instructive.  
Kant draws an analogy between empirical and moral systems. In the Preface to Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant divides metaphysics into the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics 
of morals.49   These two departments of metaphysics correspond to two different kinds of objects and 
laws.  On one hand, there are natural objects and the “laws in accordance with which everything happens” 
and, on the other hand, there are willful actions and the laws governing them, namely the laws “in 
accordance with which everything ought to happen”.50 The former are the subject-matter of “physics” or 
natural science, and the latter are the subject-matter of “ethics” or the “doctrine of morals”.51  Kant 
assumes that morality, as a branch of “metaphysics” alongside physics, is lawful, which is to say it 
comprises a system.  But unlike physics, morality does not seek a systematic union of efficient causes that 
ground events, but rather a union of final causes or ends or purposes that determine an agent’s will or 
volition, which is “a faculty either of producing objects corresponding to ideas, or to determine ourselves 
to the effecting of such objects (whether the physical power is sufficient or not); that is, to determine our 
causality.”52 
Kant’s first and most famous formulation of the moral law, which I consider in the next section 
and in Chapter 5, proposes that an act is wrong if the actor could not consistently will that every actor in 
circumstances relevantly similar to her own should do the same as she, under a certain maxim or principle 
of action.  Later, in the Critique of Practical Reason, in the section titled “Of the Typic of Pure Practical 
Judgment”, Kant restates this test through an analogy with the system of nature.  He says that practical 
                                                          
49 G 4:387-4:392 
50 G 4: 388 
51 Ibid 
52 CPrR 5:15 
86 
 
judgment requires one to ask oneself whether, if the action one proposes to take were to take place “by a 
law of the system of nature of which you were yourself a part”, one could regard it “as possible by your 
own will.” 53 He is proposing, in effect, a test of the permissibility of an action according to which a 
maxim must fit into a coherent system of practical principles in the same way that a justified law of nature 
might fit into to a system of natural laws.   
Just as, when we construct a system of nature, we do not settle for inconsistencies in empirical 
laws governing how things happen, according to Kant, when we construct a system of morals we should 
not settle for inconsistencies in how things ought to happen. In empirical reasoning, we withhold assent to 
propositions that contradict our experiences or other propositions we believe. If we do not have a law of 
optics that might account for mirages, then we had better adjust the laws of evaporation to account for our 
perceptions of vanishing pools of water on highways on hot summer days.  If you think you see a friend, 
who you were sure died years ago, at the movies, then either there must be an alternative hypothesis that 
accounts for the sighting, or you must adjust your conception of death to account for the possibility of 
resurrection. In these familiar ways, all pieces of knowledge are potentially relevant to other pieces of 
knowledge. When we confront recalcitrant experiences, doubt ensues, we inquire, and try to arrive at a 
belief that squares with our experience. We do not settle for absurdities, but investigate alternative 
hypotheses that are consistent with both old and fresh observations.54  Similarly, inconsistencies in our 
moral principles must be settled with distinctions, fresh hypotheses, refinements of proposed acts, and so 
on.  Moral reasoning is actively holistic.  But whereas in science, inquiry aims to unify empirical 
concepts, for instance by adjusting our conceptions of refraction, sublimation, gravitation, etc., moral 
reason aims to unify moral concepts 
What is a moral concept?  Here is a suggestion I defend more fully in Chapter 4.  Again, the 
analogy to science is useful. Whereas physical concepts collect relations of substances and events, or 
what happens, moral concepts collect instance of what ought to happen in a systematic relation.  This 
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understanding captures how, just as we might refine our empirical concepts in light of recalcitrant 
observations or experiences, we can also learn about and refine our conceptions of moral concepts in light 
of recalcitrant convictions we might have about what ought to be done in particular situations.  This 
implies that the meaning of our moral concepts is no more fixed by our definitions of them than the 
meanings of “water” or “gravitation” are fixed by our definitions of those phenomena. 
I believe we can find this dynamic understanding of moral concepts in Aristotle’s account of the 
moral virtues.  Each virtue, according to Aristotle, is associated not with a particular action or state of 
affairs but rather with a general and rough sphere of action or dispositions.55   We properly use the virtue-
concepts to identify only one aspect of that sphere which occupies a mean between excess and defect. 
Thus in the spheres of “fear and confidence”, courage is a mean between rashness and cowardice.  In the 
sphere of “getting and spending”, liberality is a mean between prodigality and meanness.  In “honor and 
dishonor”, proper pride is a mean between empty vanity and undue humility.  In that of “anger”, good 
temper is mean between irascibility and unirascibility.  In “self-expression”, truthfulness is a mean 
between boastfulness and mock modesty.56 In each of these cases, the mean consists only in that part of 
the sphere that we really ought to conform to:  it is the genuinely virtuous or good aspect of the sphere.  It 
is not possible, according to Aristotle’s theory, to have too much or too little of one of the virtues; we 
should rather describe excess and defect as vice.  
This feature of moral concepts flows from Aristotle’s fundamental assumption that what makes 
any object the object that it is—what determines its identity—is its function or characteristic activity, its 
ergon.57  We understand purposeful objects, including actions and decisions, by understanding what it 
would mean for the object to perform its function well, and so by understanding the kinds of principles it 
follows.  We therefore need a conception of what counts as the peculiar excellence or virtue in a 
particular sphere of action in order to judge instances of the particular virtue we associate with that 
sphere. On this view, every value concept indeed has a descriptive component, which refers to a sphere of 
                                                          
55 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106a12, 1107a-b 
56 Ibid, 1107a30-1108b10; 1129a 
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action, a collection of acts or dispositions, or features that are roughly alike, and that we use the concept 
to appraise or criticize. These features, we might say, share what Wittgenstein called a family 
resemblance, and that resemblance is what enables us to use these concepts to communicate with each.58  
But that does not mean that these concepts possess a describable fixed core of meaning that just 
stubbornly is one way or another.  The proper application of the concept is inseparable from its goodness, 
and acting according to it requires practical wisdom. 
This understanding of value concepts is consistent with Kant’s idea that practical reason seeks 
unity, and that the pursuit of this unity may refine and deepen our conceptions of these concepts.  
Assume, to the contrary, that “good temper” (a virtue) could simply be reduced, rigidly, to “not getting 
angry” (a descriptive element in the sphere of action associated with that virtue).  Then one day a 
newspaper publishes false statements attacking your reputation.  “Proper pride” demands you do 
something about it, but on the reductive conception we are assuming, this value would then conflict with 
good temper if you get angry.  But on Aristotle’s account, this reductive account misuses the concepts 
because not any kind of anger, but only anger which suggests a kind of vice, namely irascibility, would 
suggest bad temper, just as not getting angry at all might suggest another vice.  We adjust and add to our 
conceptions of these concepts by reflecting on our convictions about virtue and vice, good and bad, and of 
what really ought to be done, until we come to some provisionally satisfactory understanding of what 
genuine good temper means and requires. There is no given material idea or end, such as pleasure, or well 
being, or what god has willed that can guide this search.  We are at sea on Neurath’s boat.  The system 
itself is the end.  It is an a priori end of practical reason.   
This does not mean that unity in either the natural or moral system is merely formal or logical 
consistency.  As Kant emphasizes, logical consistency is compatible both with great scientific error and 
with moral evil: “although a cognition may be in complete accord with logical form, i.e. not contradict 
                                                          
58 See my Introduction’s section “The Unity of Principle is Not Value Monism”, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, S. 66-68. See also 
discussion below in Chapter 3, Section 5 “The Meaning of Value Concepts” 
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itself, yet it can still always contradict the object…”59  This raises a puzzle that I consider more fully in 
Chapter 5.  A natural system has perceptible “objects” to which propositions in that system conform, but 
if the system of morality does not have a material purpose, then to what “object” must it conform?  I 
suggest that morality’s object is simply the greatest systematic harmony among the ends of rational 
agents, which is just the form of respect for human dignity, which is an a priori object of the moral 
system.  We fundamentally misunderstand Kant’s moral system if we think of his system of duties as a 
means for serving some end or purpose that can be specified apart from the system of duties itself and 
which the duties somehow cause or bring about.  Kant’s system of duties does indeed presuppose a 
fundamental principle (the categorical imperative) and a fundamental end (humanity as an end in itself) to 
which all subsidiary principles are in a sense a means.  But the kind of unity in Kant’s system of duties 
and the end of that system is very different from, for example, Bentham’s utilitarian monism, which 
conceived of a system of moral rules as simply a means to bring about some independent end or state of 
affairs, namely the greatest surplus of pleasure over pain.  Instead, just as in science, where reason’s aim 
is the unity of all theoretical concepts, in morality reason’s goal is the systematic unity of our ends and the 
principles that justify them.  A principle serves as an objective law, on this view, in virtue of its 
membership in a system of principles that is consistent between all persons.  Indeed, the point of morality 
is to constrain our purposes by requiring them to be inter- and intra-personally systematic so that no 
principle applies to any person on some occasion or in some circumstance that does not also apply to all 
others in identical or relevantly similar circumstances.  
So, for Kant, morality is what I called in the Introduction kind of “compelling coherence” among 
principles that grip us: “the complete principium of practical unity” is the “harmony of all our purposes in 
a sum”.60  As we will see in Part III, only by acting on a systematic scheme of principles is it possible to 
respect humanity in yourself and in other persons as having intrinsic and objective worth and not as 
having merely instrumental importance in serving some contingent end.  But that is just to say that our 
                                                          
59 CPR A59/B84 
60 On compelling coherence, see the section in the Introduction, “Making a ‘Case’: Analysis and Justification”.  The quote is Kant’s, R 4849, 
18:6, cited in Guyer, Kant on Freedom Law and Happiness, 67   
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respect for humanity requires striving to think and act according to the Unity Thesis, and indeed the 
dignity of humanity is the necessary end for which we seek unity in our principles.  This conception of 
unity is of course an ideal, something we try to approach in the limit.  It does not describe the mental 
content or psychology of any particular person, and I do not assume, and nor did Kant, that full unity 
among our principles is possible to achieve.  
 
1.6 Kant on Practical Contradictions 
In the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant bluntly states that there cannot be a genuine 
conflict of duties: 
A conflict of duties (collisio officiorum s. obligationum) would be a relation between them in 
which one of them would cancel the other (wholly or in part).—But since duty and obligation 
are concepts that express the objective practical necessity of certain actions and two rules 
opposed to each other cannot be necessary at the same time, if it is a duty to act in accordance 
with one rule, to act in accordance with the opposite rule is not a duty but even contrary to duty; 
so a collision of duties and obligations is inconceivable (obligationes non colliduntur).61 
 
Kant’s subsequent argument for this claim, which I discuss in Chapter 3, is controversial.  But the claim 
itself is clear enough.  Kant held that actual duties cannot conflict because statements of duty are 
statements of objective principles, which are systematic, lawful, and necessary truths, and since there 
cannot be contradictory necessary truths, there cannot be contradictory principles. 
Kant famously described different ways in which conflicts might enter the system. He 
distinguished different types of contradictions among agents’ “maxims”, which are the subjective 
principles that ground agents’ actions, but which are not necessarily objective practical laws valid for all 
                                                          
61 DR, 6:224. 
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rational agents, and which may fail to cohere with other maxims in a system.62 For example, in the 
Groundwork, Kant’s second illustration of his first formulation of the categorical imperative envisions 
someone getting out of a bind with a lying promise to repay a loan with no intention of following 
through.63  This person’s proposed maxim states a course of action that is to be taken in a particular 
circumstance in order to achieve a certain end, perhaps something like: “under those circumstances in 
which a false promise will relieve a financial burden, I will make such a promise.”  But when this maxim 
is considered not merely as a subjective principle governing just that person’s behavior but as if it were 
universal law governing every person’s actions, Kant says that it gives rise to a contradiction.  The maxim 
Kant envisions could not in those circumstances (normatively) necessitate the act of making false lying 
promise in the way, by analogy, a law of nature might seem to “necessitate” a physical event in a 
particular circumstance, because a world in which that maxim did necessitate false promises would also 
be a world in which no one in her right mind would accept a promise, and thus the agent’s own intention 
of getting out of trouble by making a false promise would become impossible.  In short, the maxim could 
not be a necessary, universal law for everyone.  
Why would others not accept false promises in such a world?  In order for the maxim truly to 
necessitate the action, it is not sufficient that only the person who makes the promise utter it, but also that 
no other actor behave in such a way as to make the act impossible; it therefore obliges not only the 
deceiver, but all others who could be affected by the deception.  However, if others could not actually 
accept a false promise, then not only could the deception not practically succeed in achieving the 
deceiver’s end in a world in which all others are guided by the principle that false are made in those 
circumstances, but moreover a false promise cannot even be made as a logical matter. 64   The reason for 
both these practical and logical barriers is that others who are guided by the false promise maxim are 
incapable of being deceived by it because they are also expected to act on it.  In the former (practical) 
                                                          
62 On maxims, see G 4:420.  A “Practical law, insofar as they are at the same time subjective grounds of actions, i.e. subjective principles, are 
called maxims.”  Also, CPR A812/B840; and CPrR 5:19 
63 G 4:422-423 
64 I have benefited from instructive discussions of these important Kantian distinctions in Wood, “Kant on False Promises”, in L. W. Beck 
(ed.), Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972, 614-619; Onora Nell’s (O’Neill’s)  Acting On Principle 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1975) 63-82; Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) 78; and Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1993) 137 
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case, when the maxim is given a lawful form it is then no longer practically rational to embrace it because 
it subverts one of the means (trust), which is necessary to achieve the original maxim’s purpose.  In the 
latter (logical) case, the lawful form is not even logically possible because one cannot even intend to 
make a promise without some reasonable expectation that those to whom it is made will believe it, that is 
without viable institution of promising; the very possibility of a deceptive promise depends on the 
deceptive promise’s maxim not being a law for everyone.  
Whereas the false promise examples illustrate contradictions that arise in the idea, or as Kant says 
“conception” of what the agent wills, (i.e. her subjective maxim or the world in which that maxim is a 
universal law), other examples illustrate that there may also be a contradiction, not in what is willed, but 
in willing something itself.  Kant’s final illustration of the first formulation of the categorical imperative 
imagines a maxim of always refusing to help others in need.65  But although Kant says that this maxim of 
non-beneficence can, unlike the false promise maxim, be conceived both practically and logically as 
having the force of law for all actors (it would neither practically nor logically undermine itself), Kant 
also says that it would nevertheless contradict other maxims an agent has and which might apply to her 
on other occasions.66  If there would be other occasions on which the agent would will that others assist 
her, then also to embrace the non-beneficence maxim would be both to will a world in which no one 
helped anyone and that she herself be helped.67 The non-beneficence maxim thus conflicts not with itself 
or with the world in which it governs all agents, but with other principles that Kant plausibly supposes 
any rational being also wills.  This pits the will against itself. 
The three types of contradictions Kant’s examples seem to illustrate—the practical and logical 
contradictions in conception, and the contradiction in willing—reflect not only three different ways in 
which unity among principles can break down, but also illustrate vividly how the Unity Thesis represents 
the idea of a systematic relation between principles, not just between individuals, but also within a single 
person over time.  The Unity Thesis does not merely impeach double-talk about what someone ought to 
                                                          





do in some situation, but also maintains that principles which govern different people at the same time or 
single individuals on different occasions must work together in a supportive, mutually accommodating 
relationship.   
 
1.7 Apparent Conflicts 
The idea of a rational system of principles supposes that there can be some way to resolve any apparent 
inconsistencies between principles.  Since our actual duty in any given circumstance is necessary, if there 
seem to be two principles that apply to a particular situation, then at least one of them is false.  If the only 
way to decide between them is arbitrary, such as through the use of a coin flip, then the force of some 
principles would be merely contingent, not necessary, and this would contradict the Unity Thesis.68 So the 
Unity Thesis requires that there be a principled, unique way to resolve apparent conflicts.  
Here is a more precise statement of what these apparent conflicts, and a resolution of them, might 
involve.  Formally, a practical conflict seems to occur when we appear to have two valid arguments from 
true premises, but which yield incompatible principles as conclusions.  So, for example, the principle that 
I should eat this candy may be justified through an inference from the further principle that I should eat 
sweet things, along with some fact that eating this candy will be eating something sweet.69  On the other 
hand, the principle that I should not eat deadly poison along with the fact that this candy contains arsenic 
may yield the conclusion that I should not eat this candy.  These two conclusions are inconsistent.70  If all 
the premises in both arguments are true, then we are forced to say both that we should and that we should 
not eat this sweet, poisonous candy. 
Conclusions like this seem odd because it is not reasonable to perform an action—like eating 
poisonous candy—merely because the action has an attractive characteristic, like sweetness.  Sometimes 
we can release ourselves from one of the conflicting principles by inspecting the facts of our situation 
                                                          
68 Note that there are some circumstances in which a coin flip could be a reasoned way of deciding a conflict, as when one has all-out reason for 
some decision rather than a correct decision. 
69 I am again adapting Aristotle’s example that if everything sweet must be tasted, and this thing is sweet, then this must be tasted.  See 
Nicomachean Ethics, 1147a25-31.  
70 The example is Donald Davidson’s.  See his “Intending” in Essays on Actions and Events, 95-100 
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more closely to see whether we have made an error that might cancel one principle’s application to our 
situation.  For example, we might get out of the conflict through an empirical study:  how much arsenic 
does the candy contain?  A harmless amount?  If so, then the second argument would not actually apply 
because the poison is not deadly.   
Alternatively, we might say that our principles are merely prima facie considerations and 
therefore subject to tacit exceptions and fuller elaboration. Several philosophers propose that we can 
understand the absurdity as merely apparent if we realize that the principles in major premises of our 
arguments (in the examples, the principles requiring eating sweet things and not eating deadly poisons) 
require actions only insofar as these actions have certain desirable traits, so that considerations like 
sweetness and avoiding poison are more like desiderata that suggest certain actions or forbearances to us 
rather than things we must actually pursue, sans phrase.71 Reformulating our major principles to capture 
this qualification would remove the contradiction because it would tie each of our incompatible 
conclusions to the specific trait that counts in favor of them, rather than to all of the pertinent features of 
our circumstance in which we decide to act.  On this view, the judgment that an action actually should be 
performed is a further, all-things-considered judgement that this or some other trait was enough to act on 
(i.e. that other considerations did not defeat it). The concluding principle that corresponds to that 
judgment is not, then, a qualified principle tied to some isolated desideratum, but is rather an “all-out” 
principle about what we must do.72  
Here is another way of stating the same point. The notion of a reason is distinct from Reason’s 
ultimate verdict as to what is to be done in a certain situation.  Reason’s verdict, according to the Unity 
Thesis, is univocal, and the result of adjudicating between competing considerations that might pull 
toward incompatible actions.  A reason, by contrast, is just one of those considerations.  We can state this 
                                                          
71 See Ross, W. D. Ross The Right and the Good, 16-24.  For views on the difference between apparent and all-out reasons, see Kant’s 
Introduction to MM, 6:224.  For support for this interpretation of Kant, see Paul Guyer’s “Kant’s System of Duties” in his Kant’s System of 
Nature and Freedom, 267-274, and Barbara Herman’s “Obligation and Performance” in The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1993) 164-168 ; Donald Davidson’s “Intending” in Essays on Actions and Events, 95-100. 
72 The expression “all-out judgment” is Davidson’s.  Ibid, 97 
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more formally in the idea of a “conjunctive” fact.73  We can re-describe certain facts about our situation, 
which considered one-by-one or in isolation appear to give rise to a conflict, in such a way that makes 
their conjunction a reason for only one action.  The fact that a candy is sweet is a reason to eat it, and the 
fact that it contains deadly poison is a reason not to.  But the complex fact that this sweet candy contains 
deadly poison, combined with a more complete and refined major principle which says that “one should 
not eat poisonous things even when they are sweet”, would more fully represent Reason’s verdict not to 
eat the candy.  
This approach agrees with what I take to be Kant’s main point in the following passage, which 
immediately follows his remark, mentioned above, about the inconceivability of conflict: 
However, a subject may have, in a rule which he prescribes to himself, two grounds of 
obligation (rationes obligandi), one or other of which is not sufficient to put him under 
obligation (rationes obligandi non obligantes), so that one of them is not a duty.  When two 
such grounds conflict with each other, practical philosophy says, not that the stronger obligation 
takes precedence (fortior obligatio vincit) but that the stronger ground of obligation prevails 
(fortior obligandi ratio vincit).74  
 
The unclear parts of this passage are, first, how to understand Kant’s distinction between an obligation 
and its “ground”, which Kant views as insufficient to place someone under an obligation; and second, his 
distinction between an obligation “taking precedence” and a ground of obligation “prevailing”.  If we 
understand grounds as corresponding to prima facie reasons, and what Kant calls obligation as 
corresponding to the all-out judgment of what must be done, which he already stated is a necessary truth 
that cannot conflict with other obligations, then we can make somewhat natural sense of the distinction 
between an obligation taking precedence and a ground prevailing.  Grounds, or prima facie reasons, are 
not obligations, and so one does not outweigh the other.  But if one ground (like deadly poison) defeats all 
                                                          
73 Ibid 
74 MM 6:224 
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other reasons for an action then it prevails in justifying the principle, and that is an all-out judgment of an 
obligation.  
The Unity Thesis holds that there are only apparent conflicts among practical reasons because 
prima facie principles always contains unstated exceptions that, when fully stated, reveal that principles 
never really conflict.  In the ideal (and I stress this is only a regulative ideal in the Kantian sense 
described in Section 1.4) perhaps the objective principles of morality, if the contents were ever 
completely formulated (which they could not be without also a complete specification of all relevant facts 
about our circumstance), would never conflict because in every case of apparent conflict there would be 
an exception to one reason allowing the other to prevail.  That ideal enables us to say that there are no 
conflicts in what we ought, all-things-considered, to do (i.e., between the “ought” of a conclusive 
obligation rather than the “ought” of a defeated or cancelled prima facie reason).   The analogy to science 
may again help:  although bodies subject to the force of gravity tend to move in particular directions and 
velocities, their actual movement is a vector of all the forces that act on them.  Similarly, though prima 
facie reasons count toward performing an action, the all-out principle of an action is the vector of all the 
practical reasons one has.75 
We can state the same idea in terms of value concepts rather than reasons, facts, and principles.  
Here is an easy case just to illustrate the structure of the position. Suppose an act of government has both 
the property of deliberately and directly interfering with my ability to do exactly as I wish with the means 
I have.  Suppose also that the same act of government has the property of preventing me from stealing an 
old lady’s purse.  If we accept the principle that government should not interfere with people’s ability to 
do as they wish, and also the principle that government should stop or punish people from stealing purses, 
then we have a prima facie conflict.  I assume that this conflict has a single right answer:  I certainly 
should be stopped and punished because we really accept a more complex principle that government 
should not interfere except to stop wrongful acts of theft.  But now suppose we re-describe the same issue 
                                                          
75 The metaphor of a vector belongs to Ross, The Right and the Good, 28-29. Of course the vector analogy is misleading in some respects because 
it portrays prima facie reasons in physical terms as if they collide and in that way conflict with each other.  According to the Unity Thesis, it 
would be more accurate to say that prima facie practical reasons accommodate and make room for each other. 
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in terms of value concepts.  We now say instead that we have a conflict between the concepts of liberty 
and security (or perhaps also between liberty and equality, or liberty and efficiency, or liberty and 
fairness, etc.).  It is certainly possible to define these two concepts in a way that makes our resolution in 
favor of stopping me seem like a tragic decision that violates liberty.  If liberty simply is the state of 
affairs or relation of not being interfered with, then we must, as Berlin held, compromise liberty for the 
sake of another value.  But if instead we understand liberty as I suggested Aristotle understood the moral 
virtues, as the good part of these spheres of actions or states of affairs, i.e. that part of non-interference 
that we really do have all-out reason to pursue, then the appearance of tragic conflict is actually just a 
linguistic illusion; there is no genuine conflict with liberty, but only with liberty’s ugly cousin, which we 
might call, as Locke among others did, “license”.76  Only the vicious aspect of the liberty family has been 
sacrificed, not liberty itself, properly understood.   
Again, this is an easy case just for illustration.  This is not yet an argument for understanding 
value concepts in this way.  Pluralists, including Berlin, seem to resist this approach as merely a 
redefinition of a word.77  In Chapter 4, I argue that they are wrong to do so because there is no 
“definition” of liberty to redefine. The Aristotelian conception of value concepts is a better account of 
how these concepts work in our moral thought, discourse, and argument. 
 
1.8 Resolving Apparent Conflicts 
On what Joseph Raz has called the “common view” of conflict resolution,  all-out judgments that resolves 
conflicts involve an assessment of the relative “strength” or “weight” of the conflicting apparent reasons 
for and against the action followed by a decision supported by the “balance” of reasons.78   According to 
the Unity Thesis, the familiar physical metaphors of “strength”, “weight”, and “balancing” are somewhat 
misleading.  Principles do not seem to have an intrinsic “weight”.  Instead, their practical significance is 
determined by their practical role in directing us to act for the sake of something that is worth acting for, 
                                                          
76 Locke, Second Treatise, Section 6 and Section 57 
77 A value simply “is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience,” and that 
“nothing is gained by a confusion of terms.” Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, 172 
78 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, “Postscript”, 191-192 
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and so the significance of principles is determined and shaped by their role in a practically rational 
means-end system. 
However, if we must keep the metaphor of “weight”, I suggest a better way to understand and 
assess relative strength or weight of principles in a conflict situation is to interpret the principles in light 
of other principles that justify them.  This is consistent with the Principled Model.  We might do this, for 
example, by hypothesizing a more general principle that conflicting principles seem to presuppose and in 
whose light we might refine or limit the scope of each conflicting principle, and so perhaps release us 
from one of them.79  In that way, the “weightier” principle would be the one that best fits and is justified 
by that more general hypothesis. For example, we might make a prudential judgment that the pleasure of 
eating sweet candy should yield to the benefits of eating a salad because the latter is more important, “on 
balance”, to what we had hoped to achieve on a particular day, which itself underwrites the value of both 
eating sweet food and healthy food.80  Of course, in appealing to a short term plan, we would not have 
consciously reflected on any ultimate principle or end because there is no need to.    
Ronald Dworkin often described the resolutions of conflicts through a helpful metaphor of 
solving simultaneous equations.81  We interpret the meaning and scope of values and the principles they 
name through reflection on other principle so that what any particular principle requires of us in some 
situation is sensitive to other principles we accept as true.  We may resolve the conflict by reflectively 
ascending to a more abstract principle in order to determine what action in the circumstances best respects 
that more general principle, and we adjust the more concrete principles accordingly. To take a political 
example, we might, initially feel torn between a principle requiring compliance with a majority decision 
that is patently unjust and another principle to follow some counter-majoritarian institution’s more just 
                                                          
79 I do not suppose that these presuppositions are easy to find or that we will find them in all cases of conflict. People often face very challenging 
practical conflicts that lead to great uncertainty.  I see no reason, however, to infer from this uncertainty that these presuppositions do not exist 
and that no such resolution is possible.  That is a common but, I think, unwarranted inference. 
80 Raz rejects the common “balance of reasons”  of view as an account of the way institutional reasons figure in our practical thinking “for failing 
to take notice of the fundamental point about authority, i.e. that it removes the decision from one person to another.” See his Practical Reason 
and Norms, 191-194, and The Morality of Freedom, 40-41. 
81 Dworkin, J4H, 3, 15, 263, 272; Dworkin, “Do Values Conflict: A Hedgehog’s Approach”, 251-259.  For a fuller discussion of the 
complementary relationship between equality and liberty, see Dworkin’s SV, especially Chapter 3 “The Place of Liberty”. 
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decision.82  We can resolve such conflicts by hypothesizing some more general principle that we think the 
majority principle is meant to serve (perhaps an egalitarian or liberal premise of some kind) and then ask 
which of these courses of action would better respect that general background principle.  If the counter-
majoritarian institution more adequately respects that principle, then there can be no regret over having 
not followed the majority decision.  We might conclude, for instance, that giving effect to a patently 
discriminatory or racist statute on majoritarian grounds would contradict the more abstract principles of 
equality and political liberty that justify majoritarian decision making in the first place. 
Similarly, Onora O’Neill, in describing Kant’s view that practical judgment requires us to “limit 
one maxim of duty by another”, compares practical judgment to a process of “triangulating” acts in 
relation to one another in order to bringing maxims into the most attractive relation.83 The task involves 
finding ways to perform permissible actions that do not also involve some wrong: “we identify acceptable 
forms of beneficence by ruling out beneficence that relies on theft, or on deception, or on violence to 
others, and so on; we identify acceptable ways of avoiding deception if we rule out as beneath 
consideration those that injure, are cruel, involve self-abasement, and so on…”  Like Dworkin, O’Neill 
also deploys the mathematical analogy: “Just as certain equations can be solved only because we know a 
sufficient number of constraints, so certain questions about how we ought to act are more readily and 
better resolvable if we take account of the constraints of multiple principles of obligation.”84  
 
1.9 Unity is Not Monism 
“Monism” is a name sometimes given to the idea that there is a single master or fountain value that can 
order and commensurate all other values in a system.  As I suggested in the Introduction, and implicitly in 
Section 1.4, I want to resist the identification of unity with monism.  There are at least three major 
differences between typical monistic conceptions and the idea of unity sketched here that I associate with 
the Principled Model.  First, paradigmatic monistic theories like utilitarianism, or monotheism, are 
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theories organized under an axiomized and often material master principle or value rather than, as the 
Unity Thesis supposes, an idea of unity and systematicity.  But the Unity Thesis is not an axiomized 
monism.  As I emphasized on Section 1.4 above, unity do not require a stipulated end to organize a 
system.  Instead, the end of unity is simply the total systematicity of principles.  
Second, unlike monism, unity does not posit merely internal consistency within a system, but 
rather a wide compelling coherence among all principles we accept at different levels of abstraction.  We 
should distinguish internally consistent normative systems (which include, for example, utilitarian 
monism) from normative systems that are not only internally consistent but also consistent with their own 
presuppositions, including what we might think of as the condition of normativity itself.  An ethic of 
unmitigated violence would be internally consistent, but that does not mean it is normative for anyone.  
As I argue in Chapter 5, unity demands not merely principles ordered consistently under a particular, 
material end, but principles ordered consistently with one’s worthiness to have one’s ends satisfied.  
There is an a priori limiting condition that filters out certain ends and principles as not consistent with the 
conditions of normativity itself.  Kant argued, persuasively in my view, that if we accept that hypothetical 
requirements can be normatively binding, then we must also assume that there are categorical 
requirements to respect and preserve our capacity to observe hypothetical requirements. The value of 
human dignity is both the justification of and a limiting condition on all permissible hypothetical 
requirements.  Monistic theories notoriously yield results that do not cohere with these categorical 
constraints.  Utilitarian monism, for example, sets ups clashes between principles requiring altruism and 
those demanding self-assertion, between the good and the right, and with individual rights.  
Third, the common association of monistic theories with a kind of unity, rather than with 
plurality, can be misleading.  If the foundational principle monistic theories set up requires us to perform 
actions in order to effect some factual, contingent end of some kind then these theories may actually be a 
recipe for irresolvable conflict.  On one hand, if the principle instructing the pursuit of some contingent 
end (like pleasure) is itself contingent, then this version of monism rests on the Factual Model and thus 
invites pluralism, since, as I suggested earlier, they are equivalent.  Or suppose we take as our foundation 
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the end of obeying the King and the corresponding principle “obey the King!”  If the King utters 
inconsistent commands, then this theory requires us to follow two inconsistent commands.   There is 
nothing in what the King says that can resolve that conflict for us.  In order to do so, we would need to 
reflect on the purpose of obeying what the King says, and that would mean that what the King says is not 
a final end after all.   
So unity is not monism. The kind of coherence the Unity Thesis demands is not just internal the 
way utilitarian monism is (some stipulated contingent object to be pursued plus its entailments), but rather 
global, and is a constant work-in-progress. 
 
1.10 Putative Analytical and Justificatory Support for Moral Pluralism 
We can organize different ways of defending pluralism roughly according to the two general approaches 
to defending the Unity Thesis taken in the project.  There are both analytical defenses, which suggest that 
pluralism best accounts for and seems to be presupposed by our normative practices and phenomenology, 
and justificatory approaches, which hold that pluralism is right, not as an analytical thesis, but as a 
normative thesis that our principles best work for us when they are conceived according to the Factual 
Model so that they conflict.  We can find both of these approaches in defenses of moral and political 
pluralism.  
Perhaps the most obvious analytical defense of pluralism is the fact that it seems to account for 
many experiences we have when in engaged in moral thought and argument, which often include moral 
dilemmas that can seem intractable or paralyzing and leave us with feelings of regret and guilt.  Pluralism 
seems to remain true to the complexity of these experiences.  Even when we have decided a moral 
dilemma, and even when we are certain we have decided it correctly, we often feel emotions of remorse, 
regret, or even guilt at having acted against a prima facie moral reason. We often think of ourselves as 
considering a number of competing reasons for action, and we do not think when one wins out that the 
other has lost its normative or practical force. Bernard Williams noted that in cases of severe moral 
conflict, a person may reasonably feel regret about the alternative not taken even while thinking she did 
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the right thing.85  Many pluralists say these experiences would be strange if there are single right answers.  
How can we feel regret if we have done what we think is the right thing to do? The phenomena of 
paralysis and regret seem undeniable, and pluralism seems able to explain them.  I consider these 
phenomenological issues in Chapter 3. 
At the end of Chapter 3, I consider the possibility that there is a normative case for viewing our 
principles on the Factual Model.  Contrary to Isaiah Berlin’s apparent view that liberty simply “is what it 
is”, that values just happen to be a certain way, we can interpret Berlin’s own pluralism as the upshot of 
an evaluative judgment that justifies pluralism.  We might say that the reason Berlin stipulates a particular 
definition of liberty is that he held that there is value in understanding liberty so that it conflicts tragically 
with other values.  Such a normative understanding of liberty may act as a bulwark against the various 
threats he associated with monistic ideologies.86   This kind of argument maintains that principles operate 
like brute facts and that pluralism is true, not because that’s just the way principles are, but because 
sometimes it is practically rational for us to treat principles as if they conflict.  Both of these defenses of 
pluralism and the Factual Model have their counterparts in politics and law, to which I now turn.  
                                                          
85  Williams, Moral Luck, 27-30; and Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, 86 
86  See Berlin, “Isaiah Berlin on Value Pluralism”: “The enemy of pluralism is monism—the ancient belief that there is a single harmony of truths 
into which everything, if it is genuine, in the end must fit. The consequence of this belief (which is something different from, but akin to, what 
Karl Popper called essentialism—to him the root of all evil) is that those who know should command those who do not.”   
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Ch. 2:  Two Models of Political Principle 
 
2.1 Transition to Politics 
Recall from Section 1.2 that a full specification of a principle is a conditional proposition of the form:  if 
certain facts about one’s circumstance obtains, then some action is required of an agent in that 
circumstance.  Political principles share this conditional structure.  Whether and how they apply depends 
on cold facts. But political principles comprise a distinct and unique species of moral principles because 
the kind of facts that condition and determine political principles is narrower than the set of facts that 
condition and determine principles in general.  In particular, a community’s political principles, which 
include its basic constitutional structure and legal requirements, depend upon certain types of political 
facts about that community’s political practices.   
The idea that political principles constitute a department of principles in general enables us to 
study the Unity Thesis and its rival, pluralism, now understood both as theses about political principles, in 
terms of the same two models we studied in the more general case in Chapter 1.  If political principles are 
best understood on the Factual Model—that is, if political principles are contingent truths known 
ultimately through a posteriori investigation of facts about the political practices of certain 
communities—then a pluralistic understanding of political principles seems guaranteed.  This is because, 
as I argued in Chapter 1, the Factual Model is both necessary and sufficient for pluralism. However, if 
political principles are best understood on the Principled Model, as rationally and necessarily determined 
by some facts about the political practices of communities and by other principles that make those facts 
normatively relevant, then the unity of political principle would seem to follow because inconsistent 
necessary truths cannot be true at the same time.   
Many political theorists assume that the Factual Model is a correct account of political principles.  
But we must distinguish two very different ways in which the Factual Model might be defended.  The 
first, which I call below the descriptive defense, or the Descriptive Factual Model, holds that the Factual 
Model is true as a descriptive thesis about political principles.  Prominent twentieth century conceptions 
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of legal positivism, the school of American Legal Realism, the Critical Legal Scholars of the 1970s and 
1980s, and many sociological theories of law and democracy understand political principles according to 
this Descriptive Factual Model.  The second, which I call below the Normative Factual Model, holds that 
the Factual Model is true, not as a descriptive thesis about our political institutions, but rather as a 
normative position.  This position holds that we ought to understand, judge, and reason about political 
principles according to the Factual Model because only on that understanding can political principles 
serve important political ends, such as the authoritative, efficient, clear, stable, and mutually acceptable 
settlement of our disagreements, and the coordination of our conduct. This Normative Factual Model, I 
later suggest, underpins the influential political philosophies of John Rawls, Jeremy Waldron, and Jürgen 
Habermas. 
My primary task in this chapter is to describe the transition from moral principles in general to 
politics in order to show how the factors that were relevant to assessing the Unity Thesis in the moral case 
apply equally to the political case, and to describe in some detail the structure of a political theory 
committed to the unity of political principle.  I do not argue for the unity of political principle in this 
chapter.  Parts II and III, respectively, develop both analytical and justificatory cases for it. 
 
2.2 Perspectival Principles  
The study of political principles is complicated by the following strange feature these principles possess:  
political principles can be morally false principles with which, it is morally true, we ought to conform.  I 
admit this sounds cryptic. In order to explain more fully what I mean, it will help to introduce a few new 
concepts and distinctions. 
In the Introduction, I emphasized that principles are objective normative directives.  They express 
what we are really justified in doing or not doing. But we can, and we do, also use the concept of a 
principle or a practical reason in a different way, not to express what we are justified in doing, but rather 
to explain what someone in fact does. What we can call explanatory principles are those principles we 
might attribute to a person in order to explain that person’s reasons for action, as when we say that in 
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keeping his promise Jones acted from a principle of fidelity.1  Explanatory principles are not necessarily 
true principles, and so statements about them are rather types of descriptions, not necessarily 
endorsements of their content (e.g. a principle that might best explain an act of murder is probably not a 
true principle because murder is usually not justified). 
Explanatory principles are a subset of a broad and important class of principles, which I will call 
perspectival principles.  Perspectival principles are principles as understood from a point of view or 
perspective.  They are qualified principles in that they are relative to a standpoint or frame of reference of 
some kind: they are believed to be true, or accepted as true, or endorsed, or recognized, or established, or 
in some way practiced as if they were true. But they need not be true.  They may be false. They are 
principles “for me”, or “for you”, or “for them”, we might say.  We might report perspectival principles as 
the principles recognized “around here”, where “around here” is a placeholder for a person’s or a group’s 
moral and political practices. 
The idea of a perspectival principle is a tricky notion because it refers to the principles “of” a 
person, or even of groups, or institutions, or cultures.  This notion of propriety suggests that perspectival 
principles depend on, are constituted by, flow from, or are in some way determined by facts about the 
beliefs, or activities, or practices of some person or group, and in such a way that it makes sense for 
others to say that some principle or set of principles belongs to or is accepted or is endorsed by them.  But 
just as there is no simple connection between, on one hand, what an individual person says and does and, 
on the other hand, propositions about that person’s mental content including their beliefs, motives, or 
moral personality, there is also no simple connection between the activities and behavior of members of a 
group (what they say, do, and think in acting together) and propositions about what principles are 
accepted or established or practiced within that group, i.e. about the group’s moral personality.   I 
therefore intend the idea of a perspectival principle to be very broad and general.  Perspectival principles 
are a function of some set of social facts. They are those principles that, we might say, “map” from some 
                                                          




factually defined perspective (that of the practices of a person or group) into true statements of what 
principles that standpoint recognizes or accepts or practices.  
We can nevertheless sharpen the idea of a perspectival principle with the following distinctions. 
On one hand is the content of the perspective, which includes the set of principles endorsed from the 
perspective.  On the other is the factual base which includes all of the facts about a perspective that might, 
in part, constitute or determine its content.  We can then further distinguish different types of perspectival 
principles according to the different types of facts that comprise the factual base on which they depend, 
that is, to which they are relative.  For instance, if I were to attribute a moral conviction to you, my 
judgment would depend upon certain facts about your actions and other judgments I might have made 
about your personality, which together constitute the factual base of your perspective from which my 
judgment flows.  Similarly, if I were to attribute to my political community a commitment to certain 
principles of justice, my judgment would depend upon certain facts about its political record, which may 
include its lawmaking and legal history, widely accepted opinions about justice, and so on, which together 
comprise the factual base of my community’s perspective on justice from which my judgment flows. 
We can then further distinguish different kinds of perspectives through a distinction between 
first-personal and third-personal perspectives and, even further still, within these perspectives between 
plural and singular perspectives. The first-personal singular perspective constitutes simply my principles, 
and from this perspective the distinction between perspectival principles and principles simpliciter 
collapses:  the principles I hold to be true are simply, from my perspective, true principles.   But from the 
third-personal perspective, the distinction between perspectival and true principles survives. (See Section 
5.5 on the logical space between first-personal and third-personal moral belief and truth.)  A judgment 
about another person’s principles need not imply a commitment, on the part of the person who makes that 
judgment, to the truth of those principles.  This does not mean that third-personal principles are always 
false, but just that they need not be true.   Explanatory principles, which explain a person’s motivations, 
fit into this category.  Statements of third-personal singular principles, therefore, are types of descriptions 
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because they do not state substantive normative requirements, but rather describe someone’s acceptance 
of a substantive normative requirement. 
The two plural perspectives help define political principles.  We often speak of principles from a 
third-personal plural perspective. There are principles that groups take themselves to have, and these 
principles genuinely belong to them even when they are not commonly endorsed or recognized by 
everyone in the group.  Like third-personal singular principles, third-personal plural principles need not 
be true: wicked regimes, like the Nazi regime, may govern according to certain moral and legal principles 
that none of those over whom they claim authority have an objective duty to obey, even if many might 
obey anyway.  Those principles explain why many groups act as they do, but it does not follow that they 
justify those actions.  Statements about third-personal plural reasons are therefore also types of 
descriptions. 
The first-person plural perspective defines a more mysterious, and extremely important, category 
of principles because this perspective merges explanation and justification.  Like the third-personal 
perspectives, the first-personal plural perspective does not necessarily match the first-personal singular 
perspective because first-personal plural principles are the principles of a group, not of any particular 
individual who belongs to a group.  For example, if a member of a political community, on his own, 
endorses Rawls’s Difference Principle, but the community’s political institutions are governed in 
accordance with the Principle of Average Utility, then those institutions will for that reason seem wrong 
in comparison from that individual member’s first-personal perspective.  However, the first-person plural 
perspective lacks the uncommitted, purely descriptive, fully relativized aspect of the third-personal 
perspective because it is a perspective not merely about what principles others accept, but rather is a 
perspective that in some sense all members of a group are committed to and indeed bound by, even if 
none of them taken singly would ideally endorse it. That is the sense in which political principles may be, 
from a first-personal singular perspective, morally false principles with which it may still be morally true 
that we each, from our collective perspective, ought to conform.  
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The first-personal plural perspective seems to be the perspective of most interest in political 
philosophy.  It is the subject of classic treatises that invoke the idea of a general will expressed in a set of 
public principles that need not be endorsed by all members, but to and for which all members are 
nevertheless in some way responsible. This perspective merges subject and object, individual and group, 
and multitude into unity under political principle.  Much of the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6 can be 
understood as an attempt to articulate conditions under which this mysterious perspective can be morally 
justified. 
 
2.3 Political Facts and Political Principles 
The acts, beliefs, utterances, and intentions of individuals acting within political institutions comprise the 
factual base of a political community’s first-personal plural perspective.  Any political community with 
some basic version of what H.L.A. Hart called secondary rules—social practices that stipulate authority to 
create, change, enforce, and identify law—along with basic entitlements to participate in lawmaking 
processes, and perhaps a nascent version of Montesquieu’s separation of powers, possesses the basic and 
familiar institutional structure that defines, through these social conventions, which political activities 
(factually understood) determine the base of a community’s collective perspective on principles, among 
which is its constitutional framework and all laws established pursuant to it.2  The factual base includes 
social facts about political decisions and practices, including legislative enactments, the utterances of 
political officials and citizens and texts they have written or voted for, the psychological states of officials 
like legislators, such as their intentions, desires, hopes, and expectations about how laws are to be 
understood, social customs, settled judicial practices, precedents, committee reports, debate records, 
public opinion on basic questions of basic justice, and more. These facts include what Rawls called a 
community’s “public political culture”.3 
                                                          
2 Hart, The Concept of Law, 77-96; Charles de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Book 11, Chapter 6. 
3 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded Edition, 12-13 
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Some political facts in this base may be more relevant than others are in determining what 
institutional principles the community’s plural perspective endorses.  There is no settled or crisp boundary 
between political facts and others social facts.  The important point for our purpose is that these political 
facts are normatively meaningful: for a variety of reasons (such as the values of social order, 
coordination, settlement, and the rule of law) and in a complex way they determine what we often judge 
to be political principles that we are collectively justified in following.4  Political facts in part determine 
institutional principles that are objectively normative for those to whom the institutions belong. 
The abstract concept of an institutionally defined base of political facts invites another distinction 
between two classes of political principles, which I will call ideal and institutional political principles.  
Ideal political principles are values that citizens might privately endorse, or advocate, or wish their 
community would recognize, but which might not be institutionally recognized.  An ideal political 
principle is not institutionally recognized when the factual base of the community’s perspective admits of 
no interpretation that endorses that ideal principle.  We can therefore think of ideal political principles as 
requirements that citizens and officials exercise their institutional powers in whatever way would change 
the base of political facts so that it can be interpreted as recognizing certain ideals it does not yet 
recognize.  For example, an ideal political principle might require legislators to exercise their lawmaking 
powers to write and enact a statute whose sentences could reasonably be interpreted as establishing a 
system of public healthcare.  Rawls’s Difference Principle, Mill’s Harm Principle, Kant’s Universal 
Principle of Right, his Categorical Imperative, and the Principles of Sainthood could all be examples of 
these ideal principles.  Idealized conception of democratic procedures, or of campaign finance, or of the 
rule of law may also be examples of ideal principles that may or may not be institutionally recognized. 
Institutional political principles, by contrast, are principles that are institutionally recognized.  
They are principles that the factual base of the community’s perspective can already reasonably be 
interpreted as endorsing.  Legal rights are the clearest example of institutional political principles.  Legal 
                                                          
4 See Mark Greenberg’s excellent discussion of how facts determine legal norms only with the help of principles that make them normatively 
relevant.  See Greenberg, “How Facts Make Law”, 157–198, 163.  See also Nicos Stavropoulos’s “Why Principles?” University of Oxford 
Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No 28/2007 October 2007 (available online) 
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rights are requirements or powers that citizens are entitled to enforce on demand, without further 
legislative intervention, in judicial institutions that direct the executive power. The law of contract, for 
example, creates an institutional principle that I have a right, under certain circumstances, to compel 
another’s performance or to garnish their wages through the coercive power of the state.  Some 
institutional or legal principles are constitutional rights that prevent government from enacting laws or 
adopting policies that would otherwise be useful or convenient. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, for example, establishes a legal right that prohibits certain kinds of discrimination.   
It is important to emphasize that the distinction between ideal and institutional principles is not a 
distinction between substantive outcomes and institutional procedures.  The distinction between ideals 
and institutions permits that substantive and procedural principles may both be either ideal (for example, a 
matter of what economic rights and lawmaking procedures we might wish for) or institutionally 
recognized (a matter of the economic rights and lawmaking procedures a community has actually 
instituted). 
It is also important to emphasize that the relation between institutional principles and the factual 
base on which they depend is not necessarily an identity relation.  They may come apart.  Here is an 
example.  Political facts include the literal or conventional meaning of what an official has said or 
decreed.  Suppose some constitutional provision declares with perfect linguistic clarity that all graduate 
students born in the month of November are exempt from paying income taxes. Suppose the conventional 
meaning of that decree is neither ambiguous, nor vague, nor in any way abstract.  That conventional 
meaning is a matter of social fact, of the shared linguistic rules competent speakers of English use to 
communicate.  It comprises part of the factual base of the community’s institutional political principles.  
But that fact—the linguistic entity—is not identical to the institutional principle it might determine.  
Whether that fact, or any other fact about its institutional pedigree (about who wrote or uttered it, who 
voted for it, what their intentions were in doing so, how those people were elected, etc.) determines an 
institutional political principle requiring the behavior that linguistic entity expresses, is still an open 
question.  To assume that they are identical is, as I suggest below, to assume that some version of the 
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Factual Model is correct.  But that is too quick.  We need a theory of how political facts determine 
institutional political principles.  It may well be that institutional principles are brutely determined in the 
way the Factual Model supposes.  But then again, as I will to argue, it may not be.  There may be some 
better, more complex model, some function that maps those facts into true propositions about what 
institutional principles actually apply to. 
Another way to state this point is to say that there is a difference between, on one hand, what we 
might call the positive activities of officials and, on the other hand, the doctrine of legal positivism 
according to which facts alone about those activities determine the existence and content of the law.  The 
bare positive facts of official activity—what officials together say, do, and think—are not necessarily 
sufficient to establish the objective normative principles—the legal requirements—that those positive 
facts determine. In Chapter 6, I try to show that this crucial distinction has important implications for how 
we understand the jurisprudential views of someone like Kant.  Kant’s “Postulate of Public Right” asserts 
the moral need for political institutions that flow from the “positive” activities of a coercive sovereign 
state.  But it does not follow just from that requirement that the content of that “positive” morality is 
simply a matter of social fact.  The two almost always run together, but an argument for the former does 
not necessarily entail the latter. I will argue, contrary to many interpreters, that on the best reading of 
Kant’s political philosophy, the need for positive political institutions does not commit Kant to legal 
positivism.  Although Kant demanded a strong degree of deference to positive public authority, he could 
not have been a legal positivist. 
The idea that political facts in part determine institutional principles captures several familiar 
features of institutional principles.  It fits the ordinary assumption that what our political institutions 
require of us in some way depends on our community’s political history. A claim about what our 
constitutional structure requires of citizens and public officials is correct if it flows, in some way, from 
certain facts about our constitutional record, including of course the text of the constitution, settled 
precedent, founding documents, and settled constitutional practice. It also fits the variety, types, and 
different departments of institutional political principles we find in political communities and in political 
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theory.  Institutional principles can be subdivided into distinct, but familiar, departments according to the 
types of political facts that determine them.  Moreover, we can describe institutional principles, and the 
facts that determine them, at different levels of abstraction.  At the most general level are the facts which 
determine the basis of institutional authority, namely those that determine the principles governing how to 
create, change, and recognize other institutional principles.  These are the facts that determine, to borrow 
H.L.A. Hart’s useful concept, a community’s secondary rules of recognition.5  Other facts determine 
concrete, subsidiary institutional principles governing the distribution of political powers in creating and 
changing laws, and also power in adjudicating what counts as an institutional principle and how 
institutional principles apply to particular situations.  Within the former—law-creating and changing—set 
of powers, we include democratic principles concerning the proper pattern of elections, districting, voting 
procedures, and campaign regulation, republican principles governing the system of representation, the 
separation of powers, federal principles governing the separation of local, state, and national 
governments, and in the latter principles governing the jurisdiction of courts, and the composition and 
procedures in accordance with which those courts operate.  Other facts determine the institutional 
principles that govern not the distribution of power in creating, changing, identifying, and applying 
principles, but the distribution of private resources as determined by property relations concerning  
rightful acquisition, contract, exchange, and status relations, and financial regulation in general; these 
concern, we might say, the institutional principles of distributive justice. 
Each of these different types of institutional principles is determined by different sets of political 
facts.  For example, the institutional principle authorizing (say) a unilateral American military strike on 
Syria is not determined by the same set of facts that determine the distributive principles embedded in the 
Affordable Care Act.  We justify each of these institutional principles by pointing to distinct aspects of the 
American political record that determine these principles.  Which facts, if any, determine which 
principles, can be controversial.  Jurists, for instance, disagree about the relevance of founding 
documents, ratification records, legislative history, the historical intentions of legislators and of drafters of 
                                                          
5 Hart, The Concept of Law, 77-96 
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statutes, committee reports, and public opinion.   For now, I will leave open the question of which facts 
are relevant because, as I will argue, which facts are relevant depends on certain ideal (as in non-
institutional) political principles that makes those facts normatively relevant to determining institutional 
political principles.  Any restriction on the set of facts that determine political principles will therefore 
depend on some kind of idealized justification for that particular restriction rather than some other 
restriction I might have proposed instead.  So stipulating a hard boundary at this point may unnecessarily 
pre-empt later discussion.6 
One final implication of the distinction and possible relation between ideal and institutional 
political principles, which I develop below, is that it suggests that the distinction between lawmaking and 
legal judgment is not crisp.  On a common view, legislative activities create laws that form major 
premises of jurisprudential judgment.7  But once we recognize that all facts about lawmaking practices do 
not necessarily create law on their own, but might require some background ideal principles in order to do 
so, then we see that legislative activities (that comprise part of the factual base) are at best minor premises 
in legal judgment.  Like legislation, jurisprudence is also an instance of practical reason.  The important 
difference between them lies in the type of political facts on which each activity focuses.  
 
2.4 The Principled Model of Political Principles 
Institutional political principles, therefore, are a function of political facts that comprise the “base” of a 
political community’s collective perspective on principle.  As we did in Chapter 1 in connection with 
moral principles, we can now think of an abstract theory of political principle in terms of a “model”.  
According to the Factual Model (henceforth, unless I specify otherwise, by “Factual Model” and 
“Principled Model”, I am referring to models of specifically political principles, not moral principles 
generally ), institutional political principles are brute, contingent truths that can be known solely through 
a descriptive or empirical investigation of the political facts that comprise a political community’s factual 
                                                          
6 Greenberg, “How Facts Make Law”, 169-170 
7 Rousseau compares the acts of a person with those of the body politics drawing an analogy between the Legislative (will) and Executive (force) 
Capacities, in Rousseau, On the Social Contract; Book 3, Chapter 1.  Similarly, Kant compares the sovereign’s powers—legislative, judicial, and 
executive—to the three stages of a practical syllogism, in DR 6:313. 
114 
 
base.   As I said above, if the Factual Model is right—if the content of institutional principles can just be 
contingent in this way—then we should not be surprised to discover plurality among our institutional 
political principles because it is not necessary that contingent principles cohere with one another.8 
The Factual Model supposes that the existence and content of those principles need not be 
rationally intelligible to us.  I would like to labor this crucial point a bit further through another distinction 
between two ways in which ideal and institutional political principles might relate to one another. The 
Factual Model supposes a distinctive relationship between our ideal and institutional political principles 
according to which, although ideal principles may in part justify institutional principles, the content of 
institutional principles is nevertheless entirely factual and is in no way determined by the justifying ideals 
themselves.9   According to this view, our ideals simply incorporate institutions (which would be factually 
determined) into our practical thinking without that connection in any way influencing what those 
institutions are or require of us. On this view, institutional principles are like plain facts (minor premises) 
in a piece of practical reasoning:  they are made normatively relevant by ideal principles that justify them, 
but their existence and content is not determined by those ideal principles. Their practical use is entirely 
instrumental, like a metal whose possible uses we can know empirically and which might be put to some 
useful purpose. 
In this way the Factual Model differs from the Principled Model.  The Principled Model, recall 
from Chapter 1, holds that the force and content of a principle are not brutely determined by facts, but are 
rationally determined ultimately by other principles that also justify the principle and supply its normative 
force.  In the political case, this translates into the idea that institutional principles are determined not only 
by political facts, but also by some more general, independent, ideal principle or set of ideal principles 
that also justify the institutional principles.  These background principles, which control the impact of 
political facts on the content of institutional principles, necessarily belong to our ideals, not our 
                                                          
8 See also my arguments in Section 1.2 for this general point about the relation between pluralism and the Factual Model. 
9 In suggesting that ideals in part justify our institutions, I am assuming that one reason for having an institutional perspective at all on, say, what 




institutions.  They cannot, without circularity, belong to our institutional principles because they are 
needed to determine the existence and content of institutional principles. 
The Principled Model, therefore, holds that ideal and institutional principles are integrated in a 
deep way.  It holds that institutional principles may not only be justified in part by our ideals, but that 
their content is also determined at least in part by our ideals. This does not mean that institutional 
principles are not distinct from and often or even usually defeat ideal principles when their demands seem 
to conflict.  Instead, it maintains the more complex—and interesting—view that institutional principles 
that may defeat our ideals nevertheless depend for their force and content on those very ideals.   In other 
words, the Principled Model is consistent with the common assumption that, for example, law can 
compete with abstract principles of justice or morality and, for those who accept law’s authority, override 
these other principles.  That assumption is compatible with a theory of institutional principles that makes 
our ideals concerning justice or morality part of the grounds of institutional principles rather than merely 
a justification for following institutional principles. 
The Principled Model is therefore also consistent with a traditional view of law and legal 
judgment, though it interprets it differently. Locke and Montesquieu, among others, emphasized the 
distinctive character of legal reason and judgment whose institutionally defined aim is to identify the law 
rather than to declare, as a legislature might, what the law ought to be. Alexander Hamilton captured this 
notion in his dictum that the judicial branch has no force or will, but only judgment.10  The Principled 
Model fully respects and upholds the distinction between figuring out what the law is and declaring what 
it ought to be. It adds, however, that judging what the law is can depend, in a complex way, on an 
idealized and perhaps politically controversial judgment about which values law ought to serve, that is, on 
a judgment about some background principle of political morality that justifies law. I discuss this more 
complex relation between legislation and legal judgment below in Sections 2.10-2.14. 
                                                          
10 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws,11:4, 6; Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 78.  William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of 




Finally, the Principled Model regards conflicts among political principles as merely apparent.  
We saw in Section 1.7 that, in general, facts are prima facie normative considerations that are subject to 
tacit exceptions and fuller elaboration.  The same idea holds in the political case: political facts, such as 
legislative utterances and judicial edicts are desiderata that suggest certain actions or forbearances to us 
rather than things we must actually pursue, sans phrase.  Any political judgment that a certain action 
actually should be performed or enforced is a further, all-things-considered judgement that some 
particular political fact is enough to act on (i.e. that other considerations do not defeat it). The concluding 
political principle that corresponds to that judgment is not, then, a qualified principle tied to some isolated 
desideratum, but is rather an “all-out” principle about what some political body, acting in the name of the 
community, must do.  The notion of a political reason is distinct from Political Reason’s ultimate verdict 
as to how a community must act.  Political Reason’s verdict is univocal, and the result of adjudicating 
between competing considerations that might seem to pull toward incompatible actions.  A reason, by 
contrast, is just one of those considerations.  In Kant’s idiom, the Principled Model distinguishes between 
a political obligation, which is captured (for example) in an all-out legal requirement, from its ground, 
which we met in Section 1.7 and will consider again Section 6.6 when we consider Kant’s distinction 
between a law and command.11   The ground of a political obligation is a prima facie reason, but the 
obligation itself corresponds to the all-out judgment about what must be done, which he held is a 
necessary truth that cannot conflict with other obligations.   
The unity of political principle holds that there are only apparent conflicts among political 
principles because prima facie political reasons always contain unstated exceptions.  Sometimes these 
apparent conflicts might be “internal” to a community’s institutional political principles when these 
institutional principles seem to be in tension with one another (e.g. an apparent conflict between 
institutions establishing free speech and those demanding equal campaign financing), or “external” 
between institutional principles and political ideals not yet established (e.g. between institutions 
establishing strict liability in accidents and an ideal according to which negligence is a fairer standard).  In 
                                                          
11 MM 6:224 
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Section 2.14, I discuss Ronald Dworkin’s influential account of how some of these conflicts are to be 
adjudicated and resolved. 
 
2.5 The Factual Model of Political Principle 
The Principled Model may seem politically discreditable because it partially obstructs any clear 
separation of institutions and ideals.   If we think that individual citizens and public officials, such as 
judges, should not be permitted to construct institutional principles in light of controversial ideal 
principles they happen to find compelling, then we may be drawn to the Factual Model, which says that 
the content of institutional principles is just a matter of social fact.  Indeed the Factual Model has a strong 
grip on scholars, and seems widely assumed among political theorists. According to the Factual Model, 
the grounds of institutional principles consist ultimately of non-normative political facts along with their 
logical entailments. The Factual Model most explicitly underpins certain conceptions of legality, in 
particular the doctrine of legal positivism and its manifestations in legal interpretation (originalism, 
textualism, strict constructionism, theories of legislative intent, etc.), but it also provides the best account 
of the abstract structure of several normative conceptions of democracy, in particular deliberative 
conceptions of democratic legitimacy, such as those espoused by Jürgen Habermas and Josh Cohen, and 
majoritarian conceptions of democratic authority, perhaps most forcefully defended in recent years by 
Jeremy Waldron, along with John Rawls’s political conception of justice. In fact, the Factual Model 
implicitly underwrites all conceptions of “the political” that assume a sharp distinction between 
conventional standards and “natural” standards, and which equate institutional principles exclusively with 
the former.  
Some theories that might otherwise be thought wholly at odds with each other are actually united 
in ultimately assuming the Factual Model.  Both convergence theories of political legitimacy, which 
ground valid institutional principles on the empirical fact of an original contract, agreement, or 
convention, and purely procedural theories, which ground institutional principles on the fact that they 
issue from a decision rule or deliberative process of some type, both suppose that there is some canonical 
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social moment or set of social facts (an initial agreement, a consensus, a legislative decision, the manner 
in which a decision was made, and so on) that ultimately fixes the existence and content of institutional 
principles.12 Similarly, command theories of law ground the existence and content of institutional 
principles on some person’s, or some group’s, or perhaps a divine being’s intention or act of will.   
 
2.6  The Factual Model, Political Pluralism, and Legal Indeterminacy 
In Section 1.2, I argued that moral pluralism assumes the Factual Model.  I will not repeat those 
arguments here. It is easy to see that those arguments apply when the Factual Model is understood as a 
thesis about political principles.  If the existence and content of political principles is an entirely 
contingent, factual matter concerning the political history of a community, then there is no reason why 
that community’s institutional perspective could not recognize a multiplicity of inconsistent political 
principles.   
In light of the close relationship between the Factual Model and institutional pluralism, it is not 
surprising that virtually all of the most influential theories of legal indeterminacy either explicitly or 
implicitly embrace the Factual Model as an account of the grounds of law.  The American Legal Realists 
of the early twentieth century were preoccupied with empirical questions, and in particular with 
identifying the sociological and psychological factors influencing judicial decision-making.  A central 
claim uniting the various strands of Realism is that legal “rules” and legal reasons generally have little or 
no effect on a judge’s decision, especially in appellate courts.  In deciding cases, judges respond primarily 
to the stimulus of facts and consideration of what seems fair or efficient, rather than to any applicable 
legal rule.13 In part this is because, according to the Realists, in most appellate decisions the available 
                                                          
12 Within convergence theories I include contract-based theories, and communitarian theories that ground institutional principles on traditional 
sources insofar as those sources are factually understood. 
13 For a classic statement, see Karl Llewellyn’s short essay “Some Realism about Realism”.  Llewllyn stressed in particular the Realist’s attempt 
at value-free, “scientific” inquiry, the divorce of “is” and “ought” for the purpose of study, the distrust of traditional legal rules and concepts as 
descriptive of what courts or people actually do, the distrust of the theory that traditional prescriptive rule formulations are the mainfactor in 
producing court decisions, and the belief in grouping cases and legal situations into narrower categories; and an insistence on evaluating the law 
in terms of its effects, especially its economic consequences.  For perhaps the founding statement in the Realist movement, see Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr. “The Path of the Law”, Harvard Law Review, 1897.  
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legal materials are insufficient to produce a logically unique legal outcome.14  In those cases, the law is 
rationally indeterminate because there are too many “conflicting but equally legitimate ways of 
interpreting…” the law.15  The rational indeterminacy of rules renders them explanatorily indeterminate in 
accounting for the judge’s decision in these cases.16 
The Realists’ interpretation of the judicial decision sponsors their rejection of a rather cartoonish 
conception of legal reasoning they called “legal formalism” or “mechanical jurisprudence”, which, 
according to Realists, involves syllogistic reasoning that applies rules enshrined in legal texts to the facts 
of cases in order to deduce unique legal conclusions.  A characteristic complaint of the Critical Legal 
Studies (C.L.S.) movement of the 1970s and 1980s, which sought to renew and extend the empirical 
program begun by the Realists, is its rejection of formalism.  Formalists, as C.L.S scholars characterize 
them, insist that judges do not rely on value-judgments at all in making legal decisions, but merely 
interpret the words of the law.  But since, as C.L.S. scholars announce, formalism is a false jurisprudential 
theory, then legal decisions are no more neutral than the decisions of a legislature or an executive.  
Political choices are equally involved in both.17 
Some jurists regard the target of these skeptical attacks on legal determinacy as a straw man.  
Very few judges actually regard themselves as reasoning in a formalistic or mechanical way.  In an early 
essay, Dworkin wrote of these Realists that “think they know how the rest of us use these [legal] 
concepts. They think that when we speak of ‘the law,’ we mean a set of timeless rules stocked in some 
conceptual warehouse awaiting discovery by judges, and that when we speak of legal obligation we mean 
the invisible chains these mysterious rules somehow drape around us. The theory that there are such rules 
and chains they call ‘mechanical jurisprudence,’ and they are right in ridiculing its practitioners. Their 
difficulty, however, lies in finding practitioners to ridicule. So far they have had little luck in caging and 
                                                          
14 Brian Leiter, “American Legal Realism”, 252-256 
15 Ibid, 253 
16 Jerome Frank is generally associated with the distinction he drew—first in Law and the Modern Mind—between “rule-sceptics” (who include 
Llewellyn) and “fact-sceptics” (among whom he counted himself), who wanted to uncover the unconscious forces that affect the discovery and 
interpretation of the factsof the case. For Frank, most realists missed the prejudices of judges and jurors.  For example, “plus or minus reactions to 
women, or unmarried women, or red-haired women, or brunettes, or men with deep voices, or fidgety men, or men who wear thick eyeglasses, or 
those who have pronounced gestures or nervous tics.” Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, vii-x 
17 See Duncan Kennedy’s “The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction” , 1349. 
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exhibiting mechanical jurisprudents (all specimens captured-even Blackstone and Joseph Beale-have had 
to be released after careful reading of their texts).”18  
Both the Realists and C.L.S. scholars assume that formalism understates the power of the judge to 
“make” law.  This argument relies on the Realists’ tacit loyalties to a specific theory of law, which is legal 
positivism.  As I described in the Introduction, legal positivism is the thesis that the existence and content 
of law is ultimately a descriptive or empirical matter concerning the beliefs, interests, utterances, 
preferences, or intentions of particular individuals or of members of social groups.  Joseph Raz calls this 
central positivist idea the “Sources Thesis”, according to which “all law is source-based,” where “A law is 
source-based if its existence and content can be identified by reference to social facts alone, without resort 
to any evaluative argument.”19  Analytical legal positivists, legal sociologists, and anthropologists 
characterize legal norms as logical implications of empirical social sources like an Austinian sovereign 
command, or what Hart called a community’s a rule of recognition.20 In doing so, these theories reduce 
legal principles ultimately to brute, contingent social facts about individuals’ and groups’ moral and 
political histories. 
Brian Leiter, a contemporary Legal Realist and metaphysical naturalist, writes that all Realists are 
tacitly committed to a version of positivism because legal positivism figures in the most fruitful scientific 
research programs into the nature of law, namely, the Legal Realists’ program.21 Those research programs 
assume that while legal sources sometimes logically determine unique outcomes to legal disputes, these 
sources can also sometimes leave legal questions indeterminate. In order for this claim to be true and 
explanatory, the Realist must posit a concept of law that is completely source-based; only in terms of a 
source-based concept would it possible to maintain the Realist thesis that law is sometimes inherently 
indeterminate.  
                                                          
18 Dworkin, TRS 15-16.  See also Hart’s “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”, 606-615 on the Realists’ critique of “formalism”. 
19 See Raz’s “Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law” in The Authority of Law, and his “Authority, Law and Morality,” reprinted in Raz, Ethics 
in the Public Domain. 
20 Hart, The Concept of Law, 107.  
21 See Leiter’s “Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis”, 369: “What would ultimately vindicate the conceptual 
arguments for Hard Positivism is not simply the assertion that they best account for the ‘real’ concept of law, but that the concept of law they best 
explicate is the one that figures in the most fruitful a posteriori research programmes, i.e. the ones that give us the best going account of how the 
world works”.   
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Similarly, as I suggested in the Introduction, sociological discussions of “legal pluralism” 
regularly take place within an empirical positivist framework.  Tamanaha, in his recent survey, observes 
that Hart’s descriptive account of law as the union of primary and secondary rules is “perhaps the most 
widely invoked” basic approach to defining law used by social theorists.22  John Griffiths, in a formative 
essay that helped define sociological approaches to legal pluralism, said that “a central objective of a 
descriptive conception of legal pluralism is…to break the stranglehold of the idea that what law is, is a 
single, unified and exclusive hierarchical normative ordering descending from the power of the state…”, 
and that breaking unity’s stranglehold involves “simple debunking, as a necessary prolegomenon to any 
clear empirical thought about law and its place in social life.”23  Griffiths also says that “the ideology of 
legal positivism has had such a powerful hold on the imagination of lawyers and social scientists that its 
picture of the legal world has been able successfully to masquerade as fact and has formed the foundation 
of social and legal theory.”24  The positivist “ideology” he refers to, and criticizes, is the centralist notion 
that all positive law derives from the state.  But Griffiths and legal pluralists in general accept 
positivism’s more basic assumption that whatever law is, it is empirically known, or is source-based.  As 
Sally Falk Moore has said, the fundamental assumption of legal pluralism is that “not all the phenomena 
related to law and not all that are law-like have their source in government.”25  This assumes that law and 
law-like phenomena are essentially source-based, which is to say they are positivistic.  
All positivistic theories of law are pluralistic theories of law. Even Hans Kelsen’s monistic 
conception of law allows that there could be conflicts within law.  This is not surprising because the 
criteria of legal validity in the Kelsenian picture are positivistic, entirely a matter of a norm’s pedigree in 
lawmaking and adjudicative decisions authorized by Kelsen’s basic norm. (I discuss Kelsen’s basic norm 
in Section 2.9 below.)  The basic norm is what unifies the legal system, and enables the “legal scientist” 
to interpret all valid legal norms as a non-contradictory domain of meaning.26  Kelsen once said that 
                                                          
22 Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global”, 392 
23 John Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?”, 6 
24 Ibid, 5 
25 Sally Falk Moore.  “Legal Systems of the World”, 15, cited in Tamanaha, “The Folly of the 'Social Scientific' Concept of Legal Pluralism,”193 
26 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 205-208 
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norms authorized by a static higher norm, such as the basic norm, cannot contradict each other because 
norms express “ought” statements, and two or more inconsistent ought-statements cannot all be valid.27  
But Kelsen later abandoned this doctrine of non-contradiction.28 He writes that “both the conflicting 
norms are valid.”29 The conflict cannot be resolved by interpretation, as he earlier suggested in his Pure 
Theory of Law.30  Sometimes, a judge can invoke certain canonical, rule-governed ordering principles, 
such as that norms enacted at later times supersede older ones according to the principle lex posterior 
derogate legi priori.  But if these canonical rules are not available, then “we then have a meaningless act 
of norm creation and therefore no act at all whose subjective meaning can be interpreted as its objective 
meaning.”31  In such cases, the law is indeterminate and the conflict is solved with force, by giving the 
executive organ a discretionary choice between the two decisions.32  The problem with contradictory legal 
norms is that they are “politically unsatisfactory”, not that they are invalid norms.33 
In all of these examples, the conceptions of and allowances for indeterminacy and pluralism arise 
because these theories accept or assume positivism, which is a special case of the Factual Model of 
institutional political principles. This means that in order to refute the notion of indeterminacy in law, it is 
not necessary to consider each of these different skeptical schools one-by-one.  We need only to attack 
that fundamental assumption, which is that institutions are positivistic.  If law is not fundamentally 
positivistic or factual, but is rather principled, then legal indeterminacy and pluralism are false.  That is 
my task in Chapters 3, 4, and 6 in particular. 
 
2.7 The Descriptive Factual Model 
In Parts II and III, I will consider two arguments for the Factual Model of institutional political principle.  
The first argument embraces the two-stage approach to studying principles that I identified in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
205-208 
27 Ibid. 
28 See Kelsen’s “Law and Logic” in Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy.  
29 Ibid, 233 
30 Ibid, 235.  Pure theory, 206-208.  For Kelsen on the norm’s role in interpretation and conflict resolution, see General Theory of Law and State, 
401, 406; The Pure Theory of Law, 74, 195. 
31 Pure Theory, 206-208 
32 Ibid 
33 Pure Theory, 26 
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Introduction.  This approach assumes that we can profitably study the existence and requirements of 
institutional political principles in vitro, so to speak, that is in isolation from ideal principles that might 
justify them, and then only at a second later stage consider the normative reasons we might have for or 
against acting in accordance with institutional principles. The first stage of analysis offers an ostensibly 
non-normative, purely descriptive account of the very concept or nature of institutional principles. When 
we inspect the shared rules we use, sometimes implicitly, in ordinary thought and speech, we see that the 
correct use of some concepts, like “table” and “rock”, does not seem to depend on normative judgments 
of any kind.  Similarly, the descriptive approach might hold that by analyzing the ways in which 
institutional concepts—like law, authority, democracy, convention, custom, etc.—figure in ordinary 
language, we can arrive at a similar conclusion, which is that their instances are also non-normative and 
purely factual. If this is correct, then institutional principles could be identified and studied in a 
disinterested fashion purely as sociological or linguistic facts.34  On this view, what institutional 
principles are and what justify following them are completely separate matters: ideal principles play no 
role in determining the content of the public perspective on those ideals.  Ideal principles and institutional 
principles would constitute distinct, independent domains of reasons.   
This descriptive approach still allows that ideal principles may be relevant when we move to the 
second, separate stage of analysis, which is the normative stage. This stage addresses the question of 
justification, namely of whether and why we have any practical reason to follow factually determined 
institutional principles.  Ideals could be relevant to that question in different ways.35 One way in which 
our ideals could be relevant is to serve as normative “filters” against which we could check which 
factually determined institutional principles we have reason to comply with.  On this view, we check the 
public perspective against, say, morality or some standard of “natural law”, and filter out any parts that 
are inconsistent with it. Or, alternatively, ideal principles might serve as filters in another way, by treating 
the public perspective as a provisional source of institutional principles and then discounting, not those 
                                                          
34 Descriptive approaches figure in the work, as I understand them, of analytical legal positivist like John Austin, H.L.A Hart, and Joseph Raz, 
and in the social theories of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, Joseph Schumpeter, Robert Dahl, and Hannah Pitkin, to name some that I am aware of. 
35 On the different ways in which principles might be thought to relate to and check descriptive legal content see Stavropoulos’s “Why 
Principles?”, 2, 12. 
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institutional principles that fail to match the moral or natural law, but which exceed some bottom 
threshold, or cause great injustice; only institutional principles that rise above that threshold have any 
force for us. 
The way our ideal political principles function on this descriptive model, as filters defined by an 
independent realm of normative principles, parallels a traditional distinction between the natural law 
(what is just everywhere and at all times) and the positive law (what we do around here, which is 
contingent, fleeting, factual, and can be checked against the natural law for discrepancies). The 
Descriptive Factual Model presupposes that this division between ideals and the institutional perspective 
is essentially correct and that it exhausts the possible relations between ideals and institutions.36  It takes 
for granted a basic assumption about the relationship between the content and the justification of 
institutions.  It assumes that, on one hand, what institutional principles are is one thing, which is a factual 
question. On the other hand, it is a further question whether or not we are justified in following them.  On 
this view, therefore, institutional principles are only contingently valuable: they are at best tools or 
instruments for achieving some value or principle that can be specified independently of them. 
As I argue in Chapter 3 in connection with the Factual Model of moral principles, a primary 
objection to a purely descriptive kind of approach to principles is that it is illegitimately reductive.  The 
sociological essence or shared linguistic rules it presupposes simply do not exist in relation to contested 
institutional principles because those principles are essentially normative. We often deploy them even 
when we disagree, normatively, about their instances, and we disagree about their instances because we 
do not treat them as descriptive truths.37   I further develop this objection in relation to law in Chapter 4, 
Sections 4.8 and 4.9. 
 
                                                          
36 It seems Kelsen assumed this, as he apparently countenanced only the traditional connection between positive and natural law I described 
above:  “What is here chiefly important is to liberate law from that association which has traditionally been made for it—its association with 
morals. This is not of course to question the requirement that law ought to be moral, that is, good. That requirement is self-evident. What is 
questioned is simply the view that law, as such, is a part of morals and that therefore every law, as law, is in some sense and in some measure 
moral .” Kelsen, “The Pure Theory of Law”, 474.  Kelsen may not have considered the possibility, emphasized in Dworkin’s work, that what the 
law is might depend on some judgment about what it ought to be. 
37 For this argument see Dworkin’s LE, Chapter 1; Nicos Stavropoulos’s “Obligations, Interpretivism, and the Legal Point of View”; and Jeremy 
Waldron’s “The Concept and the Rule of Law”. For challenging counterarguments, see Joseph Raz’s “Can There Be a Theory of Law?” 19-27. 
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2.8 The Normative Factual Model 
The second defense of the Factual Model rejects the descriptive approach’s two-stage method. It does not 
purport to study institutional principles independently of political ideals, but rather returns institutional 
principles back in habitat by investigating them fully in vivo alongside and in light of ideals that might be 
thought to justify them. It draws upon a normative argument, or justification, which says that we best 
serve certain political ideals only when we follow institutional political principles whose content is purely 
factual and can be determined without reference to those ideals.38 In that way, it bears structural 
similarities to rule-utilitarian accounts of the relation between moral duties and the goal of maximizing 
social utility.  On these views, utility will be maximized only if agents bar themselves from attempting to 
maximize utility through their acts considered one-by-one.  For example, the practice of not convicting 
innocent defendants maximizes utility, not because all acquittals contribute to social utility, but because 
the general observance of a practice of not convicting innocent people does. 
Many of the most prominent factual models in political theory are normative in this way.  They 
hold that institutional principles must be a matter of non-normative social facts, along with their logical 
entailments, not because, as the descriptive approach insists, it is a non-normative question what 
institutional principles are or require, but because the best normative account of their force requires that it 
we identify them as if they were non-normative social facts.  On this view, because social goals like 
political stability, predictability, settlement, finality, coordination, agreement, consensus, or the spoken 
word of a wise authority are for various reasons important, and since we best serve those goals when we 
identify and judge institutions on the Factual Model, we ought therefore to embrace the Factual Model as 
a general theory of the existence and content of institutional principles. 
This Normative Factual Model accepts that there may well be truths about what ideals of justice 
or fairness or goodness require of us.  However, its proponents emphasize that reasonable individuals 
thinking and arguing in good faith about such matters will often arrive at incompatible conclusions about 
what those truths are.  Under these conditions, the argument goes, we are all better off from the standpoint 
                                                          
38 For an influential statement of this view, see John Rawls’s “Two Concepts of Rules” in Collected Papers 
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of these ideals themselves if, rather than attempting to impose our convictions upon others, we should 
instead coordinate on a single public perspective on justice and fairness whose content, though perhaps 
wrong, is nevertheless clear and determinate for all. We all have reason to embrace these false standards 
that are publicly recognized in part just because they are publicly recognized.  It follows, on this 
normative model, that what these public standards are must be determinate in the following sense: their 
identity cannot depend on the ideals whose truth we disagree about.  Since part of the point of deferring to 
public standards is to pre-empt the ideals about which we disagree, then if the identity of those public 
standards turned on those controversial ideals, those public standards could not fulfill their purpose. 
Reasoning with these standards, therefore, must involve bracketing controversial ideals, and focusing 
only on determinate, factually understood public standards capable of transcending disagreement.   
The Normative Factual Model rules the roost at the moment.  Its basic features define several 
influential mainstream accounts of authority, law, and democratic theory.  It is the driving assumption of 
Rawlsian political liberalism.  Its engine is a doctrine about the purpose of paying attention to and being 
guided by a public institutional perspective, about the justification of institutional principles.  It supposes 
that something good happens when we do, and something bad happens when we do not, act from 
standards whose existence and content are or are entailed by plain social facts.  The content of 
institutional principles, on this view, must have a source or lineage in some non-normative social fact 
concerning what members of the practice have accepted, or said, or done, rather than upon ideals that 
might justify that content.   In diverse societies where people disagree not only about the fundamental 
questions of personal ethics and the most valuable way to live, but also about what the basic terms of 
political association ideally should be, the Normative Factual Model seems to have considerable 
normative appeal.  If we are to live together in a non-oppressive, cooperative, stable association over 
time, then we should try to “get behind”39 the substantive disagreements that divide us by focusing on 
                                                          
39 A remark by Josh Cohen, “Reflections on Habermas on Democracy”, 387, whose work in public reason follows Rawls in several essential 
respects, exemplifies the independence assumption: “An appeal to reason cannot help us ‘get behind’ the plurality of competing moral, political, 
religious, metaphysical outlooks, because the nature and competence of reason is one matter on which such outlooks disagree”. His point is that 
we cannot demarcate a domain of common public justification if that demarcation relies on politically contested reasons.  That is the mark of the 
Normative Factual Model. 
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standards whose operation does not turn on the very issues that divide us. The Normative Factual Model 
accomplishes this by translating institutional reasoning into a fundamentally non-normative inquiry into 
what standards are factually endorsed, and about what those standards entail we must do in various 
circumstances. 
 
2.9 Are These The Only Possibilities?  On Kelsen’s Supposed Third Way 
Hans Kelsen presents his Pure Theory of Law as a third way, as something other than either a purely 
descriptive, factual, social scientific theory or a normative theory based fundamentally on substantive 
moral commitments. Is it a genuine third option?  Or does it collapse into either the Descriptive Factual 
Model or the Normative Factual Model?  To answer these questions, we need to look more closely at 
Kelsen’s aims, his conception of legal norms, and their relation to what he calls a legal system’s “basic 
norm”. 
Kelsen’s theory purports to be pure: It is concerned solely with a special part of knowledge that 
deals with law, “excluding from such knowledge everything which does not strictly belong to the subject-
matter law.”40  It aims to “free the science of law from all foreign elements. This is its fundamental 
methodological principle.”41  Its purity has two aspects.  First, it is supposed to be free of empirical 
sociological and psychological suppositions.  It is supposedly conceptually distinct from the empirical 
tradition of legal positivism that, according to Kelsen, confuses law with fact. Second, it separates law 
from morality.  Kelsen rejects natural law theory because it confuses the law with morality. For Kelsen, 
law rest neither on empirical facts nor on morality.   
Instead, according to Kelsen, law consists of “norms”, which express a relation of “imputation”, 
not causation nor justification, between circumstances and required actions whereby certain actions ought 
to take place in certain circumstances.42  A norm cannot be derived solely from facts or from morality, but 
                                                          
40 Kelsen, “The Pure Theory of Law”, 474 
41 Ibid 
42 On “imputation”, see Pure Theory, 76-84 
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is rather “valid” only in virtue of its relation to other legal norms in a system.43  For that reason, there is a 
sense in which Kelsen’s conception of law is certainly empirical because it is indeed positivistic.  It is a 
positivistic theory because it accepts the core claim of legal positivism, which is the Sources Thesis.44  
For Kelsen, legal norms are not valid by virtue of their content.  Rather, a purported norm becomes a legal 
norm only because it has been constituted pursuant to specific, definite legal procedures. A norm issuing 
from a coercive judicial decision, for instance, is valid because it is constituted according to a penal 
statute book, which in turn may be validated by a state’s constitution, which has prescribed rules and 
procedures for a competent authority to create the penal statute book.  The validity of that constitution, in 
turn, probably rests on a yet older constitution, and eventually on an original constitution set up forcibly 
by a usurper or by some kind of corporate body.45 
But if we ask why that original constitution is valid, we do not find a yet more general procedure 
that constitutes and validates it.  Instead, here we arrive at Kelsen’s conception of the “basic norm”. The 
validity of this first constitution is a “presupposition”, a postulate upon which the validity of all subsidiary 
norms of the legal order depends.  The schematic form of the basic norm is roughly that “coercive acts 
ought to be carried out only under the conditions and in the way determined by the constitution or the 
organs delegated by it.”46  Only upon the presupposition of this basic norm are the declarations of those to 
whom the constitution confers norm-creating power binding norms.  
According to Kelsen, unlike subsidiary norms, the basic norm is not itself a positive legal norm 
validated by a legal act, but instead is valid because it is presupposed to be valid; and it is presupposed to 
be valid because without this pre-supposition, no human act could be interpreted as a norm-creating act. 
                                                          
43 Pure Theory, 4-15 
44 Kelsen plainly accepted positivism’s sources thesis. “The law is a system of norms, and norms are the meaning of acts of will that are directed 
toward the conduct of others. These acts of will are acts of will of human beings or of suprahuman beings—as with the acts of will of God, or, as 
in the caseof so-called natural law, of Nature. However, only norms that are the meaning of human acts of will are to be considered as legal 
norms…” Kelsen, “The Function of a Constitution”, 111.  Also, Raz on Kelsen: “The existence or non-existence of a legal system as a whole is a 
matter of social fact. It depends entirely on its efficacy in the society in question. Moreover, the test determining for every individual rule whether 
it belongs to a legal system in force in a certain country is equally a matter of social fact. It turns on whether or not it was posited in the 
appropriate way: whether or not it can be traced to an authorised social source..”  Raz, “The Purity of the Pure Theory” in The Authority of Law; 
and Kelsen, “The main difference is that the content of the positive legal order is completely independent of the basic norm from which only the 
objective validity of the norms of the positive legal order, not the content of this order, can be derived; whereas according to the natural-law 
doctrine a positive legal order is valid only if and insofar as its content corresponds to the natural law.”  Kelsen, “Professor Stone and the Pure 
Theory of Law”, 1130, 1141 
45 Kelsen, “Pure Theory”, 519-521 
46 Kelsen, General Theory, 45-46;  Pure Theory, 200-201 
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But what is the nature of this presupposition that confers normativity on all positive legal norms, but 
which is not itself positivistic?   
Here lies a puzzle.  If Kelsen’s basic norm has normative force—if it justifies the “ought” that all 
subsidiary legal norms express and thereby renders them norms that really ought to be followed —then it 
seems simply to express what I have called throughout Part I an objective moral principle, and this would 
undermine Kelsen’s claim that his pure theory is uncontaminated by objective moral considerations.  But 
if, by contrast, the basic norm does not state an objective principle, then no legal norm in the system has 
any normative force, and this contradicts the normativity of law that is central to Kelsen’s theory.47  
Moreover, if the basic norm does not state a principle, then what else could it express? If, on one hand, it 
expresses a descriptive fact about the legal system or its participants, then Kelsen’s theory seems to 
collapse into something approximating an empirical positivist legal theory.48  Furthermore, if the basic 
norm is a genuine principle, then Kelsen’s theory is ultimately moral, indeed a version of the Normative 
Factual Model.  If, on the other hand, the basic norm is simply a fact about legal systems, then Kelsen’s 
theory is ultimately an empirical conception and so a version of the Descriptive Factual Model.   
Does Kelsen offer an account of the basic norm that defies these categories, that is neither a moral 
account nor a descriptive, factual account?  Kelsen says that in postulating the basic norm,  
we merely make explicit what all jurists, mostly unconsciously, assume when they consider 
positive law as a system of valid norms and not only as a complex of facts, and at the same time 
repudiate any natural law from which positive law would receive its validity. That the basic 
norm really exists in the juristic consciousness is the result of a simple analysis of actual juristic 
statements…49   
 
                                                          
47 Stanley Paulson expresses this difficulty as follows: “the idea that legal propositions might lack normative import is an idea fraught with far-
reaching consequences, among them the fact that legal science would lose this basis for claiming the social status of a normative science." 
Paulson, “Continental Normativism and Its British Counterpart: How Different Are They?” 227, 234-235, cited in Lloyd’s Introduction to 
Jurisprudence, 8th Edition, 307. 
48 See also Paulson Ibid on this point. 
49 Kelsen, General Theory, 118-119  
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What does it mean to say the basic norm “exists” as a presupposition in the “juristic consciousness”? The 
fact of its “existence” cannot be an inductive generalization from the various ways in which the concept 
of law is used in legal discourse.  No “legal scientist” has even begun to amass the impossibly large data 
set that would be necessary to support any such generalization.  Nor could it be a conceptual claim about 
the definition of law, since the meaning of the word “law” does not include the idea of a basic norm (the 
statements “this legal system contains no basic norm” is not contradictory).  It also cannot be a claim 
about the actual mental life of any particular jurist or group of jurists since many, perhaps most, 
practicing lawyers or judges have no articulated theory of the grounds of the legal system in which they 
practice, and even if they did there is no reason to suppose it would match Kelsen’s. 
Yet Kelsen stresses that the identity of the basic norm for a particular legal system is not 
arbitrary.  On the contrary, it is identified by the legal scientist according to what Kelsen calls the 
“principle of efficacy”.  The legal order as a whole rests on the assumption that it is mainly efficacious, in 
that people mainly do conform with it: “What I say is that the basic norm refers only to a coercive social 
order which is by and large effective. That means: we presuppose the basic norm only if there exists a 
coercive social order by and large effective. ..” 50  But Kelsen’s presentation of this principle of efficacy is 
ambiguous. On one hand, it may be understood as a purely descriptive, factual thesis that a legal order is 
as a whole effective so that people do in fact behave according to the norms flowing from the basic norm 
of that order.  If that is what Kelsen means, then it is clearly an empirical question what is the basic norm 
in a particular community.  For reasons I discuss in Chapters 3 and 4, it is unlikely that any purely 
empirical investigation of jurists’ behavior could adequately capture the content of any norm, including a 
                                                          
50 Kelsen, “Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law”, 142-143.On the principles of effectiveness and the centrality of coercive control to the 
basic norm, see Pure Theory of Law, 214.  In the General Theory, Kelsen writes of efficacy in the change of the basic norm. “It is just the 
phenomenon of revolution which clearly shows the significance of the basic norm. Suppose that a group of individuals attempt to seize power by 
force,in order to remove the legitimate government in a hitherto monarchic State, and to introduce a republican form of government. If they 
succeed, if the old order ceases, and the new order begins to be efficacious, because the individuals whose behavior the new order regulates 
actually behave, by and large, in conformity with the new order, then this order is considered as a valid order. It is now according to this new 
order that the actual behavior of individuals is interpreted as legal or illegal. But this means that a new basic norm is presupposed….If we attempt 
to make explicit the presupposition on which these juristic considerations rest, we find that the norms of the old order are regarded as devoid of 
validity because the old constitution and, therefore, the legal norms based on this constitution, the old legal order as a whole, has lost its efficacy; 
because the actual behavior of men does no longer conform to this old legal order. Every single norm loses its validity when the total legal order 
to which it belongs loses its efficacy as a whole.…It cannot be maintained that, legally, men have to behave in conformity with a certain norm, if 
the total legal order, of which that norm is an integral part, has lost is efficacy principle of legitimacy is restricted by the principle of 




basic norm.  But even if we grant the possibility, then the distinction between Kelsen’s theory and 
tradition socio-empirical positivism collapses.   
On the other hand, we might interpret the principle of efficacy as the postulate that in a particular 
community the legal order could be normatively justified only if it is mainly effective.  If that is what 
Kelsen means, then it is plainly a substantive normative, indeed a moral thesis concerning the conditions 
under which actors have objective practical reason to comply with legal norms. This would mean that the 
normativity of every norm in the system ultimately relies on a substantive normative judgment, and that 
Kelsen’s system is not after all insulated from morality. 
I do not believe Kelsen’s “pure” theory offers a mid-way between pure empirical social science 
and moral theory.  The basic norm can be understood in terms of either the Descriptive Factual Model or 
the Normative Factual Model.  To what other domain, besides facts and principles, could it belong?  
Political and legal theorists influenced by Kelsen’s in many ways brilliant legal architectonic sometimes 
appear to assume that law comprises a sui generis normative domain, that the legal “ought” is 
fundamentally different from the moral or the prudential “ought”, and that “validity” is a morality-free 
mark of normative justification.  But that is not correct. What distinguishes the legal domain of practical 
reason from the rest of practical reason is the type of facts that figure in the argument for legal principles.  
These facts, as I suggested in Sections 2.1 to 2.3 are ordinary political facts about the institutionalized 
political activities of citizens and public officials.  Just as social facts about the conventional meaning of 
the expression “I promise” that figure in a practice of promise-keeping do not render promises non-moral 
practical reasons, political facts do not render legal reasons non-moral either.  Political facts comprise 
institutions that help crystallize and focus our moral responsibilities.  It can of course be controversial 
what those responsibilities they are meant to crystallize are, and that is why, as I argue in Sections 4.8 and 
4.9, the existence and content of law can be controversial.  
If the Factual Model, in either its descriptive or normative form, is an incorrect theory, then 
Kelsen’s positivism is also incorrect.  Like most of the other positivistic theories of law I have mentioned 
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in this chapter, I will not directly criticize Kelsen’s in the coming chapters, but will instead criticize their 
underlying presupposition, which is the Factual Model. 
 
2.10 Two Views of Political Legislation and Judgment: Freestanding and Integrated 
I have so far presented the Principled and the Factual Models of political principle as ontological theses 
about the character, structure, and interrelation of what I have called institutional and ideal political 
principles and facts.  But the transition to politics demands a more complex approach because political 
and legal theorists tend to study institutions in terms of epistemological categories as well as metaphysical 
ones.  The metaphysical point corresponds to an epistemological thesis concerning our capacities and the 
processes through which we understand, cognize, judge, reason, and argue about these principles.  The 
vocabulary of these epistemic categories is familiar among political and legal theorists, and so an 
ancillary aim of Parts II and III is to elaborate the implications of the Unity Thesis for how we understand 
the relation between these activities.  
I assume a distinction between, on one hand, legal judgment or jurisprudence and, on the other 
hand, adjudication. The latter concerns how a judge should, all things-considered, decide a case, the 
former how law requires a judge to decide a case.51 Various puzzles surrounding the relation between 
legislation and legal judgment occupy legal philosophers who debate the role of judges’ political ideals in 
exercising legal judgment.  Legal positivists, who maintain that the pronouncements or historical 
intentions of conventionally recognized political authorities exhaust the content of law, deny these ideals 
any essential place in legal judgment. Critics reply that positivism is a poor account of the concept of 
law’s essentially moral use in ordinary legal argument.52  Often these debates reflect underlying 
normative disagreements about the purposes, proper scope, and subject matter of legislative and judicial 
                                                          
51 An orthodox view is that we answer the adjudicative and jurisprudential questions in the same way: judges should adjudicate according to law. 
Neither the so-called legal realists, who deny law plays a causal role in judicial decision, nor legal positivists, who deny that law controls 
decisions when positive sources are unclear or contested, accept this orthodox view. Thus interpretivists, like Ronald Dworkin, who deny both 
realism and positivism in favor of the view that judges can and do adjudicate according to law even in hard cases, are in fact highly orthodox. 
52 I discuss these issues in Chapter 6. The central lines in these debates are clearly presented in H.L.A. Hart’s “Postscript” to The Concept of Law, 
and in Ronald Dworkin’s “Hart’s Postscript and the Point of Political Philosophy” in JR, Chapter 6. 
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power.  Both sides agree that moral ideals should figure in legislation, though only one (the anti-
positivists) accepts that it belongs intrinsically to legal judgment as well.  
But suppose we complicate the issue by inverting it: rather than ask only about the role of ideal 
moral principles in legal judgment, we might also ask about the role of legal judgment in legislation.53  Is 
it part of the very idea of legislation that proper legislation depends on some judgment about what prior 
existing law requires?  In order to legislate a legitimate institutional principle, do we need to draw or infer 
that principle in some way from other institutional principles already recognized within our institutional 
practice?  This possibility would be consistent with the Principled Model for politics, which allows that 
we justify and identify institutional principles holistically in terms of other principles, including our ideals 
and other institutional principles in the same system. Or, by contrast, is legal judgment only contingently 
relevant to legislation, something we must consider only if we wish to craft laws in ways best calculated 
to serve or cohere with other laws or legal constraints we have already created, but might not have 
created?  If this were correct—if we do not necessarily have to draw institutional principles from other 
principles in the same system—then this would seem to match the Factual Model for politics, which 
denies that principles must draw support from other principles in the same system, but rather can stand in 
a brute, inconsistent relation to them. 
I will present and assess two general and opposing views of the relationship between legislation 
and legal judgment (or jurisprudence).  The first, which I believe political and legal philosophers widely 
assume, is the epistemic counterpart to the Factual Model for politics. I call it the “freestanding” view, 
which is a term I adopt from John Rawls’s conception of a “freestanding” political conception of justice.54  
Rawls’s account, I suggest, is an instance of a more general outlook which assumes that acts of legislation 
and judgment need not depend upon one another but are, at best, contingently related.  The second view, 
for which I find support in the work of Kant and Dworkin, is the epistemic counterpart to the Principled 
                                                          
53 As I describe below, I use the term “legislation” broadly to encompass several activities and powers traditionally associated with lawmaking 
processes.  These include citizen participation through voting, deliberation, and argument. 
54  Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded Edition, 38. The idea of a freestanding conception of justice, which I discuss below, flows from 
Rawls’s view that political reasoning and argument in a democratic society has standards that do not depend on other kinds of reasoning, 
including moral reasoning. 
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Model for politics.  I call it the “integrated” view.  The integrated view regards these activities as 
intrinsically connected.  It holds that legitimate acts of legislation and judgment cannot be wholly 
insulated from one another because a constraint on permissible acts of both legislation and judgment is 
that they create and identify institutional principles as though they comprise a systematic unity of 
institutional requirements, which can be interpreted and understood only in light of certain political ideals.  
I suggest that if the integrated view is correct, then traditional problems of political authority and 
democratic lawmaking cannot be studied adequately in isolation from jurisprudence, nor can 
jurisprudence stand freely from the ideals that guide legislation. If the integrated view is correct, then we 
should try to develop our theories of political legislation and judgement together so that they not only 
make room for one another, but interlock. 
In Parts II and III, I argue in support of the Principled Model and the integrated view.  The 
integration of legislation and judgment is an essential, indeed constitutive, component of respect for 
human dignity, and therefore also of political legitimacy.  Respect for human dignity requires, not 
primarily that we protect or promote any particular, material social end communities might set (which 
includes social agreement about what justice requires), but rather that we properly respect the value of our 
powers to legislate and judge principles that serve those ends. This more basic requirement establishes a 
limiting condition on the principles we can validly legislate, judge, and act upon. This condition requires 
the constraint that we legislate and judge principles according to the integrated view, that is, on the 
assumption that political principles comprise a systematic unity.  Neither a political community nor an 
individual agent expresses respect for human dignity unless they strive to act on a consistent, integrated 
set of principles.  This collapses the freestanding view’s separation of legislation and judgment because it 
means that the products of all valid legislation (i.e. legal principles) necessarily coheres and must be 
judged on the assumption that it coheres.  That requirement can be met only if legislation does not wholly 
disregard judgments of other principles, and only if judgments of principle are not wholly insensitive to 




2.11 Collective Agency 
I will try to defend these claims about political principles, political legislation, and political judgment 
through an analogy to the individual moral case. Political philosophers have often studied the 
organization, purposes, and acts of political communities as if these communities were personified 
collective agents, and I will present and assess the Factual and Principled Models, along with their 
freestanding and integrated epistemic counterparts, through a similar parallel.55  In doing so, I assume—
and will argue—that it makes sense to study political communities through the vocabulary of collective 
agency, and through concepts of practical thought and judgment we most often apply to individuals.  Just 
as groups have a first-personal perspective on institutional principles that belong to the group even when 
its members disagree about them, groups also, in an important sense, exercise certain powers of 
legislation in creating institutional principles and judgment in identifying institutional principles. 
Of course if the idea of a collective agent strikes us as spooky metaphysical nonsense, then we 
might be tempted to reduce these personifications to mere rhetorical devices, shorthands for the 
individuals who represent or act on behalf of the community.  But the spooky reading and the reductive 
alternative do not exhaust the possible uses of the personification, for there is an ordinary sense of 
collective agency, discussed in Section 5.9, which neither denies that communities are merely collections 
of individuals nor reduces the sense of collective agency to that of a representative member.   If we 
understand the language of collective agency in that ordinary sense, then the political personification is 
neither mysterious nor merely rhetorical. Furthermore, since the ordinary sense of collective agency 
preserves the idea that political communities do in a very real sense act as one, we can profitably study 
the anatomy of collective political action through the vocabulary of practical agency we sometimes apply 
to individual agents. That will be my strategy. 
 
 
                                                          
55 Familiar examples are Plato’s Soul State analogy in Republic, Bk 2, 368dff, and Bk 8 (comparing Characters and Constitutions); Hobbes’s 
construction of the Commonwealth in the person of a Leviathan, Leviathan, Introduction, Section 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); 
Rousseau compares the acts of a person with those of the body politics drawing an analogy between the Legislative (will) and Executive (force) 
Capacities; Book 3, Chapter 1. Kant compares legislatures, judiciaries, and executives to the three stages of a practical syllogism in DR 6:313. 
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2.12 Two Views of Practical Legislation and Judgment: Freestanding and Integrated 
The freestanding view distinguishes and insulates two practical capacities individual agents have, and 
which we might describe in the following two-part scheme.56  First, agents have what we might call 
legislative capacities or powers.   Legislative powers share a particular subject matter or “input” material: 
they are concerned, fundamentally, with ideals, ends, and courses of actions that are appropriately suited 
to realizing those ideals or ends. A variety of sources including our upbringing, cultural and religious 
traditions, education, biology, desires, and natural inclinations, may suggest particular ends to us.  Our 
legislative capacity includes the powers to identify these ends, will or set ourselves about pursuing them, 
to deliberate about and decide upon appropriate means toward those ends that are sensitive to features of 
our circumstance, and to resolve conflict between competing ends and potential actions when these 
conflicts are apparent. Any child who has chosen a flavor of ice cream, or any adult who has struggled 
with a career decision has exercised these powers to some degree.  We commonly represent the content of 
our legislation, or “willings”, as principles at various levels of generality. The principles that I ought to 
take this job, or that Paul should repay Peter’s loan are relatively concrete. The principle that involuntary 
servitude is almost always wrong is much more general.  Finally, the utilitarian’s Greatest Happiness 
Principle, Kant’s Categorical Imperative, and the Golden Rule are highly abstract principles. 
Second, agents have what we might call powers of judgment.  In contrast to legislation, 
judgment’s function is not primarily that of laying down principles in light of ends or ideals.  Instead, 
judgment’s function is to recognize a situation or potential action as falling under a principle our 
legislative powers have laid down, and which calls for an action.  As Kant conceived of judgment, it is in 
part a faculty of subsuming particulars under universals, that is, of distinguishing whether this or that does 
or does not stand under a given rule.57  So whereas the input materials of legislative activities of willing, 
deliberation, and decision consist of possible ends and means, the input materials of practical judgment 
are the output of legislation, namely the set of principles legislation produces.  
                                                          
56 I do not assume that most people self-consciously reflect upon in order to anatomize their practical thought in the way this scheme describes. I 
assume only that we can schematize practical capacities in ways that many people might, on reflection, agree captures distinctive aspects of our 
practical thought.  I do not suppose this scheme is complete. 
57 See my discussion of Kant’s anatomy of the mind in Section 1.4.  Kant, CPR A132-133/B171-172.   
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According the freestanding view, legislation and judgment are independent activities in the 
following sense.  Nothing in the idea of legislating a principle necessarily requires that, in exercising our 
legislative capacities, we make any kind of judgment of the content or application of other principles that 
might apply to us.  Legislation, on this view, is essentially a matter of setting ends, deliberating about 
means, and deciding upon principles that guide us toward worthwhile ends, and which can be determined 
without regard for other principles we might also embrace.  Of course this does not mean that sensible 
legislation should not ever, even as a strategic matter, depend upon other principles that might apply to us. 
For instance, since we cannot, as a practical matter, deliberate or decide upon fresh principles in every 
circumstance in which we might act, it is often useful or wise to commit to policies of acting on some set 
of principles or rules one has decided upon in advance.  We might do this in order to save ourselves the 
time or trouble of deliberating about the merits of possible actions in every single case, as we do when we 
commit to a policy of exercising each morning, or to follow the directives of an expert on some 
complicated matter rather than trying to decide for ourselves when we are more likely to err.58  In such 
cases, we legislate these policies of following other principles, standards, or rules of thumb we judge to 
exist and have reason simply to follow. But our judgments in these cases do not alter the basic character 
of legislation so that it relies on judgment in an intrinsic way; it simply advises that if we want to achieve 
certain ends through legislation, we must sometimes legislate in ways that are consistent with principles 
we judge to exist when doing so facilitates the realization of those ends.  We might fail to do this, but that 
just means that we have legislated poorly, not that we have failed to legislate at all.   
Conversely, according to the freestanding view, nothing in the idea of judging a principle’s 
content or application necessarily requires any kind of reflection on the ideals or ends that might justify 
the principle whose application are judging   Any interaction between judgment and these ends is at best 
incidental.  For example, someone who judges that a principle that was previously decided upon (that is, 
legislated) requires a particular action in some situation may come to realize that it is unclear whether or 
how that principle applies to a particular situation. Or we might realize in some situations that a principle 
                                                          
58 See Joseph Raz’s analysis of rules of thumb and decisions as “exclusionary” reasons in Practical Reason and Norms, 58-73 
138 
 
we had planned to act upon is in fact unjustified so that it is better, all things considered, to ignore it and 
re-open deliberation in order to modify or replace it. In these two cases, according to the freestanding 
view, the ends which might justify these principles are irrelevant to judging and figuring out what they 
require and whether they really apply. These ends become relevant only when we consider the question 
whether we are justified in following them, as we might when we wake up ill and reconsider whether 
morning exercise really is a good idea, or discover that the expert whose directives we committed to 
follow is more error-prone than we had anticipated.  At best, according to the freestanding view, 
reflection on ends and means are there to correct our principles, not to identify or judge them.  They are 
determined and judged on independent grounds.   
In all of these ways, the freestanding view splits and insulates two questions.  First, the legislative 
question: what principles best guide us to the ends we set? Second, the judgmental question: what are 
these principles and how do they apply concretely?  It regards legislative and judgmental capacities as 
separate, independent powers, and their respective subject matters—ends and means versus principles and 
their application—as separate and independent domains.  The powers of legislation and judgment remain 
not only distinct but independent, “freestanding” practical faculties. 
 
2.13 The Freestanding View of Collective Legislation and Judgment 
The freestanding view’s basic scheme has a familiar analog in the political case.  Any political 
community with some conventions stipulating authority to create, change, enforce, and identify law, and 
perhaps a nascent version of Montesquieu’s separation of powers, has communal analogs of the two 
powers of legislation and judgment.59  These institutions empower members of the community to argue, 
disagree, deliberate, vote, decide, judge, and enforce by themselves or in concert with others.  Moreover, 
the main outlines of the distinction between and character of these powers mirror the individual case. 
First, citizens and officials, in their lawmaking roles as voters, representatives, deliberators, and 
legislators contribute in different ways to shaping legislation because their legislative activities shape the 
                                                          
59 See Hart on secondary rules, The Concept of Law, 77-96; and Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Book 11, Chapter 6. 
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set of political facts that determine the content of institutional political principles (recall from Section 2.3 
that this determination relation may be complex). Second, the input or subject matter of these legislative 
activities are social ends (ideal political principles) and means, which may include ideals of justice, 
fairness, security, social welfare, protection of legal rights in property, a functioning economy, general 
compliance with and enforcement of laws, and so on. Third, in their roles as judges, citizens do not create 
legislation, but identify and apply legislation other institutions have made because judgment is a matter of 
identifying institutional principles and recognizing situations or potential actions as falling under these 
principles, and then calling for an action, such as the enforcement of a right through the coercive power of 
sheriff or police.  
Of course there can be controversy in both legislation and judgment.  People who disagree about 
social ends will disagree about which institutional principles to legislate. Moreover, officials who 
disagree about which facts about legislative practices determine the products of legislation will disagree 
in their judgments of what laws those practices create.  But, according to the collective analog of the 
freestanding view, these controversies should not obscure the idea that political legislation and judgment 
are not only distinct, but independent.   
First, consider political legislation’s independence from political judgment. In its pure form, 
legislation is concerned with enacting political ideals and only incidentally with ensuring their conformity 
with prior enacted institutional principles. For example, on a very popular way of thinking about the 
character of institutional design, which demonstrates the freestanding view in this pure form, we discover 
the institutions we ought to establish by imagining the defects of life without any political institutions at 
all and consider what reasons we would have, under those hypothetical conditions, to institute 
government and guide legislation.   This approach is familiar from the social contract theories of Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rousseau, along with Plato’s and Aristotle’s classical discussions of the formation of political 
communities from pre-institutional conditions. But it also characterizes contemporary accounts of 
constitutional design and democratic lawmaking.  In a famous version, Rawls has us consider a group of  
individuals temporarily blind to their self-interests and ambitions, and asks what basic principles they 
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would accept, in that odd condition, to govern social institutions.60  His thought experiment invites us to 
abstract from the institutions we have in order to discover reasons for the implementation and design of 
institutions we might have.  Rawls’s approach stands freely from judgment because it studies institutional 
design in abstraction from existing institutions, like an architect plotting a blueprint on a blank canvass.   
In another influential contemporary account, Jeremy Waldron argues that justified legal authority 
arises in what he calls “the circumstances of politics”, which are the familiar social circumstances, 
characterized by political disagreement about justice, in which an authoritative institutional perspective 
on justice is both valuable and necessary.61  The felt need among fair-minded citizens for a common legal 
framework, even in the face of disagreement about what that framework in substance should require, 
should lead them to coordinate their actions on legislation made through fair majoritarian decision-
procedures.  Waldron’s presentation assumes that the pure case of these disagreements, and therefore of 
institutional design and legislation through majoritarian procedures, primarily concerns legislative 
questions about what institutions we ought ideally to have, not judgmental questions about what 
institutions we already do have.   On his freestanding view of legislation, lawmaking looks toward 
substantive ideals of justice and participatory fairness, each understood in abstraction from existing 
institutions, whereas judges judge with an eye to the product of legislation.  Legal judgment is a 
subordinate and parasitic power, and its exercise focuses solely on the conventional, positivistic output of 
legislation; it is a “jurisprudence of legislation”.62 
These examples illustrate the pure case of the freestanding political power of legislation. But as in 
the case of personal agency, although these powers are conceptually independent, the freestanding view 
allows that they may interact in certain ways. Since real communities already recognize and are 
committed to acting within certain institutional structures, it is obviously important that government 
honor those standards by acting only in ways that are consistent with them.  As in the individual case, 
existing institutions might be incidentally relevant, something that a practically wise government would 
                                                          
60 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. 
61 Waldron adapts Rawls’s use of Hume’s notion of the circumstances of justice, which are the conditions of moderate scarcity and limited 
altruism that make distributive justice both necessary and important.  See Waldron’s Law and Disagreement,102, 144, 159-160 
62 Ibid, Part 1 
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take into consideration in striving toward the best institutions possible, or perhaps which might 
inconvenience what government can responsibly do until that practice is changed, like an outdated 
electrical system might constrain efforts to modernize an older building.  Edmund Burke’s conservative 
advocacy of political action based on inherited wisdom accumulated in and constrained by the “awful 
gravity” of existing institutions, or Joseph Raz’s contemporary conception of political authority as 
coordinating or epistemic device for better realizing our ends, both share the assumption that judgments 
about existing institutions figure in our political deliberation and decision contingently in support of 
ideals that can be specified entirely independently of these judgments.63 
Rawlsian political liberalism offers a more complex example of this contingent interaction 
between lawmaking and judgment. Rawls’s account of political legitimacy incorporates an abstract 
principle of “reciprocity”, which requires that only principles all reasonable members of a political 
community can reasonably accept are appropriate grounds for the exercise of public power.  Of course the 
concept of possible acceptance is an abstract moral notion that admits of different conceptions.  By “can 
reasonably accept” Rawls cannot mean those justifications that fully informed and rational citizens would 
hypothetically accept, because that reading ignores Political Liberalism’s central aim of detaching 
political justification from “the whole truth” (more on this below).  He must instead have in mind a 
contingent, factual consensus on certain institutionally recognized fundamental constitutional principles.  
That explains why, in his later work, Rawls placed great emphasis on the history and political traditions 
of particular states that reflect factually shared principles within those communities.  Collective coercive 
power must flow from “political” conceptions of justice that are implicit in a community’spublic political 
culture, which “comprises the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of 
their interpretation (including those of the judiciary), as well as historic texts and documents that are 
common knowledge”, because that culture represents what is common, and because standards that happen 
                                                          
63 Edmund Burke.  Reflections on the Revolution in France, 32-37. Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 63-64 and The Morality of 
Freedom, 49-51, 75.  Raz describes a number of ways to establish the legitimacy of a practical authority, including a political authority such as 
the government of a state. One way is to show the authority to be wiser than the individual in determining what ought to be done in a particular 
type of situation. Another is that the authority is in a better position than the individual to achieve what the latter has reason to achieve but cannot, 
such as solving coordination problems. 
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to be common satisfy Rawls’s basic criterion of legitimacy.64  But in these ways, judgment of our 
constitutional record constrains legislation only contingently because adhering to prior institutional 
constraints is practically necessary to realize contingent social ends, namely those ideals of justice that 
happen to be commonly accepted as a matter of social fact.   
Now consider the freestanding view’s conception of political judgment.  Its purest form holds not 
only that judgment applies the law other institutions legislate, but that all judgments of what law has been 
legislated are entirely independent of the ends those laws might be thought to serve. In other words, the 
subject matter of political judgment concerns only political facts about legislative practice, not the 
purposes which justify those practices.  This pure case splits and insulates the legislative question, “what 
institutions should we have?” from the jurisprudential question, “what are our institutions?”  Whereas 
lawmaking looks to abstract social justice in order to decide how to reform or replace existing institutions 
in favor of those institutions that ought to be, jurisprudence identifies those decisions and applies them to 
particulars. Any instances of overlap are contingent, impure forms of the ideal. The impure forms will not 
necessarily be rare. On occasion, a product of legislation will require interpretation in light of its purposes 
before a judge, or official, or citizen can decide what it requires in order to enforce or follow it. Or, as in 
the individual case, we may recognize cases in which we should not act on legislation that seems patently 
absurd or morally unjustified.  These latter situations may be relatively unusual or extreme, perhaps 
involving apparent human rights violations or flagrant injustices that might warrant limited civil 
disobedience.  If this happens, we check legislation against, say, ideals of justice or fairness, which filter 
out any parts of legislation that are inconsistent with those ideals; only institutional principles that rise 
above that ideal threshold have any force for us.   But again, as in the individual case, in these situations 
morality merely serves as a normative filter on institutions, not as a standard for judging the identity of 
those institutions. 
                                                          
64 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 13–14, 100-101“Since justification is addressed to others, it proceeds from what is, or can be, held in common; 
and so we begin from shared fundamental ideas implicit in the public political culture in the hope of developing from them a political conception 
that can gain free and reasoned agreement in judgment.” 
143 
 
Like its metaphysical counterpart, the Factual Model, the freestanding conception of political 
judgment most explicitly underpins certain conceptions of legality, in particular the doctrine of legal 
positivism and its manifestations in originalist, intentionalist, and textualist, theories of legal 
interpretation. But it implicitly underwrites all theoretical conceptions that draw sharp, insulated 
distinctions between law and morality, the non-ideal and ideal, conventional and natural, valid and true, 
political and “comprehensive”. Consider again Rawlsian political liberalism. Rawls’s ideas of “the 
domain of the political” and of a “freestanding conception of justice” assume that there is a domain of 
practical reasoning about political institutions that is not only independent of theoretical philosophy but 
also independent of “comprehensive” moral theory itself.65  If it is to remain freestanding, the political 
conception must be constructed solely on the basis of political ideas implicit within the public political 
culture of a democratic society, independently of ideals peculiar to any citizen’s comprehensive doctrine:  
“A feature of public reasoning is that it proceeds entirely within a political conception of justice.”66 
Rawls holds that certain kinds of reasons, arguments, and judgments must be put off-limits in 
public life, even though people sincerely believe them to be true, and even though some of them might be 
true. These include principles that belong exclusively to people’s different religious, philosophical, and 
ethical views, to which not all reasonable citizens can agree. For citizens and officials to base their 
political judgments on these standards is to act for values that some conscientious citizens explicitly 
reject, and Rawls concluded that this borders on a violation of liberty of conscience.  For Rawls, the 
legitimate exercise of political power requires that citizens be reasonably expected to endorse at least the 
“essentials” of a constitution that regulates the exercise of political power.67 
In order to resolve all significant political questions regarding constitutional essentials, the 
political conception of justice must be “complete” if society is to avoid appealing to comprehensive 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines, which would otherwise be needed to determine the relative 
                                                          
65 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 38 
66 Ibid, 453 
67 Rawls’s final statement of this “Liberal Principles of Legitimacy” is in his “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. See Political Liberalism 
446-47, and Collected Papers, 578.  The principle states that "Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the 
reasons we would offer for our political actions - were we to state them as government officials - are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that 
other citizens might reasonably accept those reasons."  
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significance of political principles in order to judge and apply them.68  If comprehensive doctrines are 
needed to interpret and decide conflicts among institutions, then citizens would be subjected to laws that 
they cannot reasonably be expected to accept. Legitimacy therefore requires that public principles pre-
empt the comprehensive moral neighborhood. This is why, in Political Liberalism, Rawls tries to avoid 
relying on controversial philosophical and moral positions, and instead on ideas that he says are widely 
shared in liberal democratic cultures.  He converts the Kantian conception of the person and rational 
agency into what he views as non-controversial factual claims about how citizens in democratic societies 
regard themselves. In that sense, fundamental institutional principles can and must be judged entirely 
independently of the comprehensive values and ends to which citizens might subscribe. 
Of course Rawls also says that although institutional political principles are insulated from 
comprehensive values, they are nevertheless also justified by comprehensive values.  Rawls holds that a 
political conception will be stable over time because it should be able to generate an “overlapping 
consensus” on its principles among different reasonable comprehensive doctrines, each of which endorses 
the political conception for its own particular comprehensive reasons. All reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines will have sufficient reason to comply with the political conception. But the relation between 
those comprehensive ends and the principles they justify, is merely one of justification, not determination: 
our comprehensive ends may justify following common institutions, but the identity and content of those 
institutions must be judged independently of those ends.    
Perhaps the most influential recent account of the freestanding conception of judgment among 
legal philosophers is Joseph Raz’s theory of law.  At the core of Raz’s theory is a conceptual thesis about 
the nature of legal authority and its logical operation in practical reasoning. According to Raz, legal 
authorities guide their subjects’ action by issuing directives that are “pre-emptive” reasons.  Pre-emptive 
reasons are reasons that do not add to the balance of reasons for or against the directive (which includes 
the ends for the sake of which the authority directs us), but rather exclude that balance of reasons from the 
agents’ practical deliberation. This “pre-emption” thesis follows from the way, according to Raz, 
                                                          
68 Samuel Freeman emphasizes the importance for Rawls of the completeness of public reason. See his Rawls (New York: Routledge, 2007), 405 
145 
 
authoritative directives are normally justified.  Since, according to Raz, the point of recognizing someone 
or some institution as an authority in regard to certain practical matters (e.g. our ideal convictions about 
justice) is that we do better, in regard to those matters, by trying to follow the authority’s directives than 
by trying to act directly on our own judgments on those matters.  It follows that if our judgment of the 
identity of authoritative institutional directives were to depend on the controversial background ideals 
they are meant to replace, institutions could not perform their distinctive facilitating function. So they, 
and the reasons for them, cannot simply add to the balance of reasons, but must instead pre-empt them.69 
Several70 contemporary legal theorists have explicitly adopted a version of Raz’s pre-emptive 
model, and Jeremy Waldron has placed it at the center of his defense of a positivistic, majoritarian 
conception of law and democracy, which he calls “normative positivism”.71 Waldron writes that “The 
claim of the normative positivists is that the values associated with law, legality, and the rule of law—in a 
fairly rich sense—can best be achieved if the ordinary operation of such a system does not require people 
to exercise moral judgment in order to find out what the law is.”72  His positivist conception of law flows 
naturally from his majoritarian conception of democracy, which holds that, as the uniquely fair decision 
procedure in the circumstances of politics, majority rule must be able to produce decisions whose identity 
and content can be judged independently of the very issues the procedure was meant to pronounce upon.73 
Finally, deliberative conceptions of democracy also illustrate the freestanding view of judgment.  
Remarks by Josh Cohen, whose work on public reason follows Rawls in several essential respects, imply 
the freestanding view’s contention that we cannot judge the requirements of a domain of common public 
                                                          
69 See Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Chapter 3; Practical Reason and Norms, 192-193; and “Authority, Law, and Morality” in Ethics in the 
Public Domain, 199-204  
70 See for instance Tom Campbell’s The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (Dartmouth, 1996) 3, “The Point of Legal Positivism”, 9 Kings 
College Law Journal 63, 1998-1999 (78-79), and Neil MacCormick’s “The Ethics of Legalism”, Ratio Juris. Vol. 2 No. 2 July 1989 (184-93) 
186, 188.  Jeremy Waldron and Gerald Postema suggest that philosophers who may have been committed to some version of it include Thomas 
Hobbes, David Hume, and Jeremy Bentham.  See Waldron's Law and Disagreement, 166-167; and Postema, Bentham and The Common Law 
Tradition (Oxford:  Clarendon, 1986). 
71 See Waldron’s Law and Disagreement, 130-131 (for his discussion of Raz, see 95-96) and his “Normative Positivism” in Coleman (Ed.) Hart’s 
Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law (Oxford: OUP, 2001) 421.  There are many other examples of democratic 
proceduralism that share the basic freestanding structure.  See, for example, John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial 
Review (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), chapters 4 and 5. 
72 Waldron, “Normative Positivism”, 421 
73 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 107-108. “We must find a way of choosing a single policy in which [people who disagree] can participate 
despite our disagreement on the merits. And since each is to act independently once this method of choice has been followed, each must have a 
way of identifying just one of the proposed policies as 'ours', i.e. as the one which 'we' are following. That ability must not involve the use of any 
criterion such as C…for it is precisely disagreement about the application of C that gives rise to the decision-problem in the first place...” 
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justification if those judgments rely on politically contested reasons:  He writes that “An appeal to reason 
cannot help us ‘get behind’ the plurality of competing moral, political, religious, metaphysical outlooks, 
because the nature and competence of reason is one matter on which such outlooks disagree…Instead, I 
accept (with Rawls) the relative autonomy of political reason. Political reason is autonomous in that it can 
and should proceed in articulating a conception of democracy without relying on an encompassing 
philosophy of life or claiming to resolve the controversies among them, including controversies about the 
nature and competence of reason.”74 
Like Rawls, Cohen’s desire to sidestep disagreement by anchoring political reason to freestanding 
institutional structures requires that we be able to judge the content of these structures without relying on 
controversial ideals that might be thought to justify them.  This ambition characterizes many purely 
procedural conceptions of democracy that hope to tie political legitimacy to some canonical set of social 
facts—in particular the manner or procedure by which a decision was made—that, perhaps along with 
their logical entailments, fixes the existence and content of institutional principles.75    Thus, for example, 
Jürgen Habermas insists that the burden of legitimation for all laws, including basic rights, falls on a 
discursive procedure, and in particular on the “formal pragmatic conditions” that are assumed in effective 
reason-giving and argumentation.76  Although Habermas presents democratic procedures and substantive 
rights as if they were internally related, 77 Habermas labors to emphasize that his own legal paradigm is 
“procedural”, rather than based on substantive ideals or rights.  Whenever we want to convince one 
another of something, we always automatically and implicitly presume that we sufficiently approximate 
the ideal conditions of a speech situation immunized against repression and inequality.  Habermas’s 
“discourse principle” requires we meet these ideal conditions in justifying norms and making value 
decisions.  The legitimacy of political decision depends on whether norms and values could find the 
rational assent, through a communicative procedure, of all those affected.   “Rightness”, both in 
                                                          
74 Josh Cohen, “Reflections on Habermas on Democracy”, 387.  Original emphasis. 
75 Within convergence theories I include contract-based theories, and communitarian theories that ground institutional principles on traditional 
sources insofar as those sources are factually understood. 
76 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge:  MIT Press, 1996) 
77 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 26. 
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lawmaking and adjudication, “means rational acceptability supported by good reasons.”  But we have no 
way of determining whether any decision or judgment is in fact right except “only discursively, precisely 
by way of a justification that is carried out with arguments.”78 This purely procedural account of 
legitimacy is, in part, to distance his own view from the view that the democratic process could derive its 
legitimacy from an a priori (as in non-institutional) conception of the good or shared ethical or religious 
background.  Habermas writes, “under conditions of post-metaphysical thinking we cannot expect a 
further-reaching consensus that would include substantive issues [such as the specification of the content 
of rights]”; “the democratic process bears the entire burden of legitimation.”79  Habermas thus seems to 
accept, with Cohen and Rawls, that diverse societies should try to circumvent substantive disagreements 
by grounding political action on standards whose identity and operation do not turn in any way on the 
issues that divide us, but only on certain institutional facts whose requirements can be judged 
independently of the ideals we might think justify them. 
 
2.14 The Integrated View of Collective Legislation and Judgment 
The integrated view does not deny that legislation and judgment are distinct powers with distinct 
functions and proper subject matters.  But it does reject both the independence of these two powers and 
subject matters. According to the integrated view, a political community’s powers of legislation and 
judgment are, and ought to be, understood as integrated, not independent.  It regards these two powers as 
integrated because only on that assumption is it possible for a political community to legislate, judge, and 
act on a unified, systematic, consistent set of institutional political principles; that is, the integrated view 
is essential to realizing the unity of political principle. 
The integrated view seeks an ideal of coherence, or what Ronald Dworkin calls “political 
integrity”, among a political community’s set of institutional principles. When this ideal of integrity is 
met, then government’s behavior as a whole—in its decisions, judgments, and coercive acts—can be 
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understood to express and to be committed to a theory of justice and fairness to which it must hold itself 
on all occasions where it applies.  Of course the views of many different office holders (legislators, 
judges, and citizens in their capacities as voters and deliberators) contribute in very different ways to 
molding the content of legal institutions.  Nevertheless, the integrated view requires that each office-
holder should try to create, judge, and argue about our institutional principles as though these institutions 
represent a single, unified conception of justice.   
Just as in the moral case, the idea of political integrity does not merely demand logical 
consistency among laws, but rather insists that legislation and judgment seek to create and identify a 
public scheme of institutional principles that treat relevantly like cases alike.  Political integrity unifies 
two general sets of institutional principles, which Dworkin refers to as principles of justice and principles 
of fairness, and which pervade lawmaking and jurisprudential practice.80  Principles of justice, in 
Dworkin’s vocabulary, are a matter of the right substantive outcomes the political system produces. They 
refer to the proper distribution of goods, opportunities, and other resources.  Principles of fairness 
primarily concern lawmaking and adjudicative procedures, and are “a matter of the right structure for that 
system, the structure that distributes influence over political decisions in the right way.”81  Principles of 
fairness are all tied to specific institutions—such as legislative or electoral institutions—and their 
procedures for reaching outcomes within the community.  Two such principles of fairness are what today 
we refer to as legislative supremacy—the principle that enacted laws must be given effect even if their 
content is not substantively just—and the doctrine of precedent—the principle that present courts are 
bound by past judicial decisions.  Political integrity requires that we treat both the substantive outcomes 
and principles of political fairness found within legal systems as if they function in a coherent relation.  
This is a very different understanding of the relationship between these two kinds of principles than what 
many political theorists hold.  On a common view, just outcomes may conflict with fair procedures, and 
usually the latter is said to pre-empt the former when we disagree about justice and need a common 





decision.82  On Dworkin’s view, both substantive and procedural principles are embedded in a 
community’s political record.  Political integrity requires lawmakers and interpreters of this record to 
construct an overall interpretation of these principles so that it reflects, so far as possible, “coherent 
principles of political fairness, substantive justice, and procedural due process, and reflects these 
combined in the right relation.”83 
Integrity requires that, in interpreting the legal practice as a whole, we give effect to all of these 
principles, even those that would seem to pull against what might seem to be substantive coherence in the 
law’s principles of fairness or justice considered on their own.  That is, we may have to give effect to 
basic principles of distributive justice even if that requires adjusting principles of democratic fairness that 
may be at odds with basic justice, and that we must generally give effect to statutes even when the best 
possible interpretation of a statute still is inconsistent with our own views about what substantive justice 
requires.  If we neglected to legislate and judge these sets of values in their best relation—if, for example, 
we gave exceptionless priority to one over the other—then our acts of legislation and judgment would do 
a worse job of realizing overall integrity in the public scheme of principle as a whole.  If, for instance, a 
judge were to ignore the principle of legislative supremacy whenever doing so would allow her to create 
and enforce a more just law, then she would violate integrity overall, that is, integrity between the 
principles that justify legislative supremacy and the substantive principles she seeks unilaterally.84  In 
interpreting law, we must not seek integrity viewed from the standpoint of substantive justice or fairness 
alone—that is, coherence in the substantive principles of justice or of fairness that flow through the law—
because doing so would violate a wider integrity that gives effect to all of the law’s component virtues.   
                                                          
82 See the above discussion of Waldron’s circumstances of politics and the pre-emptive character of majoritarian decision rules. 
83 Dworkin, LE 404.  Dworkin does not claim that legal principles found in any existing legal system must be coherent, and in fact he admits that 
they may be contradictory;  he insists only that in order to judge what counts as an instance of law in any given case, one must assume that  “these 
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84 Dworkin also refers to this form of ‘overall’ integrity which obtains between institutional and substantive principles as “inclusive” integrity.  It 
is inclusive because ‘pure’ integrity among only the substantive principles in the legal system may have to be qualified in order to accommodate 
or ‘include’ the normative pull of institutional principles also found in the law.  What results is a wider form of integrity which envelops all 
principles in the legal system. See LE 404-407. 
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A critic might raise the following objection to the idea of integrity.85  A legislator or a judge bent 
on integrity may—indeed in all likelihood will—be required to reach decisions in particular cases that run 
contrary to the decisions he would likely reach if he showed more direct concern for ideals of justice.  If 
integrity really is an independent political virtue, then is it not possible that its demands might conflict 
with the requirements of justice, and in such cases, when a choice between the two is needed, do we not 
lose something in the way of justice by seeking integrity instead?   If so, does the concern for integrity not 
therefore amount to embracing half a loaf of justice in the interest of a fuller loaf of coherence? And 
wouldn’t a half a loaf of coherence be preferred to a fuller loaf of justice?   
This is an important objection.  It should be noted that Dworkin himself does not hang his case 
for the value of integrity on the assumption that pursuing it will lead to a more just society than by 
pursuing justice directly case-by-case.86  He does, however, seem to accept this objection’s supposition 
that justice and integrity are in fact distinct values that might compete with each other.  Much, therefore, 
seems to turn on the truth of that claim, that is, on whether or not there is a genuine tension between 
justice and integrity so that the objection expresses a real worry. The relation between justice and 
integrity—especially whether they compete with one another—is an interesting and, in my view, 
important topic worth further exploration.  Some recent work argues that they do not conflict.87  Gerald 
Postema and Jeremy Waldron, for instance, have suggested, in different ways, that they are not in fact in 
competition with each other.  Postema thinks that integrity, in some sense, really is the embodiment of 
principles of justice that speak to citizens under the conditions of ordinary political life in which people 
disagree about what ideal justice really means.  Integrity, he says, is “justice in workclothes”.88  Waldron 
also sees no conflict because he understands integrity as operating at a different “level” of practical reason 
than justice does, a level characterized by the circumstances in which integrity’s demands are 
unnoticeable.   Integrity, he says, is a value that kicks in only when, first, disagreement about justice 
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makes the realization of perfect justice untenable and, second, when institutions charged with settling 
disagreement over justice produce outcomes that conflict with each other.  It is misleading to speak of 
conflict between justice and integrity, Waldron says, precisely because integrity is important only because 
justice matters but cannot be pursued directly in the circumstances of politics.89 
There is another response to this objection, however, which does not require resting integrity on 
justice in these ways.  As we will see in Section 3.3, in a rational moral system, principles connect to and 
reinforce each other along both a “vertical” dimension—which connects abstract and concrete 
principles—and a “horizontal” dimension—where relevant similarities and analogies determine 
principles’ applications.  We might say that an institutional conception of justice is unified or well 
integrated when relatively concrete principles in the system cohere with or intelligibly flow from the most 
abstract principles in the system, as when a particular system of taxation really is the best expression of an 
abstract egalitarian ideal a system recognizes.  When this coherence between the particular and the 
abstract obtains, the system has vertical integrity.  However, a conception could be vertically well 
integrated only locally among principles at a certain level of abstraction, as when the discrete principles 
governing the law of negligence cohere among themselves even if they do not, as a whole, cohere with 
the most general principles of distributive justice in the entire institutional system.  This distinction 
between local and general vertical integrity enables us to say that advances in general vertical integrity 
might compensate for departures from more local integrity.90  A superior concrete conception of equality 
might represent a departure from local integrity, while also representing an improvement in vertical 
integrity because it better fits the more abstract and higher egalitarian requirements that justify the rest of 
the system.  If we think that justice is essentially a matter of equality (for example), and if our institutions 
recognize a general egalitarian constraint, then improvements in the system’s overall justice would not 
necessarily compromise integrity overall, even if it compromised integrity locally.  Similarly, an 
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improvement in vertical integrity may actually lead to a more just system in the abstract.  There need not 
be a tension between these two values. 
Dworkin recognizes that our institutions constantly violate integrity in a particular way.91  Areas 
of our institutional structure may express coherence when considered on their own, but may not cohere in 
principle with other areas of the law because these different departments were determined by different 
bodies with different powers and at different times.  The American constitutional system, for example, 
creates a federal system that assigns different states sovereignty over the same issues. Even if each state’s 
laws taken in isolation are coherent, that does not guarantee harmony between all of the states’ laws taken 
together.  But that is not necessarily a violation of integrity overall, because the federal principle is itself a 
higher-order unifying standard about the proper division of power between national and local levels.  
Since there may be principled reasons to allow those differences across states, then the local 
inconsistencies can be understood as part of a deeper, underlying collaboration of principle. But there 
may be limits to the degree of local inconsistency that integrity can tolerate before those inconsistencies 
undermine the purpose of the system which permits them.  In that case, it may be that local integrity must 
yield to a wider integrity.  We have seen this occur in the United States as some matters of principle 
formerly left to the states, including abortion and marriage laws, have ceded to a national standard out of 
a concern for principled consistency on a national level.   
These considerations suggest how the integrated view and the ideal of political integrity blur the 
distinction between legislation and jurisprudence, and depart from the freestanding view’s sharp division 
of responsibilities between legislative and adjudicative offices.  Consistency with the political record is 
commonly regarded as an essential responsibility of certain officials who occupy certain offices, and who 
perform certain kinds of tasks.  A Supreme Court Justice paradigmatically acquits her responsibilities by 
deciding and acting in strict accordance with the political record.   Her signature responsibility is to 
enforce the rule of law, which is an ideal that constrains political power by the impersonal force of public 
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standards previously announced, rather than by any particular individual’s unconstrained judgment.92  If 
we associate fidelity to the record with this view of the rule of law, we might be tempted to think that 
reasoning from past practice to current political decisions is solely a matter of legal judgment.   
But, according to the integrated view, fidelity to the political record is an intrinsic virtue of all 
exercises of political power, whether through deliberating, voting, or legislating, in addition to judging.  
The integrated view assumes that the general practical question anyone who is not a revolutionary 
confronts is neither, “why institutions?”, nor “which institutions should we ideally have?”, but rather, 
“given the institutions we already have, and the extraordinary power these institutions give to certain 
office-holders, how must the office-holder act in changing and judging them?  How should I, as a citizen, 
or legislator, or official, act in my institutionally defined capacity?”  These acts occur within an 
institutional context, inside an existing constitutional framework, not on a blank slate. We act within 
institutions both when we are following them and when are changing them. We debate about justice and 
fairness through the institutions we have, seeking to reform these institutions as we use them. As Dworkin 
has put this point, “[p]olitics, for us, is evolutionary rather than axiomatic; we recognize, in working 
toward a perfectly just state, that we already belong to a different one.”93 
The idea of integrity thus introduces an essential, not merely contingent, backward-looking, 
indeed conservative aspect to legislation.  We saw that the freestanding view regards this conservative 
element as incidental, as a mere instrument or even a practical obstacle to legislation, like old plumbing 
we might gut if we could.  The integrated view, by contrast, regards this conservative element as essential 
to the very idea of valid legislation, something worth protecting in all legislation for its own sake, and a 
condition of legislation’s legitimacy.  The constraint of integrity is not limited to occasions on which 
government is actually enforcing demands but in principle extends to all political action that might 
ground obligations imposed on others.  It requires that a political community use its coercive power to 
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93 Dworkin, LE 164 
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enforce some standard only when that standard flows from and is constrained by the community’s own 
past decisions, judgments, and actions.   
Similarly, the integrated view rejects the idea that legal judgment can or should abstract entirely 
from the ideals of justice and fairness that legislation aims to serve. It cannot abstract from these ideals 
because every judgment of principle relies in a necessary, though usually concealed way, on some 
reflection about the ideals principles serve.  To see why, consider again the individual case. In Section 
3.5, I describe why all practical action in general requires judgment, which is simply recognizing what 
ought to be done in awareness that there are no conflicting considerations.  But, we even unreflective 
practical judgment still relies, in clandestine fashion, on an assumption about what ideals our principles 
serve.  For even when we act on what seem to be obvious principles, we tacitly judged, “negatively” and 
perhaps unawares, that no other consideration competes in a way that forces self-conscious reflection on 
the value of adhering to those obvious principles.  But even in what are usually obvious cases, 
imagination or more attention to our situation could potentially reveal a conflict that forces more noticed 
reflection on not only the content of our principles, but on the purposes they are meant to serve, and in 
light of which we might refine them and resolve the conflict. The relation between principles and the 
ideals that justify them remain submerged in easy cases, but those ideals are always there exercising 
control, but only become apparent when our practical deliberation needs to become more concerted in 
order to figure out what we must do.94  To put it metaphorically, the force and content of any principle 
always depends on a surrounding belt of other principles that restrict, limit, shape, and justify it. 
As in the moral case, institutional principles can fail to guide us when the actions they instruct us 
to take are abstract or, as I noted in Section 2.4, conflict either “internally” with themselves or, in extreme 
cases, “externally” with the ideals that are supposed to justify them.  When these failures and conflicts 
arise, institutional principles must be interpreted before an official or citizen can decide what they require 
in order to enforce or follow them.  Sometimes, interpretation is necessary when a law is stated abstractly 
in a way that does not indicate how it is to be applied in concrete circumstances. The abstract rights of 
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modern liberal constitutions—freedom, equality, dignity, and so on—are abstract in this way because they 
do not on their own suggest their impact on particular social situations, and so an idealized judgment of 
some kind, drawn from our own understanding of the value of these rights, needs to be made in order to 
apply them. On other occasions, interpretation in light of our ideals is needed to resolve conflicts when 
two or more institutional principles appear to collide internally.  On the freestanding view, resolving these 
conflicts involves adopting an essentially legislative stance in order to fill apparent “gaps” of 
indeterminacy in institutional guidance.  But on the integrated view, by contrast, these resolutions involve 
coming to a better understanding of what the conflicting principles really are and require. For example, on 
a question of hate speech, a principle requiring the freedom of expression may collide with a principle of 
toleration or equal citizenship.  The conflict may be resolved in ways described in Chapters 1 and 3, by 
distinguishing facts of the case, or by assessing the strength of the competing principles by formulating 
some hypothesis, rationale, or a justification for them that might enable us to limit their scope and thereby 
release us from one of them. If, for instance, we think the special protection our institutions give to 
freedom of speech is justified by the instrumental importance of that freedom to the discovery of truth, 
then we might decide against a right to inane, purely hateful speech that plainly has no redeeming value in 
the marketplace of ideas.  But if we think free speech is better justified by a principle that, as a matter of 
equal citizenship, no one may be denied expression of an opinion simply because it is offensive, then we 
may reach the opposite decision. We would have to choose between these two options by taking one to 
provide a superior justification of free expression than the other does.  But without some conception of 
the political ideals we take these principles to serve we could have no idea which principle or justification 
to choose. So the resolution of conflicts like this would seem to depend on our ideals. 
This approach to internal conflicts supposes that ideal principles are, in a sense, “embedded” or 
implicit in, or presupposed by our political practices. Though they are part of the institutional practice, 
they are “unenumerated” principles and so have not been explicitly acknowledged in some factual sense 
such as having been declared in writing or even having been anticipated or intended by anyone in 
advance.  They can be appealed to in order to adjudicate conflicts and to fill apparent “gaps” in 
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institutional guidance. We begin identifying these background principles first with a rough sense of the 
political facts that are relevant to a particular problem—the positive enactments, court decisions, and 
whatever additional facts might seem to be in the neighborhood of the problem—and then hypothesize a 
principle that supplies a rationale for those facts.  For example, it may be possible to extract a novel 
principle protecting individual privacy in consensual sexual relations between homosexuals from a 
political record that already recognizes principles protecting similar right to privacy among interracial 
couples, heterosexual relationships, a principle protecting privacy in making procreative decisions, 
including a limited right to abortion, and principles protecting the use and sale of contraception.95  
Perhaps underpinning all of these principles of privacy is an implicit commitment to something like 
Mill’s Harm Principle, or perhaps Kant’s Innate Right to Independence.  If so, then failure to extend that 
more general justifying principle to the case of homosexuals would represent a failure to allow that more 
general principle its full extension.  That failure would mean that a community accepts a principle to 
justify part of what it does that it must also reject in order to justify other things it does.  It would mean, in 
other words, that it acts in a contradictory, unprincipled way. 
What I called “external” conflict occurs when institutional principles conflict with ideal principles 
themselves.  When that happens, there is a prima facie conflict between the reasons that justify deferring 
to those institutional principles (e.g. principles of order like the need for settlement, coordination, 
authoritative guidance, etc.) and reasons that justify our ideals.  These conflicts are most vivid in extreme 
cases, such as apparent human rights violations or flagrant injustices that might warrant limited civil 
disobedience, or where the legitimacy of some institutions may be in doubt. These conflicts refine our 
understanding of the scope of the principles involved in the conflict.  An all-out judgment that an 
institutional principle should prevail over an ideal is not merely an arbitrary choice between fully 
specified principles, but includes a reworking of the principles themselves in light of each other. This 
represents another way in which institutional and ideal principles are sensitive to one another. 
                                                          
95 See Dworkin’s discussion of Eisenstadt in “Law’s Ambition for Itself”, 179-81 
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Political integrity, and the integrated view of legislation and judgment it requires,  thus suppose 
that institutional principles are working, dynamic notions that fit together systematically as a public 
theory of justice to which a political community can commit itself.  The clear requirements—the positive 
law—furnish an abstract basis for argument and interpretation, the raw materials or skeleton for a public 
conception of justice we construct through interpretation in light of the ends we each believe they serve.  
They guide us on the assumption that the public theory they represent is a unity, that there are single right 
answers to what our public perspective requires of us in particular circumstances.  Since the content of 
institutional principles depends in part on our own ideals, we understand institutional principles fully in 
vivo, as occupying an active, if not always obvious, role within each citizen’s moral life.  
In my view, this is conceptually quite plausible.  If institutional principles comprise a set of 
perspectival principles, then they should bear at least some formal resemblance to those true principles on 
which they offer a perspective.  In political morality, those true principles comprise a conception of 
justice, and so presumably our institutional principles should at least be recognizable as a conception of 
justice, which is not likely to happen unless we can judge those institutional principles in the light of 
some background understanding of what a conception of justice is like. In other words, the reasons for 
having a public perspective on justice are also—and equally—reasons for legislating and judging that 
perspective on the assumption that it operates as a conception of justice might operate.  
Moreover, if institutional principles are understood as comprising a community’s theory of 
justice, then we can draw a useful analogy between institutional political principles and an individual’s 
moral principles. As in the individual case, a community must exercise judgment, interpret, and revise its 
principles in light of each other in order to unify them.  In that way, institutional principles can guide 
communities on the assumption that these principles form a unity, that there are single right answers to 
what our public perspective requires of us in particular circumstances. This model would ensure that there 
is an institutionally prescribed answer to all possible cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the 
community’s public political theory of justice. In Chapters 4 through 7, I emphasize the connection 
between this feature of the integrated model and the justification of coercive power, which many, 
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including Kant, Dworkin, and much of the republican tradition of political thought, believed requires 
constraining public power with a system of laws that is capable of authorizing all exercise of it. 
Finally, the integrated view has interesting implications for how we might argue in political life.  
Typically, this issue is framed as a choice between two exhaustive and mutually exclusive possibilities: 
either people should be allowed to invoke their ideal “comprehensive” convictions in public life, or they 
may only appeal to “public” reasons that comprise a distinct and independent set of standards.96 Theorists 
then scramble to try to delineate crisp boundaries between these two domains. On the integrated view, 
however, although there is a distinct domain of institutional principles that might ground public argument, 
the content of those principles depends on our ideals because only through those ideals can we fully 
identify what our institutions instruct. But this means that ideals unavoidably play a role in institutional 
guidance and therefore in the direction of public power; we cannot simply bracket them as illegitimate 
political justifications.
                                                          
96 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” in Political Liberalism, 435 
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Part II.  A Case from Analysis 
 
Ch. 3: Argument, Truth, Uncertainty, and Regret 
This chapter begins what I called in the Introduction a case from “analysis” for the unity of moral 
principle in general.  I argue that the Principled Model better fits certain features of our moral practice 
than does the Factual Model.  The features I have in mind are what I assume many would accept as 
central aspects of the structure of normative argument, deliberation, and judgment, and I show that several 
familiar and famous philosophical theses reflect these aspects. In Section 3.8 and in Chapter 4, I extend 
these arguments to the special case of political principles.    
First, the Principled Model better fits our understanding of what normative justification involves, 
and in particular that justification does not rest ultimately on intuitions of facts, but rather ultimately on 
other principles. A principle is justified not by some independent, bare social or physical fact or moral 
property, but by an argument that renders it rationally intelligible to us and locates it in a system of 
principles.  Second, the Principled Model provides a more plausible account of what could count as 
normative truth.  What grounds a principle’s truth is identical to the standard of justified acceptance of 
that principle, which is simply that it is well justified by other principles.  Unlike propositions about facts, 
there is no further truth “out there” to ground a principle’s truth.  So our ways of organizing practical 
principles into a systematic unity constitute not only a standard of justified belief about principles, but 
furnishes a standard of objective knowledge about principles. Third, the Principled Model better accounts 
for the phenomenology of conflict, in particular familiar experiences of struggle and uncertainty in hard 
moral cases.  We need the idea of unity to make sense of our reticence in these cases.  Finally, the 
Principled Model preserves and accounts for the phenomenology of moral regret, which is the experience 
of there being something “leftover” in a hard moral decision.  It explains this phenomenon as involving a 
conflation of two distinct perspectives we adopt toward a hard decision, one that focuses on defeated 




3.1 Principles Are Not Generalized From What Is or Happens 
I want to try to persuade you, if you are not already convinced, that it is part of the very idea of a principle 
that it is a necessary truth and that what one ought to do in a particular circumstance is rationally 
intelligible.   In order to show this, it will help to highlight what I hope you might agree are important 
differences between principles and contingent facts about the natural world.  Facts about, say, the number 
of hairs on your head, planets in our solar system, rocks in Alaska, historical events about what people 
have said, done, thought, desired, willed, intended, or been inclined toward, and probabilistic facts about 
what effects certain events and actions might cause, are contingent:  they could have been otherwise.  It is 
perfectly conceivable, for example, that every aspect of our world could have turned out to be exactly as it 
is now, but with one exception, which is that you have exactly one more hair on your head than you 
currently do.  It is not a necessary fact that you have any particular number of hairs on your head. Of 
course there may be some causal-historical story to tell about your heredity, age, or stress levels, or 
fashion sense, that might explain why you have the number of hairs you currently do, but the fact that that 
story actually unfolded rather than some other story is not necessary.   Perhaps if we had a complete (and 
unimaginably massive) data set of all biological, genetic, and environmental facts pertinent to your hair 
growth over the years, along with a complete specification of all physical laws, we could jam all of this 
information into a supercomputer that could deduce from those premises (the laws and the facts) the 
number of hairs you necessarily would have at some later point. But even then the result would be 
contingent because although that result would follow necessarily from its premises, the premises 
themselves are contingent.  Scientific laws are often hypotheses from which scientists deduce or predict 
certain consequences that can be tested against experience, and so deduction is indeed an essential part of 
the scientific method.  But the soundness of those deductions ultimately depends on experience because 
the hypotheses that figure in the premises are among the results or conclusions to be supported by 
evidence, and the inference from observational evidence to hypothesis is surely not deductive, and does 
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not carry its necessity.1  So even deductively inferred scientific conclusions are still contingent because 
the laws of nature that serve as premises in their deduction are contingent because a posteriori. We cannot 
insist on a deductive explanation of those laws because we would need a conception of the situation from 
which those laws emerged (of what things were like before the Big Bang, for instance) in order to deduce 
them, or even to judge them as probable or accidental.  But we do not have that sense.2 
So it seems that contingent facts about the world are ultimately brute.  It may not be possible for 
us to see why they are the way they are, why falling bodies accelerate at exactly the rate they do.  Perhaps 
on some occasion they might inexplicably stop falling altogether and instead spontaneously start rising 
up, contrary to our best physical theories.  That would certainly be surprising, but it would not be an 
absurdity.  As Hume wrote, “It implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an 
object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary 
effects.  May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all 
other respects resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire?  Is there any more intelligible 
proposition than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and 
June?”3 
But whereas facts could be messy in these ways, moral principles seem different.  For example, it 
would be very odd to hold that we might intuit or induce from some kind of moral properties or regular 
patterns of actions in our world the principle that people should not rape, but that perhaps one day we 
might discover that rape is actually permissible on Thursdays, and even required on Mondays.  We do not 
seem to think that the rightness or wrongness of rape can just happen to be a particular way, with no 
further account of why it is that way.  If someone were to suggest that in a particular circumstance, rape is 
                                                          
1  I follow W.C. Salmon who explains why hypothetico-deductive scientific methods ultimately rely on induction in “The Problem of Induction”, 
excerpted in Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings (6th Edition), Perry et. al (eds) (New York: Oxford, 2013), 224. 
2  See Thomas Nagel’s fascinating discussion in “Why is There Anything?”  in Secular Philosophy and The Religious Temperament (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009) 28. This understanding of nature seems compatible with a traditional understanding of God as an omnipotent, 
omniscient, and good creator, for that understanding of God does not itself necessitate that He would create any particular set of natural laws 
rather than another.  An omnipotent creator may well have decided to create something entirely different.  All that follows from that divine choice 
is, as Leibniz once wrote, “necessary only by a hypothetical necessity,” that is a necessity conditioned  a choice that was not necessary, but rather 
might have been otherwise.  Leibniz “Letters to Arnaud” from Leibniz: Philosophical Writings, G.H.R. Parkinson (ed.) (Everyman’s Library, 
1934)  
3 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Eric Steinberg (Ed.) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 22 
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actually permissible, it would certainly make sense to insist on a justification why it is permissible under 
that circumstance.  Any “discovery” of that kind would have to include a further accounting in terms of a 
factual change in circumstance, a change that justifies an exception to the general principle that one ought 
not to rape.  If this were not generally true about principles—that is, if principles could just happen to be 
some way or another—then it would be possible that the deletion of one molecule from the universe could 
eliminate all normative truths without any further reason why that deletion has that normative 
consequence.4  But that seems hard to conceive.  If a change in our circumstance makes a difference to 
what we ought to do, that must be because there is a reason that explains why that change makes a 
normative difference, and that reason consists in some more general principle that justifies the change’s 
normative significance and renders it rationally intelligible to us.  This seems to be because principles, 
unlike facts, do not stand alone as brute features of reality.  They lack the ultimate contingency of facts, 
and cannot be inferred simply from any collection of observations of facts without some further reason 
why those facts have the normative implications they do.   As Kant held, “with respect to moral laws, 
experience is (alas!) the mother of illusion, and it is most reprehensible to derive the laws concerning 
what I ought to do from what is done.”5  This seems correct.  Just as we do not “justify” apples falling 
from trees, we do not collect “evidence” through experience or moral “sense” for wrongness. 
I anticipate the following line of objection.   Even if we grant that in our world rape is wrong, 
why could there not be a world in which rape is permissible?  Indeed, do we not see that kind of variety in 
our own world, and even in ourselves? We see cultures throughout history for which practices that we 
would find odious, like human sacrifice, were right, and even today we find societies in fairly similar 
factual circumstances following very different normative practices.  Moreover, this objection continues, 
don’t individuals often find themselves in similar situations willing, desiring, and inclined to perform 
different and incompatible actions?  How could we explain this kind of cross-cultural, interpersonal, and 
intrapersonal moral variation unless we accept that principles are contingent? 
                                                          
4 I am adapting Mark Greenberg’s illustration of the same point in connection with legal principles.  “How Facts Make Law”, Legal Theory, 10 
(2004), 157–198, 164 
5 Kant, CPR A318/B375 
163 
 
This objection confuses principles with facts about which principles are practiced, or accepted, or 
that individuals are inclined to pursue.  These social and psychological facts simply add to the countless 
other facts that comprise our circumstance in which we must act.  They are considerations or desiderata, 
not normative directives.  Since principles express how the world ought to be, not how any particular 
world happens to be, they cannot be contingent in the way these facts about which principles are accepted 
are contingent.  If it is morally true that rape is wrong, then there cannot be a world in which rape is 
generally permissible because, by hypothesis, such a world would be morally defective; it would be a 
world we ought to change through our actions.  Moreover, despite the undeniable diversity the objection 
correctly points out, all cultures seem to share a more basic assumption which confirms the necessity of 
principles.  Different cultures must hold, not that their moral principles are right for them, or for their 
culture, or their time.  Rather they must hold they are simply right.  Only on that assumption can the 
moral differences between cultures count as disagreements.  In order for cultural differences about 
morality to count as disagreements about morality, there would have to be some deeper, objective, 
universally valid idea about which these cultures take opposing views and take themselves to be 
disagreeing.6    Otherwise, cross-cultural disagreement truly would be preposterous, and the entire 
practice of moral argument a deluded joke and a massive error, like arguing over which flavor of ice 
cream tastes best. 
 In any case, it is worth noting that the objection’s premise, about the prevalence of disagreement, 
is easy to exaggerate.  Different cultures tend to converge rather dramatically upon certain general 
principles.  They condemn betrayal, theft, deception, and accept ideals of fidelity, honesty, loyalty, and 
more.  This is easy to lose sight of amid differences over what these ideals require in particular situations, 
and since many factors produce different customs and social conventions, including people’s factual 
beliefs, education, and the physical circumstances in which cultures develop.  But these more concrete 
differences do not necessarily reflect disagreements at the most general levels about right and wrong, 
                                                          
6 My own view, for which I argue in Chapter 5, is that this underlying idea is human dignity, and that different individuals and cultures interpret 




good and evil.  Even apparent disagreements about ultimate principles and the ends of human life—say 
between utilitarians, perfectionists, monotheists, and Kantians—seem to presuppose the universal validity 
of these competing conceptions, and the fundamental importance of human life going well rather than 
being wasted.  
 
3.2 Principles Are Justified By What Ought to Be or Happen 
If we accept these reflections on the differences between facts and principles—if, for instance, we believe 
that rape is wrong even for someone who does not accept or practice its wrongness—then we already 
have a strong reason to reject the Factual Model, according to which principles, like brute facts, are 
contingent truths. The Principled Model, by contrast, accounts for the necessity and universality of 
principles because it insists that principles, not facts, have the last word in normative argument.  As we 
saw in Section 1.3, the basic unit of normative justification, the Aristotelian practical syllogism, expresses 
this important idea.   It reminds us that facts are practical reasons only within their role as minor premises 
in a sound practical inference.  This basic idea behind the Principled Model, that principles are needed to 
select facts as normatively relevant, is also well captured in several famous philosophical positions.  It 
reflects, for example, a philosophical puzzle as old as Plato’s Euthyphro.  Is something pious because the 
gods love it, or do the gods love it because it is pious?  Analogously, we might ask: should we do as the 
gods say because they say so or because we ought to do as the gods say?  Socrates’ question exposes a 
crude reductionism in Euthyphro’s account of piety, and more generally in any attempt to explain a type 
of value, not just in terms of a simpler part (as we might explain water in terms of H20), but in terms of 
something entirely different from value, namely what someone (e.g. the gods) accepts as valuable.  
Acceptance is a type of brute, descriptive fact that cannot itself justify a value statement without relying 
on some other value which makes that acceptance normatively relevant. The upshot—the reason 
Euthyphro’s definition of piety is unsustainable—is that value is not reducible to a bare fact about what 
someone or some being said, did, or willed. 
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A parallel point may be found in a position often ascribed to David Hume, who is widely 
interpreted to have said that normative propositions about what ought to be can never be known through 
an inference solely from propositions about what is the case.7 “Hume’s Law” expresses the important idea 
that the normative cannot be transcended by the descriptive.  Whatever the facts, the question “Given 
these facts, what should I do?” is always in order.  No fact of any kind—no desire or emotion or feeling, 
no habit or practice or convention, no contingent cultural or social practice—could render that question 
pointless because no fact about our situation could, on its own, ground an answer to that question.  Of 
course if we uncompromisingly divide possible objects of knowledge, as Hume did, into relations of ideas 
and empirically known matters of fact, then we might, as he also did, conclude skeptically that there is no 
such thing as an objective moral principle.8  Hume believed that value judgments are expressions of a 
special moral sentiment or feeling, not reports of objective principles, and so they could not be true or 
false.9  Therefore, since any principle that could bridge the gap between is and ought is not even eligible 
for objective truth, any inferred “ought” judgment couldn’t be true either.  But Hume’s division of 
knowledge is too narrow, and seems contrary to our everyday views about morality.  As I suggested in the 
Introduction, the idea that our moral discourse expresses mere feelings and sentiments conflicts with our 
everyday assumption that morality provides a critical standard to which we hold ourselves and others to 
answer, whatever our inclinations and sentiments might be.10  
If we instead adopt a wider view about possible objects of knowledge that includes judgments of 
value, then Hume’s Law becomes a powerful weapon against reductive theories that would try to explain 
principles ultimately in terms of facts alone.  This is because Hume’s Law is an instance of a more 
general kind of epistemological barrier, what Greg Restall and Gillian Russell call “barriers to 
                                                          
7 “In every system of morality…the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes 
observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulation of propositions, is and is not, 
I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last 
consequence.  For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; 
and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from 
others, which are entirely different from it…[I] am persuaded, that a small attention [to this point] wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of 
morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason.” 
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. David Norton (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 300 
8 Hume’s mature presentation of this division of knowledge, later called as “Hume’s Fork”, is in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 
Eric Steinberg (Ed.) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993) 15-20 
9 Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. J.B. Schneewind (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), Section 1. 
10 See “The Meaning of Moral Objectivity”, Section C. in my Introduction. 
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inference”.11   An inference barrier denies that statements of one type can be derived from statements of 
another.  As described in Section 1.2, Hume also identified another important inference barrier according 
to which one cannot derive sentences about the future from sentences about the past or present; and 
Bertrand Russell observed that we can never arrive at a general proposition by inference particular 
propositions alone.12  The barrier to direct inferences from facts to principles shows us that the only way 
to justify a principle in terms of facts is in the light of another more general principle.  That is why 
Hume’s Law sponsors the Principled Model. 
More recent manifestations of the notion that principles make facts normatively relevant include 
Saul Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein on rule-following.13  Kripke observed that it is generally 
impossible for any facts about a rule-following practice alone to determine their own normative 
significance, and therefore to determine a rule’s proper use. In order to identify the rule that these facts 
determine, the question must first be settled which aspects of the practice are relevant to determining the 
rule’s requirements.14 This point will play an important role in Sections 4.8 and 4.9, where I argue against 
the Factual Model as a thesis about institutional political principles such as legal requirements. 
Another recent example is Ronald Dworkin’s use of Hume’s Law to support his ambitious thesis 
about the metaphysical independence of value, and against all forms of empiricist moral skepticism.15 Yet 
another is G.A. Cohen’s argument that all principles derived from facts are ultimately grounded on fact-
                                                          
11 See “Barriers to Inference”, Greg Restall and Gillian Russell.  http://fitelson.org/few/few_05/russell.pdf 
12 I owe Ibid for Russell’s example. 
13 For an illuminating discussion of Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein in relation to law, see Nicos Stavropoulos’s “Why Principles?” University 
of Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No 28/2007 October 2007 (available online), and Mark 
Greenberg’s “How Facts Make Law” Legal Theory, 10 (2004), 157–198.  See also Stavropoulos’s Objectivity in Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996), especially the Introduction and Chapter One.  Stavropoulos traces the argument also to Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989) 84-88, and the fundamental point to Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, (Oxford, Blackwell 
1982). 
14 Stavropoulos, “Why Principles?”, 9-11 
15 Dworkin’s independence thesis states: “Hume’s principle (as I shall call that general claim) is often taken to have a stark skeptical 
consequence, because it suggests that we cannot discover, through the only modes of knowledge available to us, whether any of our ethical or 
moral convictions is true. [However], his principle has the opposite consequence. It undermines philosophical skepticism, because the proposition 
that it is not true that genocide is wrong is itself a moral proposition, and, if Hume’s principle is sound, that proposition cannot be established by 
any discoveries of logic or facts about the basic structure of the universe. Hume’s principle, properly understood, supports not skepticism about 
moral truth but rather the independence of morality as a separate department of knowledge with its own standards of inquiry and justification. It 
requires us to reject the Enlightenment’s [naturalist] epistemological code for the moral domain.” J4H, 17 
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insensitive principles. On Cohen’s view, “principles that reflect facts must, in order to reflect facts, reflect 
principles that don’t reflect facts.”16 
Kant repeatedly insisted that empirical truths cannot alone determine normative truth; 17 that we 
need moral principles to identify any kind of behavior as moral or immoral; that we cannot judge Jesus as 
moral without a more basic understanding of what morality is;18 that we need an idea of moral perfection 
to say God is morally perfect.19  Kant said that “the occasion of all the mistakes of philosophers with 
respect to the supreme principle of morals” was to identify it with a descriptive fact of some kind, 
“…whether they placed this object of pleasure…in happiness, in perfection, in moral [feeling], or in the 
will of God.”20 Kant recognized, consistently with the Principled Model, that a moral theory that begins 
with empirical, divine, or what he called “popular” morality inevitably leads to an inconsistent patchwork 
of principles because it always involves substituting some contingent fact about what someone or some 
being said, or did, or believed, or was inclined toward with morality itself, which is rationally intelligible, 
a priori, universal, necessary, and systematic.21  
Kant’s point applies not only to categorical imperatives, by to all practical principles including 
hypothetical imperatives.  In contrast to Hume, who believed a “passion” was at the bottom of every 
motive, Kant held that the question whether, given that one has a particular passion, one should act on it is 
always open to rational consideration.  Our passions do not pre-empt the question, “Given that I have this 
passion, what do I have reason I do?” because the authority of any passion is always open to question.22   
There is, again, a useful though limited analogy to Kant’s account of empirical cognition.  Kant held that 
                                                          
16 G.A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, no. 3, 2003.  Cohen insists that his view that all fact-sensitive principles 
presuppose fact-insensitive principles does not presuppose Hume’s Law because it would hold even if facts determined fact-sensitive principles 
through some kind of semantic entailment.  I discuss the plausibility of semantic entailment in Chapter 3. 
17 Kant, G 4:408-4:409.  Nor can morality be derived from examples, G 4:407  
18 Kant, G:4:408: “Even the Holy One of the Gospel must first be compared with our idea of moral perfection before he is cognized as such.” 
19 Kant, CPrR 5:41, G 4:409   
20 Kant, CPrR 5:64 
21 Kant, G 4:409-410. See also CPR B 3-4: “Experience never gives its judgments true or strict but only assumed and comparative universality 
(through induction)...Thus if a judgment is thought in strict universality, i.e., in such a way that no exception at all is allowed to be possible, then 
it is not derived from experience, but is rather valid absolutely a priori” Moral laws cannot be derived from empirical study of actual examples of 
human conduct because, logically, no finite number of examples of morally appropriate human conduct could yield any truly universal and 
necessary moral laws. 
22 For additional powerful contemporary statements of this position, see Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986) 150; Nagel, The Last Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 102-103; Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press) Chapter 1 “Reasons”, especially 43-44 on how desires are given in practical reason, not the product of 
practical reason, and his Appendix refuting Bernard Williams’s reasons internalism; and Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999) 50-54. 
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we are not passive receptacles of empirical intuitions, but that our intellect organizes them to enable 
experience.23  Empirical intuition provides reasons for us to believe things, but only because we can 
intelligently respond to them and interpret them as reasons for belief.  As Kant incisively summarized his 
point, “…Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind…”24  Similarly, 
practical reason “must not be content to follow, as it were, in the leading-strings of nature.”  Reason is not 
“nature’s pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him,” but rather is nature’s judge and 
indeed critic, “who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to 
propose.”25  Just as empirical intuitions alone do not give us reasons for beliefs about nature, our desires 
and inclinations alone do not give reasons for action, but rather suggest incentives for action to us: “An 
incentive can determine the will to an action only insofar as the individual has taken it up into his maxim 
(has made it into a general rule, according to which he will conduct himself).”26  Practical reason 
generates principles of action (maxims) that select empirical objects as ends worth pursuing.27 In order to 
choose to aim at the satisfaction of some desire, we must first recognize that desire as good. We recognize 
something as good, Kant held, when we recognize a reason for pursuing or responding to it:  “The will is 
a faculty of choosing only that which reason, independently of inclination, recognizes as practically 
necessary, i.e. as good”.28  To say that some desire is good is to say that there is reason to satisfy it, and to 
say there is reason to satisfy it is to judge that a principle marks it out as something to be satisfied. “That 
is good which pleases by means of reason alone, through the mere concept.”29  
Kant’s account of the good, as something there is a practical reason to seek or respond to, helps to 
account for yet another familiar feature of moral thinking that G.E. Moore captures in his famous “open 
question” argument.  This argument claims that any attempt to equate the good with a natural property is 
                                                          
23 Kant, CPR B x 
24 Kant, CPR A50-51/B74-76 
25 Kant, CPR B xiii 
26 This crucial Kantian idea has been emphasized by Henry AIlison under the name “the Incorporation Thesis”, which says that in the case of a 
will, desires produce actions only by the way they are incorporated into maxims or practical principles that serve the agent as subjectively 
adopted norms.  See Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 39-41. Kant, R 6:2:19.  
27 Kant, CPrR 5:60, 5:61  “What we are to call good must be an object of the faculty of desire in the judgment of every reasonable human being, 
and evil an object of aversion in the eyes of everyone; hence for this appraisal reason is needed, in addition to sense.”  
28 Kant, G 4 :412-413   
29 Kant, CPJ 5:207-208, CPrR 5:57-58 ,5:59 
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guilty of a so-called “naturalistic fallacy”.30   The identification of good with some natural property such 
as “pleasant”, or “whatever satisfies a desire” is always insufficient to capture the idea of the good 
because it always makes sense to ask whether that descriptive property really is good.  Moore inferred 
from this “open feel” of goodness that moral concepts must instead refer, not to natural properties, but 
rather to non-natural properties.  I do not think his alternative is correct because it still assumes a brute 
ontology and intuitionist epistemology for value that ordinary moral argument does not presuppose.  
Instead, I suggest we can understand the important conviction behind Moore’s open question argument in 
terms of the Principled Model.  If, as Kant said, the good is what we have reason to do, then of course we 
cannot reduce value to any descriptive property because Kant’s account of the good implies that values 
represent not brute properties of any kind, but rather sets of principles rationally connected through 
justifying arguments.  On this view, we should think of something valuable or good, not as a property that 
in some way “exists”, but rather in terms of actions or attitudes that we ought to undertake or adopt.  I 
develop this conception of value in Section 4.6. 
These important lessons from these great philosophers should, I think, lead us to resist the 
assumption that there must be some basic, fixed, or fully abstract condition on our practical knowledge 
that determines in some brute way what we ought to do.  Just as we cannot rest a principle on some bare 
set of facts, or procedures, or desire, or authoritative decrees to which we give axiomatic status or 
priority, we also cannot give some epistemological axiom priority over the rest of our convictions.  To do 
otherwise would be one more way of reducing principles to something that they are not.   
One final point, which I will not try to defend but will merely suggest.  The Principled Model, it 
seems to me, reflects what we might think of as a two-way relation between a person’s mental life and the 
physical world.   Since physical events in the world seem to impinge upon us in a way that explains 
mental events like perception and sensation through which we cognize those physical events and come to 
know the physical world, it makes sense that factual premises grounded in perception take priority in 
empirical argument.  In other words, natural causality on the mind explains why empirical arguments 
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fundamentally rest on inductive generalizations from empirical observation and intuition.  That is perhaps 
why something like the Factual Model is appropriate for scientific inquiry.  But whereas in sensation and 
perception physical events cause mental events, in ordinary volition, by contrast, certain mental events 
seem to justify physical ones.  In particular, the principles from which we act seem justificatorily31 prior to 
actions and the physical events they cause.  To act willfully is, as Kant held, to act on the representation 
of a practical maxim (an “ought”).32  The priority of “ought” in practical argument as captured by the 
Principled Model, and the priority of experience in theoretical argument, each correlate to these two 
directions of perception and justification:  We form concepts of what is through perception, and form 
volitions of what ought to be through reason.  I have no good idea how, and I will not try, to develop this 
connection.  But it seems worth noting that the basic structure of moral justification seems ultimately to 
rely upon, and reinforce, a position in the philosophy of mind, and in particular a conception of persons 
with both empirical and rational aspects.   
 
3.3  Justification and Truth: Case as Ground 
I have presented some familiar differences between facts and principles, described some famous 
philosophical accounts of the structure of normative argument and justification, and suggested that these 
differences and accounts support the view that principles are not contingent pieces of reality but are rather 
necessary truths that are rationally determined by other principles, just as the Principled Model holds.  I 
will now suggest a closely connected point concerning, not how principles are justified, but rather 
concerning what makes statements about principles true or false.  
Since at least Plato, philosophers have analyzed the concept of knowledge into the idea of 
justified true belief.33  But justification and truth can come apart.  An unjustified belief can be true by 
accident, and because we are fallible, a belief can be justified, though perhaps false. One main attraction 
                                                          
31 I do not suppose that justification, unlike empirical causal explanation, has a temporal dimension. So even if epiphenomenalism is true, it does 
not necessarily undermine the justificatory, as opposed to the explanatory, priority of principles. 
32 See Kant’s Groundwork discussion of a rational being, G 4:412-413, and his remarks in the Preface distinguishing laws of nature and laws of 
freedom, which govern the will and how things ought to happen, G 4:387. 
33 What I am calling “justification”, Plato calls “giving an account”.  See Plato’s Theaetetus 201d-210d.  I do not assume that Plato’s classic 
analysis of knowledge as justified true belief states necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge.  For influential counterexamples to Plato’s 
analysis, see Edmund Gettier’s “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” in Analysis 23, 1963, 121-123. 
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of assessing normative principles, especially controversial ones, along the plane of justification alone, 
rather than of truth, is that justification seems to provide a less demanding standard than truth does.  This 
can be attractive in political life which demands a certain degree of toleration for other people’s points of 
view even when those views are wrong.  We might still ascribe justified opinion or intellectual 
responsibility to someone whose views we regard as false.  Focusing on justification has also become 
attractive in theories of democratic institutional design, since certain decision processes that, some think, 
are more likely to yield correct decisions might be thought to impart a presumption of reasonableness or 
rationality on decisions without the assumption that those decisions are actually true.34  
I want to suggest that the truth and justification of principles cannot be separated as easily as this 
usual focus assumes.  Justification, I suggest, is not merely an independent measure of the reliability of a 
normative beliefs’ being true, but is rather a constitutive condition of its truth.  Having moral knowledge 
is essentially a matter of holding one’s moral beliefs in a responsible, and in particular a systematic, 
unified way.   
As described in the Introduction, no single conception of knowledge fits all domains of inquiry.35  
Roughly speaking, a correspondence theory holds that we have knowledge only if our beliefs match the 
facts, where the facts are conceived as somehow “external” to us, and independent of our beliefs about 
them.  Of course whether or not a belief about some non-normative empirical fact is justified depends on 
the strength of the available evidence for believing the proposition.  But, on a correspondence theory, 
whether the belief is true depends, ultimately, not on the strength of the evidence, but on whether in fact 
what the belief reports is true in virtue of some independent ground.  If my belief that the snow is white is 
true, that is because the snow is in fact white.  The sound of rainfall and appearance of water on the 
window may provide evidence for the belief that it is raining, but whether the belief is true depends 
ultimately, not on the strength of the evidence for believing the proposition, but on whether it is in fact 
                                                          
34 See, for example, Jurgen Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge:  
MIT Press, 1996) , and Habermas’s “Reply to Critics”, in the Cardozo Law Review (March 1996). 1505. “The deliberations that are 
institutionalized in democracies and coupled with deadlines and voting procedures do not guarantee valid outcomes, but rather justify the 
presumption that outcomes are rational.  They thereby insure only that decisions reached in conformity with procedure are ‘rationally acceptable’ 
to citizens.  They cannot, of course, guarantee ‘truth’.” 
35 An old point emphasized repeatedly by Aristotle.  Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b12-27, 1096b29-33, 1098a25-1098b8 
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raining (the sprinklers may have turned on instead).   The fact that my eyes detect a pen on my desk is 
excellent evidence in support of my belief that there is a pen on my desk.  But whether the belief is true, 
depends on whether the pen is actually there.  Perhaps I am fooled by an optical illusion. 
But this correspondence view contrasts sharply with a coherence theory according to which, 
roughly, we have knowledge of some proposition we believe only if that proposition fits with other 
propositions in our body of belief considered as a whole.  Whereas a correspondence theory elicits an 
image of propositions mirroring a reality “out there”, which may be an appropriate model of some 
naturalistic truths, the coherence theory evokes an image of a web of mutually supporting propositions.  I 
suggested in the Introduction that this seems like a better model for principles.  Unlike the belief about 
rain or the pen, there is no bare, independent objective fact in virtue of which the principle that one should 
take an umbrella, or the principle that one should keep promises, could be true.   We do not suppose that 
normative propositions report brute facts “in the world” whose existence make them true.  If asked to 
justify a belief in a normative principle, ordinarily we would give practical reasons for it, by citing other 
facts and other principles, in an attempt to show why the principle in question serves other principles and 
is in turned served by others.  We justify a principle, in other words, by connecting it with other 
principles, in the spirit of something like Rawls’s conception of reflective equilibrium.  These connections 
could become quite complex, even multi-dimensional.  For instance, we might ascend upward into 
abstraction, citing more general principles that give more specific ones force.  Or we might proceed 
downward into particularity, as when we reflect upon whether general principles we might be tempted to 
accept are consistent with what it seems right to do on specific occasions.  I might, for instance, accept the 
general principle that promises ought to be kept, but make an exception to that principle in light of an 
unexpected emergency that obviously overrides the promise.  Or, what seems an even clearer example, I 
might make an exception to a general principle forbidding murder in light of a strong conviction that I am 
justified in taking life to defend my friend or family member. 
In addition to these two vertical dimensions, moral argument could also proceed laterally into 
similarity and analogy, as when we inspect a principle to see whether we would assent to it in relevantly 
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similar situations, or perhaps even “diagonally”, combining elements of analogy with ascent into 
abstraction or descent into particularity.  Normative argument, for instance, often proceeds in these ways 
when we check either our own, or another’s, convictions by reflecting upon whether the principles we 
accept are consistent with other principles we might also be tempted to endorse in relevantly similar 
circumstances.   
This basically Socratic mode of argument is a powerful form of normative reasoning not just 
because it can effectively confound an interlocutor, but more fundamentally because we generally think it 
counts against a principle’s truth that it is not reconcilable with other compelling principles, and that it 
counts in favor of a principle that it can be integrated with other compelling principles.  Dialectic does not 
just name a process of argument, but a standard of truth implicit in ordinary normative reasoning and 
discourse.  This standard is unity and systematicity among our normative convictions: we aim at it in 
making a responsible effort to synthesize compelling principles into a coherent scheme, rather than 
treating them as brute and potentially conflicting facts capable of no further explanation why they 
conflict. 
In light of this feature of normative argument it seems plausible that, when we consider our 
convictions about principles from a first-personal perspective, the conditions under which our convictions 
about those principles are true is closely related, if not identical, to the conditions under which our 
convictions about those principles are justified.  We might say that we are entitled to regard our 
convictions about principles as true if those convictions are supported by the best case we can make for 
them.  As Dworkin has remarked, “we have exactly the reasons for thinking we are right in our 
convictions that we have for thinking our convictions right.”36    
I will offer two arguments for this conception of moral truth. The first argument is that this 
conception of moral truth agrees with another feature of principles, which distinguishes them from 
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contingent facts. This feature is that principles “supervene” on contingent facts.37 Despite the fancy name, 
the philosophical concept of supervenience is simple: some set of properties A supervenes on some other 
set of properties B when there can be no change in A-properties without some change in B-properties.  
The A-properties depend on the B-properties in that way.38  Contingent facts do not supervene on other 
contingent facts.  On the contrary, as I argued above, contingent facts about the natural world can stand 
alone: they can just happen to be some way independently of other facts.  This could be true for principles 
if we understand principles on the Factual Model, because then we could imagine two worlds that are 
identical, but in which different principles apply. But it cannot be true on the Principled Model. If we 
were to judge that in some world genocide is actually permissible, that must be because we have 
identified some factual difference between that world and our own which justifies its permissibility.  It 
cannot just happen to be that way for no rhyme or reason.  Genocide is not evil just because that is the 
way the universe is structured, but because there is a reason why it is evil, and that reason consists in 
some further facts and principles that together justify our condemnation of genocide. 
The supervenient character of principles implies that, just as the justification of a principle draws 
on another principle, similarly we can think of principles, in a metaphysical sense, as abstractions (but not 
weird entities “out there”) that link to other principles in a mutually supportive relation.  It is not as 
though there is some way principles happen to be independently of the reasons that justify them.  Rather, 
they are what they are only in virtue of their role in a rational system. This is the sense in which the 
epistemic and metaphysical questions converge.  It is why we are entitled to think of the conditions of 
justified belief about principles as identical to what principles are, and thus as the grounds of their truth. 
The second argument for the convergence of truth and justification is an argument by elimination: 
it seems that there is nothing else in virtue of which a belief in some principle could be true other than 
that it is well justified.  If there are no facts “in the world” that could make or cause our beliefs about 
principles to be true, then if our idea that there are true principles is not high-flown figment of our 
                                                          
37 On the supervenient character of moral principles see Dworkin, J4H, 73, 113-114.  For an important discussion of how legal principles 
supervene on political facts, see Greenberg  “How Facts Make Law”, especially 159-169 
38 On the general significance of the concept of supervenience see Brian McLaughlin, “Supervenience”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy , 2011, < http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/> 
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imagination, then principles must be true in virtue of the arguments we can make for them.   I believe 
Kant accepted that there could be nothing else that makes them true, and that there need be nothing else 
for them to be true. Consider again his distinction, discussed earlier in Section 1.4, between the 
“constitutive” and “regulative” use of reason. In its regulative use, reason guides our pursuit of 
knowledge, and seeks unity among our concepts.  The “constitutive” use of reason, by contrast, actually 
helps to constitute the objects of knowledge by providing their form as objects of possible experience. 
Constitutive principles thereby have objective standing.39  Now, our theoretical knowledge of the natural 
world involves a combination of what is a priori (contributed by the understanding and reason), with 
what is given from outside through sensibility.  This means that empirical truth ultimately depends on 
something external, given through sensibility, and so the unity reason supplies cannot actually be 
attributed to those objects themselves, but is rather the mind’s way of cognizing them.   But Kant held 
that reason’s use in the practical sphere is different.  In that sphere, reason is not anchored to sensibility, 
because normative principles are not sensed or intuited.  The practical sphere is a sphere in which reason 
is indeed a source of “positive cognitions.”40  Since the limits it faces in the theoretical domain do not 
hold for the practical domain.  In the practical domain its use is constitutive, not merely regulative.41  So 
whereas the unity of reason is a subjective ideal in our pursuit of theoretical knowledge, it is an objective 
ideal in practice because we don’t have to confine our moral concepts to perception.42  Our modes of 
reasoning about morality, not any external objects, constitute moral truth. 
Is this a troubling conclusion? If there are no moral facts in the world that can somehow act on us 
to cause our moral convictions in the way physical facts, we might think, cause our observations and 
beliefs in them, then how can we have reliable grounds for our convictions?  As I noted in the 
Introduction, a number of philosophers, from the 18th century moral sense theorists, to the intuitionists 
like Moore and Ross, value pluralists like Berlin and Galston, contemporary moral philosophers like 
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40 Kant, CPR A 796-797/B824-825, A43-A44/B61, A800/B828 
41 Ibid, A547/B 575   
42 I learned this point from Paul Guyer in his Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 63-64. 
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Gilbert Harman and Nicholas Sturgeon, and contemporary moral skeptics like John Mackie, all seem 
committed to the idea moral truths must impinge on us to explain our beliefs in them.  
Ronald Dworkin essentially agrees with the Kantian position.  He calls the assumption that, 
unless moral truths cause our moral beliefs we can have no sound reason to think that any of our moral 
judgments correctly report moral truth, the “causal dependence hypothesis” or “CD”.43  Dworkin refutes 
CD with what seem to me to be two decisive and instructive points.  The first is that CD is self-defeating. 
If it is offered as a general claim about knowledge, then if it is true, we could never know that it is true 
because there is no CD truth that causes us to believe CD.  (Nor is it a conceptual truth, since it does not 
follow analytically from the meaning of knowledge or justified belief.)  The second point is that CD is 
itself a moral claim: it states what counts as a good reason to hold a moral belief.  Since it is a moral 
claim, then it can be defended only in the way all other moral beliefs are defended, which is simply to 
offer reasons for it, and those reasons will not appeal to moral “properties” that cause us to believe in 
them. 
In an early essay Dworkin illustrates with a striking image the contrast between, on one hand, 
truth and justification in science and, on the other hand, truth and justification in morality.  In contrast to 
the justification of empirical beliefs, which treats beliefs about the empirical world as evidence or clues to 
the existence of independent facts, which make those beliefs true, “as a natural historian reconstructs the 
shape of the whole animal from the fragments of its bones that he has found,”44  moral reasoning justifies 
beliefs about principles by treating our beliefs about principles “as stipulated features of a general theory 
to be constructed, as if a sculptor set himself to carve the animal that best fit a pile of bones he happened 
to find together.”45 The sculptor’s bones are not just bare facts, but features that are understood in the 
light of some purposive or functional judgment about their role in a system.  Perhaps not all of the bones 
will fit the animal the sculptor imagines and constructs, and the animal itself need not ever have existed.  
But that does not mean that the sculptor does not discover something real, that his interpretation is just a 
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44 Dworkin, TRS 159 
45 Ibid.  For Dworkin’s mature articulation of the relation between artistic and literary interpretation and moral interpretation, see generally also 
J4H, chapters 6-8.  
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huff or puff of emotion.  It is not necessary that the creation match anything in the world in order for it to 
be a correct interpretation of the structure it creates.  Something similar seems true about morality.  
Someone who constructs a coherent case out of principles that have a grip on him cannot say that his 
principles are true because of any independent moral fact for which his case is evidence.  All he can say is 
that his principles are right because they are compelling and because they fit together in an argument that 
he finds utterly persuasive. That is enough for him, to put it metaphorically, to “see” their truth.46   
 
3.4 The Principled Model Warrants Unity  
If any principle is always justified, not ultimately by some brute intuition or experience, but by another 
other principle, then it seems we have no warrant for holding that a moral argument must simply end 
somewhere.   But that implication supports the Unity Thesis and refutes pluralism.  If argument for some 
principle can proceed indefinitely by drawing on facts and other principles, and if the truth of some 
principle depends on the truth of an indefinite number of other principles, then it seems we are not 
entitled to suppose that principles conflict because we are then not entitled to assume that this process of 
justification would never reveal a commensurating principle that could order or resolve apparent conflicts.  
Why should we not, on the contrary, assume that the direction of our thought is toward unity, not 
fragmentation?  Indeed, if normative justification does not run aground then it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that there are no conflicts among principles at all, but actually mutual support among them.47  
That conclusion seems well supported by the phenomenology of moral dilemma and decision- making.  
People discover the extent of thought and reflection they need to solve a conflict in the course of their 
reflection.  They do not stipulate or know in advance how abstract or philosophical their thinking can be 
when the result of those stipulations is to leave their problem inconclusive.  On the other hand, pluralism 
does seem to have that strange consequence, and in doing so seems to run afoul of one of the deepest 
assumptions about good inquiry, which is not to block the road to it.  
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But moreover, as I suggested in Section 1.3 the Principled Model not only seems to warrant unity, 
but seems to entail it.  The idea that it is always possible to try to justify some principle in terms of other 
principles through a non-ampliative, truth-preserving, deductive inference confers necessity on principles, 
because those inferences involve a judgment that identifies some principle as belonging to a whole, to a 
unity. That is one way of expressing the idea that we know something through reason, and that which we 
know through reason is universal, not contingent or known a posteriori.  As Kant wrote, “without 
[universality] there is no rational inference, not even inference from analogy, which is at least a presumed 
universality and objective necessity…”48  This necessity and universality entail that principles cannot 
ultimately conflict with each other, but that they must relate systematically, lawfully, and rationally.  
 
3.5. A System is Silent Prologue to All Normative Judgment 
The Principled Model has crucial and, I think, insufficiently recognized implications for the relationship 
between and interdependence among our normative convictions.  In particular, it implies that it is not 
possible to demarcate and fully insulate different types of values and principles from other types.  This 
point is especially important for contemporary political theory, much of which seems to assume the 
possibility of articulating and judging freestanding, sui generis departments of principles for political life.   
I described examples of this kind of “freestanding” theorizing in greater detail in Chapter 2, and they are 
the focus of Chapter 7.  Here I describe the point for morality in general, and illustrate how it agrees with 
compelling and familiar ideas about the relationship between principles. 
The Principled Model holds that reasoning about principles involves drawing upon or 
hypothesizing other compelling principles when needed to reconcile apparent conflict among competing 
principles.  Of course this does not mean that ordinary normative judgment always requires self-conscious 
reflection on the entire system of principles, or even on part of it.  Usually, we do not act upon or 
deliberate about principles self-consciously. The principles on which we act are usual so obvious to us 
that they escape our notice, and reflective thought about them is then not necessary.  But sometimes they 
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are not obvious, and when they are not reflection may have to become somewhat more calculated.  It 
seems impossible to stipulate in advance how far and into what level of abstraction this process of 
reflection should continue.  It seems that it should continue either until the puzzles or conflicts that 
prompt reflection have been resolved, or until we run out of time, or creativity, or just need to decide.  But 
that point is not knowable before we attempt to resolve the conflict. 
This feature of moral thought and argument reflects an important point frequently emphasized in 
Dworkin’s moral and legal philosophy.  Dworkin holds that it is impossible to say where ordinary first-
order moral judgment ends and moral theory or moral philosophy begins.  He illustrates the continuum: 
Principles and ideals have been produced at almost every level of generality. They include the 
overarching utilitarian thesis that whatever increases pleasure is good; John Rawls’s sharply 
limited political conception of justice; the theory of political democracy that I have tried to 
defend; Thomas Scanlon’s explanation of the point and value of freedom of speech; Herbert 
Hart’s observations about punishment in criminal law and the moral foundations of the law of 
negligence; the observations about personal autonomy at the heart of the three-justice concurring 
opinion in the Casey abortion case; the remarks about the fairness of market-share liability in 
several recent judicial opinions and law review articles; editorial-page observations about the 
separation of church and state; dinner-table remarks about a nation’s responsibility for protecting 
the human rights of people in other countries; a schoolteacher’s lessons about the environmental 
obligations one generation owes to another; a parent’s efforts to change a child’s opinions by 
asking, “How would you feel if he did that to you?” These specimens of moral “theory” differ 
only in their level of generality or abstraction, and any flat categorization of a moral argument as 
concrete or theoretical would be hopelessly arbitrary.49 
On Dworkin’s view, when someone tries to defend or justify a moral judgment that initially seems 
arbitrary or inconsistent by tracing its connections to more abstract principles or by confirming an abstract 
principle with a more concrete judgment, she is not then drawing upon something other than ordinary 
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moral reasoning, something different that is added on.  It is more like, to use Dworkin’s apt analogy, she 
is playing extra innings when a baseball game is tied after nine.50  Those innings are still part of baseball. 
Attempts to draw a sharp distinction between “levels” of theory miss the complexity and close 
relationship between principles at all levels.   
Since the idea of a moral system supposes principles are connected so that all can be defended 
only in terms of the others, we cannot set boundaries on justification.  It always makes sense to ask, 
critically and with a view to re-interpreting some principle, “What is the point of this principle?”  We can 
always peak behind principles to see if, in an apparent conflict, there are more general justifying 
principles that, when properly interpreted, might release us from the grip of one of the principles that 
seem to conflict.  This simply follows from the Principled Model, the idea that principles are rationally 
necessary, not just bare facts that happen stubbornly to be some way. 
The systematicity of principles also seems to imply that even when it is obvious that some 
principle is conclusive in a particular situation, other principles in the system continue to play a hidden 
role in our judgment.  For even when we act on what seem to be obvious principles, we tacitly judge, 
“negatively”, that no other consideration we are aware of competes in a way that inspires self-conscious 
reflection.  Even in what are usually obvious cases, imagination or more attention to our situation could 
potentially reveal a conflict that forces more self-conscious reflection. For example, most people believe 
they should act morally toward others, but the belief that their routine actions are consistent with moral 
principles usually goes without saying.  We need not reflect on morality every time we act in order to 
check whether what we are doing is moral. However, morality nevertheless serves, even in these routine 
cases, as what Kant called a “limiting condition” on our actions.51 This condition becomes explicit and we 
become aware of it when some fact about our situation comes to our attention that signals that what we 
are doing or plan to do may be wrong.   
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Barbara Herman illustrates this important point through a useful distinction between moral 
judgment and moral deliberation.52  All moral action, indeed all practical action in general, requires 
judgment, which is simply recognizing what ought to be done in awareness that there are no conflicting 
considerations.  But not all action requires deliberation. We do not deliberate when it is obvious to us 
what ought to be done.  The usual occasion for deliberation is when we recognize some exceptional 
feature of our circumstance or that our circumstance engages conflicting considerations.  The realization 
of an inconsistency provides the occasion for deliberation, reflection, refinement, uncertainty, decision, or 
agonizing paralysis.  
Here is another analogy to empirical reasoning.  You probably do not need to infer your belief 
that you are reading this sentence from some other belief.  Nevertheless your belief that your are reading 
this sentence is still sensitive to and depends on other beliefs you might have, and this would become 
obvious to you if those beliefs came into conflict with your belief that you are reading sentence.  For 
example, if you also believe you are currently drugged so that these words are just hallucinations, you 
would modify your belief that you are actually reading these words.  In that way, the whole body of 
beliefs hangs together in a mutually supportive way.  In the same way, unreflective practical judgment 
and action still relies, in a concealed sense, on the whole system of principles.  Easy judgments about 
principles (i.e. most normative judgments) involve a tacit judgment that no other principle selects some 
feature of our circumstance as normatively relevant. The role of the entire normative system remains 
submerged, but it is still there exercising control over what we should do, and becomes obvious in 
difficult cases.  Dworkin once described a jurisprudential theory as a “silent prologue to any decision at 
law”, including the most ordinary and easy decisions that walk into a lawyer’s office.53  His point was the 
same as Herman’s: abstract theory influences every normative judgment even when its influence is 
clandestine. 
 
                                                          
52 Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1993) 145-147 
53 Dworkin, LE, 90 
182 
 
3.6 The Phenomenology of Conflict: Paralysis, Uncertainty, and Indeterminacy 
In this and the next section, I consider two aspects of moral phenomenology that might appear to sponsor 
pluralism. The first, discussed in this section, is the familiar sense of paralysis that accompanies situations 
of moral conflict in which seemingly unrelated values compete.  Some philosophers infer from such 
situations that there is inherent conflict and indeterminacy in what we ought to do. The second, discussed 
in the next section, is the sense of regret people feel after a hard practical decision, and which may seem 
to have similar skeptical implications.  I suggest that pluralism seems to follow only if we misconstrue 
what is actually going on in these situations, and also that the Unity Thesis provides a superior account of 
both paralysis and regret.  
We sometimes face situations in which it appears that two principles require conflicting actions.  
Sartre illustrates these occasions through a famous example of a pupil during wartime torn between a 
principle of patriotism requiring him to leave home and fight for his country, and a principle of filial 
loyalty requiring him to stay home to care for his ailing mother.54  Problems like this are hard ethical and 
moral cases.  But before we jump to any conclusions about what our experiences in these cases might 
indicate about the unity or plurality of principle, consider Dworkin’s useful distinction between 
uncertainty and indeterminacy.55  If one sees compelling arguments on both sides of a moral issue and 
finds oneself unable to resolve the conflict between them, then one is entitled to declare that one is 
uncertain, or that one has no view on the matter.  One does not need a further reason to conclude that one 
is uncertain, beyond failure to be persuaded by either side. But indeterminacy, by contrast, understood not 
as an epistemological notion of uncertainty about which solution is correct, but rather as a thesis about the 
very nature of values according to which there is no single correct answer to be discovered through 
further reflection, does not automatically follow from the failure to be persuaded by either side. There is 
no incompatibility in maintaining that one is uncertain about what the right answer is in some situation, 
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 55 Dworkin, J4H, 91. See also Dworkin, OT, 129-131 
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and that there is a right answer.  On the contrary, as I suggest below, it seems that uncertainty presupposes 
the idea of single right answers. 
Some pluralists seem to assume that indeterminacy is indeed a default conclusion in a moral 
dilemma.  Michael Stocker, for instance, claims that the plurality of values is “obvious”, “commonplace 
and unproblematic”, “the rule rather than the exception”.56  William Galston writes, referring to Sartre’s 
example, that “it is not at all clear what the value that overarches loyalty to one’s mother and fighting for 
the freedom of one’s country may be. Here again, the burden of proof falls on would-be monists to move 
beyond the abstract possibility of common values, that is, to specify such values and show how they do 
justice to the moral experiences they seek to redescribe.”57  
But is this right?  Is the burden of proof really on the defender of unity?  Is indeterminacy the 
default position to adopt in these hard cases? That might be correct if, as Galston apparently assumes, we 
come to know, describe, and develop theories about values and principles through “experience” of some 
kind.  If that were true, then a hard moral case in which we felt the opposing tugs of competing principles 
might support the inference that there are conflicting principles “out there” as part of the “objective 
structure of the valuational universe”.58  For the same reason, our inability to intuit or experience an 
“overarching value” would demonstrate a lack of evidence for such a value.   But if the Factual Model is 
wrong, then moral justification has nothing to do with collecting evidence from experience for or against 
the existence of moral truths.  Moral justification, as I have tried to show, fundamentally involves 
connecting principles systematically through practical argument, not intuiting weird moral properties in 
the universe. 
Some philosophers defend indeterminacy by drawing attention to the apparent incommensurabilty 
of different kinds of values.  John Gray identifies incommensurability with the proposition that among the 
various human goods some are neither better than, nor worse than, nor equal in value to some others.59  
Similarly, Joseph Raz defines two “bearers of value” as incommensurable if it is false that of the two 
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“either one is better than the other or they are of equal value.”60  These formulations imply that since 
some values cannot be compared in this way, none among them is uniquely best.61  If moral values really 
were incommensurable in this way, then that would indeed support indeterminacy rather than merely 
uncertainty. 
I will offer three arguments against the notion of value incommensurability and metaphysical 
indeterminacy.   First, incommensurability is not a default thesis about principles.  Second, the ideas of 
incommensurability and indeterminacy falsify the phenomenology of conflict:  We need the idea of single 
right answers to account for the feeling of agony that often accompanies hard decisions.  Third, the types 
of questions we would need to answer in order to conclude that there are no right answers are no nowhere 
addressed by pluralists, and when we consider how rich the resources are for solving such conflicts, it 
seems at best premature to conclude that their stock examples of incommensurability have no solution. 
 
Incommensurability Is Not a Default 
It is important to recognize that pluralists who defend incommensurability make a positive assertion about 
the nature of moral truth that competes on a substantive level with the Unity Thesis.  Pluralists affirm 
what the Unity Thesis denies, which is that sometimes there is no single right answer about what one 
should do.  What reasons could the pluralist give to justify this positive, “no right answer” claim, to show 
that apparently incommensurable values really cannot be compared at all? 
To answer this question, it might be helpful to begin by focusing on an area in which we are (or at 
least I am) more used to making comparisons of value.  I assume, for instance, that many people think 
they are able to make at least some comparisons of athletic merit.  I think, for example, that Michael 
Jordan was a better athlete than Kobe Bryant is, and an even better athlete than Larry Bird was.  If you 
were to challenge me on this (suppose you insist that Bird was the better athlete) I would defend my view 
by pointing to Jordan’s greater ability to perform under pressure, his superior speed, and his consistency 
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throughout his career.  But I would also admit certain advantages that Bird had: a better 3-point shot, for 
example.  I might or might not convince you that I am right, but if I could not convince you, that would 
not refute our shared assumption that a comparison is possible.   The fact that we disagree about the 
answer implies that we both believe some comparisons of athletic merit are sensible. 
But now suppose you ask me whether I think that Michael Jordan was a better athlete than Tiger 
Woods, who plays an entirely different sport.  My answer would be very different.  I might sensibly deny 
both that one was greater and that they were exactly equal in merit.  I might say that both are great 
athletes, but that no exact comparison between the two is possible as it was between basketball players 
alone.  But I would have to defend this distinction with a reason. I would have to show why I can rank 
Jordan and Bird, but not Jordan and Woods. The distinction, I think, would have to be based on more 
general assumptions about the factors I believe characterize athletic achievement.  I would draw the 
distinction by arguing that athletic merit, normally, can only be measured as a response to the particular 
challenges of an athlete’s sport.  While I would admit that Jordan and Woods faced many similar 
challenges (e.g. fan pressure, mental drain over long seasons) by which they might be compared, I would 
say that other challenges they faced—such as the peculiar physical and psychological demands of their 
sports and the quality of competition they faced—were too different to allow precise comparisons along 
these dimensions.   
It seems that a similar argument would be necessary to support claims of “incommensurability” in 
other domains as well, like in art and aesthetics.   Though I believe Led Zeppelin is a better band than The 
Beatles, and I believe that Marvin Gaye was a better singer than Michael Jackson, I might also believe 
that Led Zeppelin is neither better than, nor worse than, nor equal to Marvin Gaye.  Each was responding 
to very different musical and artistic cultures that make clear comparisons very difficult.  I might describe 
this difficulty by saying that the value of their achievements, to borrow Ruth Chang’s useful concept, 
though not identical, are “on a par”. 62 According to Chang, two valuable things are “on a par” if neither is 
better than the other, they are too different to be equally good or at least good in the same way, and yet 
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they are indeed comparable.  This seems right.  Although it would be odd to say that either Jordan or 
Woods is the better athlete, Jordan is certainly a better athlete than I am, even if I only golf and never play 
basketball.   This shows that some comparisons are still possible across domains. 
But notice the character of all of these judgments of value.  If the issue is one about athletic 
greatness, then the judgment assumes that there might be certain criteria of athletic merit which, if they 
applied to each athletic form, would serve as grounds for comparison.  It then concludes that, since those 
criteria do not clearly apply to each athlete, an immediate comparison is not possible.  Similarly, if the 
issue is an artistic one, the judgment assumes that there might be certain criteria of artistic merit which, if 
they applied to each artistic form, would serve as grounds for comparisons.  It then concludes that, since 
they also do not clearly apply to each, comparison is difficult.   But whether the grounds for comparison 
do or do not apply in each case is plainly a substantive question within the domain of art or athletics.  Any 
position on that question rests on substantive convictions about what makes a work of art valuable or an 
athlete great. 
This last point has an important implication.  If one person thinks that Led Zeppelin is better than 
Marvin Gaye, another person thinks that Gaye is better than Zeppelin, and I think that they are “on a par” 
and cannot be directly compared, then there are three—not two—substantive positions on the table.  I 
cannot dismiss the first two positions just by claiming that they overlook the fact that there is no uniquely 
best answer to the problem.  My judgment rests on potentially controversial convictions about the true 
value of musical genius in exactly the way the other judgments do. 
All of this seems equally applicable to other areas of value, including practical reason, ethics, and 
politics.  Any argument I might offer to justify, for instance, the belief that the value of a fully 
autonomous life and the value of a life in which my ends are set for me by others are incommensurable 
rests on substantive convictions about what makes a human life valuable.  I could not just declare that 
there are no grounds for comparison between the good of these lives, no common test of their value, 
unless I also assume something about what the character of that test might be—what criteria it might 
involve and so on—and could show why it is incorrect as a common standard.  But I could not discredit 
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that test without giving reasons against it that draw on potentially controversial ethical convictions of my 
own.63  
John Gray has relied on the idea incommensurability to support his claim that Enlightenment 
liberalism is not universally valid.64  His arguments in support of this position are a good reminder of how 
freely some political philosophers ignore the point made in the previous three paragraphs. Gray maintains 
that, i), the varieties of human backgrounds and perspectives “means that there need not be any 
perspective on the good that is better than all the others”; ii) some values are interpreted differently in 
different cultures and often these interpretations contradict each other; iii) some values which are 
recognized in one culture often are not recognized in other cultures; iv) incommensurable values may be 
“pragmatically inconsistent”,  which means that they may appropriately apply in a particular context but 
not in another; v) “irrealism” (what Gray says is value pluralism’s metaethical cognate) holds that we can 
be in error about the good life while still accepting that there are no single best answers about the good; 
vi) liberal rights often seem to clash and people disagree over how to resolve those conflicts;  vii) every 
conception of liberty, all conceptions of equality, Mill’s harm principle, and Raz’s conception of 
autonomy can only be interpreted in light of conceptions of the good about which people will differ.65 
Many of these are interesting sociological points, but they do not undermine the universalistic aspirations 
of a liberal theory because none of them actually addresses the substantive claims of liberalism itself.  It 
will not do just to point out that many people are not convinced by liberalism, that there is uncertainty 
about whether liberalism is correct, or that many share alternative assumptions about the good life or that 
they simply do not recognize the moral concepts that liberals value.  These are each different ways of 
committing the skeptical fallacy of moving from the fact disagreement to the conclusion that there is no 
single truth.  We need a substantive moral reason for the inference.  It is not a default. 
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Falsifying the Phenomenology of Conflict 
So unlike uncertainty, indeterminacy and incommensurability are not default positions in conflict 
situations.  My second objection is that claims of indeterminacy seem to misrepresent certain assumptions 
that individuals typically bring to conflict situations.  Sartre’s pupil may never reach a conclusion that 
reconciles his two principles; he may remain permanently uncertain about the right course of action. But 
is that fact, on its own, a reason to conclude that he would never, no matter how long he struggled with 
the issue, no matter how long and thoughtfully he reflected on the ideas of filial loyalty and patriotism, no 
matter how many facts about the character of his relationship with his mother he studied, find a reason 
why these two principles do not, after all, point in different directions, so that a single course of action is 
the right one?   In the physical sciences, the complete lack of evidence to support a belief in a proposition 
is indeed a reason not to believe that particular proposition.  But the pupil’s question is not a scientific 
question, but a moral question.   Since, as I have argued, values, unlike physical objects, do not impinge 
on us causally, we should not regard the appearance of conflict as evidence of a further fact that there are 
two inconsistent values, nor the lack of an immediate intuition for a commensurating value as evidence 
that none is available.  Instead, the conflict arises from the pupil’s awareness that two prima facie 
principles, whose purposes and common presuppositions are not yet obvious to him, but which may be 
constructed through rational moral reflection, suggest inconsistent actions. But there is nothing in that 
awareness that warrants the inference that these principles just are, as a matter of cold fact, inconsistent. 
On the contrary, the very fact that the pupil’s situation strikes him as a problem makes sense only on the 
assumption that there is some answer to be found, that there is some way of interpreting these principles 
that might eliminate the inconsistency.  His feeling is not merely one of puzzlement at contradictory 
ideas, as if he were contemplating the idea of square circles.  It is rather, in Dworkin’s words, a feeling of 
“foreboding, weariness, and a fearsome sense that though we do not know how to decide, it nevertheless 
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and greatly matters how we do decide.”66  That feeling would be absurd for someone who really believes 
there is no right answer. 
Classical skeptics understood this point.  Sextus Empiricus argued that genuine “equipollence” of 
reasons on either side of a proposition should lead us to a state of “unperturbedness” or “skeptical 
quietude”, not anguish or agony.67  But if Sartre’s pupil really is in agony then he cannot really accept the 
equipollence of arguments on both sides.  If there were no answer, his anxiety would make little sense: 
why not remain indifferent? Pluralism does not make sense of such dilemmas. These dilemmas feel 
agonizing only because we assume that the competing principles have something in common that makes 
deliberation purposeful.  Again, as Dworkin suggests, “Though reticence is generally appropriate when 
one is uncertain, it is wholly out of place for anyone genuinely convinced that the issue is not uncertain 
but indeterminate...But he [one convinced the issue is indeterminate] lacks the reason for reticence or 
agony that someone who thinks the issue uncertain has.”68 Dworkin’s point is that the leap from the sense 
of paralysis to the denial of single right answers ignores the seriousness with which people ordinarily 
approach important decisions. If indeterminacy were a default, then it should dissolve the burden of hard 
decisions. There should be no unclarity at all, but rather perfect clarity that our problem is insoluble and 
reflection pointless. 
Robert Talisse has similarly observed that indeterminacy seems to render certain types of 
deliberation pointless: “When one confronts the choice between, say, the beach and philosophy, it makes 
no sense to ask oneself which option one finds more pleasurable or satisfying. As [according to pluralism] 
the goods of each option are sui generic and distinct, that one is more satisfying is no more relevant to the 
choice among them than that fact that “beach” appears before “philosophy” in the dictionary.” 69  Talisse 
argues that incommensurability implies that it is a mistake even to attempt to answer these questions in a 
non-arbitrary, rational way.  But then surely incommensurability distorts our everyday understanding of 
even the most basic and inconsequential decisions, let alone the very important ones.   
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As I suggested in the Introduction, moral conflict supplies what Charles Sanders Peirce identified 
in relation to scientific inquiry as the “irritation of doubt that causes us to attain a state of belief.”70  Doubt 
is a kind of perturbance that catalyzes inquiry, and without it, there would not be any inquiry at all.   The 
doubt we feel when we encounter inconsistent propositions “stimulates the mind to an activity which may 
be slight or energetic, calm or turbulent.”71  Peirce added that “…when all is over—it may be in a fraction 
of a second, in an hour, or after long years—we find ourselves decided as to how we should act under 
such circumstances as those which occasion our hesitation.”72  Inquiry, according to Peirce, is the 
“struggle” to attain a state of “belief” from a prior state of “doubt”.73  It is possible to read Plato as 
exploiting this relation between doubt and inquiry to great rhetorical effect. In Plato’s early and middle 
dialogues, in which he investigates the content of ethical concepts such as justice, Socrates capitalized on 
our and his interlocutors’ discomfort with these kinds of struggles and apparent contradictions. Socrates’ 
interrogations aimed to show that his interlocutors accept both one thesis about the meaning of some 
concept (usually one they themselves profess) and also its negation.  His cross-examinations, which often 
ended in no affirmative conception of the concept under investigation, might be understood as affirming 
moral conflict.  But in fact, the method’s effectiveness relies on our rejecting the possibility of permanent 
conflict.  The conflicts seem troublesome to us because they entail a kind of truth value-lessness of the 
principles we assent to, and that is something we seem to reject out of hand in hard cases. 
The ideas of permanent conflict and incommensurability therefore seem to misrepresent, rather 
than reflect, moral phenomenology.  Practical reason involves an action-guiding element that pluralism 
ignores with premature invocations of indeterminacy.  Apparent conflict, which we hope is temporary, 
should be interpreted as the beginning, not the end, of moral inquiry.  It is not “evidence” for the view 
that values, just in their nature, conflict. 
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Do These Questions Really Lack Single Right Answers? 
What kind of questions would we consider if we seriously wanted to solve an apparent conflict of values?  
Can we conclude that value conflict cannot be resolved without first considering how they might be 
resolved? That would seem at best premature.  Raz offers an example in which a person must choose 
between two promising career paths, one as a lawyer and one as a clarinetist.74  Neither career initially 
seems better than the other seems, and they also do not appear to be equally good. Yes, these two careers 
seem very different, and lives devoted to them would have very different value.  But to test the further 
pluralist claim that these careers are simply incommensurable, let us try to put ourselves in the position of 
having to decide between these two lives.  If you were in that position, would you really think there are no 
grounds at all for comparing them, no overarching considerations that might help arbitrate conflicts and 
guide your choice?  Is there really no way that you might successfully combine elements of both law and 
music in your life?  Are there really no relevant facts about your innate lawyer-ing abilities or musical 
talent that indicate you are better suited to one path than to the other?  Is the value of a life of public 
service in law really so disconnected from the value of a life of artistic creation that these two careers are 
simply incomparable?  If you think they are incomparable, have you arrived at that conclusion by 
interpreting these ideals in light of other more general convictions you might have concerning what 
makes a career valuable and, more generally, a life good? 
We might say that these two careers belong to different “genres”, just as music and fine art do, 
and for that reason might regard comparisons between them as very difficult.  But why should that 
difference pose an insurmountable obstacle to comparisons?  Any genre, after all, is just a species of a 
wider genus, which may in turn be a species of a yet wider genus.  Aristotle thought it was the nature of 
the world to be divided up in this way, and Kant held that humans understand the world by carving it up 
into genre and species.75  But if everything is divided up into genus and species, why is there no way to 
make comparisons between careers by backing up to the wider genre to which the species of both public 
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service in law and artistic creation through music belong, and then adjudicate between them on the basis 
of the values that define that wider genus? What is that wider genus?  How about the values you associate 
with “successful career”? Or the values you associate with “meaningful contribution to the lives of 
others”?  Those are abstract categories, but they are not empty, and we have as yet no reason to think 
reflection on them could not dissolve the appearance of conflict.76 
The pluralist’s heavy artillery consists of examples like Raz’s.  These examples pose questions 
whose answers are not initially clear, and we are expected to draw the conclusion that they have no single 
right answer at all.  But why?  Pluralists rarely attempt to reflect on questions or strategies that might 
solve these conflicts, and until they adopt a model of principles that more accurately matches the face 
value of moral argument and conflict, we should not accept the premature conclusion that values just, in 
their nature, conflict. 
 
3.7 Regrets and Remainders 
Another phenomenon that might be thought to support pluralism is the experience of remorse, or rational 
regret, or irreplaceable loss people sometimes feel after a moral decision, even when they believe they 
have acted in the right way.77  Consider an admittedly artificial example, which nevertheless illustrates the 
basic idea.  If we assume that the criterion of an act’s rightness is its tendency to promote well-being, and 
Jones would receive more well-being from receiving some gift than Smith would have received from 
receiving the same gift, and the gift can only be given to one of them, then the right act is to give the gift 
to Jones.  But is there no reason to regret the denial of well-being to Smith? If so, then that “remainder” 
might seem to indicate a moral loss of some kind, that some wrong has been committed even though we 
did the right thing.  This sense of loss might seem to support the pluralistic view that some true principle 
that should have been acted upon was not acted upon and could not have been acted upon. 
                                                          
76 The argument in this paragraph is indebted to Christine Korsgaard’s critique of Raz’s theory of value in Korsgaard’s “The Dependence of 
Value on Humanity” in Raz, The Practice of Value, 69-70 
77 See Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, 27-30. 1972; and Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, 86 
193 
 
Now it may be possible to explain away feelings of regret or remorse as simply useful character 
traits, sentiments we develop or are born with that help to ensure reliable performances of our duties. I 
will not rely on that psychological explanation here, but will instead take the experiences at face value.  In 
my view, there seems to be a more straightforward account of these feelings that we can draw from within 
the framework of the Principled Model. 
The idea of a “remainder” is most plausible if we accept the Factual Model.  If we adopt that 
understanding of value, then the “experience” of regret, of something leftover, might be interpreted as 
“evidence” of some further leftover value-fact.  But once again, we should avoid the mistake of assuming 
that the feeling of regret is somehow evidence for a moral remainder: for we do not know principles 
ultimately through experience of what is the case, so no experience can count either as evidence for or 
against any kind of moral truth.   
The Principled Model, by contrast, supplies a better way of explaining the apparent remainder.  
On this view, the jump from regret to pluralism results from confusing two different perspectives, 
discussed in Section 1.6, from which an agent might consider her situation and the reasons that apply to 
her in that situation. These perspectives are, on one hand, the perspective of the many prima facie reasons 
that apply to her and, on the other hand, the all-out perspective of Reason itself.  In other words the 
inference to pluralism conflates a reason with the verdict of Reason or, as we saw, what Kant called the 
ground of obligation with obligation itself. (Recall from Section 1.6 that Kant shifts the possibility of 
conflict from obligation itself to the grounds of obligation, which we can understand on Ross’s model of 
prima facie reasons.) 
The sense of regret seems natural when we reflect on the prima facie reasons we have for an 
action only from the point of view of part of our circumstance.  Smith did not gain any well-being.  It is 
regrettable that the world is not different so that there is a second gift for him, or perhaps so that he is 
indifferent to receiving a gift.   But that is merely a conflict between different prima facie considerations 
or desiderata.  It is not a conflict within the truth about what should be done.  Desiderata, like all 
contingent facts, inclinations, desires, and so on, often conflict with one another.  But unfulfilled 
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desiderata do not entail unfulfilled obligations. The result of deliberation is always obligation.  Grounds 
or desiderata are not principles:  they do not obligate on their own.  As I have tried to show in the last two 
chapters, they are provisional considerations that set terms for moral deliberation, the data for theorizing, 
and the occasion for moral struggle.  But they are not the conclusion of moral deliberation.  The 
conclusion is a principle which represents an all-out judgment about what must be done.   
 
3.8  An Important Extension: The Intelligibility of Political Principles 
The arguments of this chapter carry over to the politics. In particular, they support the conclusion that 
political principles are rationally intelligible, not brute.  If principles in general cannot be generalized 
from what is or what happens, then neither ideal nor institutional political principles can be generalized 
from what is or what happens.  No political fact in the base of a community’s political perspective can on 
its own determine a political principle.  The political principles that political facts in part determine do not 
just fall out of those facts.  We need some more basic normative reason that justifies which utterances, 
ink-blots, and actions are relevant and which principles they actually establish.78   
I suggest that we should think of political facts as minor premises in a grand practical syllogism 
whose conclusion states a binding institutional principle, such as a legal requirement, and whose major 
premise is a principle which states a political ideal, such as justice or the fair settlement of disagreements, 
that makes facts about the political practice normatively relevant.  The major would have to be an ideal 
because we would need some principle that holds independently of the political facts, and institutional 
principles those facts establish, in order to make those facts and institutional principles normatively 
relevant.  The institutional principles of a political order are thus binding only because some ideal 
regulates their normativity.    
If we think of ideal political principles as major premises in practical inferences whose minor 
premises include political facts and whose conclusions are institutional principles of some kinds, then it is 
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easy to see why institutional principles belong to a complex web of other principles, including ideal 
political principles.  If, as we saw in Section 3.4, the argument for any principle can proceed indefinitely 
by drawing on facts and other principles, and if the truth of some principle depends on the truth of an 
indefinite number of other principles, then it seems we are not entitled to suppose that either institutional 
or ideal principles are wholly insulated from one another or conflict, because we are then not entitled to 
assume that this process of justification would never reveal common presuppositions that could order or 
resolve apparent conflicts among them.   
As we will see in the next chapter, this conclusion is also well supported by the phenomenology 
of political decision-making, paradigmatically the hard judicial decision.  Judges discover the extent of 
thought and reflection they need to solve apparent conflicts or fill gaps within law in the course of their 
reflection. “The judicial predicament,” as Dworkin writes, “arises precisely because the judge may not 
switch roles when his own becomes too difficult, but must press on even though his [idealized] 
hypotheses becomes more dubious and his speculations more tenuous than he would like.”79  Depending 
on which ideal principle a judge finds normatively significant, she may find different facts about political 
practice normatively relevant.  Ideals of fairness, fair-warning, and political stability could all explain 
why most judges most of the time believe that the ordinary meaning of what past authorities have said is 
significant in determining the content of the law those authorities have created.  But the same reasons 
could also justify attending to a legislator’s intention.  If a judge believes political fairness requires 
deference to popular opinion, and if a legislators’ intentions are good indicators of what their constituents 
believed, then that is a reason to attend to facts about the mental states (actual or hypothetical) of 
legislators.  If, however, the ordinary meaning of a statute, as written, is so absurd from either a policy-
standpoint or moral perspective that it appears entirely drained of normativity, then a judge’s more 
idealized convictions may take center-stage, and require her to look to other aspects of the political record 
that could legitimately control the outcome of a case before her.  If she accepts a principle that similar 
cases should be decided similarly, and identifies a sufficiently attractive substantive principle underlying 
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other aspects of the practice that bear similarity to the case before her, then she may conclude that that 
other principle should control her decision. 
Two important points follow from this.  The first is that, at the very least, the rational 
intelligibility of political principles undermines what I called in Section 2.7 the Descriptive Factual Model 
of institutional political principles.  Contrary to the descriptive legal positivist tradition of Kelsen, Hart, 
and Raz, law is not a matter of plain fact, but is a system of normative principles whose force and 
justification depends on some more basic background principles of political morality.  However, this 
leaves open the possibility that one could still defend a version of legal positivism on normative grounds.  
That is, the rational intelligibility of political principles allows that some version of what I called in 
Section 2.8 the Normative Factual Model might be correct.  But whether it is correct would depend on a 
normative argument that draws on idealized principles of political morality to show that institutional 
principles best serve some valuable social purpose when they are identified positivistically.  Theories that 
offer such arguments include John Rawls’s political liberalism, Jeremy Waldron’s democratic 
majoritarianism, and Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory of democratic legitimacy.  I consider the 
normative case for these conceptions of the Normative Factual Model in Chapter 7. 
The second point is that the rational intelligibility of political principles helps to explain a central 
feature of political practice, which is the essential contestability of the concepts we use to argue and 
disagree about how we ought to act together through our political institutions.  Disagreements about the 
meaning of justice, liberty, equality, or the rule of law, are not merely disagreements about how we 
should define these concepts, but are rather normative disagreements about the real value these concepts 
represent.  As we will see in Section 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10, the Descriptive Factual Model is incapable of 
accounting for what Ronald Dworkin called “theoretical disagreement” about law.  A theoretical 
disagreement about a legal proposition, such as a disagreement about what some constitutional provision 
that is in some way vague, or abstract, contradictory, or otherwise unclear means or requires in a 
particular circumstance, is not a disagreement about any kind of social fact, but rather a disagreement that 
reflects deeper disagreement about the underlying purpose or principle presupposed by the unclear 
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provision.  If we understand law on the Descriptive Factual Model, then we are forced to conclude that 
these disagreements, which are ubiquitous at all levels of legal practice, are not what parties to the 
disagreement take them to be, and therefore that participants in legal practice are either gravely mistaken 
about the nature of their occupation, or simply insincere about what they are doing when they argue over 
what the law is.  The Principled Model, however, which accepts that the content of law is in part 
determined by background principles that control the impact of a provision’s language on the law that 
language creates, fits and explains this disagreement smoothly.  They are disagreements about the purpose 
and value of the rule of law. 
The phenomenon of essential disagreement is important because it suggests a general answer to 
the third fundamental question I posed at the beginning of the Chapter 3, which is the conceptual 
question:  Are judgments about principles purely analytic judgments that are true or false in virtue of the 
meaning of the concepts we use to form such judgments?  Or are they synthetic judgments that are true or 
false in virtue of something beyond meaning, such as how the world really is or ought to be?  The next 
chapter explains why these questions matter for the Unity Thesis, and develops an answer. 
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Ch. 4:  The Meaning of Value Concepts 
 
4.1 A Conceptual Case for Pluralism? 
The Factual Model and the Principled Model are competing accounts of what principles are. In Chapter 1, 
I suggested that these two options are each necessary and sufficient for, respectively, moral pluralism and 
moral unity, and in Chapter 2 suggested the same holds in the political case. In Chapter 3, I argued that 
the Principled Model better fits our understanding of moral argument, justification, truth, and the 
phenomenology of hard moral decisions.   
If the Principled Model is correct, then it seems that principles, unlike facts, are not known a 
posteriori through some kind of moral experience, but rather are known ultimately a priori and are 
necessary truths.  However, the idea that principles are a priori may be consistent with the idea that some 
judgments about values and principles are analytic rather than synthetic, that they are semantically 
entailed by the very concepts we use to make judgments about them. This possibility may threaten the 
Unity Thesis because, if it is part of the very meaning of certain value concepts that they require or permit 
certain forms of conduct, and if the meaning of such concepts conflicts, then it would seem that some 
values conflict. 
In ordinary language, we deploy concepts in order to argue, agree, disagree, assess, and reason 
about what to do.  These value concepts, which we may also call with the Ancients “virtues”, name sets of 
principles we should follow, acts that would be patriotic, loyal, moderate or, in politics, acts or decisions 
or institutions that would be legitimate, just, democratic, liberal, egalitarian, and so on.  In this chapter, I 
challenge the notion that we might sensibly defend an account of any value concept on analytic or 
conceptual grounds.  I show that this notion is inconsistent with the way principles, and our value 
concepts that collect them, are properly used in moral discourse and argument.  I argue that the social 
function of our value concepts is to name objective truths about what really ought to be done, about what 
really is good.  Understood that way, judgments of principle go beyond what can be known solely in 
virtue of the contents of the concepts involved in making them.   
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When we combine this point with the earlier argument, that we know principles ultimately 
independently of any particular experience, then we must conclude that principles and values are what 
Kant called synthetic a priori truths, which are universally and necessarily valid, and so unified.  That 
proposition is the central conclusion of my case from analysis for the unity of moral principle and against 
pluralism.  Later, in Sections 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10, I will apply this general line of argument to the special 
case of political principles, and in particular legal principles. 
 
4.2 Example: Semantic Arguments for Procedural Democracy 
Some versions of the conceptual argument seem plainly to misrepresent the sense of value concepts, and I 
will not focus much on them.  According to a stock example,1 someone affirms the principle that we 
ought to help people in pain because people in pain ought to be assisted, but when asked why people in 
pain should be assisted, the person answers that it is a conceptual truth that people in pain should be 
assisted, that this is just what being in pain means. This seems to me obviously false.  If it were part of the 
meaning of some person being in pain that she ought to be helped, then someone who said a person in 
pain should not be helped would be contradicting himself.  But that is surely wrong. A person who denies 
that someone in pain should be helped may or may not be callous, but is not conceptually confused.  
“Being in pain” is a state of affairs and thus a fact, not a principle of human action. It remains, in Moore’s 
phrase, an “open question” whether or not a person in pain should be helped.2 
Here is a different version of the semantic argument.  Instead of reducing a value concept to a 
state of affairs, this version assumes that although value concepts indeed represent principles, their proper 
use can be determined by an empirical or purely conceptual inquiry of some kind, perhaps by 
investigating the shared rules of application we all tacitly deploy in using the concept in ordinary 
language.  This is an important, more complicated and, I believe, entrenched understanding of how we 
can profitably investigate or ground claims about value concepts.  It is particularly prominent in political 
                                                          
1 G.A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, 228-229. John Mackie, “The Subjectivity of Values”, Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and 
Contemporary Readings, 709; and J4H, 45. 
2 See Section 3.2 above on Moore’s Open Question Argument 
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and legal theory, where sometimes it seems to reflect a desire or determination to use words in a certain 
way.   
To illustrate this understanding, imagine a biologist who refuses to allow observations of black 
swans to count as evidence against the generalization that all swans are white on the grounds that black 
swans, by definition, are not really swans at all. 3   This would seem to indicate that the biologist is 
holding whiteness to part of the definition of “swan”, so that “swans are white” is true by definition and 
“black swan” is a contradiction.  This strict semantic limitation is certainly inappropriate for natural kind 
concepts like “swan”:  We are not free to stipulate hard boundaries surrounding these concepts, because 
their meaning can evolve and deepen as we make scientific discoveries about them (just as the meaning of 
water deepened when scientists discovered that water is H20).   
Is a similar conceptual restriction nevertheless appropriate for value concepts? If patriotism and 
filial loyalty just have, as a matter of our shared rules for thinking and talking with these concepts, some 
core meaning, then it might be possible that Sartre’s young pupil could never discover through moral 
reflection anything more about the content of these concepts that might help him resolve the apparent 
conflict between them.4  Perhaps the very definitions of patriotism and loyalty would bar any non-tragic 
resolution to his problem.  As we will see in this chapter, many political theorists assume that something 
like this is true of some of the most familiar value concepts we deploy in political discourse.  In Section 
4.4, I consider in detail Berlin’s semantic claim that a value simply “is what it is: liberty is liberty, not 
equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience,” and that “nothing is 
gained by a confusion of terms.”5  But first consider another prevalent semantic argument in political 
theory, which concerns the proper meaning of the value concept “democracy” and its relation to 
substantive justice and truth.  
                                                          
3 The swan example is Joel Feinberg’s.  He uses it in a context unrelated to value judgments, but it serves to illustrate well the rigidity with which 
some use concepts.  Feinberg, “Ethical Egoism”, in Reason and Responsibility, 497  
4 See Section 3.6 above on Sartre’s and similar predicaments. 
5 Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, 172 
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This argument assumes that democracy is essentially, as a conceptual matter, a procedural rather 
than a substantive or outcome-oriented ideal.6  Democracy just means that the laws and arrangements of a 
political community should be those that citizens approve through some collective decision process 
involving deliberation, will-formation, and decision-procedures, in which all participate, and which is 
limited and defined only by a few narrowly conceived, purely formal procedural rights.  On this view, the 
democratic legitimacy of any law depends on its pedigree or the manner in which it was produced 
through particular institutions, rather than on its substantive content or whether it satisfies independent 
standards of justice or morality. 
This procedural understanding of democracy is widely accepted on apparently conceptual 
grounds.  Friedrich Hayek, for example, remarked that democracy is “[a doctrine not] about what the law 
ought to be, but a doctrine about the manner of determining what will be the law”.7  Brian Barry wrote 
that democracy must be conceived as a procedural ideal, which he understands as a rejection of “the 
notion that one could build into ‘democracy’ any constraints on the content of the outcomes produced, 
such as substantive equality, respect for human rights, concern for the general welfare, personal liberty, or 
the rule of law.  The only exceptions are those required to constitute democracy as a procedure.”8  Jeremy 
Waldron sometimes suggests that we can settle whether judicially enforced constitutional constraints are, 
conceptually speaking, anti-democratic by considering the conventional use of “democracy”: “the 
democratic claim has always been that the people are entitled to govern themselves by their own 
judgment.”9  Waldron also charges thinkers like Dworkin, who argue that counter-majoritarian 
institutions like strong judicial review do not necessarily compromise but may actually improve 
democracy, with a conceptual confusion of democratic ends and democratic means.10 Samuel Huntington 
said that procedural institutions, such as elections and campaigns are the “essence of democracy, its 
                                                          
6 In this chapter, I do not mean to suggest that theorists who rely on this conceptual point only rely on it in defending their ideas about values.  
Many offer normative arguments for them in addition.  However, I suggest below that the normative arguments are in important ways 
inconsistent with their semantic claims. 
7 See Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty,103   
8 See Barry’s Democracy, Power and Justice: Essays in Political Theory, 25 
9 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 264 
10 Ibid, 291-292 
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inescapable sine qua non.”11  Hans Kelsen argues, on conceptual grounds, that it is of the essence of 
democracy that its value consists solely in formal equality of participation in political decision-making, 
not in substantive justice, economic or otherwise.  He writes:  
Insofar as the idea of equality is meant to connote anything other than formal equality with 
regard to freedom (i.e., political participation), that idea has nothing to do with democracy. This 
can be seen most clearly in the fact that not the political and formal, but the material and 
economic equality of all can be realized just as well— if not better— in an autocratic- 
dictatorial form of state as it can in a democratic form of state.12 
 
All of these procedural democrats allege or imply a conceptual tension between democracy, conceived as 
a procedural or purely formal ideal, and individual rights and other values, understood as substantive 
ideals. They attribute to democracy precisely the tragic character that Isaiah Berlin ascribed to value 
concepts in general, as a concept inevitably at war with other political virtues. If we accept that 
democracy is a value, and if we think democracy just involves procedures for formally equal participatory 
decision-making among citizens, then we must accept that a community committed to decisions reached 
through those procedures also compromises some other values, and therefore does some wrong.  If we 
think that justice and individual rights are values, and if we think they are violated whenever a democratic 
decision procedure produces unjust laws or great material inequality, then we must also think that those 
procedures do some wrong.  If we accept both democracy-as-procedure and substantive justice, then when 
they conflict, we must choose not whether to violate one of them, but which to violate.   
That is what the procedural conception of democracy entails.  But are we really beholden to two 
independent values, one that commands proceduralism and the other that commands material equality, so 
                                                          
11 See Huntington’s The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century, 9. 
12 Kelsen’s argument is a conceptual, not a normative one.  It is also a non sequitur, as it does not follow from the fact that an autocratic regime 
might better secure material equality that material equality “has nothing to do with democracy,” understood as formal equality. Kelsen overlooks 
the conceptual possibility—which I defend below—that democracy possesses both formal and material aspects in a unified relation.  Kelsen’s 
argument is also question-begging because it presupposes that democracy is formal equality, which is what the argument is meant to establish.  
Quoted in Nadia Urbinati’s “Editors’ Introduction” to Hans Kelsen, The Essence and Value of Democracy, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2013) 7.  I am grateful to Nadia Urbinati for drawing my attention to Kelsen’s views.  See her discussion in Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, 
Truth, and the People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014) 7, 245. 
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that our political community finds itself certain that it must do wrong whatever it does?   The answer to 
this question depends on what we mean by democracy and by justice; it depends on how we interpret 
those abstract concepts.  The procedural view makes plain how many people understand democracy.  
Democracy, they believe, is a procedural ideal, not about what the law should be, but about how to 
determine the law.  If that is how we understand democracy, then it is immediately apparent that our 
commitment to it will often conflict with other commitments, including those to substantive values like 
justice.  
But are we committed to democracy understood that way? Suppose we instead understand 
democracy in a more flexible way, which builds a commitment to justice into the very idea of democratic 
procedures. Suppose we say not that democracy is a decision procedure whose results might conflict with 
substantive values, but rather that democracy is a partnership in which citizens collectively participate in 
deciding what the law will be subject to substantive conditions that make that partnership truly fair.  
Democracy, on this new understanding, would be a way to decide upon laws subject to certain principled 
limitations, so that when its outcomes are morally odious, those outcomes not only are not allowed to 
stand, but are not even considered democratic.  It is far from obvious that democracy, understood in this 
more flexible way, would produce an inevitable conflict with values like justice. On the contrary, it seems 
unlikely that it would.  If an individual’s moral rights prohibit her subjection to laws that fail to treat her 
as an equal partner in self-governance (such as racist laws, unfair equality of opportunity, or gross 
economic inequality) then a prohibition on such laws cannot count as an invasion of democracy, because 
those laws would not, on our new account, be democratic. 
Some might object to this restatement of democracy that I have simply invented a new definition 
in an unhelpful a way, fusing process and substantive outcome in a way that makes the meaning of 
democracy depend upon controversial moral judgments, and so excludes conflict between procedure and 
substance from the start.  But if that is what you think, are you assuming—like the biologist who held that 
the idea of black swans is a conceptual confusion—that the only successful account of democracy is one 
that makes it independent of substantive considerations, one that allows us to decide when democracy has 
204 
 
been sacrificed without considering contestable questions about what rights other people have?  That begs 
the question in the reverse direction—it assumes the picture of values as embattled sovereigns that makes 
conflict inevitable.  It is to embrace a kind of pluralism on purely conceptual grounds.  It requires a 
normative defense, not a conceptual defense, or so I will argue. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to trying to break the stranglehold that these semantic 
limitations seem to have on our value concepts.  My main strategy will be to show that the conceptual 
boundaries and limitations theorists seek to impose on our concepts simply do not exist.  The contents of 
our value concepts, both moral and political, are contested not merely around their edges, but at their 
cores.  They are, to borrow Gallie’s important but too often neglected expression, “essentially contested” 
concepts.13  My goal is to demonstrate the essential contestability of our concepts primarily through many 
examples that show how the proper use of these concepts in moral and political discourse requires that we 
understand them in that contested way.  When we do, the semantic case for pluralism seems much less 
plausible. 
 
4.3 Criterial Concepts, Socio-Empirical Concepts, and the Cold Fact Premise 
As I suggested in the Introduction, some value concepts also have non-evaluative senses.  A sociologist or 
anthropologist might find it useful, purely for classificatory purposes, to stipulate a hard definition of 
ideas like democracy or liberty, but not to use the definition in an appraisive sense as we might in a 
political debate to condemn a particular decision as undemocratic or as a violation of liberty.  But key 
normative concepts do seem to serve that latter, appraisive function for us. If the sense of these value 
concepts depended solely on empirical or social facts about, for example, the shared rules or criteria we 
use in thought and speech (as for instance the meaning of “table” seems to depend) or perhaps on an 
empirical inquiry of some kind (as for instance the meaning of “water” might depend), then this would 
virtually guarantee that our value concepts will conflict tragically with each other.  This is because their 
core meaning, understood in these ways, would place strict, brute, factual limits on the set of principles 
                                                          
13 See Gallie’s “Essentially Contested Concepts”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol.56, 1956, 167-198 
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that fall under them, and this would severely limit our ability to refine our concepts through normative 
reason and reflection so that they would not conflict.   
We might call definitions like these “tragic definitions” of value concepts. Indeed we see tragic 
definitions all around us, many of which are endorsed by pluralists.  As I have mentioned several times, 
Berlin defined negative liberty as the freedom from interference of others in doing whatever it is we 
might want to do.  On that view, it is immediately apparent that liberty will conflict with any other values 
that demand restrictions on people’s actions.  It implies, as Berlin pointed out, that liberty for the wolf is 
death to the lamb.14  Underlying tragic definitions like Berlin’s is a basic, though perhaps 
unacknowledged, assumption which explains and guarantees its hostility to other values.  I will call this 
assumption the “cold fact premise”.  This premise holds that the correct use of a value concept is fixed by 
some essential fact, either about rules of shared use or some natural facts that the concept names. 
Negative liberty as absence of interference, for instance, is a factual condition or relation which, in 
principle, can be identified without taking into consideration whether non-interference on some occasions 
is a good or a bad thing.  Similarly, if democracy just means some kind of decision procedure in which all 
participate, then the concept of democracy can be understood factually:  whether or not a decision is 
democratic depends on solely on the decision’s genealogy in certain types of social choice procedures.   
The cold fact premise in effect closes off what otherwise might seem to be an open question 
about whether the meaning of these concepts is subject to change, modification, or “sensitizing” to other 
values.  This explains the pluralist image of political values as uncompromising, warring sovereigns. For 
when the meanings of values are fixed in this way, they pull in opposite directions, and the choice 
between them requires sacrificing at least one.   
The cold fact premise has several consequences for how we understand political values.  For 
instance, although it closes off certain questions about a value’s core meaning, it nevertheless leaves fully 
open questions about whether that value, so defined, is attractive or unattractive, or whether it should be 
compromised for the sake of more pressing demands in the name of other values.  It leaves open the 
                                                          
14 Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, 297 
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possibility that we can argue about whether we should pursue a value, but it closes off certain judgments 
about how to conceive the value, which is determined in advance by facts about its meaning.  A related 
point is that the cold fact premise also leaves open the possibility that we might refine the concept 
“around” its core meaning, just as a mechanical engineer might refine the components of a tractor without 
changing its basic design, or as a human might develop his intellect or his musculature without changing 
the structure of his DNA.  We can tinker, for example, with the institutional structure of democracy by 
redrawing electoral districts, ensuring greater accountability at polling stations and, perhaps, by limiting 
the amount of money rich candidates can spend during campaign cycles.  But none of these “peripheral” 
changes affect the essential meaning of democracy as a procedural ideal.  
Furthermore, the cold fact premise seems, on the surface, to satisfy a logical requirement for 
meaningful communication, which is that there must, at the heart of every concept we talk about, be some 
core idea that we all recognize as settled.  It might seem that, in order for us to understand others and to 
be understood ourselves, the core meaning of any concept must, in the final analysis, be fixed by social 
agreement on core instances of that concept.  Just as we can sensibly discuss, for example, what house I 
would like to live in next year only if we both agree, at least roughly, on what counts as a house, so we 
can carry on a sensible discussion about “equality” only if we both agree on what counts as a paradigm of 
equality.   
Moreover, the cold fact premise seems to explain how disagreement about the concept intensifies 
as we move away from that core idea and into the “periphery” of meaning, just as we might all agree, for 
instance, that a truck is a core example of a vehicle, but we might disagree about the peripheral case of 
whether a pair of roller skates is also a vehicle.  Perhaps this explains both why most people converge on 
the paradigm meaning of democracy as “government by the people”, and also why there is more 
controversy on “borderline cases”, like the compatibility of judicial review and democracy, on which 
there is very little convergence.15  
                                                          




How could we confirm the cold fact premise?  What form of investigation could confirm that a 
value concept’s core meaning is fixed by facts independently of normative judgments?   It seems that the 
only test of meaning compatible with the cold fact premise must be a factual test, one that treats the 
essential meaning of a concept as fixed by some non-normative property.  In political and social theory, 
these tests typically come in two forms.16 
The first, sometimes called criterial analysis, treats a concept’s core meaning as a particular kind 
of semantic property, fixed by a set of shared rules already implicit in our common understanding of a 
concept, that we all implicitly follow whenever we use the concept in question.17  Criterial analysis 
assumes that we can clarify these shared rules by inquiring into the manner in which the concept is used 
in ordinary language, and thus draw attention to core meanings implicit in or necessarily entailed by the 
concept’s use in particular situations.18   For many concepts we employ in ordinary language, criterial 
analysis of this sort seems appropriate.  For example, a sign that reads “keep of the grass” might have 
very different meaning depending on whether it appeared on someone’s lawn or at a drug rehab clinic, 
and we could only interpret its meaning through counterfactual inquiry into the circumstances in which 
most people would agree to assign a particular meanings to “grass”.19  Philosophers have often treated 
political concepts in this way.  Gerald MacCallum, who I discuss below, tried to elucidate the hidden 
criteria behind the concept of liberty by identifying three assumptions he thinks we all share in using that 
concept.20  Similarly, H.L.A Hart influentially attempted to bring to the surface the hidden criteria in the 
concept of law through thought experiments and by paying close attention to how that concept is properly 
used in particular situations.  We can see how one might think that many of the most important concepts 
in political philosophy plainly are governed by semantic criteria. Obviously, we can imagine claims about 
                                                          
16 Here I am relying on Stephen Perry’s distinction between two forms of ‘descriptive’ methodology, namely, semantic and social scientific.  See 
Perry’s “Hart’s Methodological Positivism” in Hart’s Postscript:  Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law, 313-354.  See also 
Stavropoulos on Kripke-Putnam semantics, Objectivity in Law,17-34, and Dworkin’s discussion of criterial concepts in JR “Introduction”, and 
J4H,   
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid, 333-34. 
19 I owe this example to Professor Kent Greenawalt. 
20 MacCallum says that any statement about freedom or unfreedom can be expressed as a ‘triadic relation’, a statement relating three things: an 
agent, certain preventing conditions, and certain doings or becomings of the agent. On this view, any conception of freedom specifies what is free 
or unfree, from what it is free or unfree, and what it is free or unfree to do or become. See MacCallum’s “Negative and Positive Freedom”, 
Philosophical Review, 312-34. 
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liberty or democracy that would be ruled out on the basis of standard usage.  I would (usually) be making 
a conceptual mistake, for instance, if I said that lobsters were the least democratic crustaceans, or that 
square roots were highly legitimate. 
The second approach to meaning, which we can call socio-empirical analysis, treats a political 
concept’s core meaning as a sociological or anthropological property that can be determined by applying 
some descriptive or explanatory method, like that employed in the empirical sciences, to empirical social 
phenomena about the concept’s use.  It could potentially confirm the cold fact premise because its point is 
to advance, from an “external” point of view, a descriptive, morally neutral theory of the social world and 
our concepts of it.  Many social theorists use something like socio-empirical analysis to explain various 
sociological and political concepts.  Concepts like “state”, “nation”, and “bureaucracy” have been used in 
this way to make empirical sense of how people are organized in societies.  In the Introduction, I noted 
that sociological approaches to legal pluralism might be plausible if it attempted something like this, 
which it does not. 
Socio-empirical analysis of these concepts permits a type of analysis that criterial analysis would 
not allow, for it can claim to have discovered the “nature” or “essence” or fundamental characteristic of 
these concepts, in the sense of their basic organization.  That sort of explanation would make no sense for 
criterial analysis, which is concerned only with shared criteria needed for understanding.  But what 
criterial and explanatory approaches have in common is that they both provide a certain type of test for 
the meaning of political concepts, namely, a purely descriptive, factual test.  Each supposes that we might 
test whether a judgment about liberty, equality, or democracy (for example) is true by consulting an 
empirical fact such as whether the proposition follows from a linguistic convention, or some observable, 
empirical feature of the social world.    
Since the cold fact premise assumes a non-normative test of meaning, it can be sustained only if 
some version of criterial or socio-empirical analysis provides a plausible account of the sort of reasoning 
we actually engage in when we make judgments about political values. If neither does—if it would be 
silly to think that we could settle questions about the requirements of liberty, democracy, justice by 
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referring to ordinary linguistic usage of those words or by consulting an empirical study—then it is 
equally silly to hold that political concepts have the sort of structure that only those empirical tests could 
confirm.  We would then have very good reason to abandon the cold fact premise.   
Perhaps it is obvious that these are silly tests for the meaning of value concept.  But I will not 
take that for granted, and so will try to be rigorous in showing that they are poor accounts of how we use 
value concepts, particularly in political theory. 
 
4.4  Why Criterial Accounts Collapse Into The Factual Model 
The criterial approach assumes social convergence on certain rules, perhaps implicit in our use of certain 
concepts, and which govern their proper use.  Conceptual analysis of these criteria would try to explain a 
particular concept by attending to judgments that competent speakers or thinkers using that concept 
converge in being disposed to make in particular situations.  But there is a fundamental problem with this 
conceptual approach.  Convergence is a fact about the linguistic practice in which the concept is used.  
But it is a normative question how a concept is properly used in a particular language, in particular a 
question about how properly to follow a rule.  We would therefore need some normative theory, defended 
on grounds other than facts about people’s beliefs, which showed what role people’s convergent 
judgments about proper use should play in determining the content of a linguistic rule. We could not refer 
that issue back to any facts about their use itself, because we first have to determine the precise normative 
relevance of those facts.  To be clear, the point is not that people’s judgments about proper use are 
irrelevant. The point is that these judgments cannot determine their own normative relevance in 
determining a rule. We must appeal to something outside the nexus of facts about our linguistic practices 
in order to settle that matter.  
There is a general version of this point, emphasized by Kripke and Wittgenstein, and which I 
mentioned earlier in Section 3.2.21  The point is that it is generally impossible for any non-normative facts 
                                                          
21 For helpful discussions of Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein, on which I rely, and which relates the issue to law, see Nicos Stavropoulos’s “Why 
Principles?” 157–198.  See also Stavropoulos’s Objectivity in Law, especially the Introduction and Chapter One.  Stavropoulos traces the 
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about a practice alone to determine their own normative significance, and therefore to determine a rule’s 
proper use.  In order to identify the rule that these facts determine, the question must first be settled, at an 
analytically prior level, which aspects of the practice are relevant to determining the rule’s requirements.  
Without this prior explanation, for any purported rule, all it would take to make a case for its being 
required by a practice would be to deploy some ad hoc explanation of which aspects of the practice are 
relevant. We could always design a rule consistent with the facts of the practice.22 
So it seems we have to ask a normative question: we have these concepts whose use is 
determined in some way by facts about our practice, but what is the point of using such concepts?  What 
is the social function of these concepts?  What do they do for us?  These questions show that we need to 
reflect on more general principles from which we infer the normative implications of certain sets of facts, 
which is exactly what the Principled Model holds.  If this is right, then the principles governing the proper 
use of our value concepts must unite with any other principles that govern anything else we do us, and 
this seems to vindicate the Unity Thesis. 
But perhaps not.  Perhaps when we inspect these principles governing the proper use of value 
concepts, what we will find is that we ought to use those concepts as if their correct use depended on 
factual questions alone.  And indeed the social function of many concepts may seem to confirm this.   
The concept of a book, for instance, does not have a natural essence; it is a human artifact.  There are 
nevertheless shared criteria our practices that use the expression “book” deploy, and which determine its 
instances.  We might disagree about these criteria, as when we disagree about whether a pamphlet counts 
as a type of book23, but when we do, we do not suppose that we could settle the disagreement by further 
analysis of the concept, since this would just be a fringe case in which our shared criteria have run out and 
we are just deploying homonyms.  But the important point is that we rely on these shared criteria because 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
argument also to Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons, 84-88, and the fundamental point to Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 
(Oxford, Blackwell 1982). 
22 Stavropoulos illustrates with the following example:  “Hart's practice whereby men removed their hat upon entering a church now requires that 
men remove their jacket or tie. We could say that the relevant aspect of the practice is not the thing which is removed as such, but the fact that 
that thing is the first thing men would remove upon returning home from work. This would be perfectly consistent with the situation Hart 
describes, for hats plausibly were not only what men removed when in church but also the first thing they took off once they got home when Hart 
wrote. So the rule always was to remove whatever item of clothing would be the first to go once back home, and would have nothing to do with 
hats. Adding further facts to the database won't help—they would be more grist for the mill.” Stavropoulos, “Why Principles?”, 11 
23 The example is Dworkin’s, LE 45 
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the social purpose of the concept “book” is usually to facilitate smooth interaction and communication 
through conventional criteria, which is worth achieving. That explains why we think it would be a trivial, 
silly, merely verbal disagreement to bicker over whether “book” includes “pamphlet”.  Nothing important 
normally turns on that kind of disagreement in which we would simply be using different criteria. 
Are value concepts like the concept of a book?  One difficulty with that interpretation is that if the 
social function of value concepts were to facilitate smooth communication by supplying shared criteria 
that determine its correct use, then they apparently do a horrible job at it.  If mere coordination were their 
purpose, then the only kinds of disagreements we should expect about them would be the trivial kind that 
characterize merely verbal disagreements about, for instance, what counts as a book.  But we certainly do 
not see merely these kinds of disagreements.  On the contrary, we also see substantive normative 
disagreements about value concepts.  Unlike “book”, or “chair”, our value concepts are meaningful for us 
even when we disagree, normatively, about their correct application.  Insofar as there exists some 
convergent understanding about what count as, say, liberty, it would be silly to claim that our shared 
criteria settle the heated controversies we have, for instance, about whether public healthcare or higher 
taxes abridge liberty.  When people have these kinds of disagreements about value concepts, it is not 
because they are using different criteria, but because they share a fundamental assumption about the 
concept’s proper use: it is central to a value concept’s social function that it names substantive normative 
ideas—principles—that we really do have reason to pursue.  That, at any rate, is what I will now try to 
show.  
 
4.5 Essential Disagreement 
I take it for granted that the meaning of a concept depends in part on its use. Here I will show that 
empirical tests like those provided by criterial and empirical analysis cannot account for the sort of 
disagreements we have about the meaning of value concepts when we use them. In anticipation of later 
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discussions of political principles, I will focus on key political value concepts, especially the concepts of 
democracy, liberty, and, toward the end of the chapter, legality.24 
We can identify two types of disagreement we might have over whether a judgment about 
democracy is correct or not.  On one hand, if we all agree on the meaning of democracy, we might still 
disagree, empirically, about whether something is democratic or not. We might all agree, for instance, that 
the proposition “a law is democratic only if it is enacted by a representative majority in parliament” is a 
correct statement about the meaning of democracy. (I am not endorsing this meaning, but using it for 
illustration.)  But we might nevertheless disagree about the empirical question whether a given law was in 
fact decided by a representative majority (e.g., there might be suspicion over how truly representative a 
particular majority is or, what is less likely, whether a majority vote was actually taken).    Call this first 
kind of disagreement an “empirical disagreement” about a value concept. On the other hand, we might 
disagree about the very meaning of democracy itself, about the most basic conditions which must be 
satisfied in order for a judgment about democracy to be a correct. Call these kinds of disagreements about 
value concepts “essential disagreements”, for they are disagreements about the essential meaning of these 
concepts.   
Essential disagreements about democracy are commonplace.  Once we examine closely the 
phenomenon of essential disagreement and realize how deeply it penetrates, we notice that the meaning of 
democracy is not the subject of very much agreement at all: democracy has no fixed conceptual core—not 
even a procedural core.  Citizens, politicians, social scientists, and political philosophers disagree about 
which apportionment of political power, which interpretation of political rights, which system of 
representation, which pattern of elections, and which other institutional arrangements count as genuinely 
democratic.  In fact, our disagreements are much more fundamental than this.  Democratic governance is 
widely believed to be a source of political legitimacy capable of conferring moral defensibility upon 
forcibly imposed political structures.   Democratic authority, on this view, derives from some notion of 
                                                          
24 The following argument parallels and is indebted to Dworkin’s argument from theoretical disagreement against criteria and naturalistic 
conceptions of law.  I describe his argument in detail in Sections 4.9-4.10 below.   
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popular sovereignty, or “government by the people”. But that is an exceedingly abstract and unhelpful 
tautology.   Is a law the expression of the people’s governance if it is the outcome of a procedure in which 
all can participate?  Presumably, any such procedure would have to meet some minimal threshold 
standards of fairness and inclusion.  What must those standards be?  Are they to be narrowly conceived, 
strong enough to police only processes of deliberation, argument, and decision-making without also 
prejudicing the content of the outcomes thereby produced?  Or does “procedural fairness” require that a 
more robust, substantive set of economic, property, and civil rights be secured, so that democratic 
procedures and outcomes cannot be considered entirely independently of one another?   We might look 
further to other democratic ideas like freedom, equality, or the rule of law, and those ideas might raise 
new kinds of disagreement about whether democracy is, after all, just a procedural ideal.  Some might 
interpret “government by the people” in other various substantive ways, for example as essentially about 
the protection of minority interests and basic rights, including economic rights.  Others might view 
democracy as simply a restraint on decision-making at all levels, rather than as a particular scheme of 
government.  Some countries have historically found “democracy” in the idea of the one-party state. 
Our disagreements concerning the meaning of liberty are just as deep, and in the history of 
political thought, they are famous.  For Berlin, because anyone’s purpose, whether my private purpose in 
crossing your yard, or the state’s public purpose of coordinating traffic or collecting taxes, can conflict 
with some other person’s ability to achieve her ends, the goals of individuals and of the state necessarily 
conflict. This understanding, which pits liberty and legality against one another, would certainly have 
struck some in the classical liberal tradition as idiosyncratic.  Locke, for instance, called what Berlin 
coined negative liberty “license”, not liberty.  Locke viewed the state as a creative force for freedom. He 
said in The Second Treatise, “that ill deserves the Name of Confinement which serves to hedge us in only 
from Bogs and Precipices.... [T]he end of Law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge 
Freedom.”25 Locke held, contrary to Berlin’s flat conception of liberty as non-interference, that liberty 
                                                          
25 Locke, Second Treatise, Section 6 and Section 57. Locke also says: “where there is no law there is no freedom,” and that “freedom is not, as we 
are told, ‘a liberty for every man to do what he lists’, for who could be free when every other man’s humour might domineer over him?”  
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requires the prohibition of arbitrary acts of violence and that property-holders must be permitted to 
acquire and dispose of their holdings as they wished, subject to certain limits he placed on property 
acquisition.  Similarly, John Stuart Mill identified liberty, not as non-interference with achieving 
whatever purposes one might have, but as personal sovereignty over all thought and action that causes no 
harm to others.26  Thus, also unlike Berlin, Mill embraced an understanding of liberty that incorporates 
moral limitations into the very idea of individual liberty.  Marx, by contrast, believed both the Lockean 
and Millian conceptions of liberty falsely assume that individuals need to be protected from one another.  
For Marx, the only sort of liberty worthy of the name is that which we realize in our freely creative 
cooperative production with others.27   
Kant held a conception of moral freedom that can be realized only when we act under the 
direction of reason rather than arbitrary self-interest, and of juridical freedom as a system of reciprocal 
limitations under coercive laws.  He conceives of juridical freedom, not as the absence of interference to 
achieving our ends, but rather as individual independence in deciding for ourselves what ends to set and 
pursue in light of the means we each rightfully have at our disposal.28 You are at liberty, according to 
Kant, if you, rather than someone else, are ultimately responsible for setting the goals you will pursue.  
Kant’s conception of freedom-as-independence, like Locke’s, regards legal authority as potentially 
freedom-enhancing because it accepts that government may be necessary to secure the means in light of 
which individuals can act independently.  Like Locke’s and Mill’s conception, Kant’s incorporates 
concern for others by defining freedom in terms of one’s rightful means, which, for Kant, is a matter of 
distributive justice and indeed requires a minimum social provision for all.29   
Moreover, Kant specifically indicates that liberty and equality do not conflict, but are rather 
different parts of a more basic value, which is the value independence, or not being subordinated or 
subjected to someone else’s will.  Kant’s “one innate right” underlying his conception of juridical 
freedom is the right to independence (“not being subject to another person’s choice”), and he insisted that 
                                                          
26 Mill, On Liberty in general. 
27 Marx, “On the Jewish Question” 
28 Kant, DR 6:237.  See Section 6.4 below.   
29 Kant, DR 6:325-326 
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it equivalent both to an idea of liberty and of equality.30  Liberty, for Kant, demands that you, not anyone 
else, are your own master.  If I usurp your choices through paternalistic or coercive acts, then I violate 
your independence by violating your liberty.  But if I deprive you of basic resources and opportunities, 
then I also violate your independence by violating our equality.  You are made dependent both if you are 
treated unequally and if others are entitled to set your ends for you.31 
Consistent with the Kantian view, many people today in many countries insist that a person who 
has no genuine economic prospects or who suffers from systemic discrimination is not truly at liberty.  In 
contrast to the Kantian view, some libertarians insist that social justice, though important, must be 
sacrificed to some extent because negative liberty prohibits the forcible taxation of the wealthy, or the 
elimination of systemic discrimination, that could be required to achieve social justice.32  Many who 
subscribe to this latter view embrace some version of Berlin’s flat notion of liberty is non-interference. 
Criterial analysis of the concepts of democracy and liberty cannot account for these sorts of 
essential disagreement because criterial analysis assumes that the meaning of political values is in some 
way fixed by an implicit consensus on linguistic criteria. But if there is widespread disagreement about 
what those criteria are, then those shared criteria simply do not exist.  There is no standard usage from 
which it would follow whether democracy is a procedural ideal, or whether all criminal laws or taxation 
invade liberty.  We cannot imagine any of the most important and controversial claims about democracy 
or liberty being ruled out in this way.  The idea that we could settle these disagreements by analyzing 
definitions is silly, like trying to decide whether affirmative action is unfair by analyzing how people 
typically use the word “unfair”, or trying to decide the gay marriage issue by consulting Webster’s 
definition of marriage. 
Yet there have been many attempts to explicate the meaning of political concepts through criterial 
analysis.  MacCallum’s perceptive elucidation of liberty, which reduces all conceptions of freedom to a 
                                                          
30 See Section 6.4 below. 
31 Kant, DR, 6:230 
32 See, for example, Tibor Machan’s Libertarianism Defended, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishin, 2006). 
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single triadic relation33, is a paradigm example.  But we can criticize his triadic relation in either of two 
different ways that are relevant here.  We could say, on one hand, that his relation is so abstract that it is 
uninformative and so unhelpful in deciding controversial questions of any importance about what liberty 
requires, permits, or prohibits in particular cases.  Or we could say, on the other hand, that it is 
sufficiently concrete that it does not capture all of the various possible conceptions of liberty that are in 
the field, in which case it is just another conception of liberty, competitive with all the others, about 
which people might disagree. As Charles Taylor points out, if one thinks of freedom as involving self-
direction, then one has in mind an “exercise concept” of freedom as opposed to an “opportunity 
concept”.34  If interpreted as an exercise concept, freedom consists in actually doing certain things in 
certain ways—for example, in realizing one’s true interests or in acting on the basis of rational and well-
informed decisions.  But MacCallum’s triadic relation indicates merely the possibility of doing certain 
things (i.e. the lack of constraints on doing them or, alternatively, in having the conditions in place to 
realize them), and in that sense it does not supply an essential notion of freedom because it contradicts 
Taylor’s. 
The socio-empirical framework is also incapable of explaining essential disagreements as there 
are no social scientific or explanatory methods that can settle what the proper grounds of liberty or 
democracy actually are.  Suppose, for example, that we compile a list of all the past and present political 
arrangements that we would agree are democratic arrangements, and then ask which of the features that 
all such instances share are essential to their counting as a democracy and which are only contingent. 
(Ignore the already-decisive objection to this approach that we would still need some prior account of 
what makes one features essential to its character as a democracy and another feature only contingent.)  
We might then ask, using the explanatory concept we induce from that list, whether a law enacted in the 
United States prohibiting abortion is democratic, and discover that our concept answers “yes, it is 
democratic”.  Could that answer conclusively refute someone who holds the contrary view?  Suppose you 
                                                          
33 MacCallum’s “Negative and Positive Freedom”, 312-34. 
34 See Taylor’s “What's Wrong with Negative Liberty’, in A. Ryan (ed.), The Idea of Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) 
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disagree with that answer and insist that the law is undemocratic because it violates certain rights 
expressed in the American Constitution, rights that you believe constitute American democracy.  How 
could the explanatory concept we have empirically induced show that you are wrong?  The concept might 
indicate that the difference between a system which allowed everyone to vote, but denied blacks the right 
to vote, is taxonomically insignificant because a taxonomy of the social world that ignored that distinction 
turns out to have greater explanatory power.  In short, it would identify democracy with institutional 
features we do not care about. But surely that concept could not persuade anyone who believes, for 
example, that unequal voting rights are undemocratic that they misunderstand the meaning of democracy. 
There is no pseudo-scientific test that is relevant to establishing the correct meaning of democracy, no 
historical list of democratic institutions we could stare at long enough to find out whether counter-
majoritarian institutions like courts imperil or protect majoritarian procedures, none that could settle 
whether economic justice is necessary for decision procedures to be fair, and none that could determine 
whether any claim about democracy is, in fact, a claim about some other concept. 
All of this follows from the fact that essential disagreements are not disagreements about how 
people speak, nor disagreements about social facts.  They are rather deep, normative disagreements about 
what conduct democracy, liberty, and other values demand of us. Our moral convictions play an 
important role, not just in assessing some concept whose meaning is already established, but in filling out 
the very meaning of the concept itself. 
But there is perhaps one point keeping us from that conclusion, which is the apparent logical 
requirement that there must be something fixed and concrete at the heart of political concepts.  If one of 
us believes that “dog” refers to the meowing animals people own as pets, then that person would not share 
our concept of dog, and any discussion we had about dogs with that person would probably be senseless.  
Similarly, if someone claimed that purple was the most egalitarian of the colors, it would be difficult to 
disagree sensibly with her, since she would plainly have a very different understanding of equality than 
we would.  But since we do not believe that our moral disagreements about democracy and liberty are 
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senseless in that way, then wouldn’t there have to be some core idea that anchors meaningful discussion, 
agreement, and disagreement? 35   
This argument appears to provide strong support for the cold fact premise.  But in order for it to 
succeed, it would somehow have to demonstrate that essential disagreement is not what it appears to be.  
It would have to show that the appearance of essential disagreement about the meaning of political 
concepts is just an illusion, that when theorists and citizens appear to disagree about what these values 
require, they are not really disagreeing about the meaning of democracy or liberty, but something else 
entirely, such as what they should be, rather than what they actually are.  But that seems implausible. If 
all we are doing when we argue about these concepts is arguing about what they should be rather than 
what they are, then why do we—theorists and citizens alike—argue in terms of what these concepts mean, 
require, prohibit, or permit?   Why do libertarians say that liberty condemns higher taxes, rather than that 
liberty should condemn higher taxes?  Why do welfare egalitarians deny that primary goods, rather than 
well-being, are the correct metric of equality, rather than that primary goods should be the correct metric?  
Why did Thrasymachus insist that justice is the advantage of the stronger, rather than that it should be?  
The cold fact premise would imply that political theorists and ordinary citizens are either deluded about 
the true character of their arguments, or are simply inventing new concepts while speaking as if they are 
simply reporting what their concepts mean. That seems to me to be an uncharitable interpretation of our 
political arguments and disagreements.  While political argument may well be a flawed practice, it is not a 
delusion or a deception.  We genuinely believe that the claims we make in the name of these concepts are 
claims about what, properly interpreted, they demand.  We do not approach these arguments assuming 
that liberty, as a matter of empirical fact, just is something and then set out to fix it or alter it.  On the 
contrary, when we make claims in the name of these concepts, we regard ourselves as reporting what 
these concepts actually mean.  Of course it is true that our arguments are often intended to repair or 
                                                          
35 The force of this apparently logical requirement is relevant to all political concepts, but it has perhaps its fullest development in the study of 
one in particular: the concept of law.  See Sections 4.8 and 4.9 below.  Legal positivists like Joseph Raz, for instance, argue that, if there are to be 
limits on what propositions of law are true, then the meaning of law must, in the final analysis, be fixed by empirical (i.e. semantic), rather than 
evaluative (i.e. moral) criteria of validity.  See Raz’s “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law”, in The Yale Law Journal, 81:5 (1972) 842-854.  
Anti-positivists like Dworkin, however, say that such arguments are misleading.  See Dworkin’s discussion of what he calls “the semantic sting” 




correct other people’s interpretations of what these concepts are.  But that is because we believe our 
interpretations are superior conceptions of what these concept, properly understood, really require.  
But then if there is no core essence behind these concepts, how do we anchor our claims so that 
we are not simply talking past each other?  I believe we must relax our assumptions about the conditions 
under which meaningful communication and disagreement are possible.  To illustrate, consider the very 
abstract concept of “fairness”.  Our disputes about fairness—for example, about the fairest distribution of 
benefits and burdens, political fairness, fairness between friends and siblings, the fairness of a game, 
etc.—do not require that everyone using the term “fair” and “unfair” agree on certain rules or instances in 
order to communicate effectively.  We may try to capture some general plateau from which arguments 
about fairness largely proceed, and try to describe this in some abstract proposition taken to “define” the 
concept of fairness, so that arguments over fairness can be understood as arguments about the best 
conception of that concept.  But it would be impossible to find a statement of the concept of fairness that 
is at once sufficiently abstract to be uncontroversial, yet sufficiently concrete to be useful.  Suppose, for 
example, that a philosopher proposes the following statement of the concept:  “fairness is different from 
other political and moral virtues because it is a matter of evenhandedness, of the right of people to be 
treated with equal concern by other people.”  This formulation seems unhelpful because the concept of 
evenhandedness is too close to fairness to be illuminating, while the idea of equal concern is too close to 
the ideal of equality to be a non-controversial account of fairness.  Perhaps no useful statement of the 
concept of fairness is available.   
If this is so, however, it hardly casts doubt on the sensibility of our disputes about fairness.  This 
is because we still seem to share a rough sense of its boundaries, boundaries demarcated by our shared 
cultural systems of meaning, or our “lifeworld”.36   We use this to distinguish conceptions of fairness we 
reject from positions we would not count as conceptions of fairness at all.  Our disagreements are not 
senseless, because they are based upon the same objects of interpretation, namely, the practice of talking 
and arguing over “fairness”, and the dimensions of this practice are finite and therefore limit the available 
                                                          
36 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 22-23, 27-28 
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interpretations there can be of that practice.  In order to set limits to the “data” our practice furnishes, 
participants in the practice must understand the practice in sufficiently similar ways to recognize the sense 
in each other’s claims, so that they do not speak past one another. But this does not mean embracing the 
cold fact premise.  It just means sharing an understanding sufficiently concrete so that we can recognize 
sense in what others say.37  
There is an instructive analogy to natural kind concepts like “water”, about whose meaning we 
might also disagree.  Just as we can discover natural facts that can correct our shared understanding of 
“water” (like, for instance, the discovery that water is H2O), we can also learn about, and deepen our 
understanding of values.  But with value concepts, rather than discovering natural properties, we reflect 
instead on normative considerations that show what is good about the concept.  That would explain why 
we disagree about them; we disagree about the normative instances they name.  Whereas natural kinds 
name empirical instance that determine their proper use, values name normative instances, things we have 
reason to pursue, that are valuable.  In order to sensibly communicate about them, we require only enough 
agreement on paradigm normative instances to share the concept, but that does not preclude disagreement 
at a deeper level about what the value in question really means and requires. 
So, essential disagreement seems real and sensible.   If we want to deny it, we are forced to say 
that theorists and ordinary citizens are so confused about the practice they study that they routinely 
engage in silly or disingenuous argumentation.  But once we accept the phenomenon of essential 
disagreement, and the fundamentally moral character of our discourse, the cold fact premise no longer 
seems plausible.  There is no essential property that can bypass our moral convictions in fixing the core 
meaning of a political concept.  We must treat political concepts as subject to interpretation, as ideas 
whose content depends in part on normative judgments. 38 
 
                                                          
37 Here I follow Dworkin, LE 63-64 
38 This account does not destroy analytic truths about value concepts.  As Jeremy Waldron points out in a discussion of the essential contestability 
of the rule of law, there are still conceptual boundaries to what we can say about, for example, democracy.  Tulips are not democratic.  Moreover, 
“the claim that democracy is an essentially contested concept is itself an analytic thesis: it presupposes that analysis can establish certain truths 
about the concept in question” Waldron, “Is the Rule of Law and Essentially Contested Concept?”, 152  
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4.6 The Meaning of Value Concepts 
The cold fact understanding of values reduces their content to particular, determinate, material facts, 
states of affairs, or relations.  This guarantees that these values conflict with each other. If liberty is 
simply the crude relation of non-interference, then of course it will conflict with equality or any other 
reason we might have to stop people from doing exactly what they might wish to do. If we understand 
values as merely states of affairs or ways the world might go that “bear value” and are part of the 
“furniture of the universe”, then that also seems to guarantee conflict since it would mean that values 
could just happen to demand inconsistent actions. These conceptions of value do not capture the 
essentially contested, evaluative character of values, the idea that we seem to disagree about values 
because we disagree about what is good about them.   
Here is an alternative conception that seems truer to their use in our thought and discourse.  
Rather than identifying political values with strict definitions, or with entities “out there” in the world, let 
us use the key value concepts to collect acts, ends, dispositions, character traits, and so on, that are really 
good in the Kantian sense I described in Section 3.2.  On this view, values are not some independent, 
existential, or linguistic bedrock that grounds what we have reason to do, but rather represent types of 
reasons for acting in certain ways. This conception of political value is similar to, and indeed an instance 
of, a general theory of value recently defended by Thomas Scanlon, according to whom values name the 
kinds of reasons things we call valuable give us.39   
To value something, according to Scanlon, is to take oneself to have reasons for holding certain 
positive attitudes toward it and for acting in certain ways in regard to it.  A person who values friendship 
will take herself to have reasons to do those things that are involved in being a good friend: to be loyal, to 
be concerned with her friends’ interests, to try to stay in touch, to spend time with her friends, and so on.40  
Someone who values science will see reasons to support scientific research, or perhaps to take up 
scientific inquiry as a career, to try to be a good scientist, to choose areas of inquiry that are significant, to 
                                                          
39 Thomas Scanlon  What We Owe To Each Other, 88-91 
40 Ibid, 88 
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report results accurately and in a way that will be helpful to other inquirers, and to support scientific 
research. 41  Exactly what reason values represent, and what actions and attitudes they support, will be 
different for different values and in different cases. They generally include, as a rough guide, reasons for 
admiring or respecting something valuable, to preserve and protect it (as, for example, when one values a 
work of art), and to be guided by the standards that the value involves (as when one values loyalty). To 
claim that something is valuable (or that it is “of value”) is to claim that others also have these reasons to 
value it.42  On Scanlon’s theory, there are no ultimate “sources” of value. Value is not a property we try to 
bring about through our action and to which our principles guide us. Rather, to say something is valuable 
is to say that certain normative principles—reasons—apply to our situation.  
This conception of value implies that we should identify as values only those things we really 
ought to pursue or respond to.  Moral values, for instance, name not just acts, but virtuous or good acts.  
Value concepts collect instances of ends, actions, or states of affairs that we have reason to pursue. They 
have no linguistic or pseudo-naturalistic essence, but rather what Wittgenstein called a family 
resemblance; they are threaded together in a complicated network of similarities that overlap and 
crisscross, and which are not bounded by a clear “frontier”.43  For instance, we might say that the concept 
of negative liberty collects certain instances in which it would be a bad thing to stop people from doing 
certain things or to dominate them, or a good thing to permit or empower them to do as they have a right 
to do.  Roughly, acts of paternalism, the illegitimate use of another’s property, and so on would fall into 
the liberty family of acts we have reason to respond to in certain ways.  Equality (or inequality), on the 
other hand, roughly collects good or bad instances of having or not having a fair opportunity, being or not 
being subordinated to other people, having or not having one’s fate determined by bad luck, and so on.  
Finally, democracy might collect instances of truly valuable or valueless participation in collective 
decision-making, a vision of society in which all are treated or not treated as of equal worth, and so on.  In 
order to determine what these concepts mean and require in particular circumstances, we would interpret 
                                                          
41 Ibid, 90-91 
42 Ibid, 95 
43 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Sections 68, 33a. 
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the clusters they represent in light of our convictions concerning what parts of it are really good, that we 
really do have reason to pursue or respond to, and then use the concepts to name those parts as really 
instances of liberty, or equality, or democracy. 
This means that our concepts may be dynamic, and fluid, and amenable to revision. As I 
suggested in Section 1.5, whereas in the physical sciences we develop and adjust our conceptions of 
nature according to what is and what happens, in ethical theory we might say that we develop and revise 
our ethical and moral concepts according to our convictions about what ought to happen through our 
agency, that is according to our considered judgments about principles. This implies that we must be 
prepared to withhold commendation with a value concept when that concept refers to something we 
should not do, and we should similarly withhold criticism with value concept when it names something 
we should do. 
This account of value concepts fits both our disagreements about values and the Principled 
Model.  If values name families of principles, and principles depend for their content on other principles, 
then it is clear why we disagree about the meaning and application of values, because we disagree about 
the correct way to justify principles in terms of other principles.   
This account of value also has another virtue, which is that it makes sense of the close relation 
between, and differences among, facts and values without collapsing the familiar distinction between 
them. Bernard Williams described this relation between facts and values in connection with what he 
called “thick” ethical concepts, which are concepts that mix commendation or critical judgments with 
very prominent descriptive components so that the concept can be applied properly only to certain 
particular sets of acts.44  Fairness is not a thick ethical concept because the set of acts we might appraise 
using the concept of fairness is highly abstract and rules out very few.  Democracy, by contrast, is a 
relatively thick concept because the rough set of acts or decision we might call democratic or 
                                                          
44 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 140–143.  See also John McDowell “Reason, Value and Reality,” in Mind, Value, and 
Reality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); and Dworkin, J4H, 181-182 
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undemocratic is much more specific: usually they pertain to forms of political governance, decision-
making, basic rights, and so on. 
In an influential essay, Hilary Putnam argues that, with respect to these thick concepts, facts and 
values are deeply entangled in ways that call in to question the entire distinction between them.45  He 
draws attention to several thick predicates—including brave, cruel, temperate, just, rude, generous, and 
elegant—that seem to have both descriptive and normative elements.  Putnam claims that a thick concept 
refutes the supposed fact/value divide and “cheerfully allows itself to be used sometimes for a normative 
purpose and sometimes as a descriptive term.”46   
On the theory of value proposed here, the descriptive elements these concepts possess are simply 
the qualities that certain types of actions, ends, dispositions, or objects might have that are reasons, that 
we ought to respond to.  Our language is certainly flexible enough that someone may appropriately use 
these concepts generally to refer to the cluster of properties that share a resemblance, rather than to the 
reason-giving or good members of these clusters, perhaps in order to describe the concept to someone 
who does not possess it (e.g. a foreigner learning the language).  But the fact that the concept can be used 
in this non-appraisive way does not undermine the social function of the concept in moral discourse and 
argument, which is to name the reason-giving members of that cluster.  And since judgments about which 
members are reasons are essentially normative judgments, an important difference still remains between 
ordinary descriptive concepts, like “table”, and value concepts, like “courage”.  The difference is that one 
names an empirical object and the other a value.  
So suppose we grant this theory.  Wouldn’t it still be more convenient for everyone if we just 
define our value concepts so that they do function the way “table” functions for us?  For clarity’s sake, 
why don’t we just define democracy as majority rule, justice as flat equality of income, and liberty as 
maximum absence of interference?  Then we could say that when people disagree about liberty’s 
requirements, they’re really just advocating different things, even though they use the same word; we 
                                                          
45 Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002) 
46 Ibid, 35 
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might even distinguish different senses or concepts of liberty: we could call them liberty, shliberty, 
fliberty, and so on. 
But in fact this approach makes things less clear, because it distorts and makes impossible our 
normative disagreements. When theorists or citizens disagree about whether or not a law would violate 
liberty, it is not like one is advocating for pizza while the other is advocating for Chinese food.  It is more 
like they are disagreeing, more basically, about what would count as good eating.  We would still need 
another more general concept to capture that deeper disagreement, and that is what liberty, democracy, 
equality, and the others already do for us.  So we do not need to proliferate definitions and words to 
improve clarity. Our value concepts are contested precisely because their social function is to collect, not 
facts, but a region of our practical convictions that we actually have reason to follow.  Reducing our value 
concepts to one particular instance of those actions would just push back the issue; we would still need to 
introduce another concept to stand for the value we are disagreeing about.  So, in the interest of clarity, 
we should stick with the implicit argumentative practice we currently have. 
 
4.7 Example: Liberty and Tragic Conflict 
An example may help to illustrate the implications of this understanding of the relationship between value 
concepts, principles, and the Unity Thesis.  I will consider Berlin’s tragic definition of liberty.  
Berlin thought that liberty, properly understood, is the freedom from the interference of others in 
doing whatever one might wish to do.   Stated this way, his conception ensures that its fulfillment makes 
the fulfillment of others ideals impossible.  On this view, any person’s liberty to choose to live as he 
wants must be weighed against the claims of many other values, of which equality, justice, happiness, or 
security, are perhaps the most obvious examples.   
As I have argued, we should judge political values in a way that preserves what is morally good 
about them, that part of them we really have reason to pursue. This has an important implication for 
Berlin’s tragic conflict thesis.  For if what we are trying to do when interpreting a value is to judge what is 
good about it, then we should expect a good interpretation to yield an understanding of that value that is 
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both hostile to things we have reason decry, but also accommodates other ideals for which we have reason 
to be enthusiastic.   In other words, a successful interpretation will conflict with what is bad, but cohere 
with what is good.  But if a successful interpretation of one value fits with other values in this way, then it 
would be odd also to expect that those values are naturally in conflict.    
 Despite his semantic rhetoric I have already noted several times, it is also possible to understand 
Berlin’s case for negative liberty as essentially a moral argument that attempts to expose the value in 
liberty, a value he appears to locate in two main sources. The first source is the interest Berlin claims 
individuals have in living their lives according to their actual wishes rather than being led by others.  This 
interest he believes is indispensable both to the minimum development of an individual’s natural capacity 
to conceive of and to pursue various ends, and also to the formation of the individual’s own identity, 
which Berlin thinks must, in large part, be determined by what the individual actually feels and thinks.47   
The second apparent normative argument for negative liberty, according to Berlin, is the very fact 
that it does conflict tragically with other values.  Such an understanding of liberty, and all other values, 
acts as a bulwark against the various threats he associates with monistic ideologies.48  Negative liberty’s 
tragic character may be a reason to embrace it, since history teaches us that many societies whose 
reigning ideology denied conflict among important values—“who held the conviction that all the positive 
values in which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible, and perhaps even entail one 
another”—ended in some form of tyranny or disaster.  He held that whenever a political leadership 
believes that they hold the philosophical key to truth in this way, this conviction will be used to justify 
coercive, and usually oppressive, means.  His argument is rooted in the history of ideas, and motivated by 
the threat of tyranny that he believed nearly always resulted from a positive conceptions of liberty, which 
identifies true freedom with various elusive ideals such as rational self-direction, “self-mastery” or some 
“true” or “higher” human nature the individual cannot on his own realize, except under specific political 
                                                          
47 Ibid, 203.  Berlin thought that paternalism and domination are despotic because they “insult my conception of myself as a human being, 
determined to make my own life in accordance with my own (not necessarily rational or benevolent) purposes, and, above all, entitled to be 
recognised as such by others. For if I am not so recognised, then I may fail to recognise, I may doubt, my own claim to be a fully independent 
human being. For what I am is, in large part, determined by what I feel and think...”    
48 See Berlin, “Isaiah Berlin on Value Pluralism”: “The enemy of pluralism is monism –the ancient belief that there is a single harmony of truths 
into which everything, if it is genuine, in the end must fit. The consequence of this belief (which is something different from, but akin to, what 
Karl Popper called essentialism –to him the root of all evil) is that those who know should command those who do not.”  
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arrangements.  His tragic conception of negative liberty, and other values, would appear to minimize the 
possibility of oppressive enforcement of monistic ideologies because by guaranteeing conflict, it puts the 
lie to monism. 
Is Berlin’s normative interpretation of liberty a good one? Does it preserve the abstract value 
most of us agree liberty has?  In order to expose its value, we must attempt to construct an understanding 
of liberty that eliminates, as far as possible, any aspect of it that would endorse actions we have reason to 
regret, along with any aspect that would condemn actions we have reason to value.  If the concept we 
develop has a feature that has either of these two consequences, then we need to eliminate that feature 
from it.  Here is a test, proposed by Dworkin, that we might deploy to check whether Berlin’s conception 
accommodates or eliminates such features. 49 We should ask ourselves whether we think the actions 
Berlin’s conception declares as violations of liberty really are bad or wrong, and whether the actions it 
permits are really good or right.  If not—if nothing truly bad actually happens when the value is allegedly 
transgressed, and if nothing truly good happens when the value is upheld, then his proposed conception of 
liberty is in those ways inadequate; it provides us with no reason to regret its loss and therefore does not 
preserve liberty’s value. 
Does Berlin’s conception pass that test? Berlin held we have an interest in having our actual 
wishes realized, rather than having them imposed from without.  Is it proper for the state, or any one, to 
force an individual to act in ways they think make a life better even when the individual whose life it is 
believes it makes it worse?  Of course some governments force individuals, against their wishes, to wear 
seatbelts in order to prevent injury, and we coerce children against their wishes, at least in the short term, 
to attend school because we believe it is their own long term interest.  But some governments also claim a 
right to make people’s lives better in a different way.  They coerce people to act not only against what 
they might happen to want to do, but against their deepest convictions.  It seems that this latter form of 
coercion is certainly less acceptable.  While it may be argued that part of what matters in being free is that 
                                                          
49 I am using the same test Dworkin proposes to judge whether an interpretation of any value is a successful one.  Dworkin, “Do Values Conflict: 
A Hedghog’s Approach”, 255  
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people live in the right way, it is difficult to see how a life that achieved the right results, but which left its 
owner bitter and believing that he was living falsely, could be a truly valuable life.   It is hard to see how 
two priests might both live equally well when one of them feels that he was forced into the cloth.  Of 
course, there are reasonable exceptions to this.  Seatbelt laws, we could say, do not have this embittering 
effect and are for that reason more easily justified, especially when one considers various other non-
paternalistic reasons which support them, such as the prevention of costly accidents.  Moreover, we can 
plausibly assume that a child who is forced to go to school is very likely to endorse that imposition at a 
later date, and if he does not, he would not have wasted too much time he might otherwise have spent 
pursuing a career that made no use of his school training.    
So at least along one dimension of value—the value in living one’s life according to one’s own 
lights—Berlin’s conception of liberty so far meets our test; it endorses a way of living for which there 
appears to be good reason to be enthusiastic.  But now suppose that one of the things I endorse doing to 
do is shoplifting.  On Berlin’s account, the law would compromise my liberty by stopping me from doing 
so.  Of course, Berlin would allow, there is no question that I should be stopped because there are other 
more important values at stake which must prevail over my liberty to shoplift.  But in violating my 
liberty, on his account, something of value is nevertheless lost.  Does this pass our test?  Does an account 
of liberty which declares that something wrong occurs when I am stopped from shoplifting really preserve 
liberty’s goodness?  If nothing bad has happened when I am prevented from shoplifting, then what reason 
could we have for adopting a conception of liberty that describes stopping me as some kind of sacrifice?  
If an interpretation of liberty should protect our enthusiasm for that ideal, then a conception of liberty is 
unsuccessful when it forces us to describe some event as an invasion of liberty when nothing regrettable 
has happened.  It generates the appearance of value conflict when there is none at all.  The only way to 
uphold that alleged conflict would be to insist, at one and the same time, that I have no right to shoplift 
and that I do have a right to shoplift.   A good interpretation of liberty will release us from the appeal of 
one of these competing “ideals”, and in doing so will dissolve the alleged conflict between them.    
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Of course we could envision more difficult alleged conflicts involving liberty in which we might 
be much less certain whether something of value is lost when someone is interfered with.  For example, is 
anything of value lost when I am forced by my country to fight in a war I do not condone?   Does any 
wrong occur in such a case?  It is sometimes suggested that in cases like this we would decide the matter 
by balancing the competing considerations on both sides.  On one hand, we might say, are all the reasons 
we have for respecting an individual’s conscience, and we could collect these reasons under the value 
concept of individual “liberty of conscience”.  On the other hand, we might say, are reasons of collective 
welfare, security, and prudence which weigh in favor of infringing that liberty of conscience.  But, as I 
suggested in Section 1.8, this balancing metaphor misleads insofar as it suggests that what is involved is 
only a process of weighing or comparing the reasons on each side of the issue.  If we think about the 
problem that way, then whichever decision we make will involve some loss in value, for any decision 
involves rejecting reasons on the losing side that nevertheless carried moral weight. 
Instead, the reasons on each side must be considered within a more complex interpretive structure 
which the balancing metaphor conceals.  Interpreting the concept of liberty of conscience will require us, 
usually in an unacknowledged way, to consider the point of liberty, or the reasons we have to think it is 
valuable.  Suppose, for example, that we think the point and value of liberty is to secure our self-respect, 
which entitles us to live our lives according to our own lights.  That point will help us to determine not 
only which forms of coercion violate liberty, but also which forms of coercion follow from the point of 
liberty itself and represent no violation of it at all.  If, for instance, forcing individuals to fight in a war 
were absolutely necessary to secure the conditions under which it is possible for individuals to live self-
respecting lives by their own lights (suppose, for example, that a war were necessary to resist a violent, 
expansionist, tyrannical regime), then this force may not cost liberty anything at all, because it follows 
from the point of liberty itself that a war is necessary.  In that case, it would be inaccurate to say that we 
have balanced the reasons in favor of conscription against reasons in favor of liberty.  Rather, we would 
have shown that a proper, mutually accommodating understanding of both flows from the same value, 
namely a principle of self-respect.   
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We ought to build that mutual sensitivity between values into our understanding of liberty.  We 
should say that an individual is at liberty when she is free to realize her wishes, so long as in doing so she 
respects the moral rights of others in general.  This formulation is still highly abstract, but it has two main 
advantages.  First, it is stated in a way that makes explicit that further judgment and further interpretation 
are required to understand what it demands in concrete situations, and that it therefore represents an 
abstract point of departure for further interpretation and argument about the meaning of liberty.  In this 
way, it preserves liberty’s “open feel”, and so does not guarantee tragic collisions with other values.  
Second, though it is abstract, it is stated concretely enough to capture the way in which morality in 
general constrains our free action.   
People will of course disagree about which forms of interference liberty requires or prohibits.  A 
libertarian might suggest that progressive tax rates constitute an illegitimate constraint on liberty, while a 
liberal egalitarian might say liberty requires progressive taxation.  But our revised conception of liberty 
does not allow us to settle this disagreement on definitional grounds.  It demands that we consider 
whether, for example, something valuable really is lost when talented and ambitious individuals who, 
through hard work and smart choices, have achieved financial comfort are forced to aid the poor and the 
ill.      
So this conception passes our interpretive test in ways that Berlin’s does not.  But what about the 
other argument Berlin apparently makes for negative liberty, that we have strong reason to adopt a tragic 
conception of liberty because that sort of conception may reduce the risk of monistic tyrannies?   Our new 
conception, which fuses morality into the meaning of liberty, allows that individuals may not necessarily 
be the final judge concerning the boundaries of their own freedom.  By making liberty—and the meaning 
of other values in general—dependent on morality in this way, are we opening the door totalitarianism?   
I do not think so.  There is no route for Berlin to liberal toleration from pluralist premises. There 
is nothing in the idea of pluralism among the key political values that requires toleration or open-
mindedness, no reason why values conflict would make it less likely that any particular value would be 
seized upon and conformity enforced through oppressive means. It may mean only that this would occur 
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arbitrarily and haphazardly, as expressions of dogma, whim, or prejudice, rather than rationally in 
accordance with reasons that might be offered in order to justify the value and demonstrate that it is being 
pursued in good faith.  In any case, unless we eliminate states altogether, the coercive imposition of some 
values is inevitable, and pluralism has the distinctive moral disadvantage of ruling out the possibility that 
the choice of such of values could made on principle, and in a way that makes the choice at least 
intelligible even to those who do not accept it.  It seems to me that the most potent inoculation against any 
form of abuse is not to shy from resting our conception explicitly upon substantive morality, but rather to 
embrace that connection.  We do not avoid threats from totalitarian ideology and social injustice by 
treating values such as liberty as hard facts.   
 
4.8 The ‘Hart-Dworkin’ Debate 
I have so far left institutional principles, including legal requirements, out of the argument.  I want now to 
show how the arguments of this chapter figure in a famous debate in Anglophone legal philosophy.   
Brian Leiter declared in a 2003 article50 that the “clear victor” of the so-called “Hart-Dworkin”51 debate 
about the nature of law is H.L.A. Hart and the doctrine of legal positivism.  That debate, whose origin is 
Ronald Dworkin’s 1967 critique52 of the twentieth century’s seminal work on Anglo-American 
jurisprudence, H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law, 53 spawned and organized a massive literature whose 
central focus concerns an old problem in the philosophy of law, the relation between law and value.   
As we have seen, Hart defended a descriptive positivistic account of law according to which the 
existence and content of law in any legal system are fundamentally determined by empirical social facts 
alone without necessary reference to evaluative, including moral, considerations of any kind.  For Hart, to 
say that a given standard is legally valid in some legal system is to recognize that it passes tests defined 
                                                          
50 See Leiter’s “Beyond the Hart-Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence”, (2003), American Journal of Jurisprudence, 48, 
17-51 
51 The designation is a misnomer.  Hart never published a sustained reply to Dworkin during his lifetime, and most of the “debate” has played out 
through a series of dialectics between Dworkin and other legal theorists, many sympathetic to Hart’s project, as well as between positivists 
themselves.  The range of issues covered is so incredibly vast that I hesitate to characterize it even as fundamentally concerning the relation 
between law and morality, though that problem certainly soaks most of the issues. 
52 See Dworkin’s “The Model of Rules” The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 35 No. 1 (Autumn, 1967), 14-46.  Later reprinted as Chapter 
Two in TRS. 
53 See Hart’s The Concept of Law, 107 
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by that system’s “rule of recognition”, a rule that is accepted by substantially all legal actors in that 
system and which operates for them as a decisive pedigree test for what counts as law.54   From the 
beginning, Dworkin’s criticism of Hartian positivism focused on the behavior of judges and lawyers.  His 
earliest objection55 drew attention to the fact that judges frequently consider moral principles as 
appropriate legal standards and argued that Hart’s theory, which grounds law in social sources alone, 
therefore falsifies a significant part of legal phenomenology and so must be rejected.  Some positivists 
replied to Dworkin either, as Joseph Raz did56, by denying that when judges appeal to moral principles 
they are in fact appealing to legal standards at all (rather than simply applying extra-legal norms as law 
directs them to do), or, as Hart himself eventually did, by simply allowing that moral principles may be 
valid legal standards so long as a social rule of recognition stipulates that they may.57  According to 
Leiter, these positivist replies conclusively refuted Dworkin’s central criticism and rendered it now 
mainly irrelevant and lacking even in heuristic value.58   
A renewed interest in an argument Dworkin made in 1986, however, has raised doubt among 
positivists about Leiter’s verdict.59  In a 2007 essay, Scott Shapiro, a prominent legal positivist, called 
Leiter’s verdict premature noting that it is “one of the great ironies of modern jurisprudence that in spite 
of the huge amount of ink spilled on the Hart-Dworkin debate, so little attention has been paid” to this 
“more powerful” 1986 argument.60  The argument Shapiro refers to, which Dworkin makes in the first 
chapter of Law’s Empire, draws attention to an apparently commonplace feature of legal practice, which 
is that legal actors frequently disagree about the correct way to interpret law.  The character of these 
                                                          
54 Ibid, 100. 
55 Dworkin, MR1 
56 Raz, Joseph “Legal Principles and The Limits of Law,” Yale Law Journal, vol. 81, no. 5, 1971 
57 See, e.g., Hart,  The Concept of Law, “Postscript” 
58 Leiter, “Explaining Theoretical Disagreement”, 17 
59 While Dworkin allows that his 1986 argument differs from his 1967 critique, he denies it differs substantially from anything he has written 
since 1972. See his remarks in “The Concepts of Law” in Dworkin’s JR 234.  For an opposing view see The ‘Hart-Dworkin’ Debate: A Short 
Guide for the Perplexed”, in Ronald Dworkin, ed. Arthur Ripstein (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  Dworkin is right. The 
consensus among positivists seems to be that Dworkin was wrong until he finally got things right in 1986.  But the consensus is wrong.  The 
phenomenon Dworkin happens to call “theoretical disagreement” in Law’s Empire implicitly underpins in same phenomenon he’d written about 
since his first publication in 1963 along with his first major critique of positivism in 1967, and is explicit in his follow up to that in 1972. 
Theoretical disagreement just is the condition under which there is no rule of recognition.  Moreover, his 1975 “Hard Cases”, where he 
introduced the “rights thesis” is a theory of decision under conditions of theoretical disagreement. In sum, there is absolutely no essential  change 
in Dworkin’s central position.  If, as Shapiro points out, positivists had not met this argument, as it was presented in 1986, then they also did not 
meet his earlier critiques extending back two decades.   
60 Shapiro, “The ‘Hart-Dworkin’ Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed” 
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disputes, which Dworkin calls “theoretical disagreements” (henceforth TD), suggests not only that there 
is no settled convergent practice among legal actors about how to identify law, but also that legal actors 
do not, as positivism supposes, regard law’s identity as fixed by convergent practice at all. Referring to 
positivism, Dworkin writes that, “[i]ncredibly, our jurisprudence has no plausible theory of theoretical 
disagreement in law,” and that positivism “distorts legal practice” and amounts to “an evasion rather than 
a theory”.61   
Shapiro thinks that Dworkin’s argument from TD, if correct, poses a serious challenge to any 
positivistic theory which grounds law ultimately in social convention, including not just to Hart’s 
positivism, but also today’s perhaps more widely accepted positivist doctrine, so-called “exclusive” 
positivism, whose canonical formulation is Raz’s.62   If Dworkin is right that the phenomenon of TD 
falsifies legal positivism, then TD simultaneously undercuts the idea of legal pluralism and indeterminacy 
which, as we saw in Section 2.6, depend on a positivistic understanding of law.  What is Dworkin’s 
argument, and does Dworkin’s argument succeed? 
 
4.9. Dworkin’s Argument from Theoretical Disagreement 
A central aim of legal philosophy is to explain legal phenomena, to make sense of what those who have 
law believe law is and do in its name.   Legal philosophers have typically understood that enterprise as 
requiring an analysis of the “concept” of law, but they disagree about what exactly conceptual analysis is.  
None thinks it requires analysis of the word “law”, but that is where agreement mainly ends.  We can 
distinguish, broadly, three different approaches.63 
One approach understands conceptual analysis as a philosophical method that aims to retrieve and 
clarify the common criteria relied upon in a language community to which those who have a concept hold 
                                                          
61 See Dworkin’s LE 6-7 
62 A challenge he takes up in his new book, Legality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).   
63 In this discussion I follow discussions by Rodriguez Blanco, Stavropoulos, Raz, and Dworkin.  See Veronica Rodriguez Blanco’s, “The 
Methodological Problem in Legal Theory: Normative and Descriptive Jurisprudence Revisited” Ratio Juris. Vol. 19 No. 1 March 2006 (26–54), 
26-40; Nicos Stavropoulos’s Objectivity in Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), especially the Introduction and Chapter One.  Stavropoulos 
traces the arguments about natural kinds to Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons (New York, Oxford University Press, 1989) 84-88, and the 
fundamental point to Saul Kripke’s  Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford, Blackwell 1982; Raz’s Between Authority and 
Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 60-65; Dworkin’s JR. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2006), especially the Introduction and Chapter 6, “Hart’s Postscript and the Point of Political Philosophy”. 
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themselves responsible in using it.   A criterial explanation of the concept of law assumes that the use of 
the concept of law is governed, in our language, by shared criteria that determine whether its use is 
correct or incorrect, or falls in some borderline areas between the two.  It may not be obvious what these 
criteria are, but we can uncover these criteria through meticulous thought experiments designed to 
excavate what criteria are appropriate in particular situations 
Some legal philosophers, however, understand the investigation into the nature of law as 
essentially naturalistic, in the sense that it is methodologically continuous with scientific and, in 
particular, sociological and psychological inquiry.  Legal philosophers who adopt this approach either 
reject, or are at least highly sceptical of, the possibility of acquiring knowledge through criterial 
conceptual analysis.  They often hold a metaphysical view that natural properties or events must be 
capable of explaining some aspect of our experience if they are to be considered real. On a 
methodological level, many legal realists, like Brian Leiter, favour a view of legal philosophy as a branch 
of the natural sciences in this way.64  We can nevertheless describe the analysis they recommend as 
“conceptual” if we like, as long as we clearly distinguish it from criterial conceptual analysis.  The 
concepts the naturalist explains are governed not by background assumptions about shared criteria, but by 
natural facts about the objects they are concepts of.  They study law as if it were what I called earlier 
natural kind concepts whose instances are essentially natural facts that can be the object of widespread 
error and which can show the rules we apply to be mistaken.   For instance, people use the term “water” 
to describe a potable, colorless liquid, but scientists could discover that only some of these liquids that 
people call “water” really is water, that we can distinguish them by looking at their chemical structure.   
The chemist’s task is “conceptual” in that he attempts to describe the true essential properties of the 
concept whose surface features we converge in recognizing as water. But we recognize that his analysis is 
not an attempt to retrieve our shared beliefs about these surface features, but rather to reveal the 
                                                          
64 See Leiter’s Legal Realism, “Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis” in Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the 
Concept of Law 
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independent properties that make those surface features what they are.  Legal philosophers of this bent are 
like chemists who study water. 
It is clear that both criterial and natural kind explanations of a concept purport to be descriptive, 
factual explanations in the sense that neither relies on evaluative judgment about the concept’s normative 
or moral significance.65  They are rather empirical, not normative or moral.  Importantly, the only sensible 
disagreement either criterial or natural kind conceptual analysis permits, therefore, is empirical 
disagreement about either shared usage about the concept of law or natural facts about participants in 
legal practice.    
For still other legal philosophers, however, it is implausible to suppose that the proper analysis of 
law is descriptive in the way that criterial or natural kind explanations are.  Some of them66 argue that the 
concept of law is more like the concepts of “goodness” , “beauty”,  “justice”, or “respect”, concepts 
whose instances it would be odd to think could be identified either by consulting the criteria most people 
use or by discovering their physical “essence”.  Some legal philosophers believe the proper analysis of the 
concept of law is normative in just this way.  They maintain that we cannot identify law’s instances 
without relying on evaluative judgments, indeed moral judgments, which are necessary to pick out of our 
shared beliefs those that are essential and most important to the concept and, in the case of law, which are 
necessary to explain law’s normativity. 
Dworkin presents his main argument from TD in order to show why, in his view, criterial 
explanations of law disfigure legal phenomenology.  Although he did not then point it out, for the same 
reason his argument undercuts criterial explanations, it also undercuts natural kind explanations.  This is 
because both types of explanations deny what the phenomenon of TD seems to confirm, which is that the 
explanation of the concept of law is normative, not what I called “descriptive”.   
                                                          
65 In a wide sense, of course, all conceptual analysis is “normative” in being responsive to the norms governing theory construction which 
structure our thought.  These norms are most clearly present in scientific theory construction and we will later notice Leiter’s use of them.  I call 
criterial and natural kind explanations “descriptive” to distinguish them from the stronger sense of normative in which Dworkin and, I will show 
later, Raz conceives the study of the concept of law. 
66 Most notably Dworkin.  See the Introduction and Chapter 6 in JR 
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Dworkin begins by distinguishing between what he calls “propositions of law” and “grounds of 
law”.67 Proposition of law are the different statements people make about what the law requires, permits, 
prohibits or entitles people to, and so are claims about the content of the concept of law, its instances.  
These propositions can be true or false.  If they are true, they are true in virtue of the “grounds of law”, 
which are the appropriate tests for legal validity in their legal system.  The truth of the proposition that 
right turns on red lights are prohibited in Manhattan is grounded, for example, in the fact that a majority 
of legislators voted for a statute to that effect.  The truth of the proposition that victims have a legal right 
to collect damages for emotional injury caused by negligence is similarly grounded in the fact that there is 
a judicial precedent to that effect.   
But the grounds of law include not only statutes and judicial decisions but also, and perhaps more 
fundamentally, the correct ways to figure out what those statutes and judicial decisions actually mean, 
what true propositions of law they give rise to. The grounds of law include, in other words, the correct 
“interpretive methodology”.  Right turns are illegal in Manhattan in virtue of a particular interpretation of 
the statute the legislators enacted, perhaps an interpretation that follows the ordinary or “plain” meaning 
of the statute. 
Now when judges deciding difficult cases announce a new rule or principle, they generally offer 
these announcements as reports about what the law, properly interpreted, already requires.  When taken at 
face value, their opinions do not typically indicate that they are inventing a new standard, but rather that 
the standard they report is required by the soundest account of the grounds of law as they see it, even 
though the standard had not been previously recognized by any official decision.  But judges also often 
disagree about how to interpret the law, and when they do their disagreement seems—again, when taken 
at face value—to reveal disagreement about the correct account of the grounds of law.68  Dworkin calls 
this sort of disagreement “theoretical disagreement”. 
                                                          
67 Dworkin, LE 4. 
68 Often disagreement is of an empirical nature about what the facts of the case really are and so whether the grounds of law are satisfied by those 
facts.  Dworkin calls this “empirical disagreement” to distinguish it from “theoretical disagreement”, which is his focus. 
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Hart’s legal positivism states that whatever the grounds of law are in a legal system, they are 
fixed by an empirical social fact, the fact that officials mainly all agree on a fundamental social rule of 
recognition which defines those grounds, a rule which Hart apparently discovers through a criterial 
explanation of the very concept of law. But Dworkin tries to show, through several representative 
examples which appear to demonstrate genuine TD, first, that at least in the American and British legal 
systems the grounds of law are not fixed by any convergent practice at all, that a rule of recognition is 
simply a fiction, and second, that the normative character of TDs falsifies Hart’s criterial approach.   
We need only consider Dworkin’s first example.69 In Riggs v Palmer70 the court was to decide 
whether Elmer, who had murdered his grandfather in order to prevent him from changing his will, could 
still inherit under that will.  If we take the way the opinions are written in this case at face value, then it 
certainly seems like the court divided, not over whether it should change the law rather than follow it, but 
rather over what the law actually was. The New York statute of wills made no explicit exception for a 
beneficiary who had murdered his testator.  Judge Gray’s dissent, which sided with Elmer, apparently 
adopts “a theory of literal interpretation,” according to which the words have “the meaning we would 
assign them if we had no special information about the on text of their use or the intentions of their 
author.”71  Judge Earl, writing for the majority, however, appeared to adopt a different theory of 
interpretation according to which “a statute does not have any consequence the legislators would have 
rejected if they had contemplated it”.72  Since “it would be absurd…to suppose that the New York 
legislators who originally enacted the statute of wills intended murderers to inherit” and since “a statute 
                                                          
69  For those interested, here is a summary of Dworkin’s second example (LE 20-23): In TVA vs. Hill, 437 US 153 (1978), conservationists sued 
the Tennessee Valley Authority to have them halt the completion of a one hundred million dollar dam because the completion of the dam would 
destroy the existence of a small, useless, but nevertheless endangered fish called the snail darter. (LE 20) They argued that, according to The 
Endangered Species Act (which was passed after the dam was authorized, funded and almost completed), the court was required to stop the 
completion of the dam.  This would have been an extremely wasteful thing to do, but the conservationists argued that, according to the plain 
meaning of the statute, that is what the law requires. The Supreme Court sided with the conservationists. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice 
Burger said that the plain meaning of The ESA provides no explicit exception for construction projects which were almost completed by the time 
of the passage of the Act, and because Congress did not indicate an intention that they wanted the project to continue, the Court was required to 
follow the plain meaning of the Act. Justice Powell, however, dissented, arguing that when the plain meaning of a statute’s text yields an absurd 
result, judges are not required to follow it unless it can be shown that Congress specifically intended for the Court to implement this absurd result.  
Dworkin identifies the theoretical dispute in TVA was this: Burger believed that plain meaning should control unless there is evidence of an 
intention that it not, whereas Powell believed that plain meaning should not control if it leads to absurd results unless there is evidence of an 
intention that it should.  Again the face value of the opinions suggest that both judges believed that they were following the law, rather than 
inventing it.  They disagreed about what the law, properly interpreted, was.   
70 22 NE 188 (NY1889), 




does not have any consequences the legislators would have rejected if they had contemplated it,” the 
majority decided that Elmer should lose because the legislature never would have intended a murderer to 
benefit from his misdeed in this way.  Dworkin finds that Earl also apparently appeals to another 
interpretive principle, which requires judges to “construct a statute so as to take it to conform as closely as 
possible to principles of justice assumed elsewhere in the law.”73  Earl had argued that in other cases the 
law recognizes the principle that no one should profit from his own wrongdoing and that the New York 
statute should be read in a way that respects that principle.  So Dworkin identifies the theoretical dispute 
in Riggs as this:  Gray believed the plain meaning of the statute should control the outcome, whereas Earl 
believed that the counterfactual intention of the legislators along with principles of justice implicit in the 
legal record control the outcome. 
Dworkin concludes that the opinions in this and other cases express a disagreement over the 
proper interpretive methodology and therefore the grounds of law.  But neither is the disagreement an 
empirical disagreement about whether the facts of the case satisfy the proper tests, nor an empirical 
disagreement about the historical intentions of legislators, nor an empirical disagreement about what tests 
officials converge in accepting, nor an empirical disagreement about shared criteria for the correct use of 
the concept of law.  In offering their arguments, the courts do not appear to mean to express or report 
views shared by all lawyers, or even by all of its members.  Rather, they appear to disagree in large 
measure about what the soundest tests for interpreting the law are.  This sort of disagreement, it seems, is 
inexplicable under a criterial explanation of law because that framework assumes that the grounds of law 
are fixed ultimately by shared rules for the concept of law’s application.74  TDs of the sort officials 
apparently take themselves to be having are not trivial empirical disagreements that could be settled by a 
                                                          
73 Ibid 
74 Raz has long maintained that legal sources can be controversial on a positivist framework. See his reply to Lyons in Raz “Authority, Law and 
Morality”, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politic, 219.  But the Theoretical Disagreement Dworkin has in mind 
is not controversy about what rules for the correct use of the concept of law officials converge in accepting, but rather normative disagreement 
about what the proper grounds really are, disagreements that appear to make most sense on the assumption that official accept them in virtue of 
normative convictions they hold independently.  Raz’s refutation of a related argument of Dworkin’s (known as the ‘semantic sting’ argument) is 
therefore ineffective against Dworkin’s argument from TD because Raz there assumes that the sort of disagreement Dworkin had in mind is 
disagreement over what a convergent linguistic practice requires.  Dworkin is, however, clear that that kind of disagreement is trivial and cannot 
adequately explain what judges do (LE,41-44)  Both Shapiro (“Short Guide for the Perplexed”, 41, 54) and Leiter (“Explaining Theoretical 
Disagreement”, 1217) seem to allow this. 
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mere headcount about what criteria most officials accept.  They are explicable only on the assumption 
that they are disagreements about which grounds are the correct grounds, regardless of what officials 
converge in believing.   The disagreement expresses a normative disposition officials have about what the 
law, properly understood, really is. 
On the assumption that propositions of law can be genuinely controversial and that the sort of 
controversy involved is normative, indeed moral, in nature, Dworkin then offers an analysis of law as 
what he calls an “interpretive concept” which explains how disagreements about the concept of law can 
be genuine even without shared criteria for its application.  Sharing an interpretive concept does not 
require any underlying agreement or convergence on either criteria or instances.  People share the concept 
because they participate in a social practice of judging acts and institutions in accordance with some 
normative purpose or point they assign to it.  Each participant deploys his own sense of the values that the 
practice should be taken to serve and draws from those values concrete opinions about what the practice 
requires on a particular occasion.  For Dworkin, we best account for the face value of TD about law by 
treating law as a normative concept, not, as he supposes Hart did, as a criterial concept. In later work, 
Dworkin extends the argument from TD to show why it undermines natural kind explanations also.75  
Because TD is not an empirical disagreement about the natural “essence” of law, it is implausible to 
suppose that, for those who share the concept of law, any kind of scientific study offer genuine insight 
regarding its instances.  Overall, the argument from TD, if correct, challenges “descriptive” approaches to 
law of both the criterial and natural kind variety. 
Dworkin anticipates the following objection to his assumption that the face value of TD should be 
taken as seriously as he takes it.76  Perhaps theoretical disagreement is just an illusion.  Perhaps lawyers 
and judges, as many legal realists suppose, systematically connive to misrepresent the true nature of their 
actions in order preserve the credibility of judicial institutions within society that values the separation of 
judicial and legislative powers.  It may be politically dangerous for courts to legislate nakedly from the 
                                                          
75 See “Hart’s Postscript and the Point of Political Philosophy”, Chapter 6 in Dworkin’s JR 
76 Here I summarize the discussion at LE, 6, 37-43 
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bench and in order to preserve their legitimacy they act as if there were in fact law to find when in fact 
they are merely creating it.  This explanation fits neatly in the positivist framework since when judges 
seem to disagree about the grounds of law the face value of their disagreement must be misleading since 
there can be no law in such cases to report.  Their disagreement must in fact not be about what the law 
requires, but rather disguised argument about what the law should be.   
While recognizing that judges may sometimes or even often act disingenuously, he finds this 
explanation defective as a general account of what judges do.  First, the legitimacy explanation is 
question-begging because it tacitly takes a side in a theoretical disagreement—it assumes that the correct 
account of the grounds of law determines law in a way that judges flout.  But by taking a side on the 
question of whether or not judges make or find law, the legitimacy explanation implicitly contributes to 
the theoretical disagreement it attempts to expose as disingenuous and therefore ignores the core question: 
what are the true grounds of law? Second, if judges really are uniformly “well-meaning liars” trying in all 
cases to change rather than report law, it is hard to explain why they decide and argue as they do.   Judges 
often concede that what they take to be the right legal decision is very unwise from a policy perspective, 
yet insist that the legal materials must be interpreted in certain way in spite of these defects.  Third, the 
legitimacy explanation assumes the public has in general yet to catch on to the judicial ruse, but if it is 
common knowledge among lawyers and judges that courts uniformly deceive the public to perpetuate a 
myth, then how has that institution maintained what credibility it has?  It seems mysterious that the myth 
of judicial fidelity to the law has persisted as long as it has.  If positivism is correct and theoretical 
disagreement is an illusion, then why has no one been able to expose the farce?  Why didn’t popular 
political culture and the legal profession long ago embrace a more honest jurisprudence?   
Scott Shapiro finds Dworkin’s arguments not altogether convincing. 77  He points out that law is a 
professional practice whose ground rules most people are simply ignorant of and may not really care to 
become informed about. Furthermore, judges may still act politically to change the law even when their 
arguments and decisions seem politically unwise.  They may attempt to change the law indirectly, 
                                                          
77 Shapiro, “Short Guide for the Perplexed”, 11, 42-43.   
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perhaps, for instance, by attempting to shape the norms of statutory interpretation in a way that will lead 
in the long run to decisions they favor from a policy perspective.   
Nevertheless, Shapiro maintains Dworkin’s main point cannot be dismissed so easily. Although 
we might impute political motives to lawyers and judges in order to explain their behavior, no such 
explanations are available to explain the prevalence in legal practice considered more generally. Legal 
scholars fill law reviews with disputes about the proper way to interpret legal texts.  Theoretical 
disagreements in fact pervade legal theory, yet legal theorists generally have no motive to distort their 
practice as judges might.  Dworkin’s central point puts positivists in an awkward position of having to 
explain why not only lawyers, judges and lay persons, but the entire legal practice is somehow 
systematically confused about the practice in which they engage, that whenever they report some 
controversial proposition as a proposition of law they are in fact mistaken about how what “law” actually 
is. 
 
4.10 Is Law a Gigantic Error?  Leiter’s Critique 
Leiter’s new essay78 tries to rescue descriptive positivism from Dworkin’s argument by advancing two 
independent explanations of the “face value” of TD. The first is an error theoretic explanation that 
proposes to debunk TD.  It insists that parties to a TD, if they are sincere, are simply in error because even 
though “they think there is a fact of the matter about what the grounds of law are, and thus what the law 
is, in the context of their disagreement...they are mistaken, because in truth there is no fact of the matter 
about the grounds of law in this instance precisely because there is no convergent practice of behavior 
among officials constituting a Rule of Recognition on this point.”79   
The second explanation contends that parties to a TD are simply disingenuous so that, despite 
what they say, they are really subconsciously or consciously trying to repair or change the law rather than 
report established law. Leiter’s disingenuousness argument takes us deeper into his legal realism and his 
                                                          
78 Leiter, “Explaining Theoretical Disagreement” 1225 
79 Ibid, 1224 
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opinions about how judges think.  I will not discuss it here, as I believe Shapiro’s point, discussed above, 
about the pervasiveness of TD throughout legal practice, adequately addresses it.80  I will instead focus on 
the error theory, first by describing it and then by showing that Dworkin’s theory is a superior account 
that does not require any error-theoretic treatment. 
As with error explanations familiar in other areas of philosophy,81 Leiter’s error theory supposes 
that one way to reconcile inconsistent aspects of our beliefs is to conclude that some of them, in particular 
the ones we find unsupported by evidence that supports our well-established beliefs, are simply mistaken 
and should be disregarded.  Leiter thinks TDs about law invites error theoretic treatment because they 
represent only a minute fraction of all legal judgments.  In fact most legal judgments, he rightly points 
out, display agreement rather than disagreement.82 To apply Dworkin’s own image,83 we might think of a 
community’s legal practice as a giant iceberg whose massive, submersed body includes all the questions 
that are brought into lawyers’ offices, and whose surface, which barely peaks above the water, includes 
the few legal cases that reach the highest stage of review, such as Supreme Court cases.  It is true that, in 
the latter set of cases, there is a lot of what looks like TD in Dworkin’s sense.  But, says Leiter, the 
striking thing is that the farther down we penetrate into the iceberg, the fewer TDs actually break out.  
What we find is that there is in fact a massive amount of agreement about what the law is.  Most potential 
“disputes” that walk into a lawyer’s office do not actually result in legal action since, on most issues, 
lawyers do agree about what the law is and how it applies to the facts of the case.  Even if a case is 
litigated it would not necessarily be to resolve a question of law, but only because one side believed that 
they could prove their own understanding of the facts.  Only a slim fraction of actual disputes are 
appealed to highest courts, and only a fraction of those include theoretical disputes that are recorded in 
case books.  Leiter asks why any theory of law should be organized around the phenomenon of TD 
“absent some showing—nowhere to be found in Dworkin’s corpus—that it is somehow the central (or 
                                                          
80 For brief yet persuasive criticism that Leiter’s reading “flouts the principle of charity so brazenly”, see Shapiro’s new response to Leiter in 
Legality, 290-291 
81 E.g. Mackie’s error theory in ethics.  J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing right and Wrong (Penguin, 1977) 35 
82 Leiter, “Explaining Theoretical Disagreement”, 1220-1 
83 LE, 129 Leiter makes his point using the image of a pyramid rather than an iceberg.  But the iceberg image is more revealing since it better 
expresses, as normative conceptions of law rightly require, the latent character of theoretical disagreement even in ordinary legal practice where, 
although consensus is the norm, it is a consensus by what Dworkin calls “independent conviction”, which I discuss below. 
243 
 
even a central) feature of law and legal systems?”84   Descriptive legal positivism has the theoretical 
virtue that it explains massive agreement in law since, according to descriptive positivism, what the law is 
is fixed by social convergence.  
But Dworkin also has an account of pervasive agreement in law, one that, if correct, does not 
require an error treatment of TD, and which therefore also preserves the face value of legal practice as a 
whole.85  Even though consensus might appear to be the norm, that appearance conceals an underlying 
disagreement about the reasons for that consensus.  Dworkin distinguishes between what he calls 
‘consensus by convention’ and ‘consensus by independent conviction’.86  It could be that the consensus is 
explained by the existence of a convention, so that lawyers and judges take the fact that other lawyers and 
judges tend to decide cases in a certain way as the primary reason for them to decide them that way too, 
                                                          
84 Leiter, “Explaining TD”, 1220.  Leiter’s point here is somewhat misleading. We should distinguish two different types of judgments one might 
make about the relevance (or in Leiter’s case, the irrelevance) of a particular datum like TD, what we might call theoretical and pre-theoretical 
judgments.  A theoretical judgment judges a datum irrelevant or anomolous when the best available theory of the totality of possible phenomena 
does not account for it, and the fact that the best theory does not account for the phenomena is taken as a reason for that judgment.  Leiter’s 
judgment that TD is anomolous, and his conclusion that parties to a TD must be in error, is a theoretical judgment of this sort; it claims that TD is 
anomalous because it is inexplicable under the best available theory of the existing set of legal data (positivism) a theory which is best because 
more simple, consilient, and conservative than its competitors.  
Pre-theoretical judgments, by contrast, judge the status of possible data without regard to any existing theoretical account of them.  
Such judgments are primarily concerned with determining what data properly count as the subject of theorizing even before theorizing takes 
place.  They are thus an essential—indeed unavoidable—step in theory construction in generally.  For example, when we theorize about 
anything—physics, mathematics, morality, or law—we begin with a grasp of paradigm instances fit for inquiry, of what sort of data count in 
some obvious sense as relevant to theorizing within the domain.  It does not matter to morality, for instance, that seven is a prime number; it 
would be a pre-theoretical mistake for moral theory to concern itself with accounting for that mathematical fact.  Similarly, a theory of law (the 
social practice) need not account for the rate at which apples accelerate from trees—such propositions are ruled out seemingly from the start as 
theoretically irrelevant.   The term “pre-theoretical” judgment, of course, may be a misnomer. There are no “theory-free” pre-theoretical 
judgments, no presuppositionless judgments that are not themselves parasitic on other beliefs we have which enable us to demarcate certain 
phenomena from others as fit for investigation.  But it nevertheless is useful to distinguish two stages of theory construction in the way I have.   
It is clear that theoretical judgments about law depend in an important way on pre-theoretical judgments about what data a theory of 
law ought to concern itself with and about which of these data are in greatest need of explanation.  Leiter's theoretical error judgment depends on 
his view that legal positivism is the best theory of legal data taken as a whole, which, in turn, depends on some pre-theoretical judgment as to 
what that data consists in and what parts of it are most important to legal theorizing.  When Leiter asks of Dworkin, “why should a theory of law 
be organized around the phenomenon of theoretical disagreement about law, absent some showing—nowhere to be found in Dworkin’s corpus—
that it is somehow the central (or even a central) feature of law and legal systems?:, he appears to be asking for a justification of Dworkin’s pre-
theoretical convictions.  In reply, one might ask of Leiter “why should a theory of law not take TD seriously enough as to discredit positivism for 
being unable to account for it?”  To answer with his theoretical judgment “because positivism makes TD conceptually irrelevant” does not 
answer the question because the question asks for a justification for the pre-theoretical importance of TD.  Leiter might answer that he does not 
need to provide a pre-theoretical justification, that the burden is on Dworkin to justify his pre-theoretical commitments.  But Leiter faces the same 
burden. Why should a theory of law be organized around just the set of phenomena that descriptive positivism happens to explain well, absent 
some showing—nowhere to be found in Leiter's essay—that it is central?  Leiter's theoretical judgment that “because those are the data 
positivism—the  best available theory—explains”, delivers no kind of answer to that question.   
We should therefore emphasize that his challenge to Dworkin’s focus on the face value of TD should be understood as a theoretical, 
not a pre-theoretical challenge.  Why, we might ask, should Dworkin retain a commitment to explaining its face value if descriptive positivism 
better explains the totality of data—as assessed along the dimensions of the theory’s simplicity, consilience, and conservatism—than Dworkin’s 
supposedly esoteric theory?  Put that way, descriptive positivism claims a theoretical aDVantage over Dworkin’s normative conception.   Leiter’s 
descriptive positivism, then, may itself be challenged by an alternative theory on those same standards, i.e. one that is more simple, consilient, 
and conservative. 
85 Leiter pays Dworkin’s explanation short shrift. He might, for instance, have attended to Dworkin’s discussion of  “a variety of forces which 
tempers differences and conspires toward convergence” (LE, 87-88) about the proper grounds of law; or his discussion of  “consensus by 
independent conviction” (LE, 135-137); or of interpretive paradigms (LE, 72 ); or of the “positive” claim of “conventionalism”, which accounts 
for the massive convergence in ordinary legal practice (LE, 129) 




so that, for instance, if there is a social practice to the effect that the plain meaning of a statute controls 
the outcome of a case, then that convention is a reason to decide cases that way.  On the other hand, their 
consensus might be explained by convergence among normative convictions each holds independently 
not because other agree with them.  They might think, for example, that the plain meaning of a statute 
usually controls not merely because there’s a convention to that effect, but because there are independent 
reason (perhaps of political morality—reasons of fair warning, stability, democracy, etc.) for the plain 
meaning to take center stage in most cases.   People would converge about what the law is for different 
reasons—principled reasons—that each recognizes as a matter of personal conviction and which, for 
them, both explain and justify the law’s normativity, its claim to their allegiance.  Those reasons may 
conspire in a number of ways to lead people to the same interpretive conclusions on most occasions.  It 
may, for instance, be that individuals accept the same interpretive methodology, but for different reasons.  
One judge might accept a plain meaning approach because he thinks that approach the best way to protect 
the legitimate expectations of most people.  Another might accept that approach because he thinks it the 
best way to preserve useful social conventions.  Alternatively, their different reasons could lead each to 
adopt different interpretive methodologies that nevertheless, in the vast bulk of ordinary cases, still yield 
the same answer to questions of law.  This possibility has plausibility:  it makes sense to suppose that 
most of the time the plain meaning of a statute, for instance, is the meaning those who enacted it intended 
it to have.  In that case a plain meaning and an intentionalist approach to interpretation would converge 
yielding similar outcomes except in relatively exceptional cases in which the plain meaning either 
delivers an absurd result unlikely to have been intended, or is otherwise unclear.  We could expect TD 
would naturally occur in these peripheral cases as the opportunity presented itself for deeper level 
disagreements about why the law is binding (those reasons each accepts independently) to poke their head 
and argue in different directions.  
Dworkin’s explanation has the virtue of being able to explain the normative force of legal 
argument even in the vast bulk of cases.  The mere existence of a consensus of opinion among officials 
about the correct sources of law and rules for interpretation seems insufficient as a legal argument with 
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any normative force, and is certainly not a fact that most legal actors would cite as an argument in support 
of their legal conclusions, even if everyone accepted them.  Dworkin’s assumption that independent 
normative reasons, in particular principles of political morality, preside over one’s acceptance of an 
interpretive approach seems necessary to explain this feature of even mundane legal practice that Leiter 
draws attention to. 
Dworkin’s analysis of legal practice is sound for another reason, which I emphasized in Section 
3.8, which is that institutional political principles, including legal requirements, are rationally intelligible.   
This fits neatly with theoretical disagreement, and in fact explains it.  Why? Because TD is disagreement 
about the point of law, about the major premises that make political facts normatively relevant.  We need 
to reverse the question the criterial and naturalist legal philosophers ask.  Instead of asking “what is law?” 
and then asking whether we should follow it, we should first pose the normative question—“under what 
conditions could the political facts about our practice be normative for us?”—and then ask the question of 
content—“what do those conditions entail about the possible content of that law and what it requires?”  
The more basic normative question will occupy Part III of this project, which offers a normative 
justification for the unity of political principle. 
 
4.11 Conclusion: Unity Fits Our Moral Practice 
Throughout Part II, I have attempted to show that Unity Thesis better fits central features of our moral 
and political practices than does a pluralistic, factual understanding of principles.  The Unity Thesis 
presupposes what I called the Principled Model according to which principles are justified and determined 
by facts in the light of other principles.  The alternative, the Factual Model, supposes that principles are 
contingent features of reality, like empirical facts are.  But ordinary standards of moral argument, 
justification, truth, and the phenomenology of hard moral and political decisions do not support the 
Factual Model, but do match the Principled Model.  Moreover, the conceptual argument that principles 
might be semantically entailed by certain facts is inconsistent with the best normative interpretation of the 
social function, use, and meaning our moral practices assign to value concepts, such as justice, 
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democracy, and law.   In those practices, the social function of our value concepts seems to be to name 
types of principles, not facts.  These considerations together suggest that principles, unlike facts, are not 
contingent truths known a posteriori through moral or sensory experience, but rather are necessary truths 
known a priori.  Moreover, since judgments about values are not semantically entailed by the meanings 
or definitions of the concepts we use to make them, they are not analytic truths, but rather synthetic and 
real.  So, in conclusion, the case from analysis for the unity of principle suggests that principles are what 
Kant called synthetic a priori truths, universal, necessary, and therefore systematically related.  My next 
task, which occupies Part III, is to morally justify this conclusion.
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Part III.  A Case from Justification 
Part III argues that the Unity Thesis is morally justified.  I present the argument mainly through a 
reconstruction and synthesis of Kant’s practical philosophy and Ronald Dworkin’s various discussions of 
the relationship between human dignity, principled consistency, and the social value of moral and 
political integrity.  In Chapter 5, I develop a Kantian case for Dworkin’s conception of political integrity, 
which, as we saw in Sections 2.4 and 2.14, requires that coercive government bring its actions under a 
coherent program of political principle.  No government is legitimate, according to Dworkin’s theory of 
Law as Integrity, unless its acts of legislation, judgment, and enforcement, interpreted together 
holistically, can be understood to express its acceptance of the equal objective importance of the lives of 
all citizens over whom it claims coercive authority.  We cannot attribute that acceptance to any 
government whose actions do not express a recognizably consistent commitment to a scheme of political 
principle.   
Chapter 6 continues the argument from Chapter 5 through an interpretation of the first part of 
Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, the “Doctrine of Right”.  I argue that the now-popular assumption that 
Kant was a legal positivist is defective.  To the contrary, just as Kantian ethics furnishes the ethical core 
of Dworkin’s conception of Law as Integrity, Dworkin’s conception of Law as Integrity is a natural 
extension of Kant’s political philosophy.  
Finally, Chapter 7 considers some influential contemporary understandings of political authority, 
law, and democratic legitimacy, in particular those of Jeremy Waldron, John Rawls, and Jürgen 
Habermas.  I argue that, despite their explicit professions to the contrary, these authors’ theories tacitly 








Ch. 5. The Kantian Core of Law as Integrity 
 
5.1 Integrity and Kant 
In Justice for Hedgehogs, Ronald Dworkin discusses the place of his ideas within a larger historical 
picture.  He presents his moral, political, and legal philosophies as a single, unified interpretation of an 
ethical practice to which Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, you, and I belong.  Here I join Dworkin in that 
interpretive project, though in a more limited way.  I offer a reading of Dworkin’s own work that isolates 
and expounds its Kantian core.   
Kantian notions pervade Dworkin’s writings, and are most explicit in his later work.  Dworkin 
calls Kant’s idea that respect for one’s own humanity finds its fullest expression in an equal respect for 
the humanity of all persons the “anthem” of his own attempt to unify personal ethics and our interpersonal 
moral responsibilities.1  He also describes in some depth how Kant’s work contains “all the ingredients” 
to support his own moral conception.2  Yet these ingredients have not often been explored in connection 
with Dworkin’s most basic claims about the nature of law.3  I propose to do so by focusing on what I 
regard as a fundamental Kantian element in Dworkin’s work:  moral lawfulness.  I argue that we can 
better understand Dworkin’s claim that individuals and political communities must strive to act only on 
principles that fit into a coherent moral conception, or with what he calls “integrity”, in terms of Kant’s 
categorical requirement that agents strive to act in accordance with principles that have the form of 
lawfulness.  Principles that have the form of lawfulness possess both universality—and therefore extend 
to and govern all relevantly similar cases—and necessity—and therefore cannot genuinely conflict with 
each other but rather must provide single right answers to ethical, moral, and legal questions wherever 
they apply.  
                                                          
1 Dworkin, J4H, 19 
2 Ibid, 265 
3 The two attempts, of which I am aware, to understand the Kantian roots of Dworkin’s theory of law both focus on the role of Kant’s conception 
of teleology and reflective judgment in Dworkin’s interpretive theory, not, as I focus here, on Kant’s ethics.  See Alessandro Ferrara’s Justice and 
Judgment. (London: Sage Publications, 1999) 84-85, 70-74; and Alexandre Lefebvre’s  “Critique of Teleology in Kant and Dworkin”, Philosophy 
and Social Criticism, March 2007 33:2, 179-201. 
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In politics, Dworkin’s conception of integrity requires office-holders to try to create, judge, and 
argue from public political principles as though these principles constitute a single, unified public 
conception of justice. So, as we saw in Section 2.14, a legislative principle of integrity “asks law-makers 
to try to make the total set of laws morally coherent”, and an adjudicative principle “instructs that the law 
be seen as coherent in that way” by judges when they apply law to particulars.4  Integrity’s demand for 
principled consistency—that we extend to all the standards we extend to some—is , on Dworkin’s view, 
the moral nerve of fair equality before law, and the essence of the 14th Amendment’s equal protection 
guarantee.5  It condemns a kind of hypocrisy in a community’s moral personality which manifests through 
officials’ political decisions, judgments, utterances, and actions.6   
But Dworkin’s interpreters disagree about what the value of integrity really amounts to.  On one 
hand, critics like Joseph Raz, Larry Alexander, and Kenneth Kress argue that its concern for coherence 
with past practice competes with and may compromise a community’s direct pursuit of justice as an 
ideal.7  On the other hand, sympathizers like Jeremy Waldron and Gerald Postema argue that concern for 
coherence can be both valuable and necessary to combat the possibility of an inconsistent and unfair 
patchwork of positive laws that inevitably results from arbitrary fluctuations in political power and 
sectional interests.8  Postema adds that under these familiar political circumstances integrity is justified by 
structural features of justice itself so that concern for justice in communities whose members disagree 
about justice is replaced by concern for integrity; integrity simply is justice in political “workclothes”.9   
Although I will not directly assess these various readings here, I believe the Kantian reading I 
offer shows why the critics’ objections fail to appreciate the specifically political value of integrity under 
circumstances in which individuals disagree about what justice and morality in general ideally require.  
My reading therefore redeems Dworkin’s, Waldron’s, and Postema’s understanding of integrity as a 
distinctly political virtue.  It shows why the value of integrity inheres, as Dworkin emphasized, not 
                                                          
4 LE, 176 
5 Ibid, 185 
6 Ibid, 165. 
7 Joseph Raz, “The Relevance of Coherence,” in Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 303-309.   Larry Alexander and 
Kenneth Kress, “Against Legal Principles,” Iowa Law Review, Vol.82, 1996/1997, 748  
8 Jeremy Waldron, “The Circumstances of Integrity,” in Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 
9 Gerald Postema, “Integrity: Justice in Workclothes” in Dworkin and His Critics, Justine Burley (Ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004)  301 
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primarily in its relation to or tendency to serve justice as an abstract ideal, but rather in its relation to 
political legitimacy, to the conditions under which the use of collective coercive power can be justified.  
The Kantian reading does this by highlighting the constitutive relation between integrity and a key 
condition of political legitimacy that Dworkin long emphasize: that government take citizens’ rights 
seriously.  
This last point—that the Kantian reading connects integrity and what it means to take rights 
seriously—is the central position I wish to defend, and an advance summary and some background may 
help to convey its meaning.  Although perhaps most commonly regarded as a catchy motto for his early 
work, Dworkin used the phrase “taking rights seriously” as a philosophical term of art with a highly 
structured meaning.10  For any person, citizen, or political official to take her moral and political 
responsibilities seriously is for her to adopt a certain attitude toward matters of principle.  From his 
earliest essays in the 1960s on adjudicative “discretion” to his posthumous work on religion and human 
rights, a unifying thread in Dworkin’s work is the importance of thinking about, arguing for, and holding 
principles in the right way, a way that shows attention rather than indifference to their importance to us, a 
way that honors their role in our lives and those of others.  Although he himself defended a conception of 
liberal rights he thought objectively correct, a fundamental aspect of his political and legal philosophy is 
his account, not of which theory of rights is correct, but of which theories, though perhaps incorrect, we 
must nevertheless respect because they have the character of a responsible moral position, one that 
expresses its proponents’ seriousness about the very idea of rights and their ground in human dignity.   
Dworkin holds that our convictions express this attitude of seriousness through their form. To 
take political rights, or one’s moral responsibilities more generally, seriously is fundamentally to strive to 
fit the principles upon which we act in our personal lives and through political life into a coherent 
program of action.  The Kantian reading shows why both individuals and communities who strive to act 
with integrity can be understood to take their responsibilities seriously because this reading renders vivid 
the relation between integrity and moral personality or attitude.  Starting with individuals, I argue in 
                                                          
10 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriousl (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) 
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Sections 5.2 to 5.5, by presenting a series of analogies and parallels between Kant’s and Dworkin’s moral 
philosophies, that the moral core of Dworkin’s conception of integrity is Kant’s categorical requirement 
that individuals must strive to act only on principles that can serve as universal practical laws for all 
persons.  This demand is a matter of degree and so can be satisfied to a greater or lesser extent. To the 
extent that individuals do satisfy it, they can be understood as morally responsible actors who take 
humanity seriously. They can be understood this way because striving to act according to an integrated 
system of principles constitutes proper valuation of humanity.  It constitutes proper valuation of humanity 
because we cannot treat our humanity as an end in itself rather than as a mere means to some merely 
contingent end, such as our own happiness, except by acting on an integrated system of principles. Nor 
can we interpret others as respecting our own lives as ends in themselves unless we can detect consistency 
among the principles from which they act.  For that reason, integrity has vital social value.  It can inspire 
moral feeling, mutual esteem, nourish community, and is an indispensable condition of our ability to 
tolerate and respect others with whom we disagree about how we ought to live.   
Sections 5.6 to 5.9 then discuss integrity as a virtue, not of individuals, but of political 
communities understood as personified agents.  I show that the same Kantian reading of integrity that 
ought to govern individuals helps us to make sense of the notion of a political community as a personified 
collective agent.  There is no genuine democracy, no collective self-governance, no—as Kant called it—
truly omnilateral will, but only collective heteronomy in a political society governed by a patchwork of 
positive laws. Only to the extent that officials and citizens act in their political capacities in accordance 
with public principles that flow from a coherent interpretation of the public political record—that is with 
political integrity—can government be understood as a politically legitimate actor, as an autonomous 
collective agent who takes the dignity of its subjects seriously.  Interpreted in this way, Dworkin’s theory 
of Law as Integrity is a distinctively Kantian liberal jurisprudence. 
I am anxious to forestall at the outset a potential misunderstanding of my argument.  Recent Kant 
scholars have inferred, mainly from Kant’s remarks condemning political revolution and his view that 
legal authority must render a conception of justice determinate, that Kant tacitly endorsed some version of 
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legal positivism, which is the theory of law Dworkin consistently attacked over half a century.11  My aim 
in this chapter is not to defend any particular reading of Kant’s own legal philosophy, but rather to present 
Dworkin’s central normative positions in Kantian terms in order both to justify and structure those 
positions and to highlight certain ways in which Kant’s and Dworkin’s practical philosophies complement 
each other.  In my view, we can better understand the character and ethical foundations of Dworkin’s 
political and legal philosophy as essentially Kantian.  I also suspect, however, that we can better 
understand Kant’s true commitments within the philosophy of law in terms of Dworkin’s jurisprudence.  I 
reserve a more complete defense of that claim for the next chapter. 
 
5.2 Taking Humanity Seriously 
Dworkin distinguishes two departments of an individual’s normative responsibilities: ethics and personal 
morality.12  Whereas ethics concerns what each person must do in order to live well, personal morality 
concerns what each as an individual owes other people.  Within ethics, Dworkin argues for two 
fundamental ethical principles, which together comprise his conception of human dignity.  First, dignity 
requires that we each accept that it is objectively important that we each live well.  A life well lived has 
“adverbial” value, which is the performance value of one’s acts in striving to produce good consequences 
in a life, and which does not depend ultimately upon the goodness of any consequences those acts might 
produce.13  Living well means striving to create a good life.  Second, dignity demands that we each live 
authentically “from the inside”, accepting a personal responsibility to make ethical decisions and find 
                                                          
11 See in particular Jeremy Waldron’s  “Kant’s Legal Positivism”, Harvard Law Review 109, 1995-1996, 1535-1566 (slightly modified and 
reprinted as “Kant’s Positivism”, in Waldron’s The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 3; Arthur 
Ripstein’s masterful Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009) 191, n. 12; and 
Ripstein’s “Kantian Legal Philosophy”, in The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, 393.  As I argue in Chapter 6, each 
of these positivist readings of Kant assumes that it follows from the need for an authority to decide moral or legal disputes in a way that replaces 
each subject’s private judgment of what morality or law require that what that authority actually decides can be ascertained without regard to 
those moral considerations upon which the authority is meant to decide.  But there is no inconsistency in accepting both that an authority’s 
decisions must replace our own judgment on some issue and that what the authority has decided must be constructed in light of moral 
considerations. To confuse these requirements is to confuse the need, which Kant certainly accepts, for positive official activities to establish law 
with the very different requirement that we must understand and judge those requirements according to the doctrine of legal positivism.  So 
although, as Ripstein shows, Kant holds that we do not understand justice unless we understand law’s role in constituting it, this is nonetheless 
consistent with a non-positivistic conception of law which integrates law into morality in a way that makes law’s content in some way sensitive to 
morality.     
12 J4H, 25, 327-328. Dworkin does not draw this distinction from ordinary language, but instead offers it as a useful way of organizing distinct 
departments of practical reason.  He says he follows Bernard Williams who uses this terminology in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy,174-96. 
13 J4H, 97, 202-204 
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value in our lives for ourselves.14   Dworkin argues that these two principles of dignity mutually imply 
one another. On one hand, he maintains, you cannot think that in finding value in your life you have lived 
your life well, in the performative sense, unless you were the one who identified that value in it.  
Otherwise, he argues, the performance could not be attributed to you.  On the other hand, you cannot 
think you have created something of performance value unless you find what you have created truly 
valuable.15   
In the Appendix to this project, I present an interpretation of Kant’s attempt to establish the value 
of humanity as the fundamental ground of morality.  Right now, I focus on showing how Kant’s account 
of the supreme value of humanity in certain respects parallels Dworkin’s account of the value of human 
dignity.  By pausing to consider Kant’s analysis of what it means properly to value humanity we can 
illuminate and structure Dworkin’s account of what it means to take human dignity seriously. By 
“humanity”, Kant does not mean any particular biological characteristic of homo sapiens.  Kant often uses 
“rational being”, “rational nature”, and “humanity” interchangeably. In general, humanity is the capacity 
to set, revise, and pursue ends through reason, and to form an idea of our happiness—or what Dworkin 
calls a good life—as a whole.16  Kant emphasizes two important aspects of humanity.17  The first is that 
humanity is an end in itself, or an objective end, whose worth is unconditioned by desire or inclination or 
any particular act of willing, and is necessarily an end for all rational beings.18  Precisely what he means 
by this claim is controversial, but the basic point might be summarized in the following way.  Kant held 
that the worth of humanity is a necessary presupposition of all rational willing. We cannot think it is good 
rationally to set and pursue any particular end unless we presuppose that the rational setting and pursuit of 
these ends is itself good, and this is just to hold our rational capacity as good in itself and a condition of 
the goodness of any end we might realize through it.  We value and stick to our plans because we believe 
that we ourselves matter as rational end-setters who can form and pursue our plans; we have a conception 
                                                          
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid, 204 
16 Kant, G 4:437, 4:416, 4:418; DV, Second Part of the MM, 6:392  
17 Kant, G 4:428 
18 Ibid, 4:429 
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of our own self-worth that justifies ends that otherwise possess only relative value. The second aspect of 
humanity Kant emphasized is that it is an existent end, an end to be esteemed and preserved wherever it 
arises.  Kant contrasts this kind of end with an end to be effected or produced, such our own material well-
being or happiness.19  Unlike an end to be effected, humanity is something for the sake of which we act, 
as when we salute a flag or observe a moment of silence, not something we create or bring about through 
our own causality.  
In at least three ways, the supreme value of humanity in Kantian ethics corresponds to the value 
of living well in Dworkin’s ethics.  First, like Dworkin, Kant held that properly valuing humanity 
fundamentally involves adopting a certain attitude toward it.  For both philosophers, ethically good 
conduct expresses respect and seriousness, rather than disrespect, indifference, or contempt for humanity 
as an objectively valuable existent end.  Second, both conceptions of value prescind from any contingent 
or empirical end or state of affairs that our acts might realize.  They instead locate the value in an activity: 
in Dworkin’s case the value of a performance independent of its lasting effects, and in Kant’s case the 
value in our freedom or the exercise of our capacity to set and pursuit ends.20  Third, both regard this 
value as a limiting condition on, or—as Dworkin says in adopting an expression Rawls popularized 
among philosophers—lexically prior to, any contingent goals we might choose to pursue.21   
Moreover, for Dworkin, dignity’s demands also extend to our interpersonal responsibilities, or 
what he calls morality.  In transitioning from ethics to morality, Dworkin appeals directly to Kant.  What 
Dworkin calls “Kant’s Principle” urges that the objective importance of our lives and the respect we owe 
to ourselves, as an ethical responsibility, entail a parallel respect for the objective importance of all other 
persons’ lives.22  Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative, sometimes called the Formula 
of Humanity, instructs us to act so that we always use humanity, in our own person and in that of every 
                                                          
19 Ibid, 4:437, and Kant’s CPrR, 5:22 (on the character of humanity as an end that is not be effected) 
20 Ibid, 4:400. For Kant, only what is an “activity of the will” is even eligible for respect.  We can at best only be inclined toward, or admire, or 
love, objects or the effects of any action, but we cannot respect them. 
21 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Rev. Ed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) 37-38 
22 Dworkin, J4H, 19, 246, 255, 260 
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other person, as an end and not as a mere means.23  That injunction captures both the ethical, or 
intrapersonal, and the moral, or interpersonal, dimensions of Dworkin’s account of dignity.  The first, 
intrapersonal, component of the humanity formulation says that we must see ourselves as objectively 
important, and act in our own lives in a way that respects that importance.  Its second, interpersonal, 
component is fundamentally about the manner in which we must value other persons.  Since the value we 
each find in our own humanity is objectively valuable, and since that value is equally represented by all 
other persons, then all persons must recognize the same objective value in the lives of all other persons 
that they each find in their own.  Therefore, just as we must treat that value in ourselves as a limiting 
condition on our own actions, we must also treat that value in others as a limiting condition on our own 
actions. 24    
Through Kant’s Principle, Dworkin thus extends dignity’s ethical demands by recasting them also 
as moral demands.  It follows that, just as Dworkin’s account of dignity requires that we take seriously 
our own ethical responsibility to live well, it also demands that we take seriously our moral 
responsibilities to respect the equal objective importance of every person’s responsibility to live well.  On 
this view, Dworkinian dignity fundamentally requires that we take a certain attitude toward our lives, that 
we take our ethical and moral responsibilities seriously.  But what, more concretely, does it mean to adopt 
this attitude?  What kind of achievement can living with dignity, or treating humanity as an end in itself, 
involve?  And what is its relation to integrity? 
 
5.3 Seriousness and Integrity in Dworkin 
To begin answering these questions, first consider Dworkin’s discussion of what he names the concept of 
moral responsibility,25 which in his sense is a notion we deploy in describing people who take their moral 
                                                          
23 Kant, G, 4:429 
24 Ibid  
25 Dworkin introduces the term moral responsibility in J4H, but the concept that term represents has been central to his thought since at least his 
1968 criticism of Lord Devlin, upon which I draw below. Dworkin, “Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Moral”, reprinted as “Liberty and 
Moralism”, Chapter 10 of TRS. 
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duties and obligations seriously, who are not indifferent toward them.26  Dworkin adds matter to this 
attitude through an analysis of the different ways in which moral responsibility can break down, of how 
people can fail to take their moral responsibilities seriously.  A morally responsible person, Dworkin says, 
acts in a principled rather than an unprincipled way; she acts from rather than in spite of her moral 
convictions.27  A morally irresponsible person, by contrast, fails to act from the principles he professes 
when his moral convictions or actions are, on close examination, not rationally intelligible in terms of any 
moral principle that might justify them. 28   
One clear signal of moral irresponsibility arises when someone professes a principle that does not 
guide his conduct.  When one is insincere about or when one rationalizes a conviction, that conviction is 
best explained by some reason other than the one the agent who holds the conviction claims to accept.29 In 
Kantian terms, he is like someone who acts in spite of duty, rather than from duty. His conformity with 
duty is arbitrary; he would not maintain the position if he ceased to have the inclination or desire which 
really drives it.30  His supposed conviction is consistent with indifference toward and even contempt for 
humanity, rather than seriousness about it.   
A second kind of signal of moral irresponsibility arises when someone has no intelligible reason 
for a conviction.  The role of that person’s conviction is brute and stubborn, and so respect and concern 
for human dignity play no justificatory role in explaining why the conviction guides the person’s 
conduct.31  Even when someone believes he has a reason, plain errors of fact and logic, especially if they 
are repeated, may obscure the justificatory connection between one’s purported reason for a conviction 
and the conviction itself, and therefore signal that some other factor, besides the reason he professes, best 
explains his conviction.  A conviction may be obviously mistaken because it cannot, even charitably, be 
thought to draw justificatory support from any value.  We might say that convictions like this fail even a 
                                                          
26 Dworkin, J4H, 104-105.  For an earlier valuable analysis of the different sense of this difficult concept, see Joel Feinberg’s Doing and 
Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974) 
27 J4H, 103 
28 Ibid,104 
29 Ibid,105-107 
30 Ibid  




threshold test of moral justification.  There is of course room for disagreement about which mistakes are 
threshold mistakes, but some seem obvious. The most glaring examples include principles that assume 
natural superiority of one group over another, or that condone blatant prejudice and discrimination, 
humiliation, rape, torture, and indiscriminate killing.  Someone who accepts principles supporting these 
practices is morally irresponsible because such principles are rarely if ever consistent with respect for 
human dignity on any intelligible conception of what dignity requires.   
Finally, moral responsibility can seem compromised when a professed conviction is inconsistent 
with others one claims to accept.  Such convictions do integrate coherently with others and so, in 
Dworkin’s terminology, lack integrity.  This inconsistency can manifest in various ways, as when 
someone feels committed to two contradictory principles but accepts the conclusion of only whichever of 
the two happens to pop into his mind at a particular moment.  The arbitrary place of these principles in his 
thought and action signals his judgment is an accident, rather than reasoned, and that it bears a precarious 
justificatory relation to dignity. 32  This is morally objectionable to the extent that it permits unprincipled 
and arbitrary moral judgments and leaves open the possibility that one’s moral convictions and actions 
reflect a mix of objectionable contingent incentives or impulses: prejudice, rationalization, aversion, taste, 
self-interest, blind inclination, or that one is simply parroting a belief one has heard.  We might say, in 
Kant’s idiom, that a morally irresponsible person whose actions and convictions lack integrity are to some 
extent heteronomously determined, not grounded on or motivated by respect for the moral law or 
Dworkin’s principles of human dignity.  Principled consistency, or integrity, is, according to Dworkin, 
essential to moral responsibility because inconsistency signals that the moral law governs one’s behavior 
only whimsically.  
 
5.4  Seriousness and Integrity in Kant 
We can illuminate this relationship between integrity and moral responsibility by again looking to Kant, 
and in particular to his account of what it means for a person to act for the sake of the moral law, to value 




humanity as an end in itself rather than as a mere means.  For Kant, to treat humanity in our own person 
as an end in itself is just to treat it as having objective, unconditional, and necessary value, rather than as 
something that can be restricted, or subordinated to, or compromised by, any particular end of merely 
conditional value.  To treat humanity as an end in itself is always to treat it as a limiting condition on the 
pursuit of any contingent end we might have.  Our pursuit of any particular end suggested by inclination 
must be subordinated to the value of humanity or rational nature itself.  Otherwise, we would be treating 
humanity as having value only as means to those contingent ends. We would not properly respect our 
lives—we would not live up to our own self-conception as having objective value—if we dedicated our 
lives to achieving some one or another of these particular goods.   
What does this limitation, which is so central to respecting humanity, involve? What is entailed 
by the idea of not subordinating the unconditional value of humanity to some merely conditional end?  If 
it means that a person must limit her actions merely by subordinating all of her other inclinations to the 
pursuit of one or more inclinations, come what may, then that would involve treating some contingent end 
as having primary value.  Similarly, if it means subordinating any particular end to the maximum total 
satisfaction of her contingent ends, or perhaps to that of someone else or of society as a whole, then that 
too would just be to subordinate her humanity to some contingent state of affairs she has set up as 
dominant. So whatever the limitation involves, its purpose cannot be to serve a contingent end.  Kant 
argues that the only other option is that this limiting principle must be formal, necessary, and universal, 
which is just Kant’s definition of an a priori practical law. 
What is an a priori practical law, according to Kant, and what does it mean to according to one?  
In the Preface to Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that metaphysics is the study of 
particular kinds of “determinate objects and the laws to which they are subject”, and that one department 
of metaphysics, alongside “physics”, is “ethics” or the “doctrine of morals”. 33   Here Kant assumes that 
morality—as a branch of “metaphysics”—is a lawful domain.  But by this he means something quite 
                                                          
33 Kant, G, 4:387-4:392.  Here Kant’s use of the terms “ethics” and “morality” depart from Dworkin’s.  For Kant, morality is a domain that 
includes both our intrapersonal responsibilities to ourselves (what Dworkin calls “ethics”) and our interpersonal responsibilities to others, which 
include our political obligations. 
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specific.  For Kant, a law is a generalization that is universally and necessarily true.34  For the moral law, 
this means it applies to all rational beings capable of performing free actions.35  But this a priori, lawful 
limitation on contingent ends we may pursue entails a condition: in any particular situation, what we 
ought to do must be in some way necessitated.  It implies that, given the facts of one’s situation, it is not 
that some normative principle possibly applies to an agent, or even that it does apply to an agent.  Rather, 
it is that some principle must apply to an agent.  What we ought, all things considered, to do in a 
particular circumstance is a necessary truth.  But if normative principles are necessary in this way, there 
cannot be a plurality of inconsistent principles because there cannot be contradictory necessary truths.  As 
Kant bluntly states in the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, there cannot be a genuine conflict of 
duties: “a collision of duties and obligations is inconceivable.”36 Kant’s subsequent argument for this 
claim is controversial.  But the claim itself is clear enough.  Kant held that actual duties cannot conflict 
because statements of duty are statements of objective principles, which are systematic, lawful, and 
necessary truths, and since there cannot be contradictory necessary truths, there cannot be contradictory 
principles. 
This crucial conclusion follows from Kant’s basic assumption that acting for a practical law or 
principle involves acting for reason. 37  In deciding what one has reason to do, one adopts a universal 
standpoint.  Even if a practical decision is merely about how to satisfy a particular desire or urge that only 
I have, I must still constrain my decision to those actions that anyone else who had my desire or 
inclination in a similar situation would also have reason to perform.  Acting lawfully is acting for a 
reason, and to act for a reason is to act in a way anyone judging from my point of view ought to recognize 
as correct. This universality of reason implies that the aim of practical reason is to arrive at principles that 
are valid for everyone similarly situated.  Kant held that unless we assume that anyone should draw the 
same conclusion from the same premises, we cannot regard the conclusion as justified by reason, since 
                                                          
34 Ibid, 4: 389, CPR, A126 
35 Kant, G, 4:420  
36 Kant, Introduction to the DR, 6:224. 
37 As David Velleman suggests, one way to understand the central project of Kantian ethics is as offering the imperative “act for reasons”, and 
drawing out the implication that to “act for reasons” is to act on the basis of consideration that would be valid for anyone in similar 
circumstances. See Velleman’s “A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics” in John Perry et al (eds.) Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and 
Contemporary Readings (6th Edition), Perry et. al (eds) (New York: Oxford, 2013), 523-524 
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the characteristic feature of a rational inference is its universality.  But if practical reason is general in this 
sense, then we also must suppose, at least as a working assumption, that there are no genuine conflicts 
among principles, that they relate, or can be thought to relate, in a unified, systematic way.  For to negate 
and affirm the same reasons in relevantly similar circumstances, which is what a genuine conflict among 
competing principles would mean, is just to deny that one always ought to do what reason demands in 
those circumstance. 
On Kant’s view, therefore, the very idea of normatively lawful actions requires that we bring our 
actions on certain occasions under the principles that ground our behavior on other occasions, or, 
equivalently, that we bring our actions under a coherent system of principles that we strive to respect in 
all contexts in which they apply.  Kant famously described different ways in which conflicts might enter 
this system.  Through several examples he offered to illustrate the categorical imperative, he distinguished 
different types of “contradictions” among agents’ “maxims”, which are the subjective principles that 
ground agents’ actions, but which are not necessarily objective practical laws valid for all rational agents, 
and which may fail to cohere with other maxims in the system.38  As we saw in Section 1.6, Kant scholars 
distinguish different ways in which maxims may fail to cohere—practically, logically, in an agent’s will, 
and in an act’s conception, for example.39  The normative significance of all of these inconsistencies lies 
in Kant’s assumption that a morally permissible maxim is one that can serve as an objective law by virtue 
of its membership in a system of principles that is consistent between all persons.  Indeed, the point of 
morality, for Kant, is to constrain our purposes by requiring them to be interpersonally and 
intrapersonally systematic so that no principle applies to any person on some occasion or in some 
circumstance that does not also apply to all others in identical or relevantly similar circumstances.  If a 
change in our circumstance makes a difference to what we ought to do, that must be because there is a 
reason that explains why that change makes a normative difference, and that reason consists in some more 
                                                          
38 G, 4:422-423.  A maxim is an agent’s principle of action.  Maxims are practical laws if they could serve as a universal law for all rational 
beings.  On Maxims, see G 4:420; CPR, A812/B840; and CPrR, 5:19 
39 I have benefited from instructive discussions of these important Kantian distinctions in Wood, “Kant on False Promises”, in L. W. Beck 
(ed.), Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972, 614-619; Onora Nell’s (O’Neill’s)  Acting On Principle 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1975) 63-82; Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) 78; and Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1993) 137 
261 
 
general principle that justifies the change’s normative significance and renders it rationally intelligible to 
us.  Unethical or immoral behavior always involves acting on considerations whose validity for others or 
for ourselves on different occasions we are not willing to acknowledge.  When we apply different reasons 
to others, or to ourselves on different occasions, without making principled distinctions between 
situations in which these reasons apply, we flout the idea of a practical reason, which is that it must apply 
universally and necessarily to all rational agents, to all of humanity. 
We are now in a position to see why valuing humanity as an end in itself requires that we strive to 
act on a systematically related set of principles, that is, with integrity in Dworkin’s sense.  Suppose I fail 
to act on an integrated set of principles: I make a false promise to you even though I would not permit you 
to make one to me if we switched places. In doing so, I am acting on a principle that I refuse to extend to 
you.  How can I justify making that exception for myself?  If our circumstances are identical in all factual 
respects, then there has to be a non-factual difference that explains why different reasons apply to us. But 
the most plausible difference would seem to be that I am assuming that your rational agency (your ability 
to recognize and respond to reasons) matters less than mine does, and that this justifies subordinating your 
agency to whatever particular end or purpose that incentivized my false promise—my own convenience, 
for instance.  That failure expresses disrespect for your humanity because it presupposes a different 
valuation of your rational agency, a judgment that your ability to recognize and respond to reasons 
matters less than mine does and in a way that legitimizes subordinating your agency to my own purposes.  
In Kant’s conception, therefore, treating people as ends in themselves rather than using them as mere 
means requires, first, that we claim no privilege for ourselves that we do not grant others in similar 
circumstances and, second, that we burden them with no responsibility that we would not admit we also 
would have in similar circumstances. This is an ideal of equality: all are to be subject to the same 
privileges and burdens of a consistent, systematic scheme of principles.   
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Kant’s insistence that others be able to “contain the end of my action” is the flip-side of this 
egalitarian coin. 40  Others’ being able to “contain” my end is not the idea that others must be able in fact 
to agree to it if asked, but is rather the idea that my end must be consistent with any end I would have 
reason to accept in those circumstances, that is any end I would rationally set for myself in their 
circumstance.  If my end cannot cohere with those ends I would grant to them, then if I nevertheless act 
on my end, then I am refusing to value their status as rational agents as I value my own, and I would thus 
express contempt for their agency and so too for their humanity.  Violations of duty involve making an 
exception for ourselves in situations in which we recognize, yet still ignore, a universal law that should 
morally necessitate our and everyone else’s action in similar circumstances.  Kant writes that  
if we attend to ourselves in every transgression of a duty, then we find that we do not actually 
will that our maxim should become a universal law, for that is impossible for us, but rather will 
that its opposite should remain a law generally; yet we take the liberty of making an exception 
for ourselves, or (even only for this once) for the advantage of our inclination.41   
 
Making an exception for ourselves “for the advantage of our inclination” just is to fail to act on a 
necessary, universal, a priori principle (a practical law in Kant’s vocabulary), in order to serve some 
contingent end.  Treating humanity as an end in itself demands this integrity among principles—it is the 
essence of being governed by law, and is a condition of our living up to our self-conception as persons 
who are capable of acting for reasons rather than as passive things that are blown around by our impulses. 
Integrity’s role in autonomous agency follows neatly from its role in defining what constitutes 
moral behavior.  Kant regards autonomy, or self-governance by universal law, as a necessary condition to 
realizing a kind of practical freedom. 42  This freedom involves, negatively, the independence of our will 
from domination by our own inclinations and by the choices of other people and, positively, the 
subjection of our will to the moral law, that is, the recognition that rational nature itself is a supreme 
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reason for action. We are autonomous when we subject our actions to the moral law rather than 
subordinate rational nature in order to serve some contingent goal.   Kant distinguishes autonomy from 
heteronomy, which involves the subordination of the will to principles whose ground is some contingent 
material end such as pleasure, or an empirical idea of happiness as the fullest satisfaction of our 
inclinations, or the will of someone else or of some God.43 The autonomous person respects the dignity of 
humanity properly. We would not respect our rational nature as having supreme value if we devoted our 
lives to achieving some contingent end.  On the contrary, that kind of heteronomy would subordinate our 
agency and treat it as having value only as an instrument to achieving those ends.  We are fully self-
governing, therefore, only when we treat our agency as an end in itself, and we accomplish this not 
merely by acting in accordance with the moral law (which could be done by accident), but by striving to 
actively comply with it, by striving to act from duty for the sake of the moral law.  As Kant writes, “…if 
any action is to be morally good, it is not enough that it should conform to the moral law—it must also be 
done for the sake of the moral law.”44  But, as we have seen, this means that we are practically free when 
we act on universal laws, that is, on a scheme of unified, systematically related principles that apply 
necessarily in all contexts.  The dignity in our self-governance, therefore, consists in our ability to act on a 
coherent scheme of principles, that is, with integrity.  As Kant writes in describing his principle of 
autonomy, autonomy is “the principle of every human will as a will universally legislating through all its 
maxims”.45  Autonomous agents do not merely act from laws considered one-by-one in isolation, but from 
a set of laws that comprise a harmonious whole.  That is what it means to act rationally in accordance 
with a practical law.  In a “Kingdom of Ends”, each autonomous agent legislates maxims that conform to 
the idea of “a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws,” and that express both 
concern and respect for the humanity in all persons. 46  
Here, then, is how we may understand Dworkinian integrity in terms of Kant’s account of what it 
means for a person to act autonomously for the sake of the moral law. On Dworkin’s view, integrity is a 
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requirement of moral responsibility, and thus of human dignity in the same way unity and non-
contradiction is for Kant a requirement of proper respect for humanity. For both philosophers, principled 
inconsistency—failing to allow some principles its full extension whenever it applies—is a failure to act 
on principles with universal and necessary application, a failure that subordinates the objective values of 
humanity and of living well to some contingent end such as the achievement of happiness or of a good 
life.  But since that central value is objective and represented in all persons, then consistency is both an 
intrapersonal ethical requirement and an interpersonal moral requirement.   To maintain that another 
person in exactly my position, or a relevantly similar position, does not have the reasons I do, depends on 
an assumption, perhaps a clandestine or unconscious one, that their reasons matters less than mine do, that 
they are something less than beings with an identical capacity to recognize and respond to reasons, that 
they are mere things.  Only when we aim to act with integrity, both within our own lives and in our 
interpersonal relations, can we really claim to take our ethical and moral responsibilities seriously.  
 
5.5  The Third-Personal Value of Integrity 
The previous two sections present what we might call a “first-personal” justification of integrity because 
they address how responsible agents must arrange their own principles in order properly to value human 
dignity.  However, Dworkin has argued that integrity possesses not only first-personal value as a 
condition for the propriety or correctness of moral judgments, but also that it possesses third-personal 
value because it facilitates social and political relations among people who otherwise disagree in detail 
about which moral judgments properly value humanity.47  Individuals who hold different or incompatible 
ethical and moral views will not be able to prove or demonstrate that their opinions are correct and others 
false, nor will they always be able to find reasons that others would be irrational to reject.  However, 
despite these barriers to agreement,  Dworkin suggests that people in that situation can nevertheless aim 
to convince each other that, although they may regard one other’s opinions as hopelessly in error, they 
each have behaved responsibly, and so with integrity, in arriving at and acting on the convictions each 
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holds.  We may judge that others are seriously wrong in what they believe, but we can distinguish 
between, on the one hand, wrong opinions that are arrived at carelessly, or through self-interest, from, on 
the other hand, wrong opinions that are arrived at through a responsible effort to discern what we really 
owe to each other.   
Dworkin early on emphasized this distinction between having a correct moral position and having 
a moral position. We sometimes use the latter not to refer to moral positions we think are right, but to 
contrast positions we may think are wrong, but which nevertheless are free from prejudices, illegitimate 
bias, rationalizations, and arbitrary stands that fail to express the evenhandedness we associate with a 
truly moral position.48  Dworkin’s claim has familiar support in everyday moral discourse.  In our 
personal relations, not just in politics, we sometimes hope to persuade others as well as ourselves that we 
are right about how to live and how people should treat each other.  But the goal of persuading people that 
we are right does not exhaust the point of moral argument.  Reflective people also want to satisfy 
themselves and those impacted by what they do that they are acting conscientiously from principle, not 
arbitrarily or from self-interest. So they try to explain their convictions in a way that displays 
thoughtfulness, sincerity, and coherence, even when they know they cannot expect to convince others that 
they are right.  Diverse societies require a high level of tolerance and respect among people whose 
opinions differ and whose opinions may even seem repugnant.  Dworkin argues that we may more easily 
tolerate those contrary opinions when we can see that they express an intelligible conception of what 
dignity requires.  That is, we can more easily respect them when others “try to act consistently with what 
they take, rightly or wrongly, to be [dignity’s] demands.”49  That attitude, which “signals a basic shared 
respect even in the face of moral diversity,” is, for Dworkin, a prerequisite of civilization.50 
We can view each other as morally responsible in this way to the extent that our various concrete 
moral judgments can be interpreted as expressing integrity rather than whimsy.  That integrity is an 
important achievement on its own, because it can elicit respect and esteem from others who otherwise 
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disagree with the substance of our viewpoint.  We care that people act in a principled way, with integrity, 
whether or not their convictions are correct.51  We care because we value the attitude toward human 
dignity that a person who acts from principle expresses.    
The motives of concern and respect for humanity do not best explain the conduct of someone 
moved by arbitrary incentives.   If such a person’s actions turn out to be morally right, then that is merely 
a lucky coincidence, a happy alignment between his desires and his duties.  His motives are still 
consistent with an attitude of indifference or even contempt for dignity.  But we might still esteem the 
conduct of someone who acts with integrity because we see that he has taken his moral responsibilities 
seriously in striving to act correctly.  His attitude expresses, in Kantian terms, a “good will”, a will 
motivated by respect for the moral law and therefore by the necessity of duty.52  Kant held that an action 
performed from the motive of duty possesses a special kind of value, “moral worth”, that can awaken a 
moral feeling of respect because it reveals the power of our own practical reason to govern our conduct. 53  
The moral feeling is more than a sentiment of love or affection we might have for someone whose 
strength or courage we admire.  It is rather a feeling that the humblest person, in whom we might yet 
“perceive uprightness of character”, can awaken in us.54   
It is true that Kant says that only dutiful actions could possess moral worth because only dutiful 
actions could be performed from the motive of duty; no acts “contrary to duty”, Kant held, can be done 
from duty.55  This might seem to suggest that Kant denies precisely the class of actions whose value I am 
now trying to ascribe moral worth, namely those action that someone sincerely but perhaps mistakenly 
believes morality requires. But that reading of Kant is too quick. For Kant, the moral worth of an action or 
conviction lies in the attitude it signifies.  As Barbara Herman suggests, when Kant says that an agent’s 
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action has moral worth, he means to indicate that the agent acts with concern, rather than indifference, for 
the rightness of her action; the agent is moved by respect for humanity.56  That attitude and motivation are 
consistent with disagreement about whether a particular action moved by the moral law is in fact dutiful.  
There is no inconsistency in maintaining both that someone acted for the sake of the moral law and that 
this person erred in judging what the moral law actually demands on that particular occasion.  
This conceptual space between an action’s moral worth and its moral correctness invites a further 
comparison:  between Dworkin’s conception of moral responsibility and Kant’s conception of ethical 
virtue.  For Kant, an agent whose will is good is not necessarily also a virtuous person. A good will is 
volition on good, which is to say morally permissible, maxims. But simply acting on a good maxim, 
unlike being virtuous, does not guarantee a good character because it is possible that in acting on a maxim 
one acts out of character.57  Kantian virtue, by contrast, concerns the lasting qualities of an agent, in 
particular the agent’s moral “personality”.  Kant calls virtue “moral strength of will”, or “the moral 
strength of a human being’s will in fulfilling his duty”.58  Virtue is a type of strength to control and order 
incentives that might oppose our acting on duty, including arbitrary passion, affects, fears, and 
inclinations.59  Its contrary is vice, which is “the brood of dispositions opposing the law … monsters [the 
agent] has to fight.”60   Whereas vice involves “contempt for moral laws,” virtue signifies respect for the 
moral law. 
The relationship between virtue and the good will is a means-end relationship.  Whereas the good 
will is moved by respect for moral principle, an agent’s virtue is the strength of an agent’s disposition to 
act from principle rather than in spite of it, and so represents the surest guarantee of the good will.61  So to 
the extent that the good will, moral worth, esteem, and respect have interpersonal social and political 
value for us, then, on Kant’s view, it is incumbent upon us to strive to cultivate the strength of virtue 
which ensures these moral goods.  Virtue fortifies our character against arbitrariness and contingency that 
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threaten to fragment our principles into a patchwork plurality.  This Kantian understanding of virtue can, I 
think, be found in Dworkin’s striking metaphor describing moral responsibility as a filter surrounding and 
protecting our decision-making will from being dominated by contingent incentives.62  Moral 
responsibility requires that these contingent influences pass through the filter of ethical and moral 
convictions so that they are “censored and shaped by those convictions, as light passed through a filter is 
censored and shaped.” 63  The more integrated our principles are, the thicker and more protective the filter, 
and so our moral responsibility, becomes.  A person who strives to achieve full moral responsibility 
signals full respect for human dignity in striving to act in accordance with a unified moral position in the 
purest sense of that idea.   
Dworkin’s image is of course an ideal, not something he believes we can actually achieve in full, 
but rather something toward which we strive.  Achieving full moral responsibility, he says, “would be the 
achievement of Kant’s man of perfectly good will, and no one is that intelligent, imaginative, and 
good.”64 Instead, he proposes, “we must treat moral responsibility as a work always in progress”, an ideal 
we accept and aim at but only approach asymptotically.   Dworkin’s description echoes Kant, who once 
described virtue as “always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning. It is always in progress 
because, considered objectively, it is an ideal and unattainable, while yet constant approximation to it is a 
duty.”65  For both philosophers, then, the development of a virtuous character—the process of 
interpretation aimed at thickening morality’s filter around the will—is an ongoing assignment.  But the 
very acceptance of that assignment signals seriousness about humanity.  The form of moral virtue, like 
that of moral truth, is integrity, which is something we can detect even in others whose views we 
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5.6  From Morality to Politics 
In Dworkin’s vocabulary, whereas ethics concerns how people best manage their responsibility to live 
well, and personal morality concerns what each as an individual owes other people, what he calls political 
morality concerns what we all together owe others as individuals when we act in and on behalf of a 
political community, understood as a personified collective agent.66  In the next four sections, I will argue 
that Dworkin’s conception of political integrity, like his conception of moral integrity that we have so far 
considered, is best understood as imposing on political actors, who act in and on behalf of the rest of the 
community, the Kantian constraint to act from principles that can serve as a universal law for all.  
However, whereas in the personal ethical and moral cases integrity demands that any particular principle 
we embrace must cohere with our own personal convictions considered as a whole, in the political case 
integrity demands that we act in the name of our community only on principles that cohere with the 
community’s institutionally defined public political morality, a morality that is embedded within the 
community’s political record interpreted constructively as a whole. 
Dworkin’s account of political integrity flows from his conception of human dignity and from his 
more general theory of political obligation, which he regards as a type of associational responsibility that 
arises not among strangers but within special relationships among particular group of individuals.  
Whereas performative obligations arise when we make some people morally special through datable and 
voluntary acts, like making a promise to them, associational obligations, by contrast, arise when some 
people become morally special to us by virtue of some associational bond, such as a bond of family, or 
kinship, or partnership in a joint enterprise.67   
Dworkin maintains that the two principles of human dignity generate distinctive associative 
obligations for members of political communities who are related in a special way, independently of any 
voluntary, dateable, hypothetical, or even tacit act of consent.68  Political communities are coercive 
organizations in which some act on behalf of the collective in telling members what to do and forcing 
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them to comply.  We of course need the order and stability that these organizations provide in order to 
find value in our own lives and to seek justice alongside others.  However, these same institutions, once in 
existence, impact our circumstances in a way that creates new problems and new threats to human 
dignity.   In particular, the content of these institutions and the ways in which they are created and 
administered may authorize or involve collective coercive acts that are incompatible with human dignity.  
Dworkin supposes that these vulnerabilities are consistent with dignity only if individuals associated 
under these coercive relationships acquire special egalitarian obligations toward each other.69   The 
coercive, non-voluntary character of the political relation creates a threat to each member’s dignity that 
can be justified only when coercion is exercised in a way that treats everyone’s life and personal 
responsibility as equally important, none subordinated to any other. 70   
In that way, the two principles of dignity also form the spine of Dworkin’s public political 
morality.  He translates them into a basic two-part political principle, which he has long referred to as the 
principle of, or right to, equal concern and equal respect (henceforth ECR).71  First, no government is 
legitimate unless it shows equal concern for the fate of every person over whom it claims coercive 
authority; government must accept that it is objectively important that those lives go well and are not 
wasted.  Second, government must respect the responsibility and right of each person to be the final judge 
for himself or herself of what counts as a valuable way to live. 72  A government’s obligation of ECR is a 
limiting condition, or “trump”, on the type of collective goals or policies that a government can 
legitimately pursue in trying to make society better off on balance.  Just as the two principles of dignity 
justify and limit the pursuit of individuals’ particular ends, the two parts of ECR impose an analogous 
constraint, not on an individual’s ends, but on the community’s or government’s (understood as a 
collective agent) pursuit of collective goals.  As Dworkin early on wrote, “[ECR] is the source both of the 
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general authority of collective goals and of the special limitations on their authority that justify more 
particular rights.” 73 
Dworkin assumes that in mature democracies almost everyone accepts, or would on reflection 
accept, that government must treat those it governs with ECR.74  Governments achieve justice to the 
extent they succeed in treating people this way.  But it is of course controversial among citizens, officials, 
and across nations what ECR means.  We cannot expect all or even many people to agree about what 
dignity requires concretely.  In light of this disagreement, Dworkin maintains that although people do 
have a political right to the correct conception of ECR (that is, to an ideally just society), they have a 
more fundamental right to be treated with the attitude that these disagreements about ECR presuppose 
and reflect; namely, they have a right to be treated in a way that demonstrates government’s acceptance of 
the importance of human dignity.75 Governments may be legitimate, therefore, even though they are not 
even fully just.  More specifically, they can be legitimate if their laws and policies can reasonably be 
interpreted as expressing a good-faith effort to take human dignity seriously.  A government can be 
legitimate, that is, “if it strives for its citizens’ full dignity even if it follows a defective conception of 
what that requires.”76  Notice that this is an interpretive test of an attitude of acceptance.  It is not a bundle 
or list of enumerated basic resources or opportunities. The right to this attitude is the basic human right, 
and all other human rights flow from it.  Human rights, on Dworkin’s view, are those rights the violation 
of which expresses an attitude of indifference or contempt toward the value of human dignity. 
Government may therefore still respect human rights even when it fails to achieve a correct understanding 
of what is truly just.77 
This interpretive test of political legitimacy makes two key assumptions. First, it assumes that 
there are ways of identifying an “attitude” of acceptance of the requirements of dignity.  Second, it 
assumes that there is such a thing as a collective agent—the political community acting through 
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government—to whom it makes sense to attribute this attitude.  I will try to show how a Kantian 
understanding of political integrity is a structural condition on political and legal principles which, if met, 
makes sense of and justifies these two key assumptions.  
 
5.7  Political Integrity and ECR 
The interpretive test of an attitude of acceptance can be satisfied only when a government’s overall 
behavior expresses an intelligible, even if incorrect, conception of ECR.78  This assumes there is some 
way of identifying an attitude of ECR that is different than assessing how just a community’s laws might 
be.  Integrity enables us to understand what this attitude might intelligibly be thought to involve because 
it helps to mark the distinction between, on one hand, good-faith mistakes about what dignity requires 
and, on the other hand, contempt for or indifference toward dignity.   
Recall our analysis in Sections 5.2 to 5.5 of Dworkin’s conception of individual moral 
responsibility.  There is a useful comparison here between, on one hand, the conditions under which a 
government might be considered legitimate and, on the other hand, the conditions under which an 
individual might be considered morally responsible.  Among those conditions of moral responsibility, we 
distinguished threshold and integrity requirements.  Both of these requirements supply guidelines for 
judging the extent to which the rational connection between the principle on which a person acts and the 
requirement of dignity on which she must strive to act is intelligible.  In the political case, we can 
translate these two dimensions of intelligibility into two parallel requirements of political legitimacy, and 
in fact Dworkin distinguishes exactly these requirements. 79 
First consider the threshold requirement.  Of course not every policy we might consider unjust 
amounts to a threshold violation of ECR, because many arguably unjust policies may still bear an 
intelligible relation to human dignity. In Britain and several continental European nations, for example, 
people have a legal right not to be publicly insulted because of their race, a right protected by laws 
                                                          




making hate speech a crime.  These laws might be justified on the grounds that hateful expressions 
empirically have the effect of reducing certain sub-groups to second-class citizens and that equal concern 
cannot countenance these acts of subordination.80  We might disagree with that argument, but since it is at 
least an intelligible argument we cannot maintain that countries who accept it express contempt for 
human dignity. 
Nevertheless, there are clear, threshold violations which almost always express contempt for 
dignity.  Dworkin plausibly lists policies condoning genocide, torture, or racial discrimination as policies 
that could not be justified on any intelligible interpretation of ECR; no one who understood the idea of 
human dignity could reasonably conclude that those policies respect it.81  Torture, for example, is widely 
understood to violate dignity because it is designed to dominate and override a person’s power to weigh 
costs and benefits and to reduce him to a mere instrument or a thing, not to treat him as a person who is an 
end in himself.  Torture profoundly insults humanity, and so is almost always a clear violation of ECR.82 
Now consider the integrity requirement as a test of the intelligibility of government’s acceptance 
of ECR.  Just as an individual might express ethical or moral irresponsibility in embracing or acting upon 
inconsistent principles, government might also demonstrate indifference or contempt for human dignity 
when it acts, not merely in hideous ways that fail even a threshold test of respect for human dignity, but 
rather in ways that are inconsistent with its own commitments to what dignity requires, commitments that 
are embedded or implicit in its own laws and political practices.83  Dworkin supplies several examples to 
illustrate this point.  If, for instance, a community has established a particular version of freedom of 
speech protection it views as essential to human dignity, it could not then defend denying an equal 
freedom to any particular individual or subgroup within the community as a good-faith attempt to respect 
that individual’s or subgroup’s dignity.  If a community accepts that the ordinary criminal-justice 
practices of the United States establish what proper respect for human dignity requires for those accused 
of crimes, then we would show inexcusable contempt for the basic human dignity of terrorist suspects if 
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we were to deny that respect to them, no matter how useful or convenient it would be to do so.84  We do 
not allow ourselves these conveniences in ordinary criminal justice practices because we accept that 
depriving someone of his liberty by locking him away without due process is a severe violation both of 
his status as someone whose life has intrinsic value and of his personal responsibility to lead his own life.  
When we fail to extend that same treatment to others over whom we together exercise coercive power, we 
transgress our fundamental Kantian duty to treat others as ends in themselves by “making exception” for 
some without a relevant distinction to justify the difference in treatment, and in doing so, we show that we 
value those others differently, indeed as something less than persons.  When a state fails to extend to all 
the principles it affords to some, it fails to regard all as belonging to the community of persons who can 
bear political rights.  When Frederick Douglass asked, “[a]re the great principles of political freedom and 
of natural justice, embodied in that Declaration of Independence, extended to us?”, and when Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton demanded for women “no better laws than those you [men] have made for yourselves,” 
they were not primarily challenging the justice or content of America’s founding principles or legal 
institutions, but rather the inconsistency with which the American federation applied and extended the 
principles and institutions it professed.85  They were making, in other words, an integrity-based criticism 
to expose a kind of collective hypocrisy that implies that the lives and personal responsibilities of some 
members of American society matter less than those of others.86 
So the integrity test that the idea of human rights imposes, the test of consistency of respect for 
dignity, prohibits a government to act in ways that cannot be justified by the conception of ECR that this 
government has already embraced or is committed to by virtue of its past actions and decisions. 
Government would wrong people if it failed to stand by these conditions, that is, if it failed to treat 
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which he identifies unenumerated rights by reflection on the most abstract principles embedded in America’s legal system:  “[i]nterpreted as it 
ought to be interpreted, the Constitution is a glorious liberty document. Read its preamble, consider its purposes. Is slavery among them? Is it at 
the gateway? Or is it in the temple? It is neither….Now, take the constitution according to its plain reading, and I defy the presentation of a single 




relevantly like cases alike in its practice of enforcement.  Consistency and fidelity to the past matter 
because inconsistency and infidelity are ways in which government’s commitment to dignity can break 
down.  They require that a political community use its coercive power to enforce some standard only 
when that standard flows from and is constrained by the community’s own past decisions, judgments, and 
actions.  The idea of integrity implies that the political principles these activities express are working, 
dynamic notions that fit together systematically as parts of a public theory of justice to which a political 
community might commit itself over time.  The rulebook requirements—the positive law—furnish a 
provisional basis for argument and interpretation, the raw materials or skeleton for a public conception of 
justice we construct, when necessary, through interpretation in light of the values we each believe they 
serve.  They guide political judgment and action on the regulative assumption that the public theory they 
represent is a unity, that there are in principle single right answers to what our public perspective requires 
of us in particular circumstances.   
Integrity’s consistency constraint severely narrows the decisions a community can permissibly 
make.  It means that officials in general, including legislators and citizens-as-voters, may not use their 
official powers simply to institute their own favorite conception of justice, no matter how much that 
conception appeals to them, unless they find it consistent in principle with the community’s constitutional 
structure as a whole, including the record of interpretation of that structure. They must regard themselves 
as partners with other officials, past and future, who together elaborate a coherent public morality, and 
they must take care to see that anything that they contribute fits with the rest. Integrity thus opposes forms 
of political legislation or legal judgment whereby officials legislate or judge merely in a forward-looking, 
consequentialist style, or in order to make the community more just overall, if this means disregarding 
consistency with past practice as such.  Integrity resists the idea that legislators and judges may open up a 
fresh story about what dignity or justice demands every time they make a decision.  Government must see 
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itself as writing continuous chapters in a coherent story that has been going on for a very long time.87  It 
must view itself as part of the community’s political history. 
 
5.8  The Kantian Core of Law as Integrity 
Let us now tie Dworkin’s justification of political integrity in law directly to Kant’s conception of 
systematicity and lawfulness in morality.  We saw that Kant held that our humanity is not an end we 
create or produce through our own causality, but rather an end for the sake of which we act, as when we 
bow or doff our hats out of respect.88 Acting for humanity as an end in itself fundamentally involves 
acting with a certain attitude that expresses an appropriate valuation of that end.  In Dworkin’s 
terminology, humanity is an end we must take seriously. This requires that we always treat it as a limiting 
condition on the pursuit of any contingent end we might happen to set.  This limitation constrains 
permissible principles of actions to those that have the form of a universal law, that are applicable to 
anyone in relevantly similarly circumstances:  we must strive to act from a coherent system of principles. 
But this constraint is exactly what Dworkinian political integrity requires. To fail to act with integrity is 
to fail to meet the formal condition of respect for human dignity, which is that we strive to act on 
principle rather than in spite of principle. 
In the political case, all particular social ends, such as the general happiness or social agreement 
on basic matters of justice, have merely conditional value in Kant’s sense because they are a matter of 
what people happen to want or agree upon.  Political integrity, by contrast, resists the idea that political 
legitimacy can rest on social agreement understood in a factual or even counterfactual sense.  Instead, 
integrity represents an ideal of equality, that all citizens must be subjected to the same privileges and 
burdens of a consistent scheme of political principles.  Kant’s insistence, discussed earlier, that others be 
able to “contain” the end of others’ action is not an agreement-test for morally permissible collective 
                                                          
87 For this analogy, see Dworkin’s “How Law Is Like Literature” in MP (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1985), and also “The Chain 
Novel” in LE, 228-238 
88 “[T]he end must here be thought not as an end to be effected but as an independently existing end, and hence thought only negatively, that is, as 
that which must never be acted against and which must therefore in every volition be estimated never merely as a means but always at the same 
time as an end.” Kant, G 4:437 
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actions.  Its political analog is the idea that a political community’s coercive acts must be consistent with 
any other coercive acts it takes or would take in similar circumstances.  If a community’s principles of 
action cannot cohere in that way, and if it nevertheless governs according to its conflicting principles, 
then it tacitly refuses to value some citizens’ status as rational agents as it values others, and thus 
expresses contempt for their agency and their humanity.  This is because a government that acts on 
inconsistent principles expresses its contempt for or indifference toward the value of those lives it 
coercively burdens in acting on those principles.  Thus, any contradiction that might arise within or 
between institutional political principles signals the illegitimacy of those principles and, conversely, a 
political community that strives to conform its actions and decisions to universal laws signals its concern 
and respect for humanity.  Treating humanity as an end in itself demands this unity of principle—it is the 
essence of being governed by law, whether moral or political. 
Consider also the third-personal parallel to the moral case, and in particular the parallel between 
individual moral responsibility and political legitimacy. We considered Dworkin’s position that moral 
irresponsibility arises when a person’s reasons for acting on or accepting some principle is, on closer 
examination, not intelligible in terms of some other principle that might justify it, but rather of some 
arbitrary, contingent feature of circumstance or personality, such as a heteronomous norm.  In the political 
case, moral responsibility breaks down not in any individual’s moral convictions, but rather in the body of 
a community’s public principles of justice, considered as a whole.  When that happens, the justificatory 
connection between those principles and the demands of dignity is not rationally intelligible. When this 
intelligibility breaks down, it signals that democratic politics is merely nominal, governed not by a 
collective commitment to principle, but rather by power and sectional interests.  Under these conditions, 
hypocrisy rules, and a polity loses its collective moral personality.  A community committed to material 
social ends cannot be viewed as a morally responsible, legitimate, collective agent whose decisions we 
might still respect even when we disagree with them. 
By contrast, morally responsible collective decisions, judgments, and acts express Kantian “moral 
worth”, whose social value lies in the attitude it signifies.   We can more easily tolerate contrary opinions 
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when we can see them as expressing a colorable theory of what dignity requires.  That is, we can more 
easily respect them when others “try to act consistently with what they take, rightly or wrongly, to be 
[dignity’s] demands.”89  We expect public officials to act and decide on the basis of a consistent and, 
ideally, well-articulated public conception or interpretation of justice, even if that conception or 
interpretation is an incorrect one, because only on that condition can we regard the standards in 
accordance with which we are coerced to reflect equal concern and respect for our dignity.  Political 
corruption, favoritism, double-talk, flip-flopping, masked prejudice, self-interest, and opportunism are 
objectionable not because those who commit these acts necessarily act wrongly (they may not), but 
because their motives are contemptible and their behavior is unfair.  This requirement of even-handedness 
is particularly important in diverse societies where people disagree not only about what ideals to pursue, 
but about what their institutions require.  We cannot transcend these disagreements by inventing factually 
identifiable, positivistic standards capable of guiding us on all important questions, because we will 
sometimes also disagree about what those standards mean.  But we can insist that throughout these 
disagreements we each be treated with the attitude that these debates assume, which is that each of our 
lives is important and that we need to find resolutions to our disagreements that respect that importance.  
Those who exercise power in the name of the community can be interpreted as holding that attitude only 
when their actions and decision, taken as a whole, express integrity and so flow from a consistent 
interpretation of the community’s institutional framework.  We assume, in both individual and the 
political cases, that we can recognize other people’s acts as expressing a coherent conception of justice 
even when we do not endorse that conception ourselves.90  That recognition alone can help to promote 
mutual respect, esteem, and unity within diverse societies that are characterized by moral and ethical 
disagreement. Governments that act with integrity signal equal concern for all citizens even when those 
citizens disagree in substance about whether the government has acted rightly. 
                                                          




We saw that Kantian moral virtue is the strength of an agent’s disposition to act from principle 
rather than in spite of it.91  Whereas in the personal moral case virtue safeguards our acts and motives 
against arbitrariness and contingency that threaten to fragment principle into a patchwork plurality, in 
politics we can envision an ideal of civic virtue as the strength of political community’s officials’ and 
citizens’ commitment to respecting human dignity. A community that manages to achieve full moral 
responsibility signals full ECR and acts in accordance with a unified moral position in the purest sense of 
that idea.  Of course, this political virtue, like Kantian moral virtue, must only be understood as always in 
progress, as an ongoing assignment, an end we approach but never fully achieve.  But a community’s 
mere acceptance of that assignment itself matters.  The form of that acceptance is political integrity, and 
that is something we can detect in our laws, our officials’ judgments, and citizens’ decisions, even as we 
publicly argue and disagree about the whole truth.  
 
5.9  Integrity, Collective Agency, and Democracy 
The classics of political philosophy attempt to identify conditions under which an aggregate of 
individuals might be unified under a single set of public principles for which members of the collective 
are morally responsible even when these principles are not factually endorsed by all members considered 
one-by-one.  That idea assumes that there can be such things as collective agents to which we might 
rightly attribute or assign responsibility for the decisions and actions it takes.  Dworkin argues that 
political integrity is a key to making sense of this idea.  He writes that the Kantian and Rousseauian 
conceptions of political freedom as self-legislation need integrity, “for a citizen cannot treat himself as the 
author of a collection of laws that are inconsistent in principle.”92  Integrity, he supposes, is a moral 
condition that must be satisfied before citizens can rightful take responsibility for the decisions and 
actions of their community.  After sketching Dworkin’s argument for this claim, I will conclude by 
                                                          
91 Kant, G, 4:401 
92 Dworkin, LE, 189. 
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showing how we can understand Dworkin’s conditions for collective agency in terms of Kant’s 
conditions of moral autonomy. 
The concept of collective agency is not a strange ontological notion. There is an ordinary sense of 
collective agency that neither denies that communities are merely collections of individuals nor reduces 
the sense of collective agency to that of a representative member. 93   We use this ordinary sense of 
collective agency whenever we speak of individuals acting intentionally in concert with others toward a 
common goal.  Our practice of assigning praise and blame to these groups assumes that under some 
circumstances people can together share responsibility for the cooperative success or failures of the 
groups to which they belong, even when those successes or failures are independent of any causal 
responsibility each individual member might have for what the group does.  A frustrated employee might 
blame her company as a whole, not just its human resources department, for failure to ensure timely 
payment.  A corporate executive might take shame in his company’s performance after doing his own job 
flawlessly.  A hockey player might say “we failed” after scoring a hat-trick in a losing effort.  Each of 
these people regards the agent to whom criticism or praise falls as the group to which they belong, not any 
particular member of the group, and quite independently of any particular member’s performance within 
the group.  
These examples highlight the important gap between someone’s or some agent’s being morally 
liable to praise and blame, and their having caused an event for which they are liable to praise or blame.  
Whether or not a group is collectively responsible for some event raises independent ethical and moral 
questions whose answers cannot rest solely on empirical investigations about causes, but must rely 
ultimately on moral premises about the conditions under which it is appropriate to judge individuals or 
groups for some event or decision.  Political communities are groups of individuals, but citizens and 
officials have powers that allow them to act alone or in concert with others in the name of the community 
as a whole for the sake of ends that cannot be achieved except through cooperation.  Citizens may, under 
some circumstances, properly judge the community as a whole to be responsible for what it accomplishes 
                                                          
93 For fuller exposition of this ordinary sense of collective agency, see Dworkin’s LE, 167-175, his EDC, 335, and his PC, 453-458. 
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independently of what any particular citizen or official has caused to happen.  But in order to identify 
these circumstances, we need to identify independent moral conditions for holding people responsible for 
what they have caused or not caused.  In other words, we need to find moral conditions under which 
shared responsibility holds.  
Under what conditions can we attribute moral unity to a multitude? Dworkin’s conception of 
democracy supplies a three-part answer to this question.  He holds that citizens have shared responsibility 
for political decisions in, but only in, a political association that meets at least three moral conditions, 
which he calls conditions for moral membership in a “true community”.94  First, a true community must 
provide citizens with substantial equality of part and voice in its collective decisions. This means that you 
are not a member unless you are assigned a role in what the community does.  This does not require that 
your actions in that role have any measurable impact whatsoever on the outcome of the group’s collective 
actions.  It does require, however, that you play a part in what the community decides to do, that you have 
a fair opportunity to participate.  Second, a true community must recognize the equal importance of every 
member’s fate in deliberating and executing those collective decisions.  Each citizen must be regarded as 
having an equal stake in the community’s collective decisions: no one’s life or personal responsibility 
may be subordinated to that of any other.  Third, true community must guarantee immunity to each 
individual member from collective decisions over certain matters of conscience and faith that, as a matter 
of personal responsibility, individuals must decide for themselves.  In particular, the community cannot 
force anyone to agree with or endorse any particular decision once it is taken, though it may enforce 
compliance.  This condition, Dworkin argues, distinguishes the true liberal community he endorses from a 
monolithic, totalitarian community in which the individual is subordinated to the interests of the state.95 
The second condition—equal stake—most clearly justifies integrity as a prerequisite of 
meaningful collective agency. No one can share moral responsibility for what a community does if that 
community does not regard him or her as a full partner with an equal stake in the community’s actions.  It 
                                                          
94 LE, 201-206; and Dworkin’s FL 24-25. 
95 Dworkin, PC, 456-57; FL, 20-23; Dworkin, EDC, 335-339, 340-342. 
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is no more appropriate for those individuals a community does not recognize as full members to accept 
shared responsibility for the community’s actions than it would for a baseball player to regard as his own 
the accomplishments of a team that did not count him as a player. In politics, it would be wrong for 
members of a racial minority to accept a shared responsibility for political decisions that systematically 
ignored their own needs and fate, even if they were each allowed an equal vote in the majoritarian 
processes that produced those decisions. When someone is systematically and deliberately denied equal 
status in the community, his community’s actions do not morally redound to him. We saw that a 
community fails to treat some members as equals when it acts in an unprincipled manner in not extending 
principles to all. A community that denies integrity thereby denies equal status, and thus denies a key 
condition of shared responsibility and therefore of collective agency.  To the extent that a community 
does achieve integrity, a community’s claim to collective responsibility becomes stronger. 
Perhaps Dworkin’s analysis of the idea of shared responsibility and its conditions describe only 
partial conditions for collective agency.  But if we accept them as at least a working template for these 
conditions then we can draw an important conclusion.  I said earlier that in order to make sense of the 
attitude of equal concern integrity reflects, we must first make sense of the idea of collective agency.  But 
the foregoing analysis suggests a deeper connection between collective agency, attitude, and integrity:  
collective agency, understood in terms of the moral conditions of shared responsibility, does not precede 
the idea of integrity at all, but is rather constituted by it.  We attribute group agency only under certain 
conditions in which persons’ dignity is adequately respected.  The condition of equal stake requires 
integrity, and indeed equal stake and integrity are both parts of the same idea basic ideal, which is the 
attitude of ECR that we owe to others with whom we are associatively related under coercive political 
institutions.  We might say, for that reason, that integrity is part of what makes the Rousseauian and 
Kantian conceptions of collective agency possible.  It enables a truly general will only because it alone 
captures the idea of universal self-legislation.96  
                                                          
96 LE, 189-90 
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To take the parallel one step further, we can translate Kant’s conception of moral autonomy into 
an ideal of collective political decision and action.  Kantian autonomy, recall, requires compliance with 
the moral law for the sake of the moral law.97  Heteronomy, by contrast, means acting predominantly for 
contingent ends whose value is conditioned by our own or others’ acts of willing, and therefore possess 
only conditional worth.  We can identify political analogs of these two ideas. For Dworkin, the conditions 
of genuine collective self-governance, or political autonomy, require government to express, through 
principled action, its commitment to treating each citizen with ECR, to respect their dignity. True political 
autonomy is not attainable within a community whose acts are governed ultimately by contingent and 
conflicting social facts. A community governed by a positivistic understanding of law, or by John Rawls’s 
limited conception of an overlapping social consensus, or by pure majoritarianism, is a heteronomous 
community. Autonomous agents, individual or collective, do not merely act from laws or abstract 
principles whose grounds are factual, but rather strive to act from a set of laws that comprise a 
harmonious whole.  That is what it means for agents to act rationally in accordance with self-legislated 
practical laws. A “Kingdom of ends”, Kant said, is a “whole of all ends in systematic connection.”98 In 
that Kingdom, each agent—every public official, citizen, legislator, judge—aims both to act from public 
political principles and to legislate these public principles in a way that respects equally all citizens’ 
humanity by conforming his decisions to the demands of political integrity.99 Within that common 
enterprise, even when we disagree or argue about matters of principle in detail, behind the controversy 
about what our traditions and principles require, there is something that unites us:  a common 
commitment to human dignity that we necessarily share, that none of us can relinquish, and which 
furnishes an abstract plane of principle from which political argument proceeds.   Conceptions of law and 
democracy that identify the content of a public political will with a particular kind of social fact furnish 
merely contingent and conflicting grounds of political institutions. They furnish at best contingent 
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convergence among citizens’ particular wills, or what Rousseau called the will of all, rather than a truly 
general, rational will. 
Many philosophers suppose that social agreement, in some form, must be a basic condition of 
political legitimacy.  So, for example, Rawls sets up, as the contingent, material end of politics that all 
collective actions, decisions, and judgments flow from abstract principles of justice upon which members 
of liberal democratic societies tend to converge as a matter of social fact.  But Dworkinian integrity 
rejects social agreement as a condition of legitimacy. A legitimate community is not a community of 
individuals or nations tied together by shared opinions about justice, especially not in detail. It is instead a 
community that, in spite of this disagreement, is tied together by a commitment to treat itself as a 
community of principle committed to human dignity, for reasons we would have whether or not we agree 
we have them.  A community that acts from principle is not one that acts for any particular person’s or 
group’s opinion about what that principle is or should be, no matter how widely shared those opinions 
might be. There is no genuine collective agency, no democracy, no self-governance where there is only 
accidental agreement.   A community committed to legal positivism substitutes heteronomy for collective 
autonomy, and so betrays its professed seriousness about human dignity.  
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Ch. 6:  Kant’s Legal Anti-positivism 
 
6.1 Kantian Legal Philosophy 
Contemporary moral, political, and legal philosophers have aligned Kant’s practical philosophy with 
different and incompatible understandings of the nature of law and the grounds of legal obligation.1  
According to some, Kant’s conviction that human dignity resides in autonomous moral self-legislation is 
inconsistent with political authority’s characteristic claim to impose legal obligations through positive 
acts of lawgiving.  Robert Paul Wolff, for instance, who cites Kant as an ally to legal anarchism, argues 
that political authority necessarily demands a level of deference that is incompatible with each subject’s 
Kantian ethical responsibility to judge one’s duty for oneself. 2 Others associate Kant with legal 
philosophy’s natural law tradition according to which, broadly speaking, legal standards that fail to meet 
certain threshold moral standard do not simply count as bad or wicked law in need of repair, but rather as 
something that is not properly called law at all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a 
disqualified soccer goal might still be called a kind of “goal”. 3  Allen Wood, for example, writes that 
“Kant is by no means a legal positivist.  He shares with the natural law tradition the idea that laws are not 
juridically valid unless they are consistent with what is right in itself.”4   
Yet a number of recent interpretations observe that both the anarchist and the natural law reading 
seem to run aground on Kant’s explicit and repeated condemnation of political revolution and 
disobedience.  Kant held that the state’s coercive authority is “unconditional”, that resisting the legislature 
                                                          
1 A useful survey of just some of the uses of Kant in different areas of the philosophy of law can be found in the first part of Jeremy Waldron’s 
“Kant’s Legal Positivism”, Harvard Law Review, 109, 1995-1996, 1535-1566, slightly modified and reprinted as “Kant’s Positivism”, in 
Waldron’s The Dignity of Legislation. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 3 
2 Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, (New York: Harper and Row, 1970) 12-19.     
3 This seems to be the view of Reiss. In a seminal essay positing a Kantian right to resist wicked states, Reiss argues that totalitarian states only 
have the outward appearance of lawfulness and seek “to use the machinery of legal government to perpetrate unlawful actions and to conceal 
unlawful conditions”.  See Reiss, “Kant and the Right of Rebellion”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 17:2.,1956, 179-192, 190.  Such a 
government, he argues, undoubtedly violates the a priori idea of a Kantian social contract, which rests on human dignity and freedom.   
Congruent views are found in Lewis W. Beck’s “Kant and the Right of Revolution”, Journal of the History of Ideas. 32:3. 1971. 411-422; and in 
Sarah Holtman’s “Revolution, Contradiction, and Kantian Citizenship” in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 209-232, esp. 225-232. 
4 Wood, “The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy”, Timmons (ed.) Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals:  Interpretive Essays,6.  For the natural 
law reading, see also Marcus Willascheck, “Which Imperatives of Right?  On the Non-Prescriptive Character of Juridical Laws in Kant’s 
Metaphysics of Morals,” Ibid, 79, note 32; Ibid, Timmons, 66-67.  See also Hans Kelsen’s natural law reading of Kant in Philosophical 
Foundations of Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism (first published in 1928), trans Wolfgang H. Kraus, as an appendix to Kelsen, General 
Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1945), 389-445, at 444-5 
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“is the highest and most punishable crime in a commonwealth, for it destroys its very foundation,” that 
“[a] people should not inquire with any practical aim in view into the origin of the supreme authority to 
which it is subject,” that “[t]here is no right to sedition, still less to rebellion”, and that “it is the people’s 
duty to endure even the most intolerable abuse of supreme authority”.5   Although Kant never explicitly 
endorsed legal positivism as jurists today understand it, many interpreters argue that positivism’s central 
thesis— that the existence and content of law can be identified by reference to social facts alone without 
resort to any evaluative argument—seems more consistent with Kant’s strong conception of political 
authority.6  Several contemporary scholars, including Thomas Pogge, Jeremy Waldron, Arthur Ripstein, 
and Christine Korsgaard each accept that, for Kant, the grounds of law must ultimately consist in 
empirical social facts capable of providing determinate resolutions to political disagreements and thereby 
protecting individual freedom from the arbitrary contingencies of private judgment that arise in the 
absence of legal authority. 7   On this positivist reading, source-based public law capable of pre-empting 
individual private judgment seems the only alternative to each person or group doing, as Kant wrote, 
“what seems right and good to it.”8    
I have argued throughout this project that positivism, which is a special case of the Factual Model 
of political principles, and the idea of legal indeterminacy or legal pluralism, are bedfellows.  My aim in 
this chapter is to undermine the now-popular assumption that there is any support for the notion of legal 
indeterminacy to be found in Kant’s political philosophy.  I will do so by raising doubts about Kant’s 
alleged positivism and by suggesting an anti-positivistic alternative reading that is neither anarchist nor 
naturalist.  I consider three exemplars of the positivist reading: Pogge, Ripstein, and Waldron.   In similar 
                                                          
5 Kant, TP 8:299; MM 6:318; MM 6:32.       
6 See Raz’s “Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law” in The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), and his “Authority, 
Law and Morality,” reprinted in Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
7 See, for instance, Jeremy Waldron’s “Kant’s Legal Positivism”; Thomas Pogge’s, “Is Kant’s Rechtslehre Comprehensive”, The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy (1997) Vol. I, Supplement, reprinted in Timmons, 133.; Wood’s “The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy”, in 
Timmons, 7; Marcus Willaschek, “Why the Doctrine of Right does not Belong in the Metaphysics of Morals“ Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethik, 5 
(1997), 205–27, at 208; Christine Korsgaard’s “Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution”, in Reclaiming the 
History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal 
and Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); and also Arthur Ripstein’s entry in the IVR Encyclopaedia of 
Jurisprudence, Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law, available at http://ivr enc.info/index.php?title=Kant's_Legal_Philosophy.   As Korsgaard 
writes, “If someone has enough authority to make and execute laws, and the people are living and acting and relating to one another under those 
laws, then that is the general will.  The failure of their institutions [and their decisions] to meet our more substantive ideals of justice is simply 
irrelevant [to their legal validity].”  
8  DR 6:312 
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ways, their positivist interpretations belie a fundamental aspect of Kant’s conception of juridical freedom, 
which is that it requires a system of reciprocal limitations on everyone’s use of freedom in which no 
person may bind others in ways they themselves cannot also be bound.  That requirement, I suggest, 
demands that law must authorize all political action with one voice, not a plurality of inconsistent voices. 
It requires that there be unique institutional answers to all questions that might arise concerning persons’ 
rightful external relations to one other.  Positivism, which holds that institutional guidance “runs out” in 
hard cases, is not equipped to satisfy this condition.  Kant’s conception of juridical freedom instead 
requires that law be understood to consist of the set of moral principles that best fits and justifies the 
juridical record of a community as a whole, and that its content be judged interpretively in light of those 
principles in order more effectively to constraint discretionary and potentially arbitrary exercises of 
political power.  Individuals cannot be equally free from political domination unless political power 
issues from a coherent public institutional perspective.  Kant’s legal philosophy is therefore consistent 
with, and in fact justifies, Dworkin’s contemporary conception of Law as Integrity.  One of the aims of 
Law as Integrity is to account for and justify our practice of arguing about law’s requirements in hard 
cases, so that law can “mutter its doom” “even when the books that are supposed to record its commands 
and directions are silent.”9   Dworkin’s theory carries to its natural conclusion Kant’s basic assumptions 
about what a system of equal external freedom, a condition of Right, requires.   
 
6.2 Morality, Ethics, and Right 
Kant distinguishes ethical conduct from rightful conduct.10  Ethical conduct concerns the ends an agent 
ought to have and be moved by and hence the conduct’s “morality”, which refers to the internal 
consistency of the subjective principles, or maxims, on which an agent acts, conformity to which must not 
be compelled or coerced from the outside by someone else.   Rightful conduct, by contrast, depends only 
on the external consistency of many agents’ deeds and interactions in space, and which may be compelled 
                                                          
9  Dworkin, LE, v 
10 “Ethical legislation (even if the duties might be external) is that which cannot be external,” that is, enforced by incentives external to respect for 
the moral law, while “juridical legislation is that which can also be external”, that is, enforced by “aversions” or the desire to avoid punishment. 
MM, 6:219-220; DV, 6:380 
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by some other person or by a state.  In contrast to ethical conduct, conduct can be rightful even if it is not 
performed from the motive of duty; it involves only the outer form of action, or its “legality”. Kant also 
divides his moral system into two sub-systems that correspond to this distinction between ethics and 
Right.11  The first part is “the system of the doctrine of Right (ius)”, which concerns duties of Right, or 
juridical duties, that others can establish and enforce.  The second part is the “system of the doctrine of 
virtue (Ethica) which treats duties which cannot be so given,” namely ethical duties.12 
Kant’s interpreters disagree about how to understand the relationship between the domains of 
ethics and of Right.  Some deny that Kant’s conception of Right is derived from the supreme principle of 
morality at all.  Although none of the three positive readings I consider below depends on that 
assumption, if the disconnection it supposes could be sustained, it might seem to imply that Kant denied 
any justificatory relation whatsoever between his legal philosophy and his moral philosophy in general, so 
that law comprises an autonomous, sui generis, purely positivistic domain that is independent of the 
values that underpin his moral theory.   
One possible source of confusion in this matter is Kant’s view that the system of Right cannot 
presume any virtue or good will even on the part of those who legislate and administer it. The problem of 
creating a civil condition, Kant says, “must be soluble even for a nation of devils.”13   We might be 
tempted to infer from Kant’s idea that duties of Right need not be performed from the motive of duty that 
duties of Right are not themselves justified by the supreme principle of morality.  But although Kant 
maintained that a particular act can be rightful independently of the incentive for compliance, it does not 
follow that the domain of Right does not serve a moral end that agents ought to strive to make their own.  
It is consistent with the idea of Right that juridical duties should be performed from the motive of respect 
for the external rights of persons, which in turn are justified by respect for humanity.   
                                                          
11 The German word Recht has no precise English equivalent. It refers both to law and the more general idea of a legitimate public power.  Mary 
Gregor and other recent translators have used the word “right,” rather than “justice” or “law”, which retains some of this ambiguity. In Kant’s 
conception, “Recht” or right refers to the set of coercively enforceable moral duties.  Here I adopt Gregor’s translation, but utilize an upper-case 
‘R’ to signify the special sense of the term “Right”. 
12 MM Preface, 6:205-206, and Introduction, 6:239-242; DV Introduction, 6:380-383. 
13 PP, 8:366 
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Kant’s terminology can mislead us.  He distinguishes the “morality”, or “moral worth” of an act 
from its “legality”. What is essential to the moral worth of actions is that the moral law should directly 
determine the will. If the will conforms with but is not moved by the moral law, it has legal but not moral 
worth.  But in saying that legal acts can lack moral worth, Kant does not mean that legality is not morally 
valuable.14  “Of every action that conforms to the law but is not done for the sake of the law,” Kant says, 
“one can say that it is morally good only in accordance with the letter but not the spirit (the 
disposition).”15  This implies that there is still moral value to legality, which is not surprising since, for 
Kant, our outward actions are central to both his ethical and juridical systems.  For example, the 
categorical imperative itself states, in the first instance, not how we must be motivated, but how we must 
act.16 
A further reason why some interpreters maintain that Kant’s conception of Right is insulated from 
his moral theory in general is Kant’s claim that the fundamental principle of Right, the Universal 
Principle of Right (henceforth UPR), is a postulate “incapable of further proof”, that is, a principle which 
cannot be deduced from some yet more abstract moral principle.17  In order not to become hopelessly 
sidetracked by the complex exegetical problem this statement raises, I refer interested readers to some 
illuminating discussions in the secondary literature.18  For my purposes here, it will have to suffice merely 
to record a few reasons, drawn from the general structure of Kant’s practical system, why every moral 
duty, ethical and juridical, can ultimately be justified in terms of the same fundamental value, which is the 
objective worth of rational nature, or humanity.  
Kant introduces the UPR as the principle that “an action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s 
freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist 
                                                          
14 CPrR, 5:71-72, 5:81 
15 CPrR, 5:72 
16 Although the test FUL prescribes is in terms of the form of an agent’s maxims, the subject matter of the imperative itself is how we must act: 
“Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” 
17 DR, 6:231, Thus Wood says that Kant implicitly denies that we might derive the principles of right from morality when Kant says that the 
Principle of Right, unlike the principle of morality, is analytic, and Willaschek seconds that claim, while adding that Kant’s statement that “the 
‘universal law of right’ is ‘a postulate that is incapable of further proof ’…would be astonishing if Kant held that this law was a special instance 
of a more general principle whose validity Kant, on his own account, had proven in the Critique of Practical Reason”.  Wood, “The Final Form of 
Kant’s Practical Philosophy” in Timmons (ed.), 7; Willascheck, “Why the Doctrine of Right does not Belong in the Metaphysics of Morals“, 208, 
cited in Guyer, “Kant’s Deduction of the Principles of Right” in Timmons (ed.), 25. 
18 See Guyer, “Kant’s Deduction of the Principles of Right” in Timmons (ed.) 
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with everyone’s freedom in accordance with universal law.”19  He then restates it as the principle to “so 
act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance 
with a universal law.”20   Underwriting these formulations is the assumption that we are creatures who 
occupy space and who act by moving our bodies.  Principles of Right arise because the outward actions of 
embodied rational beings can come into conflict.  This possibility of outward conflict among many 
persons’ actions mirrors the possibility of internal conflict within a single person’s will.  Whereas the 
categorical imperative governs the consistency of a person’s will with itself, the principles of Right 
govern the consistency of the actions of many persons who occupy space.   
A fundamental assumption of Kantian morality is that human freedom has supreme and 
unconditional value.  Both the categorical imperative and the UPR flow directly from that value because 
only by conforming to both can we be free.21  On one hand, the categorical imperative governs the form 
our maxims must have in order for us to be ethically autonomous while, on the other hand, the UPR tells 
us what form our outward actions must take to be consistent with the autonomy of others, regardless of 
the internal consistency of our maxims.  So although, strictly speaking, the UPR may not be derived from 
the categorical imperative per se, it certainly is derived from the fundamental moral value that 
underwrites the categorical imperative, namely freedom or the value of rational agency.   
Kant implies as much in the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, where he writes that “The 
concept of freedom is a pure rational concept”, and that “On this concept of freedom, which is positive 
(from a practical point of view), are based unconditional practical laws, which are called moral.”22 He 
then defines moral laws to include both the principles of Right as well as the laws of ethics: “In contrast 
to laws of nature, these laws of freedom are called moral laws. As directed merely to external actions and 
their conformity to law they are called juridical laws; but if they also require that they (the laws) be the 
determining grounds of actions, they are ethical laws. . . . The freedom to which the former refer can be 




22 MM, 6:221 
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only freedom in the external use of choice.”23  Kant also asks in the Introduction to the “Doctrine of 
Virtue”, “why is the doctrine of morals usually called (especially by Cicero) a doctrine of duties and not a 
doctrine of rights, even though rights have reference to duties? The reason is that we know our own 
freedom (from which all moral laws, and so all rights as well as duties proceed) only through the moral 
imperative, which is a proposition commanding duty, from which the capacity of putting others under 
obligation, that is, the concept of a right, can afterwards be explicated.”24  Here Kant is explicit that all 
duties and rights, including duties of right, “proceed” from the supreme value of our freedom and the 
moral law it grounds. 
 
6.3  Three Positivist Readings 
None of the three positivist readings I discuss must deny that Kant regarded juridical duties as ultimately 
justified by the values that underpin Kant’s moral system in general, in particular the supreme value of 
humanity.   After all, as we saw in Sections 2.8 and 2.13, positivism’s central claim that the existence and 
content of law is determined ultimately by social facts can be defended on normative grounds, and indeed 
the three positivist readings I consider each hold, in similar ways, that Kant’s justification for the domain 
of Right requires a positivistic understanding of law for normative reasons.  
The first reading, defended by Pogge, holds that Kant’s “Doctrine of Right” is best understood, in 
Rawlsian terms, as articulating a “freestanding” political conception of justice, indeed that it is 
“freestanding par excellence”.25   Just as Rawls maintained that the fact that a political conception of 
justice fits into a comprehensive doctrine does not imply that the political conception’s content depends 
on that comprehensive doctrine, so too the fact that Kant may derive the duties of Right from the supreme 
principle of morality does not imply that the content of those duties is in any way sensitive to the supreme 
principle; the existence and content of our juridical duties is, in relation to Kantian ethics or any 
comprehensive moral doctrine in general, sui generis, strictly factual, and positivistic.  Pogge maintains 
                                                          
23 MM, 6:214 
24 DV, 6:239 
25 Pogge, “Is Kant’s Rechtslehre Comprehensive”, 134, 135, 147 
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that Kant’s duties of Right, like Rawls’s political conception of Justice as Fairness, “can be presented 
without saying, knowing, or hazarding a conjecture about, what such doctrines it might belong to, or be 
supported by.”26  On this view, although the justification of our juridical duties may depend on the ethical 
value of our own purposive agency, or our humanity, the content of the domain of right itself is 
independent of that value because only by understanding right as independent in this way are we able to 
settle disagreements, coordinate our actions, and ensure predictable political outcomes.27   
Contrary to Pogge’s interpretation, I argue that the same reasons which, for Kant, justify our 
juridical duties are also reasons for insisting that the content of those duties remain sensitive to the value 
of humanity.   I show that Kant’s understanding of juridical duties is not only derived from, but also that 
their content must be interpreted ultimately in light of, the supreme value of humanity.  I will demonstrate 
this through a discussion of Kant’s derivation of the basic principle of Right (the UPR) from the value of 
humanity.   
The second positivist reading, defended by Ripstein, emphasizes the role that a positivistic 
understanding of law plays in enabling political freedom. 28  On this reading, law can be normatively 
binding only if it is “laid down as right”, that is, specified institutionally through positive law.  This is 
because, says Ripstein, only legally authorized exercises of power are compatible with political freedom, 
and only when specified positivistically can political institutions legally authorize all exercises of political 
power.29  Kantian legal philosophy, on Ripstein’s view, does not deny the modern legal positivist’s claim 
that whether a particular law is a valid member of a given legal system depends exclusively on facts about 
the acts and practices of officials.   
Contrary to Ripstein’s interpretation, I argue, first, that the relation he suggests between law and 
justice is also compatible with a non-positivistic understanding of law according to which, law is indeed 
distinct from, and replaces morality, but nonetheless depends for its content on morality.  Ripstein is 
                                                          
26 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 12-13,  
27 Pogge, “Is Kant’s Rechtslehre Comprehensive”, 147, 151 
28 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 87, 179; Ripstein, “Kantian Legal Philosophy”, in Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal 
Theory, 393 
29 DR, 6:229 
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correct that we do not understand justice unless we understand law’s place in it, but this is consistent with 
and, as I argue below, indeed sponsors a non-positivistic, interpretivist conception of law which integrates 
law into morality in a way that makes law’s content in some way sensitive to morality.    
The third positivist reading, defended by Waldron, holds that the specific normative function of 
the Kantian state, which is to supersede substantive disagreements by enforcing its own action-guiding 
standards, commits Kant to positivism.  Positivism supposedly follows because, in order for the state to 
perform its function of superseding and resolve substantive disagreement about legal and moral 
requirements, then exactly what its directives mean must be ascertainable without reliance on the sort of 
considerations disagreement over which it is the state’s purpose to transcend.    
Contrary to Waldron’s authority argument, I show that even Kant’s discussions about revolution 
and disobedience leave open an important protestant dimension in his understanding of law, and that 
Kant’s political Protestantism is incompatible with the pre-emptive, positivist reading. I will make this 
point through a closer examination of Kant’s remarks about the permissibility of revolution and the limits 
of political authority. 
 
6.4 From Ethics to Right: On Pogge’s Reading 
The terminology of Kant’s moral philosophy, especially the categorical imperative, occurs at several 
important points in Kant’s discussion of Right.  Kant says that Right is only possible “under universal 
law”, that you must never allow yourself to be “treated as a mere means,” and that the people must “give 
laws to themselves.”   Pogge’s general strategy is to convert Kant’s apparent moral language into 
descriptive definitions.  The domain of Right, according to Pogge, is like an autonomous game, a 
“Rechtslehre game” the rules of which can be identified independently of any comprehensive moral 
commitments that might justify them.  Right is governed by rules that divide all actions into those that are 
juridically permissible and those that are juridically impermissible and which can therefore be regulated 
with force, but the substantive merit of these rules of Right does not influence their content in any way.   
Moreover, according to Pogge, we are to understand Kant’s reference to “universal law” in the UPR in a 
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deflationary, or “weak sense”, as meaning “applying to all” rather than applying in such a way that treats 
all fairly as equals under the law.  The latter sense of universality is a matter of what our juridical duties 
ought to be, not a matter of what they are.30  Once the rules of the Rechtslehre game are to be understood 
in descriptive terms, then we can regard them as comprising, in Rawls’s terminology, a freestanding 
“module” that could fit into and be justified by a number of otherwise inconsistent comprehensive moral 
outlooks.   
Pogge’s reading focuses on the relation between, on one hand, the supreme principle of morality 
and, on the other, the UPR and its entailments.  He regards the relation between them as one-way rather 
than bilateral:  although the supreme principle of morality might justify the UPR, the existence and 
content of all juridical duties that flow from the UPR are not, in turn, sensitive to the supreme principle of 
morality.   In order to assess this interpretation, we need to consider the relation between Kantian ethics 
and the UPR in some detail.  We need to understand more specifically how the value of human freedom 
shapes Kant’s system of Right, and in particular to ask whether it demands that the content of the system 
remain sensitive to the value of freedom that justifies it. 
According to Kant, the UPR implies each person’s “one Innate Right” to external “Freedom 
(independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of 
every other in accordance with a universal law,” which “is the only original right belonging to every 
human being by virtue of his humanity.”31 Whereas the UPR demands that each person exercise his or her 
choice in ways that are consistent with an equal right of all others to exercise their choice, the “Innate 
Right” is then each person’s equal right to exercise his or her freedom within that system of equal, 
consistent freedom.32  But what exactly is Kant’s idea of external freedom?  As Ripstein emphasizes, 
being independent from the choice of others is a relational notion between persons, not a relation between 
persons and their environment or the context in which they act.  In the Introduction to the “Doctrine of 
Right”, Kant writes that the concept of Right deals with two relations. First, it concerns “[t]he external 
                                                          
30 Pogge, “Is Kant’s Rechtslehre Comprehensive”, 137-138 




and indeed practical relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as deeds, can have (direct 
or indirect) influence on each other.”33  Second, “[i]t does not signify the relation of one’s choice to the 
mere wish (and hence also to the mere need) of the other…but only a relation to the other’s choice.” 34  It 
makes no sense to speak of freedom in a world with only one person. Freedom as independence instead 
refers to a relationship between persons in which none interferes with the freedom of choice of others. 
Kant holds that this interference is not the same as interference with the context in which one exercises 
choice, nor does it mean independence or isolation from the effects of others’ choices.  Kant identifies 
freedom with independence from having one’s power of choice directed by others for another’s purpose.35  
If you have a right to independence, then you are your own master and, as Ripstein adds, if you are your 
own master, then “nobody gets to tell you what purposes to pursue with your means.”36  
This relational aspect of freedom flows from the idea of a person’s humanity, her capacity to set 
and pursue purposes.  A person’s right to external freedom is simply one’s entitlement to use one’s 
rightful means for setting and pursuing purposes that are consistent with other people’s capacity to set 
purposes with their rightful means.  So understood, the Innate Right is a relational idea. A person is 
independent only if he, not someone else, determines which ends he will pursue with his means.  Because 
the right is relational, wrongdoing is also a relational notion. We wrong others only by interfering with 
their capacity to set purposes with their rightful means, either by usurping them through deception, fraud, 
or coercion, or by destroying them through injury to one’s body or theft of one’s rightful holdings. 37     
This relational conception of freedom-as-independence is very different from what we might call 
a material conception of freedom, which defines rightful relations in terms of someone’s entitlement to 
some particular material state of affairs, such as material well-being, or happiness, or a context that is 
more conducive to achieving one’s ends.38  Since freedom is not simply one’s ability to pursue ends, but 
                                                          
33 DR, 6:230 
34 Ibid 
35 Here I follow Ripstein’s analysis, Force and Freedom, 16 
36 Ibid, 34 
37 Ibid, 31-50 
38 Kant writes that “In this reciprocal relation of choice, no account at all is taken of the matter of choice, that is, of the end each has in mind with 
the object he wants. . . . All that is in question is the form in the relation of choice on the part of both, insofar as choice is regarded merely as free, 
and whether the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with universal law.” DR, 6:230 
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rather one’s equal right to independence from the choice of others in pursuing ends with one’s rightful 
means, then physical limitations on the pursuit of ends do not necessarily abridge freedom.  Instead, 
freedom is violated only when one person or a group of persons subject another’s choice to their choice, 
either by interfering with their rightful means or by setting that person’s end for them.  
It is easy to see how this idea of being one’s own master is also equivalent to an ideal of equality 
that is implicit in the UPR’s rider, “in accordance with universal law”.   Since no person has, simply by 
birth, either the right to command others or the duty to obey others, Kant also includes under the category 
of Innate Right “innate equality, that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can 
in turn bind them; hence a human being’s quality of being his own master, as well as being a human being 
beyond reproach, since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone.”39  
Freedom and equality thus merge in the liberal-egalitarian thesis that no person can have any rights over 
others that they cannot in turn have over that person.40  It follows that there can be no rightful servitude. 
 But the sense of equality is specific.  We are not all equally subject to principles of Right that are 
designed to protect some state of affairs because the idea of Right abstracts from the “matter” of any 
potential choice.  Any arrangement that subordinated the system of equal reciprocal limitations on 
freedom to the realization of some material state of affairs some one person or group happens to will 
would make some people’s choice dependent upon others’ choice, and thus violate both freedom-as-
independence and equality. 
In light of these considerations, we can draw an important analogy between the categorical 
imperative, particularly in its first formulation, the Formula of Universal Law (FUL), and the UPR.  
Whereas the former demands that our maxims comprise a consistent, unified set of principles (or maxims) 
that have the form of lawfulness and so can apply equally to all agents in relevantly similar 
circumstances, the latter demands that external laws that authorize coercion similarly comprise a system 
of equal, reciprocal restraints on freedom so that no person is restricted by laws which do not also restrict 
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40 Ibid   
297 
 
others similarly situated.  In “Perpetual Peace”, Kant makes this analogy more explicit when he states that 
“external (rightful) equality within a state is the relation of its citizens in which no one can rightfully bind 
another to something without also being subject to a law by which he in turn can be bound in the same 
way by the other.”41  The demand for equal, reciprocal restraints on external freedom mirrors the 
categorical imperative’s demand that agent’s organize their principles of action under a universal laws 
that could univocally guide all agents in similar circumstances.  Only in such a system is juridical 
freedom possible.   
In both the ethical and juridical cases, each system of duties and rights responds to a different 
kind of heteronomy that threatens free agency.  In the ethical case, the threat is the subordination of the 
worth of rational nature to some material principle that sets up some contingent end, like the satisfaction 
of inclination or another’s will, as the false object of supreme value. In the juridical case, the 
incompatibility is the subjection of each person’s choice to the choice of another that can occur when 
outward actions are inconsistent in the ways mentioned above.  In both cases, the solution is a systematic, 
coherent system of inner and external laws.  Both systems must be internally coherent because coherence 
is the form that a system of laws takes, is what lends it universality, and is what distinguishes these 
systems from a normative domain governed by a material principle.  Whereas ethical laws subject 
material incentives’ influence on the will to an impartial principle—namely, inner systematicity of 
maxims—that subordinates incentives, juridical laws are needed to subject and direct external coercion to 
an impartial legal principle—namely, outer systematicity of actions—that can render coercion consistent 
with freedom. 
Notice also that whereas a unified, coherent system of moral principles is not merely a means to 
effecting an end that can be specified independently of that system, but rather constitutes what respect for 
the end of humanity itself involves, the same is true for the relation between juridical principles and 
external freedom.  For Kant, law is not a tool for achieving moral purposes that are entirely independent 
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of it and that can be described without any reference to those laws.42  They are not, as some modern legal 
positivists insist, just tools for the effective guidance and coordination of behavior.43  By starting with a 
conception of freedom as independence from the choice of another, the Kantian approach shows the sense 
in which juridical freedom is constituted by law.  A unified system of equal external freedom is 
inconceivable apart from the laws that define, restrict, and render compatible the outer conduct of 
persons.  The system of freedom just is the system of unified laws.  
We are now in a position to see the defect in Pogge’s reductive reading of Kant’s juridical 
concepts.  Pogge asserts that Right is governed by rules that divide all actions into those that are 
juridically permissible and those that are juridically impermissible and which can therefore be compelled 
with force.  He claims that this idea of Right does not constrain the content of rules of Right beyond 
whatever rules happen to be laid down by a political authority.  But if, as we have now seen, juridical 
laws constitute a unified system of institutional principles that define equal and reciprocal limitations on 
freedom such that each person is her own master, and if such a system, like a system of ethical principles, 
necessarily abstracts from all material principles, then it is not true that by “universal law” Kant can mean 
merely “applying to all” because a system based on some material principle would not “apply to all” in 
the relevant sense that pervades Kant’s practical thought.   It is also misleading to say that the idea of 
Right places no constraint on the content of the rules that comprise Kant’s “Rechtslehre game”.  The 
universality of principles of Right cannot merely “apply to all” in a flat descriptive sense, but requires that 
duties of Right apply to all in morally relevant ways; it is the same sense of universality that Kant deploys 
everywhere else in his moral philosophy, though unlike ethical laws, the universal laws of Right do not 
concern maxims, but rather public laws established by political authorities.  Indeed those rules are 
constrained to genuine universality in the same way ethical principles are constrained.  Only a unified 
system of institutional principles that exhibits this kind of unity is compatible with external freedom.  
Indeed, it constitutes external freedom.   
                                                          
42 Ripstein also emphasizes this important point in Force and Freedom, 7-11 
43 See Waldron, Raz, and Hart on the instrumentalist view. Raz writes, “I doubt that there are important tasks that are unique to the law, in the 
sense that they cannot at all be achieved any other way.”  Raz, “About Morality and the Nature of Law” in Between Authority and Interpretation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 178 
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Moreover, if the content of juridical duties is constrained to unity in this way, then this just means 
that the content of a system of Right is sensitive the value of humanity which justifies it. But that 
contradicts Pogge’s view that the domain of Right is a freestanding, purely factual, positivistic system.  
On the contrary, the same fundamental value which justifies a system of Right, on Kant’s view, is also a 
reason why the content of Right must be sensitive to that value.  Right is a condition in which none is 
subordinated to any other.  That is a morally charged notion, not a cold definition of some set of 
positivistic rules. Whether or not a duty is rightful depends on substantive normative judgments about 
whether and how it properly unites with other moral duties in protecting each person’s humanity. 
 
 6.5 From Innate Right to Public Right 
My discussion of Ripstein’s positivist reading of Kant requires closer attention to Kant’s derivation, from 
the idea of independence, of the principles of Public Right that define the responsibilities of different 
branches of government and the limits of political authority.   
Innate Right alone is insufficient for freedom because it regulates only a person’s entitlement to 
his or her own body.  Since it is possible that persons might also have entitlements to external objects as 
available means, this establishes a different kind of external relation that must be made compatible with 
freedom.44  Since Kant conceives of rational willing and end-setting as presupposing that one has means 
to one’s ends, it is not sufficient that persons have mere access to usable objects.  Instead, freedom 
demands that persons have rights to certain means to use as they will.  If persons had access to usable 
objects only ever by another person’s permission, then their freedom would be subject to that other’s 
choice, and that would violate independence.  Instead, equal freedom demands that persons have full 
ownership of usable things limited only by a similar right of others to ownership over their means.45  This 
possibility of rightfully using external objects creates new possible threats to independence.  If persons 
                                                          
44 According to Kant, the very possibility of owning external objects requires an additional “postulate”, which Kant calls the “Postulate of 
Practical Reason with Respect to Acquired Right”,  that is not already implied by Innate Right. Since nothing in the idea of Innate Right 
precludes entitlements to external objects, the only possible justification for restricting such entitlements could be that they themselves have 
rights. But because things lack Innate Right, they cannot impose duties on persons not to use them.  If we were to make usable things unusable, 
we would restrict freedom in a way that freedom itself does not demand.  DR, 6:246 
45 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 19 
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can now own things that were previously unowned, it is now possible that they can wrong others even 
when not interfering with their bodies.46   
Kant divides usable objects into three types: things, persons, and persons akin to things.47 One 
can therefore have a right to a thing, to another person’s performance of a deed, or to another person. 
These categories are instantiated in the traditional Roman private law categories of property, contract, and 
status or fiduciary obligations, which structure all Western legal systems.48  According to Kant, these 
private law relations are possible only in a condition of Public Right that defines and coercively enforces 
the private rights and obligations that interacting private citizens will have. 49  Outside of a condition of 
Public Right, private law relations cannot be rightful because they involve limitations which hinder a 
system of equal freedom in three ways, which Ripstein distinguishes as the “three defects” in Kant’s state 
of nature.50  
The first defect is that outside of a civil condition, no person’s unilateral judgment about rightful 
private relations can serve as a law for others without violating their independence.  The second is that 
outside a civil condition persons lack assurance in the security of their entitlement to use their means in 
pursuing their ends. The third is that outside of a rightful condition, there is no party available to apply 
concepts of Right to particular situations in order to render each person’s juridical entitlements 
determinate.   
The potential threats to independence associated with indeterminacy and a lack of assurance are 
instances of the more general threat to independence that may arise when some are subjected to the 
unilateral, discretionary acts of others, and so the argument from unilateral action is fundamental for 
Kant.  In fact, the problem of unilateral judgment about property rights raises the most basic puzzle of 
political authority, because unilateral judgments about property are an instance of person’s or group’s 
attempts to change the juridical situation of others simply by declaring or claiming some right or 
                                                          
46 Ibid, 60-61 
47 DR, 6:259-260 
48 Ripstein discusses how Kant inherited his conception from the Roman Law tradition. Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 54 
49 In his discussion of private right, Kant writes that “it is possible to have something external as one’s own only in a rightful condition, under an 
authority giving laws publicly, that is, in a civil condition.” DR, 6:255. 
50 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 130.  An expression coined by Locke in his Second Treatise. 
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entitlement that limits the rights or entitlements of others.51 The fundamental problem is this: how is it 
possible that some can bind others simply through a unilateral declaration or claim about property rights?  
The fact that one person acts unilaterally in, say, claiming ownership of a plot of land, does not justify 
why that action should bind others, and indeed Kant says that a unilateral will is not a law for anyone 
else.52  It could not bind others because a unilateral act subjects some to another’s judgment.  It does not 
matter how wise or just or trustworthy the person who acts unilaterally might be, because resting what 
counts as my rightful means on another’s discretionary judgment ensures that my ability to set ends 
depends on that person’s leave, and that is incompatible with my independence.  Another person’s 
unilateral act or judgment could establish a law for others only if that act or judgment is in some sense 
authorized by everyone or is made in the name of everyone. In Kant’s vocabulary, it can be rightful only 
if authorized by an “omnilateral will,” and an omnilateral will is possible only in a civil condition. 
Kant describes the assurance problem in the following terms: “I am therefore not under an 
obligation to leave objects belonging to others untouched unless everyone provides me with an assurance 
that we will behave in accordance with the same principle with regard to what is mine.”53  If any person 
unilaterally refrains from taking or using what belongs to others without assurance that others will do the 
same, then that person subjects his purposive capacity to the particular choices of others. Without public 
assurance, we rely only on contingent factors—strength or benevolence—in trusting others, and we need 
not wait until “bitter experience” reveals that we were wrong to trust.54  The solution to the assurance 
problem is to “enter a condition in which each can be secure in what is his,” through “a will putting 
everyone under obligation, hence only a collective general (common) and powerful will, that can provide 
everyone this assurance.”55  From the need for assurance, Kant concludes that force may be used to bring 
                                                          
51 I follow Ripstein’s discussion.  Ibid, 90 
52 DR, 6:262 Kant’s problem:  Acquisition involves “giving an external law”, which can be permissible only if there’s an omnilateral public 
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54 DR, 6:307; Kant refers to the Latin maxim “Everyone is presumed bad until he has provided security to the contrary”, because the alternative is 
a merely material principle based on the particular motives of interacting agents. The right to force others into a rightful condition holds “no 
matter how good and right-loving human beings might be.” 
55 DR, 6:256 
302 
 
others into a civil condition: “Corollary: If it must be possible, in terms of rights, to have an external 
object as one’s own, the subject must also be permitted to constrain everyone else with whom he comes 
into conflict about whether an external object is his or another’s to enter along with him into a civil 
constitution.”56  
Finally, Kant describes the “indeterminacy, with respect to quality as well as quantity, of the 
external object that can be acquired” as the “hardest of all to solve,” and notes that it can only be solved in 
a civil condition.57 The problem of indeterminacy arises from the possibility of disagreement about rights 
that inevitably occurs because rules that contain universal concepts are not sufficient to classify 
particulars falling under them. As Kant argues in the Critique of Pure Reason, if the proper application of 
a rule to some particular required a rule itself, the second rule would also require a rule governing its 
application, and so on, ad infinitum.  If rules can be applied to particulars, then it must simply be possible 
to apply them without having to rely on further rules.58 As Ripstein emphasizes, Kant’s indeterminacy 
argument is formal, not empirical or epistemic.  Kant shows that rights are necessarily subject to dispute, 
not that rights in fact are always disputed.59 This creates a moral problem about how indeterminate rules 
can still apply to all in the same way.  This moral problem is like the assurance and unilateralism 
problems.  No one has reason to yield unilaterally to another’s judgment about how to apply concepts of 
Right to particulars. If two parties to a contract disagree about the terms of the contract, then neither must 
yield to the unilateral judgment of the other because unilateral judgment cannot be a law for another.  
Each of the three defects in the pre-civil state of nature establishes an argument for one of the 
traditional branches of government.60  Kant’s argument about unilateral judgment provides an argument 
for a single legislative authority capable of making laws in accordance with the idea of an “omnilateral” 
will.61 The argument about assurance establishes the need for an executive branch that enforces law. 
Finally, his argument about the determinacy argument introduces the need for a judiciary that applies law 
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to particular cases.  These three branches of government—legislative, executive, and judiciary—together 
comprise the sovereign.62  Kant compares the three branches to the elements of a practical syllogism. The 
activities of the legislative branch lay down the major premise, which determines what conduct the 
sovereign will enforce.  The activities of both the executive and the judiciary thus are subordinate to and 
dependent on the output of legislation; the executive (the minor premise) can only enforce the law, and 
the judiciary (the conclusion which renders a verdict) can only apply law to particulars.  
Kant calls the need for a rightful condition under a coercive sovereign authority a “postulate of 
Public Right”.63  His argument for the postulate of Public Right shows why theories of political obligation 
modeled on private law relations of consent or contract, are misguided.  Since relations of property and 
contract are possible only within a civil condition, and since one cannot transfer, through an agreement, to 
a state or to other people titles that one does not yet have, then consent theories of political obligation 
fail.64  Kant therefore needs to show how public institutions—legislative, executive, and judicial—can act 
omnilaterally in the name of all without falling back on a consent-based theory.  Kant’s solution is that 
people unite their will by giving power to laws: “the best constitution is that in which power belongs not 
to human beings but to the laws.”65 What is needed, for example, for a legislative will to be omnilateral is 
for the legislative power to be exercised for public ends, not private ends, and in particular to create, 
maintain, and improve a rightful condition. The structure of a public official’s role therefore follows the 
structure, not of a private person in a consensual or contractual relationship, but rather of a person in a 
relationship of status who has possession, but not the use, of another person.66   
Status relations arise in situations in which persons interact non-consensually, but in a way that 
nevertheless entitles one party to possession of other person.67  They are relations in which one person 
may be unable to consent to certain kinds of use of their bodies, powers, and property. Familiar examples 
of relationships whose structure fit that of a status relation include fiduciary-beneficiary relations, patient-
                                                          
62 DR, 6:316. 
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64 I again follow Ripstein’s important discussion, Force and Freedom, 184 
65 DR, 6:355 
66 Notice the parallel to Dworkin’s non-voluntarist conception of associative or role obligations that arise only in non-consensual coercive 
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doctor relations, parent-child relations and, as we saw Dworkin held in Sections 5.6 and 5.7, the coercive 
political relation between citizens and government.  Of the examples of status relations Kant discusses, 
the case of children is the clearest.  Kant holds that children are non-consenting parties to a relationship in 
which they find themselves, and because the children are non-consenting parties, parents may not use 
their children in pursuit of their own ends.68  Instead, parents are subject to a duty to act for the benefit of 
those children, where the benefit is understood in terms of enabling the children to become full agents 
capable of setting and pursuing ends.  Kant notes that parents bring children into the world “without the 
consent of the children and on their own initiative,” and takes this to entail that parents have both a duty 
to act on behalf of their children and a right to “manage and develop” them.69  In such circumstances, the 
only way their interaction can be rendered rightful is if the parents act on behalf of their children.70 
Because all status relations always pose a potential threat to human dignity in this way, they can be 
rightful only by restricting the right-holder—parents, fiduciaries, and government—to act for long term 
purposes of the other party.71  For Kant, since public officials have the power to make arrangements for 
citizens, they may not use their office for their own private ends.  Both the parent and the state are 
responsible for making arrangements on behalf of others in which each of those others can be or become 
externally free.  The unavoidable, non-consensual character of these relations can therefore be rightful as 
long as those making arrangements for others act to ensure the continuing independence of those for 
whom they make arrangements.  The sovereign power must strive to establish laws that protect and 
promote a rightful condition of equal freedom. 
 
6.6 Is an Omnilateral Will a Positive or Principled Will?  On Ripstein’s Reading 
Since any act of political authority poses an illegitimate restriction on free choice unless that act is 
authorized by an omnilateral will, even the legislator’s power and actions must flow from or be 
authorized by law, that is, by public rather than by private purposes.  This means that we cannot act 
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legitimately at all in politics, either as legislators or as enforces, without a theory of political and legal 
judgment.  Kant’s political philosophy presupposes some theory of how to judge the content and 
requirements of an omnilateral will.    
In light of this key requirement, we should consider whether Kant’s account of political authority, 
as presented above, is consistent with the positivistic jurisprudence that Ripstein ascribes to him.  Can a 
positivistic understanding of law solve the moral problem generated by indeterminacy in the concepts of 
Right?  Can a positivistic understanding of law express an omnilateral will? 
The problem to which the office of a judiciary is supposed to be a solution is that concepts of 
Right that are legislated cannot on their own generate single right answers to all potential disagreements 
so as to apply to all in the same way. This means that similar cases must admit of similar and unique 
answers.  But this in turn creates a moral problem.  These unique answers cannot merely be what any 
interacting party thinks these unique answers are, but must rather be objective because if the answers 
depended ultimately on any particular person’s judgment about what they are, then this would subject 
those affected to a material principle and thus render those parties dependent.  The solution is that we 
need a unique, objective, omnilateral authorization of any judgment about concepts of Right even if that 
judgment winds up being controversial.72 
Univocality must replace polyphony to protect independence. But is this possible on a positivistic 
understanding of law?  One argument Ripstein presents for the positivist reading is an argument from 
political authority according to which empowering an authority that is entitled to decide all questions is 
the alternative to each person doing “what seems good and right to it”, without ever deferring to the 
judgment of an authority. The solution to the problem is to empower an authority alone capable of 
deciding.  So the Kantian, according to Ripstein, does not deny the modern positivist’s claim that whether 
a particular norm is a valid member of a given legal system depends exclusively on social sources, in 
                                                          
72 This interpretation contrasts with Jeremy Waldron’s “disagreement” reading which supposes that the need for an omnilateral will is to 
overcome controversy that would otherwise pervade the state of nature. See Waldron, “Kant’s Legal Positivism”.  But, as Ripstein points out, the 
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particular the sovereign edict.  However, there seem to be at least two central difficulties with this 
interpretation.   
The first problem is that it does not follow from the fact that an authority is entitled to decide a 
dispute over the requirements of Right in a way that replaces each person’s judgment of what those 
concepts require that what that authority has actually decided can be judged without reference those 
concepts upon whose meaning the authority is supposed to pronounce.  As we saw in Section 2.3, there is 
no inconsistency in accepting both that an authority’s decisions must replace our own judgment on some 
issue and accepting that what the authority has decided must be constructed in light of moral 
considerations.  To confuse these requirements is to confuse the need, which Kant certainly accepts, for 
positive official activities to establish law with the very different requirement that we must understand 
and judge those requirements according to the doctrine of legal positivism.  Although Ripstein is surely 
correct that we do not understand justice unless we understand law’s role in constituting it, this is 
nonetheless consistent with a non-positivistic conception of law which integrates law into morality in a 
way that makes law’s content in some way sensitive to morality.   Kant’s Postulate of Public Right asserts 
the moral need for law that is determined by the “positive” activities of a coercive sovereign state.   But it 
does not follow merely from that requirement that the content of these “positive” standards is simply a 
matter of social fact.  In the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes: 
Obligatory laws for which there can be an external lawgiving are called external laws (leges 
externae) in general.  Those among them that can be recognized as obligatory a priori by reason 
even without external lawgiving are indeed external but natural laws, whereas those that do not 
bind without actual external lawgiving (and so without it would not be laws) are called positive 
laws.  One can therefore contain only positive laws; but then a natural law would still have to 
proceed it, which would establish the authority of the lawgiver (i.e. his authorization to bind 




In distinguishing between natural and positive laws in this passage, Kant does not say that an external 
lawgiver’s choice is sufficient to bind others.  He is clear that although external lawgiving is necessary for 
positive laws to bind, unlike natural laws they do not bind unless there is a background “natural” 
authorization that justifies external lawgiving.  Moreover, it does not follow from Kant’s remark here that 
the choice or will of the lawgiver alone is sufficient to determine the content of the law he enacts through 
that choice.  Kant seems to allow as much in stating that positive or statutory laws are not morally 
practical laws at all, but only commands that “proceed from” the choice of some political authority.73  If a 
positive law is to be a morally practical law, it must depend on some more basic objective reason valid for 
everyone, and its content in some way issues from positive activities of the lawgiver. 
Kant writes in his lectures on ethics that the “ground” of a positive law is the will of another: “All 
laws are natural or arbitrary. If the obligation springs from the lex naturalis, and has this as the ground of 
the action, it is obligatio naturalis, but if it has arisen from lex arbitraria, and has its ground in the will of 
another, it is obligatio positiva.”74  This might seem to suggest that the content of all positive law is 
identical to that of the will that chooses it.  But that is too quick. To say that a positive law has its 
“ground” in the will of another is not to say that the duty that this will establishes is identical to the 
content of the will.  Recall from Section 1.6 that Kant insists that although “grounds” can conflict, duties 
cannot.  This means that we should hesitate to equate the grounds of a positive law (a lawgiver’s will or 
choice) with the juridical duty that ground helps determine.  It is still, to again use Moore’s apt 
expression, an “open question” how the fact of the lawgiver’s will or content should map into legal claims 
about external duties.  We should not automatically identify “positive” lawgiving acts of will with duties 
of Right, but rather with merely prima facie desiderata that are necessary, though not sufficient to 
determine the content of duties of Right.  Kant’s remarks about the differences between “natural” and 
“positive” laws are consistent with the view that positive enactments or decisions comprise what I called 
in Section 2.3 the “factual base” of a community’s public political perspective.  Law is a function of that 
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base, but is not reducible to it. We still need a normative, natural justification that shows how and why the 
positive activities of legal authorities are relevant in order to figure out precisely which legal obligations 
they create. 
So, for Kant, legal positivism is not a default understanding of law.  This leads to a second 
difficulty with Ripstein’s positivist interpretation, which deserves closer consideration.  Not only is 
positivism not a default understanding of law, but there are good reasons why a positivist understanding 
of law is also inconsistent with the most basic normative principles of Right, which Ripstein himself 
emphasizes. As we saw, the Innate Right of independence requires that any legitimate exercise of 
sovereign power by any of its three branches requires a legal authorization.  But that requirement cannot 
be satisfied if we understand law positivistically.  However, it is possible to satisfy that requirement if we 
understand law as Dworkin does.  Let me explain. 
Ripstein writes that Kant’s argument from indeterminacy 
depends exclusively on the need to make rational concepts apply to particulars in a way that is 
consistent with the normative point of those rational concepts. The only way that any particular 
application of concepts governing interpersonal interaction can be consistent with the freedom 
of everyone is if there is a single, public interpretation, provided by a public authority 
authorized to speak on behalf of everyone.75   
These words might have been penned by Dworkin.  A central feature of Dworkin’s theory of Law as 
Integrity that it shows how institutional concepts and principles can be understood to provide a single, 
unified, public conception of justice that applies to all in relevantly similar situations.   It argues that 
government would wrong people if it failed to stand by these conditions, that is, if it failed to treat 
relevantly like cases alike in its practice of enforcement.  A political community must use its coercive 
power to enforce some standard only when that standard flows from and is constrained by the 
community’s own past decisions, judgments, and actions.  The idea of integrity implies that the political 
principles these activities express are working, dynamic notions that fit together systematically as parts of 
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a public theory of justice to which a political community might commit itself over time.  The rulebook 
requirements—the positive edicts—furnish a provisional basis for argument and interpretation, the raw 
materials or skeleton for the public conception we construct, when necessary, through interpretation in 
light of the values we each believe they serve.  They guide political judgment and action on the 
assumption that the public theory they represent is a unity, that there are single right answers to what our 
public perspective requires of us in particular circumstances.   
So understood, Law as Integrity shows how public legal institutions guide and constrain even 
when the concepts institutions deploy are not dispositive.  This idea has been central to Dworkin’s theory 
from his earliest essays on adjudication and law, and in particular his account of how law guides even 
when positive law does not.  Dworkin’s “right answer thesis” holds that even when no settled rule 
disposes of a case, one litigant may nevertheless have a legal right to win, and this means that the judge’s 
duty to discover what the rights of the parties are, not to invent new rights retrospectively.76  Dworkin’s 
focus is on hard cases in which rules no longer guide, where they may be so ambiguous that it is not clear 
whether they apply, where two or more textbook rules by their terms apply and the judges must choose 
between them, where no textbook rule applies to the facts, or where the critical words in such rules are 
contested evaluative concepts like “reasonable”, “ordinary”, “necessary”, “material”, “significant”.77  
Dworkin argues that it is misleading to infer, as some do, that a judge has “discretion” in such cases.78  
This common inference assumes that the only standards judges can appeal to without exercising 
discretion are clear rules understood positivistically.79  But that assumption belies the fundamental 
assumption of hard cases that litigants are entitled to a legal answer even when there is no clear rule.  
That more basic assumption shows that it belongs to our idea of law that legal standards that are not rules 
in part determine what the correct legal answer is, and this calls into doubt the positivist’s assumption that 
in hard cases judges simply make up the law by exercising discretion.80 If a judge were free to adopt his 
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personal preferences as legal standards, then indeed his decisions would be simply invented. But judges 
neither regard themselves as free to do this, nor are they morally free to do this because judges are 
“subject to the overriding principle that good reasons for judicial decision must be public standards rather 
than private prejudice. And [judges are] subject to principles stipulating how such standards shall be 
established and what judicial use shall be made of them.”81 The fact that a judge might find a decision 
difficult or might be uncertain about what the correct decision is does not mean that he has abandoned the 
task of reaching the right decision and is now simply reporting his personal preference. “The judicial 
predicament,” Dworkin writes, “arises precisely because the judge may not switch roles when his own 
becomes too difficult, but must press on even though his hypotheses becomes more dubious and his 
speculations more tenuous than he would like.”82  The institutional constraints endure to the decision 
itself, no matter how uncertain or controversial it may be.83 
For which theory, positivism or Law as Integrity, is the case strongest that, by adopting it, a 
political community will better protect freedom-as-independence by ensuring that exercises of power 
enjoy an omnilateral authorization in accordance with determinate legal standards?  It seems to me that 
the answer to this question shows what Kant’s jurisprudential commitments really are. I suggest that an 
integrity-oriented conception of law, such as the method of constructive interpretation Dworkin proposes, 
offers everything in the way of authoritative settlement and univocality that the positivist conception 
does, but also offers greater univocality within law’s supposed “gaps”, precisely where the positivist 
conception offers no legal guidance at all.  Kant’s theory of Right has nothing to lose, and stands only to 
gain, by adopting an integrity-oriented conception of law. 
Imagine a society in which two defendants face a lawsuit at the same time for exactly the same 
offense, but in different jurisdictions and before different judges.  In both cases, let us say, the relevant 
statutory language and case history is identical, but is either vague or ambiguous and the relevant 
legislators’ intentions appear to be in conflict, and neither a plain meaning nor an intentionalist positivism 
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(nor some combination of the two) delivers a clear answer to the question of law.  Suppose controversy 
arises over how to decide the two cases and the lawyers on every side arrive at different conclusions about 
what the law, properly interpreted, actually demands.  The two judges each presiding over the respective 
cases, Joseph and Jeremy, are positivists and, like good positivists, recognize that in a controversial case 
like the one before them in which there is no agreed upon formula to determine what the law is we must 
not think of the decision reached as actually reporting ‘law’, and that they are, for that reason, not bound 
to the legal history which has come before them.  Their decisions then becomes a moment for each to 
exercise his “discretion” in making his decision, much as a lawmaker might exercise his “discretion” in 
designing a statute that might serve the community well down the road.  So both Joseph and Jeremy stride 
out on their own to do the best they can by their community, announcing a new rule that results in a more 
just state of affairs or that serves its economic interests. 
Now imagine a parallel society in which, again, two identical cases come to trial at the same time 
before different courts, only this time the judges in each case, Ronald and Immanuel, are not positivists, 
but constructive interpretivists whose understanding of law is grounded in the virtue of integrity and who 
seek an interpretation of the relevant legal materials that fits with the best principled justification of the 
society’s law considered as a whole.  In contrast to Joseph and Jeremy, Ronald and Immanuel do not 
disregard the legal record so quickly. They instead take care to ensure that the decision each reaches is as 
consistent as possible with the principles that might reasonably be said to justify the totality of prior court 
decisions and legislative enactments.  They will each ask themselves, in the spirit of Dworkin’s theory, 
what principles of political morality best “fit” and “justify” the legal record and attempt to reach a 
decision in the case before them that is consistent in principle with those other principles.  
Which of these two approaches—that of Joseph and Jeremy, or that of Ronald and Immanuel—
best serves Kant’s central requirement of political legitimacy that all exercises of political power must 
have an omnilateral authorization, understood as a legal authorization?  For Joseph and Jeremy, once 
determinate, factual tests have run out, there no longer are any legal criteria available to constrain the 
decision they, or any other judge, can make.  One might legislate in his own courtroom one way while the 
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other, presiding over his own court, might legislate in a completely different way, so that they reach 
disparate decisions.  What has happened to the virtue of an omnilateral will?  The state’s directives have 
become poly-vocal.   
From a Kantian perspective, the general difficulty for positivism is that there are unavoidable 
limits to the practical guidance linguistic conventions and historical facts about the hopes and 
expectations of officials can provide.  At some point, cases will come along where that guidance offers no 
determinate or no non-contradictory resolution.  In those cases, there seem to be two alternatives: either 
judges must invent a fresh rule, or they must consider what moral purposes the existing body of positive 
law might be thought to serve and to remit the question at hand to those purposes for settlement.  But such 
reliance on the purposes of various laws is a thoroughly evaluative enterprise, not a socio-empirical one. 
The latter, purposive and interpretive, approach adopted by Ronald and Immanuel requires each 
to engage their moral convictions both in determining what principles are in play and in judging how they 
fit together in justifying the relevant parts of the legal record.  What distinguishes their approach, 
however, is its demand that the legal history which has come before them still constrain their moral 
judgment even when it is controversial how that history constrains.  Whereas Joseph and Jeremy, having 
given up on the legal record, are free to cartwheel in the interstices of law, Ronald and Immanuel are 
constrained in reaching their decision by the need to identify a network of moral principles that fits and is 
embedded within the legal record, and to draw from that network a principled decision that extends law’s 
guidance.  To be sure, Ronald and Immanuel may ultimately disagree about what decision the best 
interpretation of the law requires them to reach in the case.  Nevertheless, because they are constrained in 
a way that Joseph and Jeremy are not, their disagreement will be much less arbitrary, and one might even 
think that the demands of integrity could lead them to converge toward similar opinions.   
Integrity’s consistency constraint severely narrows the decision a community can permissibly 
make.  It demands that officials in general, including legislators and citizens-as-voters in general, may not 
use their official powers simply to institute their own favorite conception of justice, no matter how much 
that conception appeals to them, unless they find it consistent in principle with the community’s 
313 
 
constitutional structure as a whole.  They must regard themselves as partners with other officials, past and 
future, who together elaborate a coherent public morality, and they must take care to see that anything 
they contribute fits with the rest. Integrity thus opposes forms of political legislation or legal judgment 
whereby officials legislate or judge merely in a forward-looking, consequentialist style, or in order to 
make the community more just overall, if this means disregarding consistency with past practice as such.  
Integrity resists the idea that legislators and judges may open up a fresh story about what dignity or 
justice demands every time they make a decision.  Government must see itself as writing continuous 
chapters in a coherent story that has been going on for a very long time.84  It must view itself as part of the 
community’s political history. 
Legal positivism, which grounds the content of law ultimately in a contingent empirical fact of 
some kind, just is the idea of governing institutional action according to a material principle.  It is 
therefore a virtual guarantee of plurality, incoherence, and gaps in legal guidance.   On Kant’s theory, we 
need a single public “perspective” to protect our independence, but if that perspective is understood 
factually rather than interpreted holistically and constructively, it ensure a normative cacophony and 
erects a legal tower of babel.  An omnilateral will must instead be formal.  This explains why integrity is 
central to the idea of an omnilateral will because it prescinds from any particular aim government might 
have and which could never guide and constrain official power in a coherent way.  
Ripstein explicitly rejects the notion that the Kantian judge might embrace Dworkin’s theory of 
law and adjudication:   
[Kant’s arguments about legal authorization of the judicial decision do not] rest on the kind of 
claim made famous by Ronald Dworkin, according to which the positive law and morality taken 
together contain a single best answer to every legal question, and the task of the judge is to 
discover it through an interpretive exercise….Dworkin’s [ideal judge] Hercules uses morality to 
render the application of positive law to particulars both determinate and morally appropriate. 
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The Kantian judge, by contrast, applies positive law to particulars in order to make the relevant 
parts of morality apply to them.85  
 
But Dworkin’s position is not, as Ripstein here suggests, that since positive law cannot apply to 
particulars without principles, that principles are also part of the law.  Dworkin’s more basic claim is that 
since law is essentially moral, the judge cannot even “see” the positive law without making an 
interpretive judgment about law’s point.  Morality does not enter the picture at analytically secondary 
stage in order to clean up the law and render it determinate. We need morality even to discover legal 
requirements in the positive activities of legal authorities. 
Ripstein’s remark is somewhat surprising, given his own account of how the Kantian judge would 
resolve conflicts in law, an account that seems fully consistent with Dworkin’s interpretive approach in 
calling upon more abstract principles to “render the positive law determinate”.  Ripstein acknowledges 
that rights work systematically and that apparent conflicts between freedom and equality are resolved by 
reflecting on the Innate Right to independence that grounds the entire system of Right.86  If, for example, 
freedom of expression appears to come into conflict with the fundamental entitlements of equal 
citizenship—as is sometimes argued in the context of laws prohibiting hate speech—any restriction on the 
former right must be justified as an expression of the underlying and more basic Innate Right of humanity 
that generates both. The particular “authorizations already contained in” the Innate Right of humanity are 
not competing members of a disparate list, and any attempt to reconcile them must presume that they can 
be adjusted in light of their mutual presuppositions.  Reconciling different aspects of Innate Right, 
Ripstein suggests, does not involve weighing one demand against another, but rather adjusts each so as to 
work the various aspects of Innate Right into a coherent doctrinal whole.87 
Finally, I suggest that any positivistic understanding of Right is inconsistent with the role Kant’s 
notion of the Original Contract (OC) plays in his conception of Right.  The purpose of Kant’s contract 
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argument is not to represent the state as the product of voluntary agreement between private wills. 
Properly speaking, Kant emphasizes, the OC is only the idea of an act of agreement in terms of which we 
can think of the legitimacy of the state.88  As we saw, Kant rejects the private model of contract or 
consent as a basis for political authority, and rather models the political relation as a status relation.  
Notice the parallel to Dworkin’s non-voluntarist conception of associative or role obligations, described 
in Section 5.6, that arise only in non-consensual coercive relations in which parties strive to treat others 
consistently with their full dignity.  The OC argument is meant to express the fundamental normative 
condition under which the exercise of public power within that relation can be consistent with individual 
freedom.89  Just as the categorical imperative constrains and justifies ethical legislation, and in Dworkin’s 
political philosophy equal concern and respect (ECR) constrains a community’s pursuit of collective 
policies, Kant’s OC is a limiting condition on the laws the state can permissibly create and act from.90  
The OC, like Dworkin’s conception ECR, is not merely an ideal against which duties of Right are to be 
assessed and revised, but also an ideal in the light of which they are to be understood and identified.  The 
notion of possible acceptance involved in the OC is best understood as the requirement that government’s 
actions and decisions express an intelligible conception of justice.  Government meets this standard by 
satisfying, as we saw Dworkin held in Sections 5.6 to 5.8, both threshold and consistency requirements 
for permissible legislation.  The idea of possible acceptance expresses the demand that government strive 
to establish and act from an intelligible conception of justice, not necessarily a correct conception of 
justice.  In “Theory and Practice”, Kant endorses this general requirement in holding that the 
“nonrecalcitrant subject must be able to assume that his ruler does not want to do him any wrong”.91 
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One way of interpreting the OC is that it states an ideal case against which we identify defects in 
laws and in light of which might strive to repair or change existing political institutions.  However, in 
addition to this function, the OC also reflects an abstract ideal in light of which officials must judge 
instances of existing institutions.   This follows from Kant’s conception of the logical function ideals play 
in teleological judgments about objects based on purposes we might impute to those objects. For Kant, 
the ideal case is conceptually basic and all other cases are understood in light of it, not merely for 
identifying or assessing deficiencies or virtues, but for even understanding the object at all.  In the 
Critique of Pure Reason he uses this general strategy not only for thinking about legal systems but also 
for thinking about the concept of a virtuous person, and even concepts of  living things. 92  In each 
instance, the parts are thought of as conditioned by the whole: virtuous acts are parts of a virtuous life, 
each of the branches of government has its function in relation to the whole that they together comprise, 
and the parts of a living thing are what they are in relation to the whole.  Kant’s suggestion here in 
connection with political governance is that the duty to govern in conformity with the idea of the OC is a 
special case of a more general principle according to which we ought to do whatever we are doing in 
accordance with the best standards internal to what we are doing.93  In governing, that means not only 
striving to be a good legislator or judge, but legislating and judging in accordance with settled standards 
internal to the community in which we legislate and judge. That requires that our decisions maintain 
consistency with the community’s institutional practice.94 
Although Kant does not provide a formal analysis of the OC’s specific demands on states, we 
might offer an analysis on his behalf, following the conditions we met in Sections 5.7 and 5.8 in 
connection with Dworkin’s conception of ECR.  There seem to be two main ways laws can be defective 
from the point of view of the OC.  First, specific laws can be defective in violating threshold 
requirements, either because they are substantively very unjust or because they are given or created in a 
way that is very unfair.  The “spirit of freedom” must prevail within the state, says Kant, so that one may 
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avoid falling “into contradiction with himself.”95  The right to evaluate and criticize present arrangements 
is an inalienable right, and citizens have a duty to form and pursue their own convictions about justice, 
and non-coercive96 rights not to be interfered with in doing so.  We have a right to bring our convictions 
forth to civil society for ratification, to participate actively in the legislative process97 and to exercise 
freedom of the pen.98 The latter right is of cardinal importance to Kant, for it represents “the sole 
palladium of the people’s rights”99, that which distinguishes the best form of a state from all others.  
While the people must suffer what they view to be injustice without physically resisting it, they have a 
right to voice their opinion about what the law ought to be, and it is, in the long run, even their duty to do 
so:  “[a citizen] does not act against the duty of a citizen when, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his 
thoughts about the inappropriateness or even injustice of [wicked] decrees.”100  Freedom of the pen is also 
essential for humanity to emerge out of a state of immaturity in which each of us suffers from a self-
incurred inability to use our own understanding without the guidance of others.101   
Second, however, laws can be defective from the standpoint of the OC if they are inconsistent 
with the community’s own conception of justice and fairness as expressed in their institutional history. 102 
Just as Dworkin’s integrity requirement, when met, signals that the state strives to take its commitment to 
ECR seriously, we can understand the consistency requirement of the OC as imposing an intelligibility 
condition which demands that it must be possible for citizens to regard the state’s acts and decisions as 
aimed at protecting and serving their Innate Right to independence.  It is difficult to see how a subject 
could reasonably assume that an official’s or government’s attitude meets this test if its acts and decisions 
fail a basic of test of consistency by failing to treat like cases alike.  In that way, one demand of the OC is 
that governments strive for unity of political principle in order to render the status relationship between 
ruler and subject consistent with each person’s Innate Right. 
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6.7 Kant’s Political Protestantism 
The third argument in favor of Kant’s alleged positivism maintains that Kant was committed to a 
positivistic jurisprudence because according to Kant the purpose of legal authority is to pre-empt 
individual judgment about law’s merits. Waldron argues on normative grounds that a political authority 
can logically carry out its function of replacing its subjects’ judgment only if the content of its directives 
does not depend at all on subjects’ judgment about concepts of Right. This understanding of authority 
thus rejects the protestant dimension of Dworkin’s understanding of law whereby officials and citizens 
may sometimes reach different understandings of what the law requires.  Some of Kant’s remarks about 
the state’s rights against its subjects and about political revolution may encourage this pre-emptive 
reading as against the protestant reading.  Kant says that although the state has duties to its citizens, the 
citizens have no correlative right that these duties be enforced. Thus the people must “put up with” 
unequal taxation, silly regulations, and so on.  Kant also says that everyone is always under an obligation 
to “obey the authority that has power over you.”103 In order to assess the pre-emptive reading, however, I 
will focus on Kant’s anti-revolutionary remarks because they are most famous and deal with the most 
extreme possible cases of injustice.      
Kant’s anti-revolution argument takes several forms. One is a legalistic argument to the effect 
that a constitution can never, as a logical matter, guarantee the people a right to revolution. In the 
“Doctrine of Right,” Kant says that “since a people must be regarded as already united under a general 
legislative will in order to judge with rightful force about the supreme authority…it cannot and may not 
judge otherwise than as the present head of state wills it to.”104 His point is that because individual 
persons are constituted as a people only when they are united under supreme head of state, then the 
people cannot rebel against the state without destroying itself.  Kant adds that if the people were permitted 
to judge the actions of the head of state, then the latter would not be the head of state after all, and so 
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“another head above the head of state” would be needed to decide the matter, and that this is contradictory 
because the original head of state would not then have been the head of state.105 
A second argument is an historical argument that denies the relevance of a state’s historical origin 
to its legitimacy.  Kant writes that “a people should not inquire with any practical aim in view into the 
origin of the supreme authority to which it is subject, that is, subjects ought not to reason for the sake of 
action about the origin of this authority, as aright that can still be called into question with regard to the 
obedience he owes it.”106 This seems to follow from Kant’s more basic claim that the legitimacy of the 
state is to be understood rationally in terms alone of the idea of the OC, not in terms of any particular 
historical or empirical fact about the state’s genesis or pedigree.107 
Neither the legalistic nor the historical argument addresses the question of a moral right to 
revolution.  But of course revolutionaries and reformers often do not appeal to legal rights to justify their 
efforts to change society.  They wish to abrogate existing law and it seems to be no objection, from their 
point of view, to find them in conceptual or legal error because they challenge the state’s authority by 
focusing on its moral foundations.  The moral challenge proceeds under the assumption that there actually 
are moral standards by which to assess state, and then argues that some states fail to meet those standards, 
and that this failure warrants coercive activity to reform or eliminate such states.   
But Kant does seem to have a more powerful argument that denies, or at least greatly limits, a 
moral right to revolution. This argument appeals to the central moral purpose of the state, which is to 
overcome the threat unilateral action poses to each person’s Innate Right to independence.  This argument 
seems to hold that because the revolutionary necessarily acts unilaterally, and since unilateral action is 
always inconsistent with Innate Right, revolution is always unjustified.  The people cannot rightfully 
rebel against their legislature, because unless they act through the legislature they are only a mob, and a 
rebellion by such a mob would destroy government and return each to the state of nature in which all act 
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unilaterally.108  Revolutionaries, who aim to act on rather than through institutions, necessarily act 
unilaterally for some end or other.  
So far, this seems like a valid argument.  But it does not yet tell us why it is wrong in all cases for 
a revolutionary to act unilaterally. Different interpreters offer different accounts of the wrong involved.  
Waldron argues that unilateral action is always wrong because it destroys a necessary condition for 
justice, which is the authoritative settlement of disagreement. For Waldron, the fact of disagreement helps 
to explain Kant’s conclusion that the state alone must possess coercive authority to secure just relations. 
Even if each person does her best to ascertain what justice requires, there will still be problems to the 
extent that different people arrive at and then act on different and sometimes contradictory conclusions.  
As Kant writes:   
[H]owever well disposed and law-abiding human beings might be, it still lies a priori in the 
rational Idea of [a state of nature] that before a public lawful condition is established individual 
human beings, peoples, and states can never be secure against violence from one another, since 
each has its own right to do what seems right and good to it and not to be dependent upon 
another’s opinion about this.109  
 
Waldron invites us to imagine what would happen if each person accepts as his maxim the principle that 
he will deploy that force against whoever stands in his way—even a state—whenever he believes justice 
is on his side?  As Waldron puts it, “if there are several conceptions of justice and rights loose in the 
community, each supported by its own self-righteous militia, any sense of universalizability, reciprocity, 
or respect for others will remain merely academic.”110   The individual can offer only erratic and 
unsystematic enforcement of his own viewpoint. Under such conditions, no single sense of right can ever 
prevail that stands for the community’s vision since interfering patterns of enforcement defeats the 
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possibility of a single coherent decision on these crucial issues that can unify each person’s will under a 
general will.111 
It is important to observe that Waldron’s interpretations of Kant’s argument against unilateral 
action focus on the impermissibility of rebellion, of active resistance to the state.   On this view, when 
Kant raises the concern about unilateral enforcement, it is based primarily on the need for a systematic 
basis for mutual assurance of that to which justice entitles us.  The state, understood as having absolute 
coercive authority, offers the ability to enforce univocal body of law, a set of standards which is capable 
of representing a general, coherent vision of justice rather than simply the aggregate or vector sum of 
contradictory individual interpretations, each backed by discrete and mutually cancelling forces.   
 But there is of course a crucial difference between a right to rebel and a duty to obey, and we 
must try to interpret Kant’s conception of legal authority, and in particular the notion that it denies law 
any protestant dimension, in light of this distinction. Waldron believes Kant’s authoritarianism commits 
Kant to normative positivism because of the specific normative function the Kantian state performs, 
which is to supersede substantive disagreements by enforcing its own action-guiding standards. 
Positivism supposedly follows because, in order for the state to be “serviceable” in Raz’s sense—in order 
for it to carry out the disagreement-superseding function Kant apparently attributes to it—then exactly 
what it requires must be discernible without reliance on the sort of considerations disagreement about 
which it is the state’s purpose to supersede.  Waldron’s inference to positivism is succinctly captured in 
his remark that 
If [Kant believes] there are reasons for thinking that society needs just one view [i.e. the state’s] 
on some particular matter to which all its members are to defer, then there has got to be a way 
of identifying a community view and grounds for one’s allegiance to it that are not predicated 
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on any judgment one would have to make concerning the view’s moral rectitude.  That is the 
positivist position…112 
 
But there is an ambiguity in Waldron’s claim that societies, in Kant’s view, have reason to defer to the 
state’s view.  What does that mean?  What sort of “deference”, then, does his interpretation of Kant 
establish?   His interpretation offers a Kantian response to the would-be revolutionary who would resist 
the state in order to correct its moral defects.  That response is that he must submit to the state’s efforts to 
enforce its view lest he destroy the formal condition of justice itself: the systematic and reciprocal 
deployment of force in accordance with a single vision of what is to be done.   To the extent that the 
reformer owes “deference” to the state’s “view”, that seems only to mean deference, or better yet 
“yielding”, to its enforcement of those views. What Waldron has established is a prima facie Kantian duty 
against revolution.  He has established that the state is irreproachable, that it cannot be resisted, and that 
there is no appeal beyond its highest official.  Its subjects have no right of coercion against it, only duties 
never to use force against it.   
But a duty never coercively to resist the commands barked out by a strongman is compatible with 
those commands never imposing an obligation to obey them.  That was H.L.A Hart’s central insight in 
criticizing John Austin’s sanction theory of law, and it is what normative positivism supposes must be the 
case for law to claim legitimate authority.113  Nothing is law, on the normative positivist view, if the only 
reason for complying with it is the threat of sanction. In fact, Kant at times indicates that, despite the 
unconditional duty to submit to the state’s enforcement, conditions may be such that subjects need not 
orient themselves toward its directives as though they were legitimate, that is, they may never actual 
assume the “internal” point of view toward the law Hart spoke of.  For instance, Kant allows at least for 
passive civil disobedience, or what he calls “negative” resistance, by both officials within the 
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government,114 as well as by individual members of society who are obligated to obey the sovereign only 
“in whatever does not conflict with inner morality”.115 Passive disobedience is not the same as attempting 
overthrow by violence even a tyrannical government which blatantly transgresses morality, for to do this 
would contradict the perfect duty to submit to its coercive authority. Still, citizens are morally permitted, 
indeed required, to attempt to expose any abuses of power, make proposals for his reform, and to disobey 
him if he commands something immoral.  
So I do not think that Waldron’s interpretation of Kant’s conception of the authoritarian state yet 
provides a Kantian account of why the state’s directives are pre-emptive reasons for obedience.  If laws 
do not impose obligations to obey for reasons other than the threat of coercion, then they are not 
serviceable, do not bring about any good that could make them reasons, and so we can draw no 
conclusions about what their meaning must be like for them to be serviceable.  But perhaps we might 
recast Waldron’s reading of Kant as an argument, not against unilateral enforcement, but rather against 
disobedience.  We might argue that unilateral disobedience alone subverts the necessary conditions for 
justice, or perhaps that disobedience is so unlikely to improve society that it is irrational to disobey. 
Ripstein seems to adopt something like this line of argument when he contrasts what he takes to be Kant’s 
views on law and civil disobedience to those of Dworkin: 
Thus the Kantian must reject Ronald Dworkin’s idea of ‘Protestant Interpretation,’ according to 
which each citizen must decide for him or herself what the best interpretation of the law is.  In 
its most extreme formulation, Dworkin contends that a private citizen is legally entitled to 
disregard a court’s finding if she believes it to be unsound.  Dworkin’s example concerns civil 
disobedience but the analysis, if sound, would appear to carry over to private disputes.116  
 
The important point here concerns Ripstein’s claim that Kant denies a protestant element in law.  We 
have already observed that Kant admitted certain forms of “passive” disobedience”.  But, moreover, I 
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suggest that, according to Kant, whether or not a state is legitimate is an essentially moral question that 
cannot be answered by the state without begging the question of its own legitimacy.  If this were not the 
case, then Kant’s apparent arguments against revolution and disobedience would support the conclusion 
that some of the wickedest regimes that the world has seen must not be disobeyed. But that is not Kant’s 
considered view.  On the contrary, the wickedest regimes in history do not count merely as greatly unjust 
conditions of Right, but rather as what Kant calls conditions of “barbarism” because they do not secure a 
rightful condition whose laws bear an intelligible connection to Innate Right at all.  
As Ripstein helpfully observes, Kant draws a crucial distinction between, one hand, the basic 
grounds for entering a rightful condition and, on the other hand, the internal criterion for assessing, 
improving, and identifying an existing rightful condition.117  The former grounds are articulated in the 
Postulate of Public Right (PPR): “When you cannot avoid living side by side with all others, you ought to 
leave the state of nature and proceed with them into a rightful condition.”118 This postulate posits, as a 
necessary condition of justice, a political authority capable of making, applying, and enforcing law 
through public institutions.  The latter criterion is, as we saw, the idea of the OC, which binds officials to 
give laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people.119 As Ripstein 
also observes, Kant’s arguments against revolution depends on this distinction between the PPR and the 
idea of the OC.  A state has an internal duty to bring itself into greater conformity with the idea of the 
OC,120 but this internal duty does not correlate to a right on the part of the people to force the state into 
conformity with the OC.121  However, Kant is also clear that physically controlling an area does not 
satisfy the PPR, and that a highly efficacious command system could fail to raise persons from a state of 
nature. Recall that a defining feature of a state of nature is that all coercive action in it is unilateral, not 
omnilateral.  Nothing in the idea of unilateral action precludes a state from displaying a large degree of 
organization, and therefore Kant’s argument thus leaves space for the idea that the world’s most wicked 
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regimes not only violate the OC, but also do not even satisfy the PPR and therefore operate as if they 
were in a state of nature.  As Ripstein notes, “To create a state out of a condition of barbaric violence is 
not a revolution; it is just the creation of a state where there was none before.122   
Kant writes in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View that the distinctive feature of 
“barbarism”, which he distinguishes from mere despotism, is that a barbaric condition violates, not only 
of the idea of the OC, but also PPR.123 Despotism is a defective form of a republic, and Kant’s remarks in 
the “Doctrine of Right” about “putting up with” oppressive legislation apply to despotic regimes. 
However, in Kant’s terminology, every existing state to some degree exemplifies despotism because no 
state, like no person, fully respects humanity, but approaches respect for humanity only asymptotically.  
The difference between despotic and barbaric regimes, however, is that the latter cannot even be 
interpreted to be striving to act for public purposes, that is, to act omnilaterally, and therefore does not 
even satisfy the PPR.  The possibility of barbaric states means that those who disobey or use force to 
depose or reform them do not violate the PPR, but rather conform to it.   
As we saw, it seems clear that Kant reserves to the state the final word on whether its decisions 
are just or unjust, but who decides whether or not a state is barbaric and can be disobeyed?  Can Kant 
non-question-beggingly reserve questions about the state’s own legitimacy to the state?  It is worth 
quoting Ripstein’s answer to this problem at length because his remarks seem to recognize that, 
ultimately, the question of the state’s legitimacy and of citizens’ legal obligations must rest with each 
person him or herself, not with the state. Ripstein writes: 
The introduction of the concept of barbarism might be thought to reproduce the initial difficulty: 
who is to stand in judgment of the regime? The critics claim that the state is behaving 
barbarously; the rulers claim that they represent the general will. Since there is no purely 
empirical way of resolving the dispute, it might appear that the rulers are the only ones capable 
of giving judgment in their own case. That conclusion, however, presupposes the very point that 
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is at issue in the characterization of a condition of barbarism, that is, whether the organized use 
of force in question satisfies the postulate of Public Right by ‘rendering to each.’…The 
entitlement to judge particulars under concepts of Right follows from the duty of those in power 
to create a rightful condition for all; those who do not even purport to do so are not entitled to 
judge in their own case. 
 
There are two revealing points here.  First, Ripstein’s allowance that the individual and the state have 
equal claims to decide questions about the state’s legitimacy and their own political obligations in effect 
admits a protestant dimension to legal judgment.  Second, Ripstein’s reference to the requirement that the 
state must “purport” to act for public purposes parallels Dworkin’s claim that the final test of a state’s 
legitimacy is that the state’s actions and decision as a whole must be capable of being interpreted as an 
honest effort to strive for each citizen’s full dignity even if the state fails to act on the correct conception 
of what dignity requires (whatever that is).  This is a weaker test than whether the state actually gets 
things right.  The state must merely express that it takes its subjects’ rights seriously. 
Waldron’s (and Ripstein’s) pre-emptive reading of Kantian political authority depends on the 
assumption that PPR, unlike the OC, is a purely formal, structural, factual non-substantive condition of 
political authority.  They hold that in order for persons to be constituted as a people with a collective will, 
there must simply be enforceable institutions and organization through which they act. But we now see 
that the PPR is also a substantive moral condition, not a purely formal, structural condition, and that 
whether or not it is satisfied is a substantive moral question, just as the question to what extent the state 
conforms to the OC is a substantive moral question.  This introduces an unavoidable moral, indeed 







6.8  Universal Laws:  The Unity of Ethics and Right 
For Kant, just as ethical and moral maxims must not flow ultimately from a material principle of the will, 
like happiness, but rather from the pure idea of duty, political maxims must not flow ultimately from 
contingent collective goal such as general prosperity or happiness, but rather from the Innate Right of 
embodied rational beings to equal freedom-as-independence.124  Moreover, to rest political legitimacy on 
some contingent public good, like social agreement or the positive dictates of a powerful individual or 
group, would deny persons this basic right by robbing the political community of the unified, integrated, 
coherent moral character that is essential to its claim to equal concern and respect for human dignity.  
Only a state that strives for each citizen’s full and equal freedom in a rightful condition finds peace in 
perpetuity and can approach justice.125 
I have argued that unity and an integrated conception of practical judgment characterize both 
Kant’s conception of ethical judgment and his conception of legal judgment. Together these comprise not 
merely instrumental means for achieving some independently specifiable good, but rather constitute 
essential conditions for properly respecting our own and each other’s dignity.  The unity of ethics, 
according to Kant, flows from the incomparable value of human dignity, and the unity of Right flows 
from the value of human dignity in conjunction with the austere and obvious assumption that human 
beings who occupy space may come into external conflict. 
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Ch. 7: ‘Freestanding’ Political Theory 
 
7.1 Do Freestanding Theories Really Stand Freely? 
I earlier classified some of the work of Waldron, Rawls, and Habermas as what I called in Sections 2.8 
and 2.13 “Normative Factual Models” of institutional principles and “freestanding views” of political 
judgment.  I will refer to them generally as “freestanding” political theories.  Freestanding theories 
advocate, on normative grounds, a particular conception of institutional principles according to which the 
existence and content of those principles ought to be ultimately a matter of social fact of some kind, such 
as what some authority figure or body has declared or intended, or what most citizens tend to agree upon, 
or the outcome of some lawmaking procedure.   Freestanding theories also assume that our ways of 
establishing and judging these principles are completely independent of one another in a strong sense.  
They maintain that not only does our institutional framework replace our political ideals as conclusive 
grounds of political guidance, but also that what that institutional framework means and requires can and 
must be judged without having to consider those ideals at all. Freestanding theories hold that this strong 
insulation of our institutions from our ideals follows from a key purpose of institutional principles, which 
is to authoritatively settle disagreement by, in Joseph Raz’s vocabulary, “pre-empting” the ideals we 
disagree about.  It follows, on this view, that if the identity of institutional principles were to depend on 
the controversial background ideals they are meant to pre-empt, then institutions could not perform their 
authoritative settling function.  The only way for our judgments about institutions to stand freely in this 
strong sense is if they are understood according to the Factual Model which holds that the identity of our 
political institutions is at bottom an empirical issue. 
Although I will focus on Waldron’s, Rawls’s, and Habermas’s legal and political conceptions, I 
believe the discussion may be generalized to apply to any form of legal positivism, of political liberalism, 
and of purely procedural majoritarian or deliberative democracy. I demonstrate through an interpretation 
of these thinkers’ freestanding theories that although they advertise them as ultimately factual and 
freestanding in the above sense, these thinkers do not actually construct their theories in the manner 
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required by a truly freestanding theory.  A theory could be genuinely freestanding only if the existence 
and content of the institutional principles it sponsors can be understood and judged without reference to 
the political ideals those institutional principles are meant to replace. However, in various ways all of 
these theories construct and judge institutional principles in a manner that is sensitive to abstract political 
ideals, and are thus not, despite their pretensions, really freestanding after all. In fact, in presenting and 
defending their theories, these thinkers rely just as heavily on controversial, idealized moral positions as 
any “comprehensive” theory might. I suggest that the best explanation of this reliance is that these 
thinkers are tacitly committed to the unity of political principle.    
My discussion is meant to suggest that political philosophers may sometimes encourage a 
mythology about the autonomy, or sui generis character, of political reason that their own theories belie. 
There seems to be a striking disparity between, on one hand, the indispensable role our political ideals 
play in identifying and understanding the institutions we have and, on the other hand, our ideals’ 
theoretical reputation as disruptive sources of disagreement that we should try to circumvent as far as 
possible. 
 
7.2 Waldron’s Positivism 
Jeremy Waldron argues that the content of majoritarian political decisions must not turn on judgments 
about the controversial moral values—about justice and political fairness, for example—on which those 
decisions pronounce. In defending this view, Waldron’s conception of law and democracy explicitly 
adopts a version of Joseph Raz’s conception of authority, which Raz calls the “service conception” of 
authority.  This conception regards authorities, in general, as “mediating between people and the right 
reasons which apply to them, so that the authority judges and pronounces what they ought to do according 
to right reason.”1 According to Raz, the primary and normal way to justify a practical authority is to show 
that the subject over whom the authority claims dominion is more likely to comply with reasons which 
                                                          
1 Raz, “Authority, Law, and Morality”, in Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Oxford Unviersity Press, 1994), 295, 299; Raz, The Morality of 
Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986) 55-56 
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already apply to him if he accepts the directives of the putative authority as authoritatively binding and 
tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow directly the reasons that apply to him.2  However, Raz 
maintains, an authority cannot provide this mediating “service” between a subject and his reasons unless 
the subject treats the authority’s directives as reasons for action which replace and pre-empt the reasons 
related to the issue the authority decides upon.  If the subject simply balanced those reasons against the 
reasons in favor of following the authority’s directive, then the subject would defeat the authority’s 
mediating purpose, which is precisely to save the subject from considering those reasons directly.3  But 
that, in turn, requires that the subject must be able to identify and follow the directive without having to 
consult those original background reasons the directive is intended to reflect and sum up.4 It follows from 
Raz’s conception of authority that political judgment about authoritative institutional decisions must stand 
freely from those background ideals and reasons that guide their creation by a political authority.  It also 
follows, according to Raz, that the content of law is a matter of social facts alone about what authorities 
have said or intended. Raz’s theory therefore supports both a freestanding view of political judgment and 
the Factual Model of institutional political principles. 
It is worth noticing at the outset how ambitious and extreme this conception of authority is.5  It 
does not claim merely that authority benefits us only when we follow its decision on some issue area 
rather than our own views.  Rather, it holds that what counts as the authority’s decision on some issue 
cannot depend in any way whatsoever on our own views about that issue.  We only get the benefit from 
following the authority if the meaning of the authority’s directive can be understood factually, not in light 
of any reasons or values that might justify it.  As we saw in Section 4.8, this very strong conception of 
authority is not a conceptual truth about the very idea of legal authority.  Anyone who has argued and 
disagreed with others about the correct interpretation of a law implicitly rejects that conceptual 
possibility.   
                                                          
2 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 53; “Authority, Law, and Morality”, 299  
3 Raz, Morality of Freedom, 57-59 
4 “Authority, Law, and Morality”, 197-198 
5 Raz, The Morality of Freedom , 63-66; and Raz’s Introduction to Between Authority and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 6.  I should emphasize that Raz presents his theory as an explanation of how the concept of authority figures in the practical thought of 
those who deploy it, and he says that his theory is not committed to the desirability of having authorities so understood.  In this chapter, I consider 
the theory from the perspective of those, like Waldron, who adopt (or might have adopted) Raz’s theory for committed normative purposes. 
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But can Raz’s theory, or theories like Raz’s, be defended on normative grounds?  Consider 
Waldron’s normative version of the same theory, which he calls normative legal positivism.6 According 
to Waldron, the core claim of the normative positivist “is that the values associated with law, legality, and 
the rule of law—in a fairly rich sense—can best be achieved if the ordinary operation of such a system 
does not require people to exercise moral judgment in order to find out what the law is.”7 If Waldron’s 
normative, freestanding, positivistic conception of law is to live up to its claims of austerity, then the 
content of the institutional principles it identifies cannot depend on idealized judgments that might justify 
those principles.  However, there are several ways in which Waldron seems to rely on idealized 
judgments in presenting and defending his supposedly positivistic theory. 
In Sections 2.4 and 2.14, I described how institutional principles can fail to guide us when the 
actions they instruct us to take are abstract or conflict either “internally” with themselves or, in extreme 
cases, “externally” with the ideals that are supposed to justify them.  When these failures and conflicts 
arise, institutional principles must be interpreted before we can decide what they require in order to 
enforce or follow them.  This process of interpretation often draws upon our ideals in order to refine the 
proper scope and meaning of our institutional principles, and therefore determines these principles in a 
way that thoroughly depends on those ideals. Waldron apparently assumes that authoritative institutional 
principles are shaped through external conflicts with our political ideals.  
According to Waldron, institutional principles govern action in what he calls “the circumstances 
of politics”, which are the familiar social circumstances, characterized by political disagreement about 
justice, and in which people judge that an authoritative institutional perspective on justice is both valuable 
and necessary.8   What considerations are involved in judging that one is in the circumstances of politics 
in which an authoritative perspective on justice is valuable and necessary?  A natural answer is that it 
                                                          
6 See Waldron’s “Normative Positivism” in Coleman (Ed.) Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 421 
7 Ibid, and Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 107-108:  Waldron on pre-emption: “…We must find a 
way of choosing a single policy in which the three of us can participate despite our disagreement on the merits. And since each is to act 
independently once this method of choice has been followed, each must have a way of identifying just one of the proposed policies as ‘ours’, i.e. 
as the one which ‘we’ are following. That ability must not involve the use of any criterion such as C: ‘What it is important to do about for it is 
precisely disagreement about the application of C that gives rise to the decision-problem in the first place...” 
8 Waldron adapts Rawls’s use of Hume’s notion of the circumstances of justice, which are the conditions of moderate scarcity and limited 
altruism that make distributive justice both necessary and important.  See Law and Disagreement, 102, 144, 159-160 
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involves as many considerations as possible: it is an all-things-considered judgment that what one has 
conclusive reason to do is to defer to an authoritative institutional perspective.   But how could one make 
such an all-things-considered judgment without also considering and “weighing” idealized and potentially 
competing reasons about the demands of substantive justice or truth?  ” (See Section 1.8 on the best way 
to understand the common but potentially misleading “weighing” and “balancing” metaphors.)  At the 
very least, the judgment that one is in the circumstances of politics must rely on a further “negative” 
judgment that ideal principles do not defeat the reasons for deferring to the authoritative perspective.  
Recall again from Sections 2.14 and 3.5 the ways in which our ideals play a concealed role in such 
judgments.  Even when it seems obvious that we ought to defer to an authority, we tacitly judge that no 
other consideration competes in a way that should lead us to engage in more self-conscious reflection on 
the value of deferring.  Unreflective practical judgment still relies, in a concealed sense, on the whole 
system of principles. The role of the entire normative system remains submerged, but still exercises 
control over and shapes what we should do.  It seems to follow that a judgment that we are in Waldron’s 
circumstances of politics would involve an all-out judgment that institutional principles established by an 
authority defeat any ideals that seem to compete with them.  If this is correct, then institutional principles 
would not then pre-empt political ideals, but rather would be identified only through a victorious 
competition with those ideals.  This is fully consistent with the integrated view of political judgment, and 
with the Principled Model of institutions.  But it is not compatible with either positivism or the 
freestanding view. 
At times, Waldron seems to suggest that talk of genuine competition between ideals and 
authoritative institutions is misleading because authoritative institutions operate on a different “level” of 
practical reasoning that our ideals operate.  On this view, institutional principles do not really compete 
with political ideals, but instead come into play only when we have bracketed those ideals in order to 
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accommodate disagreement about them.9  This difference of level, according to Waldron, makes it 
misleading to talk about a conflict or competition between ideals and institutions.10 
But the role of institutional principles is surely decided by an all-out judgment in which some 
conflict has been resolved.  If we cannot rationally ignore normative considerations that might compete 
with our institutions, then we cannot rationally identify the circumstances of politics, which are precisely 
those circumstances (i.e. most of the time) in which institutional principles win, at all.  The important 
question seems to be: can this conflict be resolved without considering institutional and ideal 
requirements in light of each other, by “weighing” them against each another, so to speak, to see which 
prevails.  Waldron seems to describe the resolution of these conflicts as a question of balance when he 
imagines “A particular individual [who] may find that his moral feelings on some potential injustice are 
so intense as to outweigh any continued commitment to a political system that would require him to work 
out a common course of action with his opponents. If that is the case, then the circumstances of 
[politics]…no longer apply to him (and pro tanto they no longer apply to the whole society).”11 Here 
Waldron clearly suggests that the practical judgment that one is in the circumstances of politics, and thus 
subject to authority, depends on one’s convictions about political ideals, in particular substantive justice. 
Elsewhere, Waldron similarly writes that “there may be practices or political arrangements which, from 
the normative point of view (the point of view that describes the function of law) are worse than no law at 
all; and for those cases, the normative account at the wholesale level [i.e. the level of principle that 
justifies institutional practice itself, and which includes our ideals] may affect the retail account [the 
content of the institutional principles themselves] of whether (or in what sense) these practices or 
arrangements are to be regarded as laws.” 12  A person who makes these kinds of practical judgments is 
not someone who allows political institutions to pre-empt her ideals, but is rather someone who allows 
contact between and sensitivity among institutions and ideals so that they play a role in shaping each 
other’s boundaries. 
                                                          
9 Ibid, 198 
10 Ibid, 196-197 
11 Ibid, 207.   
12 See Waldron’s “Normative Positivism”, 418    
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Some of Waldron’s examples may obscure the extent to which his own conception of the 
circumstances of politics depend on ideal judgments about justice.  Some of these examples suggest, 
misleadingly, that the only alternative to treating an authority’s directives as pre-emptive reasons is that 
everyone will act in order to impose whatever his or her personal convictions about justice happen to be.  
For instance, in criticizing Dworkin’s conception of rights as trumps, Waldron writes: 
 …If we say that it is the function of rights to ‘trump’ majority-decisions, it is surely incumbent 
on us to add some acknowledgement that people disagree about what rights we have and to 
offer some basis whereby that disagreement might be resolved, so that there is something 
determinate to do the trumping. We cannot play trumps if we disagree about the suits. Or if we 
do, we are open to what I regard as the unanswerable cynicism of Thomas Hobbes in the motto 
of this book: for people to demand that we treat their theory of rights as the one that is to prevail 
is ‘as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on 
every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand.’ 13 
 
Waldron is certainly correct that we cannot each in general hold politics hostage to our personal, ideal 
views about justice and rights.  But I do not know of any place in Dworkin’s corpus in which he 
recommends that we do so.  For Dworkin, rights are indeed trumps, but some trumps are legal rights, 
which is to say they are a function of the record of authoritative institutional decisions.  Moreover, the 
concept of a trump is consistent with the idea that we do not all get our own way when it comes to justice. 
After all, the right to a fair democratic process, which includes respect for majority decision, is also a type 
of trump, though it is not the only one. 
Another conviction Waldron attributes to right theorists like Dworkin, apparently in order to 
ridicule them, is what he calls the principle of “Modified Majoritarianism”.  This principle states that we 
must “‘Let the majority prevail except in cases where the majority decision threatens individual rights.’”  
Waldron objects to this principle that “if people disagree (as we know they do) about what rights we have 
                                                          
13 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 12 
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or about what threatens them, this principle will be hopeless.  Since the point of the decision procedure 
was to settle disagreement…they will need to set up another principle of fair political procedure (say, 
Pure Majoritarianism) if they are to make a social decision.”14  Waldron is once again correct that this 
extremely uncompromising principle would indeed be hopeless in his circumstances of politics, where a 
decision is needed in spite of disagreement.  But it does not follow that in those circumstances the 
“operation” of institutional principles cannot depend on contested political ideals.  To see why, consider a 
slightly weaker and more compromising principle, which we might call “Modified Modified 
Majoritarianism”: “Let the majority prevail except in cases where majority decision threatens individual 
rights that are essential for majority decision’s legitimacy.”  This weaker principle is consistent with 
Waldron’s disagreement argument; that is, it is consistent with the idea that most of the time we ought to 
defer to authoritative majoritarian decisions in the circumstances of politics. But it also allows that the 
majority principle, properly understood, is hedged against, and hence sensitive to, our political ideals in 
general.  In any case, supporters of judicial review (his target here) do not hold that majority decision can 
be abandoned whenever we disagree with its decisions, but rather only when its decisions threaten rights 
that are essential majority rule’s own legitimacy.    
Despite these examples, Waldron recently seems to have warmed to the idea of an integrated 
conception of legal judgment. In a recent essay, he writes that  
Dworkin’s… account [that judges rely on idealized principles in hard cases to identify legal 
requirements] does the most to eliminate elements of luck and unfairness from adjudication that 
can reasonably be done, without making matters much worse on other fronts. I want to end [this 
essay] by arguing briefly that this may well be the case. And it may well be that integrity does 
all that can be done for fairness and consistency, and the elimination of invidious luck, without 
sacrificing other important values.15  
                                                          
14 Ibid, 198 
15 See Waldron, “Lucky in Your Judge” in Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 9:1, 2008, 185, 214-216. Waldron apparently accepting purposivism in 
identifying legislative procedural rules: “…A rule may be followed categorically and still be followed in a way that is sensitive to the values that 
underlie it: such values may determine how important the rule is, for example, and how severely we should regard or punish a breach. Certainly, 




Waldron’s suggestion here, along with the difficulties I described above in clearly separating Waldron’s 
normative positivism from ideals of justice, seems to me to suggest that the whole distinction between 
normative positivism and Dworkinian integrity may be overdrawn.  If normative positivism is a truly 
distinctive position, then it should explain how the strong insulation it seeks between law and justice is 
ever possible.  There is nothing in the idea of the circumstances of politics that logically ensures this 
insulation, and as I have suggested we cannot even identify those circumstances without relying on our 
ideals.  The idea of the circumstances of politics demands only the more relaxed version of authority I 
described in Sections 2.4, 2.10, and 2.14 according to which the identity of authoritative institutions 
might depend, in a complex way, on an idealized and perhaps politically controversial judgment about 
which values those institutions ought to serve, that is, on a judgment about some background principle of 
political morality that justifies those institutions.  
 
7.3 Waldron’s Majoritarianism 
So the fact that Waldron at least sometimes treats institutional principles as if they are shaped through 
external conflicts with political ideals suggests that it is not clear how Waldron’s normative positivism is 
a version of positivism at all.  But furthermore, Waldron also apparently relies on ideals to resolve what I 
called in Section 2.14 “internal” conflicts between authoritative institutional principles themselves.  He 
implies as much in certain remarks he has made in a long-running disagreement with Dworkin about 
whether or not it is democratic to settle, through non-majoritarian decision rules like judicial review, 
conflicts between majority decisions and institutionally recognized basic rights, such as those one might 
find in a modern liberal constitution or in a charter of rights.16  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
cases, and that is not at all the same as refusing to follow the rule when it seems over-inclusive. A rule can seem over-inclusive in a core or non-
marginal case; or it can seem vague or indeterminate in a case that turns out to be central to the purpose or principle underlying the rule. Using 
the purpose then to help us in the vague or indeterminate case does not commit us to following the purpose rather than the rule in cases where the 
meaning of the latter is clear.” 
16  For the latest round in this debate, see Waldron’s “A Majority in the Life Boat”, Boston University Law Review (Special issue on Dworkin’s 
J4H), 1043, and Dworkin’s reply in J4H, 348, 387-399.  Ground-zero for earlier rounds are Dworkin’s introductory chapter to FL, and Waldron’s 
reply in Chapter 13 of Law and Disagreement. 
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Both thinkers agree that the majority principle and these rights share common justifications, such 
as ideals of liberty, equality, and human dignity.  They also agree that these underlying ideals can help to 
arbitrate conflicts between majority decisions and institutional rights if and when conflicts arise.17  This 
implies that the true scope of the majority principle is hedged against institutional rights so that if these 
rights, whatever they are, were to prevail in a conflict with majority rule in order better to serve their 
common justifications, this would not necessarily compromise the true value—the point—of majority 
rule, but may even be required by it.  Dworkin infers from this that counter-majoritarian institutions, such 
as strong judicial review, that are designed to protect basic rights are not necessarily undemocratic if on 
certain occasions counter-majoritarian decisions about rights are more likely to respect the majority 
principle’s own democratic presuppositions. Of course when majoritarian institutions already respect 
these presuppositions, then the majority’s verdict should be accepted by everyone for that reason. But 
when they do not, there can be no objection, in the name of democracy, to other counter-majoritarian 
procedures or institutions that respect them better.18  
Waldron disagrees. He maintains that counter-majoritarian institutions are always undemocratic.  
In order to support this position, Waldron must show that the majority principle is always better 
calculated than counter-majoritarian decision procedures are to serve the democratic justifications both 
presuppose.  Waldron seems to offer two arguments to show this. The first is that although the legitimacy 
of all decision procedures is sometimes defective, a majority principle has one moral advantage others 
lack, which is that it is egalitarian.  Unlike other procedures, majority rule allows “a voice and a vote in a 
final decision-procedure to every citizen of the society.”19  But this argument relies on ideal principles in 
at least two ways.  First, it holds that some other decision procedure, like drawing lots, is not better suited 
to ensure democratic equality.  That may be true in some cases, but it is not true in all cases. For example, 
                                                          
17 “Based as it is on respect for persons as moral agents and moral reasoners, the premises of [an argument for the majority principle] will 
certainly yield substantive conclusions about what people are entitled to so far as personal freedom is concerned and it may well yield 
conclusions about affirmative entitlements in the realm of social and economic well-being….[T]he premises of the right-based case for 
democracy may provide a direct argument for substantive rights that bypasses the case for democracy. These rights, then, are associated with 
democracy not in the sense of being constitutive of it or presupposed by it, but in the sense of being other conclusions of the very premises that 
ground the rights-based case for democracy.” Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 285 
18 Dworkin, FL, 17 
19 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 299 
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it would not be true when a majority decision would more likely reflect blatantly discriminatory opinions 
that some individuals or groups are natural superior or inferior to others.  When a majority decision is 
more likely to reflect prejudice in this way, a lottery of some kind that does not depend on anyone’s 
opinion may well be more egalitarian.  Second, Waldron’s argument assumes that a decisive justification 
for the majority principle is an egalitarian principle, rather than a utilitarian, epistemic, or deliberative 
principle.20  That assumption obviously relies on a controversial, substantive normative judgment about 
the meaning of equality, and the point and value of majority rule.   
Waldron’s second argument is that we can accept the majority principle for merely “pragmatic” 
rather than idealized reasons: “Since it would be question-begging to decide the fairness of majority rule 
by using majority rule, it is possible, as a matter of practical politics, to use an ordinary and familiar 
procedure like majority-decision to settle one of these questions, while leaving open the issue of 
legitimacy.  We may accept that vote as a pragmatic matter, without investing it with democratic 
legitimacy in any particularly question-begging way.”21  However, it is not clear what Waldron means 
here by a merely “pragmatic” rather than a legitimacy-oriented solution.   It seems he cannot mean an 
“arbitrary” solution because he consistently argues for majority rule on substantive egalitarian grounds.  
Nor by pragmatic can he mean an “effective” or “stable” solution because brute enforcement may well be 
both more efficacious and more stable.  Nor still could he mean a “familiar” solution since a coin-flip is 
surely both more familiar and practically much easier.   
There seem to be other considerations at work in Waldron “pragmatic” preference for majority 
rule, and I conjecture that these are simply covert idealized convictions concerning the meaning of 
political equality. These difficulties seem to me to confirm Dworkin’s crucially important claim that 
democracy is a “procedurally incomplete scheme of government. It cannot prescribe the procedures for 
testing whether the conditions for the procedures it does prescribe are met.”22   At some point an ideal 
                                                          
20 Each of which Waldron considers and rejects. Ibid, 133ff 
21 Ibid, 300-301 
22 See Dworkin’s introductory chapter to FL, 33 
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principle must enter the argument in order to defend some decision process as the right one, and that is 
just as true for any defense Waldron might offer for majority rule. 
I believe these points reveal a curious inconsistency in Waldron’s work. Waldron criticizes Rawls 
for not taking disagreement about justice seriously enough.  He writes that, “Compared with what [Rawls] 
says about ethical, religious, and philosophical disagreements, Rawls’s treatment of disagreements about 
justice is really quite insignificant.”23  Waldron objects that, because religious and philosophical 
disagreements infiltrate our political convictions and create disagreement about justice, Rawls’s proposal 
in Political Liberalism for an overlapping social consensus on justice is unrealistic.  But it seems that the 
same point could be made about Waldron’s faith in the ability of majoritarian institutions to settle 
disagreement.  If, as the integrated view holds, disagreement about the content of our institutions reflects 
disagreement about our ideals, then we should expect fairly deep disagreement about the content of our 
institutions as well.  
 
7.4 Rawls’s Political Liberalism 
So it is not clear whether Waldron’s putatively freestanding conceptions of law and democracy are very 
different from, or whether they in fact presuppose, the integrated view of political judgment. What about 
Rawlsian political liberalism?   Does it realize its ambition of constructing a freestanding domain of 
political institutions that can guide the exercise of public power?  To answer this question, we need to 
consider more closely Rawls’s account of political legitimacy. 
Rawls’s account of political legitimacy turns on an abstract principle of reciprocity, which, he 
says, requires that only principles all reasonable members of a political community can reasonably accept 
are appropriate grounds for the exercise of public power.24  As I said in Section 2.13, the concept of 
possible acceptance is an abstract moral notion that admits of different conceptions.  The choice between 
these conceptions surely depends on controversial, idealized, and indeed philosophical assumptions.  By 
                                                          
23 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 152, 158-159 




“can reasonably accept” Rawls cannot mean those justifications that fully informed and rational citizens 
would ideally accept, because that reading ignores Political Liberalism’s central aim of detaching 
political justification from moral truth.  He must instead have in mind some kind of factual consensus on 
certain institutionally recognized principles, and indeed Rawls placed great emphasis on the history and 
political traditions of particular states in order to find factually shared principles within those 
communities. Collective coercive power, he holds, must flow from “political” conceptions of justice that 
are implicit in a community’s public political culture, which “comprises the political institutions of a 
constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation (including those of the judiciary), as 
well as historic texts and documents that are common knowledge”, because that culture represents what is 
common, and because standards that happen to be common satisfy Rawls’s basic criterion of legitimacy.25 
Samuel Freeman describes these common elements as axioms that close the system of political reasons 
off from the rest of the moral neighborhood and thereby render politics an autonomous, freestanding 
“module”, to use Rawls’s expression.26  
One revealing puzzle that arises from this reading, however, is whether it is consistent with the 
kind of disagreement Rawls envisioned would occur in modern liberal societies.  Rawls says that our 
public reasons are not specified by any one political conception of justice alone, not even his own, Justice 
as Fairness. Since people will disagree about how to interpret, elaborate, and apply shared constitutional 
essentials, the content of public reason will be given by a family of reasonable political conceptions of 
justice that may change over time.27  One reason Rawls suggests to explain the emergence of these 
different conceptions comprising a family is that they reflect disagreements about how to deduce more 
concrete principles from commonly shared constitutional essentials, which themselves are not contested.28  
                                                          
25 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 13–14, 100-101 “Since justification is addressed to others, it proceeds from what is, or can be, held in common; 
and so we begin from shared fundamental ideas implicit in the public political culture in the hope of developing from them a political conception 
that can gain free and reasoned agreement in judgment.” 
26 See Freeman, Rawls (New York: Routledge, 2007) 357-359 Freeman draws an analogy to formal systems: “Another analogy based on a 
different kind of reasoning is formal systems. Here certain axioms are stipulated and rules of inference set forth, so that the axioms, when 
combined according to the rules of inference, yield theorems…” 
27 See Rawls Political Liberalism, lii-liii; 451, 453 
28 Ibid, 487. Indeed, Rawls holds that although the “burdens of judgment” render unanimous agreement on all political questions impossible, 




On this view, citizens’ political disagreements are ultimately based solely in political values they all 
share. But although Rawls is surely right that those kinds of deductive disagreements are likely, they 
seem not to capture the full scope and character of political disagreement, which involves not just 
empirical or logical disagreements about the entailments of shared premises, but also disagreements about 
the meaning and content of those shared premises themselves.  In effect, this factual-consensus-plus-
logical-entailment reading of Rawls obliterates the idea of a hard constitutional case, which occurs 
precisely when our shared premises themselves compete or are in some other way unclear.  
A basic interpretive challenge in understanding Rawls’s view on this issue is, I think, that there is 
a tension between, on one hand, Rawls’s requirement that a political conception of justice be complete 
and, on the other hand, that it be common. The “completeness” of public reason is its ability to fully order, 
interpret, and determine the relative significance of public values in order to resolve all significant 
political questions regarding constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.29 Public reason must be 
complete if our decisions on questions of basic justice are not to depend on comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines.30  But it is not clear how we could order and arbitrate between the 
system’s axiomatic constitutional essentials so that they provide complete and conclusive social guidance 
even when they conflict except by reflecting on their purposes, that is, in light of yet more basic 
comprehensive moral ideals.  A political conception cannot settle hard constitutional cases using only its 
own factually determined common resources when a hard case occurs precisely when those common 
resources run out.  Rawls’s theory seems to insist that we must rely on social sources, on which we 
converge and which fix certain general principles as brute axioms, at precisely the moment when they are 
unavailable.   
To illustrate this problem, consider Rawls’s views on the question of abortion, which he describes 
as involving what I called an internal conflict among basic institutional values, or constitutional 
essentials, including due respect for human life, the equality of women, and society’s interest in 
                                                          




reproducing itself across generations.31  He supposes that due reflection upon the relative importance of 
these values may suggest that a right to abortion is justifiable at least in the first trimester of pregnancy.32  
But how can citizens agree on an ordering of these essential values if they disagree about the telos of 
these values, that is if they disagree about the comprehensive question of why these essential values 
matter?  To resolve conflicts among constitutional essentials, it seems citizens would need to adopt a 
perspective independent from and more abstract than those essentials.  
I therefore suggest that Rawls’s notion of possible acceptance is best understood, because most 
consistent with his requirement that a political conception be complete, as a kind of provisional, revisable, 
and very raw area of social agreement.  The public political culture is a collection of common materials 
citizens mainly converge upon, but whose content is susceptible to revision and ordering in hard cases 
through interpretation in light of each citizen’s comprehensive ideals.  Understood in this way, Rawls’s 
view is hardly distinct from the integrated view, and is therefore not compatible with the freestanding 
view after all. 
Others have suggested additional ways in which Rawls relies, or is committed to relying, on ideal 
comprehensive judgments in constructing the content of his political conception of Justice as Fairness.  
Will Kymlicka, for example, incisively demonstrates how Rawls’s attempts in his later writings to avoid 
relying on a Kantian conception of the person fails because the Kantian capacity for rational revisability is 
essential to Rawls’s political liberal position in at least two different ways. 33  
First, the capacity for rational revisability is needed to explain why political liberalism protects 
the right of individuals to revise their way of life and to persuade others to change their way of life.34  
This bears directly on the question of how a liberal state should deal with non-liberal minority groups 
who claim not to value this sense of autonomy.  Are liberals justified in simply imposing autonomy (say, 
by demanding liberal education) on them?  Promoting individual freedom or personal autonomy seems to 
                                                          
31 Rawls's brief discussion of abortion is in Political Liberalism at 243-44n., liii-lv 
32 “Any reasonable balance of these three values will give a woman a duly qualified right to decide whether or not to end her pregnancy during 
the first trimester [since] at this early stage of pregnancy the political value of the equality of women is overriding. “ Ibid, 243n. 




entail intolerance towards these groups.35 Rawls once proposed that recognizing the plurality of 
conceptions of the good within society has the same implications for individual liberty as affirming the 
revisability of each individual’s conception of the good, and that liberals and non-liberals could therefore 
develop an overlapping consensus on basic freedoms of conscience, association, speech, sexuality, and so 
on. 36 But, as Kymlicka argues, valuing plurality and valuing rational revisability do not support the same 
conclusion on questions of individual liberty, and in particular on the issue of the freedom of individual 
members within each group to revise or reject their inherited beliefs.  Heresy, proselytization, and 
apostasy are essential liberties for liberals because they protect personal autonomy.  But for non-liberal 
groups, these freedoms are disruptive obstacles that may tempt members to question and destabilize the 
group’s beliefs.37  However, Rawls suggests that non-liberal groups can still accept liberty of conscience. 
It will not interfere with their way of life, he maintains, if we regard this liberty as applying only to 
certain limited political questions.  On this view, non-liberals can accept liberalism as a political 
conception that governs their public life, but does not require them to abandon their non-liberal practices 
in private life.38  But as Kymlicka and John Tomasi point out in response, accepting liberal autonomy, 
even as a purely political ideal, has unavoidable “spillover” effects on private life that seriously cost non-
liberal groups.39  After these costs are factored, it seems that political liberalism does not offer any 
significant change in the principles or institutions that justify a comprehensive liberal theory of justice.  
Kymlicka suggests that the entire distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism is therefore 
overstated. Both are committed to ensuring the conditions in private life needed to actually exercise 
personal autonomy in the comprehensive liberal sense.40  
The second way, according to Kymlicka, in which the Kantian capacity for rational revisability is 
central to Rawls’s political liberalism is that it is needed to explain why Rawls’s conception of economic 
                                                          
35 Ibid, 229-230 
36 Ibid, 232-233 
37 Ibid, 233-234 
38 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness:  Political not Metaphysical” in Collected Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) 405-408. 
39 John Tomasi, Liberalism Beyond Justice: Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001), cited in Kymlicka, 236 
40 Kymlicka, 239-241 
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justice holds people responsible for the expensive costs of their way of life.41   Since people have the 
capacity to rationally adjust their aims in light of their sense of justice and their fair share of resources, 
Rawls claimed, we have no obligation to subsidize those with expensive lifestyles. 42 In A Theory of 
Justice, Rawls held that it would indeed be unfair to expect some to subsidize the choices of others who 
fail to moderate their expensive aims.  But Rawls’s approach seems to undermine this earlier argument.  
He suggests that we should not subsidize expensive ways of life because it is too divisive to do so: 
“Plainly, this kind of guarantee is socially divisive, a recipe for religious controversy if not civil strife.”43   
As Kymlicka I think rightly points out, this new answer begs the question at issue.  If we assume 
that people are not generally egoistic, but rather possess what Rawls calls a sense of justice, then they 
should resent giving extra resources to those with expensive ways of life only if they think it is unjust to 
do so. But whether or not it is unjust to do so is precisely what is in question.  Moreover, if Rawls is 
correct that subsidizing costly ways of life would be socially divisive, then that is because it would be 
generally regarded as wrong to do so.  And it is wrong to do so precisely because Rawls’s original, 
comprehensive argument was right: people have the capacity to adjust their aims to the amount of 
resources it is fair for them to possess.44 So although Rawls’s later argument no longer explicitly relies on 
Kantian notions of personal responsibility, it still presupposes them.  His preferred political conception of 
justice, Justice as Fairness, still depends on the comprehensive moral ideals he is at pains to avoid. 
 
7.5 Habermas’s Deliberativism 
I will spend the remainder of this chapter discussing a particularly influential version of freestanding 
political theory.  I mentioned earlier that the criticisms I have suggested can be generalized to all 
conceptions of the political that draw sharp, insulated distinctions between political institutions and 
political ideals.  Jürgen Habermas’s deliberative conception of democracy does exactly this, and is a 
freestanding theory par excellence. I will call into question Habermas’s claim that democratic procedures 
                                                          
41 See Kymlicka, 243. See also Dworkin’s remarks on Rawls’s Difference Principle in JR, 252-254. 
42 Rawls, “Social Unity and Primary Goods”, Collected Paper 369-371. 
43 Rawls, “The Basic Liberties and their Priority” in Political Liberalism, 329-330 
44 Kymlicka, 241-243 
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alone can legitimatize collective decisions in the way he supposes they can.  I suggest that we cannot even 
specify democratic procedures that are capable of conferring legitimacy on an outcome without drawing 
upon deeply contested convictions about substantive justice. 
Habermas wishes to leave contentious questions about how to formulate basic rights to be settled 
through public discourse.  In fact, he says it is the job of the political philosopher to leave such questions 
to actual democratic processes.45  It follows that his own account of procedural legitimacy cannot rely on 
any comprehensive conception of rights that are justified independently of those processes. If it does rely 
on a comprehensive conception, then his account would not leave those issues to the democratic process.  
But his theory, I will argue, then becomes so abstract as to be normatively uninformative. Indeed, what 
Habermas does say about rights is entirely by way of offering concrete advice about how we should 
interpret them.  But precisely that sort of advice, I will argue, is necessary to sustain any claim of 
legitimacy.  As an account of democratic legitimacy, therefore, I do not believe Habermas’s, nor any 
strictly procedural account of democracy, can justify why the democratic procedure “forms the only post-
metaphysical source of legitimacy”.   Any convincing argument for procedural legitimacy—indeed any 
normatively appealing conception of democracy at all—would have to rely on just the sort of contentious 
moral judgments on which Habermas wishes not to rest his theory.  But if that is right, then legitimacy 
does not, as Habermas supposes, inhere in procedure alone, but also depends in part on the substantive 
content of the outcomes and arrangements those procedures produce.   
 
7.6 The Internal Relation of Procedure and Rights 
Relying on Weber’s social theory and sociology of law, Habermas writes that the rationalization of 
society has eliminated religious and metaphysical justifications for law.46 In pre-modern societies, 
legitimacy was grounded in a shared religious worldview that penetrated all spheres of life, but as 
modernization engendered religious pluralism and functional differentiation (autonomous market 
                                                          
45 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 125-127, 131. 
46 Ibid, 66-72. 
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economies, bureaucratic administrations, and scientific research), the potential for disagreement over 
ethics and morality increased, just as the shared background resources for the consensual resolution of 
such disagreements decreased.  Such pluralization and “disenchantment” undermine the ways in which 
communities can stabilize themselves against shared backgrounds and authorities that had previously 
removed certain issues and assumptions from challenge.  Against this backdrop, Habermas wishes to 
formulate a conception of democracy suited to the kind of diversity captured in the fact of reasonable 
pluralism, in the undeniable sociological sense of pluralism I distinguished in the Introduction.47   
It may be natural to suppose that such conditions call for a procedural conception of democracy, 
wherein legitimacy inheres in the process through which collective decisions are made, rather than in the 
substantive content of those decisions over which members of diverse societies will disagree.   According 
to procedural conceptions, the question of legitimacy can be settled, ostensibly, by looking to the 
presumptions we normally associate with procedural fairness, like values of openness, equal chances to 
present alternatives, full and impartial consideration of those alternatives, and equal chances to influence 
decisions—in general, conditions which presuppose an orientation to mutual understanding, which, for 
Habermas, constitutes communicative action.48  For Habermas, this focus on the rational procedural 
aspect of democratic decision-making, rather than on the substantive outcomes about which people will 
inevitably disagree, is needed, in part, because it “leaves more questions open [than a substantive or 
rights-based theory of democracy] because it entrusts more to the process of rational opinion and will 
formation”49; it is a process which enjoys a “presumptive neutrality of legal principles in relation to the 
content of worldviews.”50   In post-traditional societies, the democratic procedure, he says, “forms the 
only post-metaphysical source of legitimacy.”51 
                                                          
47 Ibid, 26 
48 Indeed Habermas’s discourse theory of democracy explains the legitimacy of rational deliberation in terms of a complex of reason-giving 
procedures.  This account starts with the idea that public decisions can have a rationally acceptable character insofar as they can be supported 
publicly by good reasons.  More technically, the formation of rational opinions and decision must rest on validity claims to truth, rightness, and 
so forth, which can or at least could be justified before all competent persons with convincing reasons. The exchange of reasons thus refers to a 
discourse in which participants strive to reach agreement solely on the basis of the better argument. See Habermas’s Theory of Communicative 
Action Vol.2. Trans.Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987) 273-337. 
49 Between Facts and Norms, 131.  
50 See Habermas’s “Reply to Critics”, in the Cardozo Law Review (March 1996). 1505. 
51 Between Facts and Norms.  448.    
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Habermas’s procedural approach, however, is not to be understood entirely independently from 
substantive questions such as what rights individuals have.  The very forms of communication that are 
supposed to make it possible to form a rational political will through discourse need to be legally 
institutionalized.  For this purpose the legal code must be available, and establishing this code requires the 
creation of the status of possible legal persons, that is of persons who bear actionable individual rights.  
Without some guarantee of private autonomy, something like law cannot exist at all.  Consequently, 
without the classical rights of liberty that secure the private autonomy of legal persons, there is no 
medium for legally institutionalizing those conditions under which citizens exercise public autonomy.52  
The set of individual rights that any democratic regime must elaborate and specify fall into five 
very abstract or, as Habermas says, “unsaturated” categories.   The first three are the basic negative 
liberties, membership rights, and due-process rights that together guarantee individual freedom of choice, 
and thus private autonomy.  The fourth, rights of political participation, guarantees public autonomy.  The 
fifth category, social welfare rights, becomes necessary insofar as the effective exercise of civil and 
political rights depends on certain social and material conditions, for example, that citizens can meet their 
basic material needs.53 
In turn, however, the content of these abstract rights can be legitimately specified (made concrete) 
only by a democratic procedure that grounds the supposition that the outcomes of political opinion- and 
will-formation are reasonable.  Individual rights and democratic procedures thus mutually presuppose 
each other, and this reflects what Habermas calls the “internal relation” of private and public autonomy. 54   
Coercible law, he claims, can be legitimate only to the extent that it guarantees pride of place to two key 
ideas, each found in classical liberal and civic republican traditions, respectively.  On the one hand, 
because law must demarcate areas in which private individuals can exercise their free choice as they 
desire, law must guarantee the private autonomy of individuals pursuing their conception of the good.  On 
the other hand, because law’s enactment must be such that reasonable individuals could always rationally 
                                                          
52 Ibid, 455. 
53 Ibid, 122-123 
54 Ibid, 454-458.  See also Habermas, “On the Internal Relation between the Rule of Law and Democracy” in The Inclusion of the Other, 260-61.  
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assent to it, legitimate law must also secure the public autonomy of those subject to it, so that the legal 
order can be seen as issuing from the citizens’ rational self-legislation.55  In arguing for this “internal 
relation” between private and public autonomy, Habermas wants to do justice to both sides, to develop a 
legal paradigm in which both human rights and popular sovereignty play important, co-dependent, roles.   
Still, since neither basic rights protecting private autonomy nor the exercise of public autonomy 
can alone legitimate positively enacted law, Habermas once again insists that the legitimating burden 
must fall to the practice through which popular sovereignty is exercised—the democratic process itself.56  
Legally instituted formal conditions of various sorts57 of political discourse bear the entire legitimating 
burden, because those conditions are necessary to secure both the private and the public autonomy of 
legal subjects.   According to Habermas, this is because “individual private rights cannot even be 
adequately formulated, let alone politically implemented, if those affected have not first engaged in public 
discussions” to clarify their content.  The proceduralist understanding of law thus “privileges the 
communicative presuppositions and procedural conditions of democratic opinion- and will-formation as 
the sole source of legitimation.”58  
 
7.7 Three Forms of Proceduralism 
My goal is to question the claim that the democratic procedure can bear the burden of legitimation in the 
way Habermas says it can.  I will begin that argument by drawing attention to an apparent inconsistency 
in Habermas’s own characterization of the democratic procedure. To expose the inconsistency, consider 
Rawls’s useful distinction between three forms of proceduralism applied to collective decision-making, 
which Rawls called perfect proceduralism, imperfect proceduralism, and pure proceduralism.59  Perfect 
                                                          
55 Ibid  
56 “To be sure, the source of all legitimacy lies in the democratic lawmaking process, and this in turn calls on the principle of popular 
sovereignty.”  Between Facts and Norms, 89.   
57 Habermas distinguishes several types of discourse.  At its heart, the discursive process contains discourses that have different logics depending 
on the type of question to be answered; in parliamentary settings, for instance, these discourses are linked with fair procedures of compromise. 
See Between Facts and Norms, 108-109 and “Reply to Critics”, 1506.  Legitimate laws must therefore pass different types of discursive tests that 
come with each of these validity claims.  Habermas also recognizes that many issues involve conflicts among particular interests that cannot be 
reconciled by discursive agreement on validity but only through fair bargaining processes (See Between Facts and Norms, 452).  
58 Between Facts and Norms, 450. 
59 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1999) 74-75.   
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proceduralism refers to a mode of decision-making according to which, under circumstances in which it 
is necessary for a group to reach a collective decision, it is possible to know in advance of the group 
decision (or independently of any decision procedure) what the proper outcome is and it is also possible 
to design a decision procedure which guarantees that outcome.   For example, a group may want to divide 
a cake and, assuming they know and agree that a fair division is an equal one, the natural way to ensure 
that division is to have the person slicing the cake get the last piece; assuming he wants the largest 
possible piece, he will divide it equally.  Imperfect proceduralism, by contrast, refers to a mode of 
decision-making according to which, although it is also possible independently to specify the proper 
outcome, it is not possible to design a procedure which guarantees it.  In a criminal trial, for example, the 
proper outcome is for the defendant to go free if he is innocent, but trial procedures can never guarantee 
that outcome.  Finally, pure proceduralism obtains under yet different circumstances in which it is not 
possible to demonstrate or prove to everyone’s satisfaction what the correct outcome is.  There is, in other 
words, no independent criterion that specifies a proper outcome.  In this case, a purely procedural way for 
the group to proceed is to design a decision procedure so that the outcome is right whatever it happens to 
be, and this is ensured by guaranteeing the decision procedure treats all members of the group according 
to some reasonable standard of fairness.  For instance, in the case of gambling, the fairness of the 
outcome does not depend on the distribution of winnings that results, but it does depend on the equal 
chances of the participants to win.  Given this condition, any outcome of the procedure is guaranteed to be 
fair and therefore also correct. 
Rawls’s analysis implies two important points. First, in both perfect and imperfect proceduralism 
what makes justifies the process is the content of its outcome, which is independently specified and 
known to be correct. So both of these two forms of proceduralism are outcome-dependent sources of 
legitimation. This implies that a decision process can be truly procedural—in the sense that the 
justification of the outcome depends on its pedigree in a procedure alone—only if it is purely procedural.   
Second, pure and perfect proceduralism have something in common that distinguishes them from 
imperfect proceduralism.  Whereas the former two can guarantee right outcomes in their respective ways, 
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the latter cannot.  What is special about pure proceduralism is its purely formal nature: since no one has 
more or less of a right to a particular outcome than others do, there are no necessary and sufficient 
conditions other than procedural ones that the outcome has to satisfy in order to be justified.  It is for 
precisely this reason that the justified outcome can only be the one factually obtained after carrying out 
the procedure.  If the procedure is fair, the outcome is justified, whatever its content.  Thus pure 
proceduralism cannot be imperfect:  its outcomes are guaranteed to be justified or are simply 
unjustified.60     
Which form of proceduralism best describes Habermas’s conception?  Conveniently, Habermas 
himself has attempted to characterize his theory in terms of Rawls’s distinction.  He writes: 
[My theory] is imperfect because the democratic process is established so as to justify the 
presumption of a rational outcome without being able to guarantee the outcome is right.  On the 
other hand, it is also a case of pure proceduralism, because in the democratic process no criteria 
of rightness independent of the procedure are available; the correctness of decisions depends 
solely on the fact that the procedure has actually been carried out.61 
 
Habermas’s attempt here to combine pure and imperfect proceduralism is controversial to say the least.  
As we just saw, one of the crucial features of pure proceduralism is precisely that it cannot be imperfect.  
Using Rawls’s terminology, the objection can be expressed in the following way.  If the validity of an 
outcome is equated with a pure procedural notion of rational acceptability then, as Habermas points out, 
there are no conditions other than procedural ones that the outcome of an argumentation process has to 
satisfy in order to be right.  If the procedural conditions are satisfied then the factual outcome is justified, 
whatever it is.  Thus, “the correctness of decisions depends solely on the fact that the procedure has 
actually been carried out.”62  But if the procedure actually carried out for that reason produces correct 
outcomes, then it cannot be a case of imperfect proceduralism; it cannot be criticized in turn for not 
                                                          
60 For an excellent discussion of proceduralism in both Rawls and Habermas, which isolates this important point, see Cristina Lafont, “Procedural 
justice? Implications of the Rawls-Habermas Debate for Discourse Ethics”, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 29:2, 163-181, especially 164-166. 
61 See Habermas, “Reply to Critics”, 1495.  
62  Ibid. 
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producing outcomes with independent validity.  “The outcome of a correctly followed practice of 
justification” is by definition correct.  Habermas’s attempt to combine pure and imperfect proceduralism 
is therefore inconsistent:  it amounts to affirming that the correctness of outcomes is exclusively a 
function of procedural conditions and denying it at the same time.   
As we saw, Habermas insists that there is an internal relation between popular sovereignty and 
individual rights protecting the private autonomy of individuals, and this might explain his eagerness to 
embrace both a pure procedural and an imperfect characterization.   On one hand, the idea that popular 
sovereignty, as expressed through a procedure, presupposes individual rights leads one to an imperfect 
procedural understanding, since some independent conception of what those rights are would be needed 
in order to claim that those rights constitute public autonomy.  On the other hand, if the formulation of 
individual rights, in turn, depends on the actual (factual) exercise of popular sovereignty through a 
deliberative process, then the burden falls to that process to constitute the validity of those rights, and 
only a purely procedural understanding could capture that relationship.  So we might say that the apparent 
inconsistency in Habermas’s dual formulation corresponds to the apparent circularity involved in the idea 
of mutual presupposition in his internal relation argument.  We might call this a “regress problem” of 
legitimacy in Habermas’s theory:  On one hand, only those laws are legitimate that emerge from a rational 
discourse which constitutes the procedure through which public autonomy is exercised.  On the other 
hand, in order for people to give adequate expression to their will, a legitimate political order must 
already be presupposed, and that requires the deliberative process already to be legally constituted by 
individual rights.   
Habermas appears to recognize63 this dilemma, and offers the following solution:  
The very forms of communication that are supposed to make it possible to form a rational 
political will through discourse need to be legally institutionalized themselves.  In assuming 
legal shape, the discourse principle is transformed into a principle of democracy.  For this 
                                                          
63 “The addressees of law would not be able to understand themselves as it authors if the legislator were to discover human rights as pregiven 
moral facts that merely need to be enacted as positive law.  At the same time, this legislator, regardless of his autonomy, should not be able to 
adopt anything that violates human rights.” Between Facts and Norm, 454. 
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purpose, however, the legal code as such must be available, and establishing the code requires 
the creation of the status of possible legal persons, that is, of persons who belong to a voluntary 
association of bearers of actionable individual rights.  Without this guaranteed of private 
autonomy, something like positive law cannot exist at all.   Consequently, without the classical 
rights of liberty that secure the private autonomy of legal persons, there is no medium for legally 
institutionalizing those conditions under which citizens can first make use of their civic 
autonomy.64 
 
Unfortunately, this response does not provide a solution to the regress problem so much as it merely 
restates the question. As Frank Michelman points out, “the question hangs achingly:  Where in history 
can this originary-yet valid-constitutive lawmaking ever conceivably be fixed or anchored?”65  How do 
we know what those rights are, which are to constitute the procedure?  We cannot point to the procedure 
for an answer without begging the question.  Of course, when the issue is stated in such an abstract form it 
has the air of a deep and insurmountable paradox:  the people cannot enact rights unless they are already 
constituted as citizens, but they cannot be constituted as citizens without basic rights.   
But is there really a paradox here?  I think there is not.  I will later argue that the appearance of 
paradox persists only if we suppose, as Habermas does, that the democratic procedure itself could be the 
fundamental source of legitimacy in post-traditional societies.  But, as I will now argue, it is mysterious 
how that could be so. 
 
7.8 Procedure as a Source of Legitimacy? 
When Habermas says that the democratic procedure forms the only post-metaphysical source of 
legitimacy, “legitimacy”, in his usage, carries a special signification.  It refers to a particular notion of 
what lends moral defensibility to acts of submission to a lawmaking system or to the forcible imposition 
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65 See Frank Michelman’s review of Between Facts and Norms on the Boston Review website:  http://bostonreview.net/BR21.5/michelman.html. 
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of it.  His argument in Between Facts and Norms must therefore be read as supposing that his procedural 
account of democratic legitimacy best satisfies that requirement, that it is a normatively superior account 
of legitimacy than are alternative conceptions such as those found in the classical liberal and civic 
republican traditions.66  
Habermas’s argument attempts to answer the classic question of modern political philosophy. 
Under what conditions can an individual conceive of her community’s collective decisions as in some 
sense an expression of her private will, even when she may well disagree with these decisions ultimately 
taken?  As Habermas points out, Kant and Rousseau wrestled with this problem and arrived at very 
different, and for Habermas, inadequate explanations.67  Habermas seems to embrace the following 
alternative.  One could reasonably accept the outcome of a decision procedure as an expression of one’s 
own will only if the procedure tends to produce outcomes whose content all affected, at least in principle, 
could reasonably accept.  Habermas’s discourse principle (D) expresses this requirement of justification 
in post-traditional societies that lack a shared religious or metaphysical background to settle crucial 
issues.  (D) states that “[j]ust those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could 
agree as participants in rational discourse.” 68 His democratic principle, which states that “only those 
statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of 
legislation that in turn has been legally constituted,” specifies (D) for a particular kind of discourse, 
namely, legal-political discourse.69  This makes it analogous to his moral principle (U), which specifies 
(D) for moral discourse.   
What does Habermas mean by the idea of possible acceptance, that is, by the idea of outcomes 
affected parties “could accept”?  Does possible acceptability refer to what parties truly have reason to 
                                                          
66 Habermas is clear that he wants to propose a normative account of legitimacy.  This is partly in response to what he views as inadequacies in 
social scientific concepts of legitimacy like Max Weber’s. Weber, for instance, proposes a positivistic theory of law and claims that law can be 
legitimated by its legality, which just refers to the formal process of positively enacting law via certain procedures that are believed to be 
legitimate in the existing regime. No substantive criteria of justice must be met. According to Habermas, however,“[i]t remains unclear how the 
belief in legality is supposed to summon up the force of legitimation if legality means only conformity with an actually existing legal order, and if 
this order, as arbitrarily enacted law, is not in turn open to practical-moral justification.”  See Habermas’s, Theory of Communicative Action, 265.  
This belief in legality merely presupposes that the legal order is legitimate. In other words, a belief that certain procedures will produce valid laws 
does not make it so; “the belief in legality does not per se legitimize.” See Between Facts and Norms, 202. 
67 Between Facts and Norms, 100-104. 
68 Ibid, 107 
69 Ibid, 110 
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agree to? Or does he have a possible factual or sociological consensus in mind? Habermas appears to 
resist the former, cognitivist or epistemic reading of the democratic principle:  “The deliberations that are 
institutionalized in democracies and coupled with deadlines and voting procedures do not guarantee valid 
outcomes, but rather justify the presumption that outcomes are rational.  They thereby insure only that 
decisions reached in conformity with procedure are ‘rationally acceptable’ to citizens.  They cannot, of 
course, guarantee ‘truth’.”70   As he emphasizes, the democratic principle “lies at another level” from 
principles like (U).71  The latter specifies (D) for a single type of practical discourse (moral discourse), in 
view of internal cognitive demands on justification, whereas the former pulls together all the forms of 
practical discourse and capture conditions on their institutionalization.  From this perspective, the 
democratic principle acts as a bridge that links the cognitive aspects of political discourse (as a 
combination of different types of idealized discourse) with the demands of institutional realization in 
complex societies.   For that reason, the democratic principle should also not be interpreted as 
guaranteeing a factual or sociological consensus, but rather as something like a warranted presumption of 
reasonableness for outcomes. 
So we might read the democratic principle in the following way. It is an idealized principle 
adapted to the demands of the various discourses required in complex societies.  We might then say that it 
is the closest thing in practice to a cognitivist or epistemic principle, though Habermas does not conceive 
of it as one.  A discursive procedure that guarantees a presumption of reasonable outcomes, we might say, 
is one that all parties to a disagreement could accept even when their initial convictions about what the 
proper outcome is might differ. 
On this basis, it appears that Habermas would like to claim that the democratic procedure bears 
the entire burden of legitimating its own outcome.  But this raises a crucial question.   Does it follow from 
the fact that the outcome of a decision procedure could be reasonably accepted by all parties to a dispute 
that the procedure itself is what legitimates the outcome, so that we really can speak, as Habermas does, 
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of procedural legitimation?  I think it does not follow.  Habermas claims that we must conceive of 
political legitimacy as rational acceptability under certain idealized conditions, so that when we consider 
a normative proposition to be justified, what we are really claiming is that all can accept it in discursive 
argument.  But, as Habermas recognizes72 this is an ambiguous way to describe the matter, for if being 
“justified” depends both on the practice of justification (i.e. the procedure of reason-giving) and on the 
justifying reasons that are given within that practice, then it is not obvious why we are entitled to claim 
that the former (the procedure) alone is what does the justificatory work. 
In fact, as I will now argue, the opposite seems to be true:  it is the reasons given within the 
practice, not the procedure or any facts whatsoever about a decision’s genesis, that does the justificatory 
work.  To see why, consider again the distinction from the Introduction between explanation and 
justification.73  This is a distinction between two types of “reasons” someone might have for holding any 
moral belief, including a belief that a political decision is legitimate.  According to the first, we might say 
that a person’s “reason” for holding a belief refers to the best explanation of the causes or events or 
processes which led her to hold that belief.  It is this sense of the word “reason” we would have in mind if 
we said, for example, “the reason you like cake is because you inherited your mother’s sweet tooth”, or if 
we said “the only reason Smith opposes gay marriage is because he’s from West Texas”, or “the reason a 
law taxing the rich is legitimate is that it was agreed upon in a rational discourse”.  “Reason”, in this first 
explanatory sense, refers to all the empirical (i.e. causal, sociological, historical, process-based) 
explanations of how we come to hold our belief.   
According to the second sense, however, “reason” refers to the best substantive justification a 
person has for accepting a particular belief.  We use this sense when we say, for example, “the fact that 
exercising promotes good health is a good reason to exercise”, or “the fact that utility maximization could 
oppress certain individuals is a reason to reject utilitarianism”, or “the reason a law taxing the rich is 
legitimate is that fairness requires it.” Reasons of these two different types are independent of one another 
                                                          
72 “On the one hand, substantive reasons are what convince us that an outcome is right; on the other hand, the soundness of these reasons can be 
demonstrated only in real processes of argumentation.”   See Habermas, “Reply to Critics”, 1508 
73 See Section C. in my Introduction titled “The Meaning of Moral Objectivity” 
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in the following way. The best justification for a belief is not a matter of the process by which one comes 
to hold that belief, and so explanations of that process are not on their own capable either of supporting or 
contradicting those justifications.  If you were to ask me why I believe capital punishment is never 
morally defensible, would I really give a satisfactory answer if I just cited the process by which I came to 
hold that view (I might say that I read a book by Bertrand Russell, or, alternatively, that I had a rational 
discussion with somebody in which I was persuaded to reject it)?  Would that sort of answer really 
provide you with the understanding you seek regarding why I hold the conviction I do?  Of course it 
would not.  I would have to give reasons of a different kind, reasons which justify my belief, reasons 
which actually make up a convincing case that support my conviction, rather than just explain its 
historical origins or the process through which I came to hold it.     
This has an important implication.  If normative convictions draw support from justificatory 
reasons, rather than explanatory reasons, and if the procedures that give rise to convictions are 
explanations of those convictions, then procedures are incapable of justifying those convictions.  But then 
is it not strange to regard a democratic procedure—as distinct from the justifying arguments made within 
the framework of the procedure—as the source of legitimacy for democratic outcomes?  Suppose a 
diverse society reaches a decision on some controversial rights-issue through a procedure of rational 
discourse followed by some decision method.   If afterward we were to ask one of the participants why 
the decision taken is acceptable to all, would her answer be adequate if she replied, “because it emerged 
from a rational discourse”?   It seems to me that this kind of answer would be opaque.  The legitimacy of 
the decision hinges on the justifiability of the outcome, which is independent from process by which it 
was reached.   No one actually thinks decisions are defensible because they are outcomes of a rational 
procedure.  They are defensible only because they are supported by good reasons offered within the 
framework of that procedure, or because there are good reasons for deciding according to that procedure, 
and these are very different matters.  All the legitimating work is done by substantive arguments.  The 
procedural design may provide the conditions under which those arguments can be made, but the grounds 
of legitimacy is the force of those argument not, as Habermas insists, the process of argumentation 
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itself.74  To equate procedures with the grounds of legitimacy is yet another way of reducing principles to 
something they are not, namely cold facts. 
So even though, as we saw, parties to a disagreement might have good reasons to accept a 
discursive procedure to settle an issue, it does not follow that the outcome of that procedure is legitimate 
in virtue of being the product of that procedure.  Its legitimacy, in the final analysis, depends on the 
strength of the justifications offered in its support.   
 
7.9 The Interdependence of Fair Process and Correct Outcome 
I have so far suggested that substantive judgments must preside over a procedure’s justifiability. I now 
defend the following stronger claim: the substantive judgments that justify a procedure depend upon 
equally substantive judgments about what would count as correct outcomes of those procedures.  
It seems that in any situation in which a procedure might be called upon to settle some issue, the 
sort of procedure that would be appropriate to adopt must be one that is sensitive to the point of adopting 
a procedure in the first place to settle the issue in question.  In other words, the point of any practice for 
which a procedure is enlisted will largely dictate what type of procedure is appropriate.  For instance, we 
judge a deliberative decision procedure to be more appropriate for settling political and moral 
disagreements than a coin flip or a wrestling match, and our reasons for making this judgment are 
substantive and relate to the point and value of the procedure as we understand it within the context of 
politics.   
If we take the point of discursive democratic procedures as being to facilitate rational agreements 
on practical moral questions, then what sort of design must a procedure have if it is to serve that purpose?  
To answer this question it will help to consider a putative distinction between the input conditions of the 
                                                          
74 I would actually put this point more strongly. What counts as a good argument can in fact only be interpreted as a question about correct or 
justified outcomes, rather than a question about the practice in which they were made.  There is no important difference, it seems, in what two 
people think if one thinks the only thing that can make an outcome legitimate is if those outcomes are justified by good reasons and another 
thinks that what makes it legitimate is that it was reached through a process in which good reasons were offered.  The second position is dressed 
in the jargon of proceduralism, but it adds no genuine idea to the first.  It sounds more philosophical, disengaged and metatheoretical but it is no 
less evaluative.   So when Habermas writes “only those reasons count that all participating parties could find acceptable”, we might interpret that 




procedure and the outcomes of the procedure.  The input conditions, we might say, are those conditions 
that define a fair procedure. For Habermas, the input conditions for democratic discourse and decision-
making are specified by the democratic principle in accordance with the discourse principle.  These 
conditions include a system of rights which constitutes the legal medium through which laws are made 
and the communicative framework for rational political will-formation.   They must regulate the 
compositions of lawmaking bodies, the distribution of participants’ roles (e.g. in court procedures), the 
specification of issues (admissible topics and contributions), the steps in the analysis (e.g., the separate 
treatment of factual questions and legal questions), the sources of information (e.g., experts, methods of 
investigation, etc.), and the proper timetables and scheduling of events (e.g. repeated readings, decision 
deadlines, etc.).75   In short, input conditions are supposed to establish discursive processes of deliberation 
in which participants enjoy “communicative freedom”, which exists only between actors who want to 
reach an understanding with one another and expect one another to take positions on reciprocally raised 
validity claims.76 
Here is an important question: is it possible to identify those input conditions without relying on 
evaluative judgments about what sort of outcomes would be truly good or just?  The most fundamental 
(though not the most obvious) evaluative judgment is one we already noticed and it concerns the point of 
the procedure, what makes it a relevant way to settle matters. As we saw, Habermas holds that only a 
procedure that could produce a rational consensus could reasonably be accepted by all affected under 
post-traditional political circumstances, and that guiding point—rational acceptability—is crucial to 
procedural design; it is what morally distinguishes a deliberative procedure from, say, a coin-flip or a 
wrestling match.  But beyond that important evaluative consideration, here are five additional values that 
guide the design of Habermas’s procedural institutions: impartiality, equality, openness (no one and no 
relevant information is excluded), lack of coercion, and unanimity. In combination, these values guide 
                                                          
75 See Habermas, “Reply to Critics”, 1506 
76 Between Facts and Norms, 119 
359 
 
discussion on generalizable interests that could be agreed to by all participants.77  Indeed, Habermas says, 
“The institutionalization of (a network of) discourses must be primarily oriented toward the goal of 
fulfilling, as much as possible, the universal pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation in general:  
universal access, an equal right to participate and equality of opportunity in making contributions, the 
participants’ orientation toward reaching understanding, and freedom from structural 
coercions...Discourses should be established to allow the rationally motivating force of the better 
argument to come into play.”78  
These values are highly abstract and what Habermas says about them does not supply concrete 
advice about how we should interpret them in order to specify procedural conditions.79   Take, for 
instance, the condition of equality.  Presumably, the idea behind this condition is that a procedure must 
ensure an equal opportunity for each person, taken one by one, to impact the outcome through rational 
argument.  Understood that way, however, the condition says very little.  We still need a metric of 
equality adequate to serve this egalitarian input condition and it is not clear which metric we should use.  
We might think this equality consists in having an equal capacity to influence others, that is, an equal 
opportunity to induce or persuade other people, through rational argument, to accept our own way of 
thinking about what decisions should be made.  This immediately raises the question whether this sort of 
equality is jeopardized when wealthy individuals or groups are able to buy ads on television, or in 
newspapers, or promise contributions to political campaigns, while others cannot afford any of these 
things.  If we think that it does pose a threat to equality of influence, then this reflects an underlying 
judgment that the source of the unequal influence—an unfair distribution of wealth and opportunities—is 
deplorable.  We see then how our sense for what equality of influence means relies directly on further 
judgments about economic injustice, and the fair distribution of wealth.   
                                                          
77 See Ibid, 266, 103 for Habermas’s recognition of these values. 
78 Habermas, “Reply to Critics”, 1506 
79 Habermas seems to be most specific at 121-122 in Between Facts and Norms when he discusses what he calls the “logical genesis of rights.”  
He provides a sketch of a stepwise process for the specification of the abstract procedural conditions of equality and private autonomy.  It 
provides little guidance on how these conditions are to be formulated. 
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Alternatively, we might try to get around making such judgments by prescribing a strict or flat 
restriction on political influence, so that any input condition restricting influence must apply to everyone 
in the same, flatly equal way, so that although the conditions may deny a certain opportunity to influence 
political outcomes, it denies that opportunity to everyone.  But is that what equality of influence really 
requires?  It seems that it does not because it ignores the crucial issue of whether political equality also 
requires that each person’s opportunities have the same value to him or her.  Suppose, for example, that 
one input condition prohibited the expression of religious reasons within a rational procedure, and that 
this condition applied to everyone.  Clearly this limitation would diminish the value of a religious 
person’s opportunity to influence public discourse to a much greater extent than an atheist’s opportunity.  
To take another example, suppose that an input condition prohibited the expression of Marxist views.  
Again, it is hard to see in what relevant sense a Marxist and a liberal would have an equal opportunity to 
influence political outcomes, when the Marxist is not permitted to express his most sincere convictions to 
shape those outcomes.   
If you accept that prohibitions like these would invade equality of political influence, then you 
must also accept that equality of political influence must take account not only of the formal, abstract 
opportunities people have if they want use them, but of considerations such as the value each of these 
opportunities has for someone and also of the proper distribution of wealth in society.  But once we 
accept that specifying the input conditions of the deliberative procedure must involve making judgments 
along these dimensions, then there is an evident danger to the distinction between procedural input 
conditions and the substantive outcomes they are meant to produce.  We cannot state, in an informative 
way, what our input conditions should be without making substantive judgments about justice and ethics. 
Rawls makes a similar point in his reply to Habermas’s “objection” that justice as fairness is a 
substantive, rather than a procedural theory.80   As Rawls points out, one needs to have grasped in 
advance what the conditions for an acceptable outcome are in order to define a procedure that may or may 
                                                          
80  Habermas levels this general charge against Rawls’s political liberalism in Habermas’s “Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: 
Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism” in Journal of Philosophy. 92:3 (March 1995). 109-131 
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not guarantee such an outcome.  So whatever constraints Habermas has built into the discursive 
procedures that he recommends for judging the legitimacy of norms, “they can be considered appropriate 
constraints only because and to the extent that they are likely to lead to valid outcomes”.  Appealing to 
Habermas’s own explanation of what makes the outcome of a rational discourse appropriate, Rawls 
illustrates this point with the following remark:  “The more equal and impartial, the more open that 
process [moral discourse] is and the less participants are coerced and ready to be guided by the force of 
the better argument, the more likely truly generalizable interests will be accepted by all persons relevantly 
affected...This outcome is certainly substantive, since it refers to a situation in which citizens’ 
generalizable interests are fulfilled.”81  There seems to be no way, then, to identify or design a procedure, 
even abstractly and in an uninformative way, without making judgments of what basic outcomes it ought 
to produce.   Yet the more specifically we design that procedure, the more we must rely on concrete and 
potentially controversial judgments concerning proper outcomes.  But this is just to say that procedures 
are not freestanding.  Their requirements and outcomes cannot be judged as facts, but must rather be 
understood as working principles. 
 
7.10 No Paradox 
I have so far argued for two different but related conclusions.  First, I argued that Habermas holds that no 
procedure could be an acceptable way to settle disagreements unless it promised to bring about a 
reasonable consensus among parties to the dispute.  But even then, I argued, the procedure itself is not 
what bears the burden of legitimation; rather, the source of legitimation is the set of reasons made within 
the constraints of that procedure and which justify the procedure itself.  Both the acceptability of a 
procedure and the legitimacy of its outcomes depend, in the final analysis, on persuasive substantive 
reasons.  The second related conclusion is that the selection and design of any procedure must also 
depend on substantive judgments about what outcomes it is desirable for the procedure to produce. The 
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more concretely and informatively those procedures are specified, the more specific and controversial 
those judgments about outcomes must be.   
These two conclusions are unified in recognizing the fundamental and unavoidable role of 
potentially controversial, substantive moral judgments in democratic decision-making.  No procedure 
could be deemed acceptable or designed in an informative way except by leave of substantive and 
potentially controversial judgments.  The question whether any outcome that issues from any sort of 
procedure is moral defensibility, and hence legitimate, is a question over which substantive judgments 
must ultimately preside.  We cannot climb outside of them to judge them from some external, 
“procedural” tribunal any more than we can climb out of reason itself to test it from above.  In the 
beginning and in the end is substance. 
With this in mind, consider once again the appearance of paradox we encountered toward the end 
of Section 7.7, which was captured by what we called the “regress problem” of political legitimacy in 
Habermas’s theory.  It appeared, on one hand, that only those legal rights are legitimate that emerge from 
a rational deliberative procedure through which citizens express their public autonomy.  On the other 
hand, the ability of people to give adequate expression to their will requires that the deliberative 
procedure already be legally constituted by individual rights protecting private autonomy.  Put this way, it 
has the air of a paradox.  But once we recognize the primacy of substance over procedure, then the 
appearance of paradox seems to dissolve. 
Here is the circular path of reasoning that creates the illusion of paradox.  Habermas, like many 
procedural theorists, appropriately begins from the premise that we need a way to reach legitimate 
decisions in complex, pluralistic, contemporary societies.  His crucial first step is to identify a procedure 
which satisfies this requirement because, he thinks, only a procedure provides a more-or-less 
substantively disengaged and relatively non-controversial way to proceed under circumstances of 
reasonable substantive disagreement.  But not any procedure will do.  The procedure with the best claim 
to legitimacy is a deliberative one, legally constituted by some scheme of basic rights in order that it 
simultaneously secures not only the public autonomy of legal subjects, but also their private autonomy as 
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individuals.  It is at this point that Habermas’s procedural account generates the appearance of paradox 
because those constitutive individual rights are among the very things that are the subject of controversy 
in post-traditional societies.  Our disagreements about them are, in other words, the things we need a 
procedure in the first place to adjudicate among, and so individual private rights cannot even be 
adequately formulated, let alone politically implemented, if those affected have not first engaged in public 
discussions to clarify them.  The procedure itself, in other words, is among the very things over which 
post-traditional societies will differ.   So there appears to be a circular relationship between procedural 
conditions and substantive rights.  
But we are locked in this vicious circle only if we assume that a procedure, as distinct from 
substantive arguments about rights, can be an ultimate source of legitimation.  But as I have labored to 
show, it cannot be.   The acceptability of a procedure inevitably depends upon potentially controversial 
substantive judgments concerning the proper content of outcomes.  Once we recognize that any flight 
from those judgments simply returns us to those very judgments, then we should not be tempted to 
assume that the formulation and legitimacy of legal rights can depend on something other than those 
judgments, such as a procedure.  That breaks the circular line of reasoning at the first step.   
 
7.11 Proceduralism and Political Theory 
I have argued that, if part of what makes a democratic procedure an acceptable way to proceed under 
circumstances of disagreement is that it is the best way to respect rights protecting the private autonomy 
of individuals, then designing a procedure requires us already to have in mind an answer to the question 
“what rights do we have?”.  This should not come as a surprise since all of the criteria which structure the 
procedure are essential moral concepts (equality, impartiality, fairness, and membership rights) and so 
fine-tuning that procedure essentially involves interpreting those concepts.   There is no Archimedean 
armchair from which a procedure can be specified without making judgments on issues like these.  As 
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Rawls has put the point:  “it is a common oversight...to think that procedural legitimacy (or justice)...can 
stand on its own without substantive justice:  it cannot.” 82 
Habermas intends his theory to be as substantively disengaged as possible.  The job of the 
democratic theorist, according to Habermas, is to develop an abstract account of the conditions citizens 
should acknowledge mutually if they are legitimately to regulate their living together by means of 
positive law.83 But, he thinks, the theorist must do this in a way that patrols only the input side of the 
democratic process, with as little reference as possible to the outcomes that will result.  After this abstract 
account is given to legal subjects, the citizens themselves, assuming an “internal perspective” (as distinct 
from the theorist’s external perspective), must deliberate and decide how they must give these abstract, or 
“unsaturated”, rights concrete form.84  Accordingly, Habermas sets for himself a particular goal, which is 
to develop a procedural conception of democracy that, so far as possible, leaves open the most 
controversial questions for which the abstractly prescribed procedure is supposed to deliver answers.  
I would like to suggest, however, that in taking that goal as a starting point, Habermas’s theory 
commits itself to substantive poverty.  As I have tried to show, one cannot make a concrete, or even 
persuasive, case for a procedural conception without engaging a complex web of substantive convictions 
that is necessary to specify what that procedure should look like.   His goal, which is to develop a 
procedural meta-theory that is to the greatest possible extent neutral on controversial issues, yields a 
theory that mires in abstraction. He offers a normative theory that, by offering very little concrete, action-
guiding content, is radically lacking in normativity.85   
Here is a suggestion.  Perhaps a persuasive case for the legitimacy of a post-metaphysical legal 
paradigm requires not, as Habermas insists, a putatively neutral account of democracy that leaves 
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85 Rawls apparently shares this worry:  “Habermas’s description of the procedure of reasoning and argument in ideal discourses is also 
incomplete.  It is not clear what forms of argument may be used, yet these importantly determine the outcome.  Are we to think, as he seems to 
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be counted, as is sometimes done in applying the principle of equal consideration?  This might yield a utilitarian principle to satisfy the greatest 
balance of interests.  On the other hand, the deliberative conception of democracy (to which Habermas shows much sympathy) restricts the 




fundamental and controversial question to the democratic process.   Perhaps, instead, what is needed is a 
more result-driven rather than a purely procedural approach.  Good results include having good, 
especially fair procedures.  But what counts as fair procedures also depends in part on what count as just 
outcomes. We should therefore try to develop a conception of democracy consistent with—and indeed 
constituted by—the most persuasive comprehensive conception available of what rights we have. We can 
then try to unify our best conception of substantive rights with our best conception of procedural fairness, 
duly adjusting each to accommodate one another in their best relation.  We will of course disagree about 
what counts as the best relation between process and outcome, just as we disagree about everything else.  
But the unity we strive for may itself have social value.  It shows that we regard ourselves as united under 
a coherent, integrated scheme of justice and procedure fairness, and that alone is important. This kind of 
project would call for democratic theorists to shoulder a different philosophical burden than the one 
Habermas has in mind. On this new view, they must assume the role of ideal deliberators, formulating 
ideas about rights as citizens among others with a view to persuading others, through rational argument, 
to accept their reasoned views. Perhaps democratic theorists could do a greater service by overtly 
embracing and developing a more outcome-oriented approach to democratic theory.  Perhaps political 
theory does more to improve the quality of democratic discourse by openly and willingly developing and 
offering the best reasoned arguments on crucial rights issues.  It is an attractive idea that academic 
theorists could treat their profession as an institution which calls controversial issues up from the 
battleground of power politics to an academic theater of principled discourse, one that more closely 
approximates the rational deliberative conditions even Habermas envisions, in an effort to come up with 
the best possible substantive arguments.     
One potential objection to this proposal is that even if political theorists take up this task, 
different theorists will undoubtedly produce different and perhaps conflicting conceptions.  Since those 
competing conceptions themselves need to be evaluated and compared before any can be adopted and 
implemented, we need some procedure to determine the most legitimate way to do so. Consequently, we 
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are back to the problem with which we began, which is how to develop a procedure that can adjudicate 
fairly between ethical and moral points of view about which people disagree. 
But that objection is misguided for two reasons.  The first reason is the one I have been pressing 
throughout this chapter, which is that there is no theory of how to proceed in the midst of disagreement 
which can be neutral and uncontroversial, so the objection is therefore confused.  The second reason is 
that we are not starting from scratch when it comes to developing institutions in which to decide among 
competing philosophies.   Most democratic societies already have in place various—though certainly 
imperfect and often deeply inegalitarian—discursive spaces and decision mechanisms  through which 
comprehensive philosophies of the type I am proposing can be evaluated, modified, and acted upon.  
These theories, because comprehensive and rights-based , would provide concrete advice on how to 
specify and improve the very institutional processes through which they would be considered and 
implemented and through which future modifications and refinements could be considered and adopted.  
Over time, it seems, we can reasonably expect to approach a practical reconciliation between the 
imperfect procedures that now exist and the legitimacy-conferring force of the best comprehensive 
theories of rights and democracy that political philosophy has to offer.   But none of this is possible 
without an initial effort to engage in and to produce such theories.  That calls for a shift of focus away 
from pure proceduralism and toward a more concerted engagement with first-order substantive moral 
theory. 
 
7.12 The Revolt from Principle 
Freestanding political theory is a particular response to an old dilemma, which is the problem of 
satisfying, on one hand, the demands of order through coercive political institutions and, on the other 
hand, those of good order.  The freestanding view and the Factual Model present our institutions and 
ideals as opposing demands that have no contact with one another.  By setting a boundary on our 
reflection in order to desensitize our institutions to our ideals, freestanding theory creates unavoidable 
gaps in social guidance and irresolvable conflicts among our institutional principles.   
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These consequences seem odd for a few reasons.  First, the idea of an advance constraint on 
reflection, a boundary political reasoning must not cross, is phenomenologically strange. Most people, 
especially on important normative questions, discover the scope of reflection they need by finding where 
reflection leads before they make a decision to stop reflecting. They do not know in advance where they 
must stop because they do not know in advance when their principles might collide and need to be 
reconciled.  These conflicts may not happen often, but when they do, they provide a possible occasion for 
reflection that we normally do not rule out in advance.   
Second, these consequences are morally odd because, especially in politics, these occasions for 
reflection are often ones that people find most important, are most controversial, and in greatest need of a 
decision.  The strategy of bracketing ideals can work up to a point, but the freestanding view has no 
account of how to decide important questions when institutions are silent or unclear.  This is morally 
objectionable because, as Rawls recognized in emphasizing the need for public reason to be complete, it 
is important on matters of basic justice that a public perspective supply an answer to controversial 
questions.  But if we accept the freestanding view, then the only way to decide these questions when the 
public perspective is silent or unclear is by relying solely on some people’s (usually those with great 
power) private judgments about political ideals. But then what happens to the values of procedural 
fairness, predictability, coordination, settlement, and consensus that proponents of the freestanding view 
prize?  These values are out the window on these occasions because these are precisely the occasions on 
which there is no settled or agreed upon institutional perspective.   
As I have suggested in my discussion of Waldron, Rawls, and Habermas, freestanding theorists 
seem, in their own work, instinctively to treat institutional and ideal principles as integrated, not 
freestanding.  There is therefore a striking disparity between the role contested ideals play in their 
conscious reflection about these principles and their explicit rejection of them as disruptive sources of 
disagreement. I expect one explanation of the popularity of the Factual Model is an empiricist tendency so 
prevalent in our academic culture and with it the hope of discovering some external, indubitable, factual 
ground on which to rest politics.  Theorists seem to assume that political justification and argument has to 
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end on some fact, that there must be demonstrability and finality in political argument.  In my view, that 
hope is impossible and distracting.  In practical reason, philosophical reflection on higher or lower levels 
of principles must always remain in the cards. When we raise our eyes a bit from the publicly established 
reasons that seem most on point in particular cases, and look at neighboring areas of, say, democratic 
theory, or constitutional law more generally, or to the reasons apparently widely recognized in our 
culture, we may find a serious threat to our claim that the principle we were about to endorse is actually 
one public reason requires of us.  We may discover that that principle is inconsistent with some other 
institutional principle that we must rely on in other areas of public justification. We cannot simply ignore 
the possibility that our purported justification would be unprincipled. This poses a threat not just to 
theoretical elegance, but also to how a community committed to equal citizenship should responsibly 





Conclusion: Unity and Civility 
The Unity of Political Principle is a thesis about the force and content of public political standards in 
accordance with which a political community ought to act toward its members.  The ideal of principled 
consistency, or integrity, is a virtue of political institutions.  I defended it in Chapters 5 and 6, in part, by 
comparing the morally virtuous community, understood as a personified collective agent, with the 
morally virtuous individual.  In this brief concluding section, I shift the focus of unity and integrity back 
to the individual citizen in order to suggest a theory of public discourse that I believe flows from the 
Unity Thesis. 
The Unity Thesis has interesting implications for how we might argue in political life.  Typically, 
this issue is framed as a choice between two exhaustive and mutually exclusive possibilities: either people 
should be allowed to invoke their ideal “comprehensive” convictions in public life, or they may only 
appeal to “public” reasons that comprise a distinct and independent set of standards.1 John Rawls’s ideal 
of public reason, for instance, includes a doctrine of civic virtue. According to Rawls, members of a 
political community are publicly reasonable only if, while engaged in certain coercive political activities 
such as voting and lawmaking, they adhere to a duty of civility toward other members of their community 
and attempt to justify the political decisions they reach on matters of fundamental political importance by 
reference only to supposedly freestanding public values and public standards.2  This is in part an 
injunction to argue and engage in political discourse in certain ways, specifically, in accordance with 
public reasons his model of public reason identifies.  Rawls justifies this virtue by connecting it to several 
values: inclusion, reciprocity, civic friendship, political stability over time, and acceptability to others. 
Rawls’s call for citizens to argue and deliberate in certain ways holds public deliberation 
accountable to his theory of public reasons in a specific kind of way.  It imposes what we might call an 
“institution-relative” filter on public argument.  On this view, the relationship between public reasons and 
virtuous public reasoning is that the former imposes a freestanding filter on the latter: whether or not a 
                                                          




citizen reasons in a virtuous way can be determined, in essence, by checking what they say and do against 
Rawls’s public conception of justice.  On this view, it is possible to make judgments about a citizen’s 
public reasonableness by passing their discrete acts through this discursive filter public reason gives us.  I 
believe Rawls’s institution-relative model of public reasonableness suffers from a defect that, as I argued 
in Chapter 7, similarly afflicts all freestanding conceptions of political principle that attempt to transcend 
disagreement by fleeing from it.  Since we disagree about the content of public reason, we also disagree 
about what the relevant filter against which to test an argument is, and therefore when citizens properly 
exercise public reason and hence are reasonable.  Rawls and his disciples, I think, scramble in vain to try 
to delineate crisp boundaries between our ideals and out public institutions.   
Because the Unity Thesis rejects the assumption that we can fully insulate any area of practical 
reason from the rest, it holds that although there is a distinct domain of institutional principles that might 
ground public argument, the content of those principles depends on our ideals because only through those 
ideals can we fully identify what our institutions instruct. But this means that ideals unavoidably play a 
role in institutional guidance and therefore in the direction of public power; we cannot simply bracket 
them as illegitimate political justifications or arguments. The unity of political principle instead sponsors 
what we might call a “citizen-relative” filter on our public political reasons.  Instead of assessing what 
individuals say and do in their public capacity through a filter whose content is independent of anything 
they themselves have said or done in the past, we should instead assess, in order to criticize or praise, 
what citizens say and do according to a standard of principled consistency, or integrity.  This new model, 
I suggest, has intuitive appeal. We often think it is appropriate to hold people to account for things they 
say and do, not merely because what they have done is wrong or accurate according to some independent 
standard of reasonableness, but because we value consistent, principled behavior in other people, and we 
can detect this consistency only by interpreting what people apparently have accepted, said, or done in the 
past, or would continue to do on relevantly similar occasions.  As we have seen in Chapters 5 and 6, we 
value principled consistency in others because it is an essential feature of holding a moral position at all.  
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Its contraries are whim, capriciousness, arbitrariness, irresponsibility, and moral indifference toward 
others.   
This citizen-relative model of public reasonableness still depends on the Principled Model’s 
conception of political principles:  If legitimacy requires principled consistency in public reason, then 
citizens should strive to argue in terms of those reasons.  However, in contrast to Rawls’s institution-
relative model, on the citizen-relative model I am suggesting, public reasons are not a normative filter 
wrapped around what citizens might say or do, but rather supply the very broad subject matter of public 
argument—a plateau from which public political argument proceeds.  A reasonable citizen offers 
reasonable arguments when several conditions are met, chief among which is that her arguments must 
bear a colorable rational relation to a plausible conception of public political principles understood on the 
Principled Model.  Another, more important condition, however, is that a citizen’s or official’s own 
arguments or political actions should cohere to the greatest extent that is reasonably practicable, so that 
they express an intelligible public moral personality.  Reasonableness, on this view, is a matter of degree: 
some arguments are more reasonable than others, for example, if they belong to a well-constructed 
argument whose principle cohere. 
The citizen-relative model of public reasonableness highlights an important connection between 
the community and the individual.  The Principled Model holds that we exercise political power within 
the set of existing institutions, not merely on them or from scratch. Analogously, the citizen-relative 
model of public reasonableness holds that we must judge ourselves and others in light of the whole set of 
our behavior, not merely by an external standard, such as a supposedly freestanding conception of justice.  
Public reason and public reasonableness, on this view, are coordinate notions, not freestanding sets of 
standards that operate independently of one another.  These two models together fuse citizens’ moral lives 
with that of their political community, but in a way that has distinctive political value within societies 
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Appendix: Kant’s Moral Anti-Constructivism 
This appendix supplements the discussion in Section 5.2 by offering an interpretation of Kant’s attempt to 
establish the value of humanity as the fundamental ground of morality.  As suggested in Section 3.2 in 
discussing Kant’s “incorporation principle”, Kant held that principles are rationally connected to one 
another; we cannot justify a principle in terms of facts without relying on another principle that rationally 
justifies the normative significance of those facts. The centrality of this point to Kant’s moral philosophy 
may be obscured in recent interpretations of Kantian ethics inspired primarily by the influential work of 
John Rawls.  These interpretations emphasize the role of procedures of “construction” that supposedly 
ground moral truth in Kant’s theory.1  Simply stated, moral constructivism holds that moral judgments are 
true in virtue of the fact that they issue from laws or procedures that we ourselves actually construct. In 
Kantian terms, constructivism might hold that maxims that pass a test defined by a rational procedure are 
valid and that the procedure “confers” moral goodness, or at least permissibility, on the actions these 
maxims propose.2  Kant’s presentation of his first formulation of the categorical imperative, which Kant 
scholars call The Formula of Universal Law (henceforth FUL), and which illustrates what appears to be a 
procedural test for the permissibility of a maxim, seems to support a constructivists reading.  So also does 
Kant’s third formulation’s references to moral self-legislation, the idea of autonomy of the will as “the 
property of the will through which it is a law to itself (independently of all properties of the objects of 
volition).”3   A constructivist reading might follow from this third formulation if we stress the “autos” 
(author) rather than the “nomos” (law) aspect of autonomy.4  
However, the constructivist reading has come under attack in recent years by Kantians who 
emphasize the primacy in Kant’s system of certain principles, values, and ends that justify the binding 
                                                          
1 John Rawls, “Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy,” in Freeman (Ed.) Collected Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).  Allen Wood, 
who disagrees with Rawls’s reading of Kant, also credits Rawls for doing much to make Kantian ethics respectable.  Wood, Kantian Ethics. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) x.  Authors who inspired the constructivist reading in general include Nell (O’Neill), Onora, 
Acting On Principle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975); Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reasons (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989); and Christine Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 112 
2 A useful survey with a useful account of constructivism and its rivals is Paul Formosa’s “Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?”  
European Journal of Philosophy ISSN 0966-8373, 2011, 1-27 
3 Kant, G: 4:433–4, G 4:440 
4 For this reading of the formula of autonomy, see Wood’s Kantian Ethics, 108-110 
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force of any procedures Kant might seem to have embraced.5  It is true that Kant seems to derive the 
categorical imperative in the First Section of the Groundwork in an austere way, in which he deprives the 
will of all sensible inclinations that might serve as an end for the will.6  Nevertheless, Kant rather plainly 
writes in the Second Section that all rational action requires an end, though unlike contingent ends 
suggested by our inclinations, moral ends are not contingent but rather necessary and universal.  Kant 
argues that if there are unconditionally binding laws there must be “objective ends” which alone can 
ground practical principles which are “valid and necessary for all rational beings”.7 Kant postulates that 
these objective ends are just rational beings themselves, or persons.8 Thus for Kant, there is a more basic 
principle that grounds any procedures he might also have endorsed, and this is a principle that requires 
respect for the value of rational nature, which he presents as the “objective”, “absolute”, “incomparable” 
worth of humanity in all persons, and which “marks them out as an end in itself”.9    
It is worth quoting at length Kant’s remarks at the end of the Critique of Practical Reason where, 
after a long formalistic discussion of moral duty, Kant finally identifies its “origin” or determining 
ground, the value that justifies it, variously with the value of rational nature, moral personality, and 
humanity as an end in itself: 
 Duty! Sublime and mighty name…what origin is there worthy of you, and where is to be found 
the root of your noble descent which proudly rejects all kinship with the inclinations, a descent 
from which is the indispensable condition of that worth which human beings alone can give 
themselves?… On this origin are based many expressions that indicate the worth of objects 
according to moral ideas. The moral law is holy (inviolable).  A human being is indeed unholy 
                                                          
5 For this new reading, see generally and especially Guyer’s Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom (New York: Oxford, 2005), Guyer’s Kant on 
Freedom, Law, and Happiness (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000) (a useful survey is in the Introduction); Allen Wood’s Kant’s 
Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) Chapter 4, Wood’s Kantian Ethics, chapters 4-6; and Barbara Herman’s The 
Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), Chapter 10, “Leaving Deontology Behind”. 
6 Kant starts the Groundwork by asserting that the only thing of unconditional value is a good will, then shows that such a will manifests only in 
doing one’s duty for its own sake, and then argues that since acting from duty deprives the will of any contingent object of desire, nothing is left 
to ground morality except the “conformity of actions as such with universal law” Kant, G 4:402. 
7 See Kant, G 4:428, where he distinguishes subjective from objective ground of the will, material versus absolute ends and introduces humanity 
as an absolute, universal, objective determining ground of the will: “But suppose there were something the existence of which in itself has an 
absolute worth, that, as an end in itself, could be a ground of determinate laws; then in it, and in it alone, would lie the ground of a possible 
categorical imperative, that is, of a practical law. Now I say that the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not 
merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion; ...[must] always be regarded at the same time as an end.” (original emphasis). 
8 Kant, G 4:428, 435–6 
9 Kant, G 4:429 
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enough but the humanity in his person must be holy to him. In the whole of creation everything 
one wants and over which one has any power can also be used merely as means; a human being 
alone, and with him every rational creature, is an end in itself: by virtue of the autonomy of his 
freedom he is the subject of the moral law, which is holy.10  
 
This passage captures the sense in which Kant’s theory, which is sometimes contrasted with teleological 
theories like utilitarian monism, is teleological.  For Kant, although the moral law’s ground is not a 
contingent end suggested by inclination, it is nevertheless is an end, namely a necessary, universal, a 
priori end: rational nature or humanity itself.  The value of humanity, not an act of the will, is the ratio 
essendi of the moral law.11  
Moreover, as Allen Wood has remarked, the constructivist reading would deprive Kantian 
morality of any claim to objective reality because it implies that the moral law’s validity must arise out of 
acts of one’s own will, that is as “human-made morality”.12  Yet Kant was clear that any principle whose 
validity turns on a subjective act of willing is only a maxim, never an objective principle.  Kant’s point 
here takes a clear side on Plato’s Euthyphro puzzle.  Reasons are prior to desires, the good is prior to 
inclinations, ends are prior to acts of will, and the Gods love something because it is pious.13  Understood 
this way, Kant’s moral philosophy is consistent with the Principled Model. 
But another puzzle arises for Kant’s theory concerning his case for the supreme principle.  If all 
principles are ultimately justified in terms of the supreme principle of morality, which requires respect for 
the incomparable worth of humanity as an end in itself, then what justifies that supreme principle?  It 
would seem that as a supreme principle it is not capable of being justified through a practical inference 
from another principle, because that would mean it is not supreme. Moreover, unlike subsidiary moral 
duties which are derived from both the supreme principle and premises concerning empirical facts about 
                                                          
10 Kant, CPrR: 5:86-87 
11 Kant, CPrR 5:5 
12 Wood, Kantian Ethics, 108-110 
13 Here I paraphrase Wood’s conclusion. Ibid 
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human beings and the natural world, the fundamental principle must be known entirely a priori.14  On the 
surface, this would seem to preclude any rational justification for the supreme principle, or at least any 
justification consistent with the Principled Model.  But that conclusion would be too quick.  I would like 
to suggest that a case can still be made for Kant’s supreme principle in both directions I described in the 
Introduction: both analytically (by showing that our moral convictions presuppose it), and also 
justificatorily, though involving a slight refinement to the idea of a justification.  
I will start with the analytical case. Notice that there are different ways of understanding the idea 
of a supreme principle.  It could be understood as a brute, incorrigible, inexplicable axiom that is just 
stubbornly there for us to live with, like facts are.  Or it could refer to the most abstract principle in a 
system that contains principles at varying levels of generality and concreteness, and which reinforce each 
other.  This second understanding would allow us to support a supreme principle by arguing, analytically, 
that unless we assume that principle, the rest of the system would not make any normative sense.  And 
indeed this is Kant’s explicit approach in the first two sections of the Groundwork, where he says he 
proceeds “analytically”, moving from “what is more evident to us” toward the “first principle”.15 Kant’s 
strategy in the First Section is to show that if morality, as understood in “common rational cognition”, is 
not merely a “high-flown fantasy”, then moral motivation and the supreme moral principle must be of a 
certain kind, which he tells us is that it has the form of universality.16 The Second Section then makes the 
same point in terms of a “philosophical” theory of the will.17 Although these two sections focus on moral 
concepts that arise different levels of abstraction and sophistication, the first which focuses on 
unreflective common sense and the second on a philosophical theory of the will, they nevertheless both 
                                                          
14 Kant, DR, 6:216–17. “Just as there must be principles in a metaphysics of nature for applying those highest universal principles of a nature in 
general to objects of experience, a metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with principles of application, and we shall often have to take as our 
object the particular nature of human beings, which is cognized only by experience, in order to show in it what can be inferred from universal 
moral principles.”  
15 Kant, G 4:445.   
16 Kant, G 4:394, 401-403.  Wood helpfully explains what Kant means by “common rational cognition” in Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought, 19-20.  
“It refers to an everyday unreflective awareness of the rational standards Kant thinks anyone must use in moral deliberation and judgment.”  The 
ideas of good will, duty, and moral worth are the main “common sense” notions Kant utilizes in the First Section of the Groundwork in order to 
elicit his reader’s unreflective instincts about how the supreme principle abstracts from all contingent ends and inclinations, such as self interest 
or even beneficence, and therefore is a priori and universal. 
17 Kant, G 4:419, 425, 429, 439    
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proceed analytically from certain ideas to the supreme principle as an hypothesis those ideas presuppose. 
They supply an interpretation of what we are committed to in virtue of certain other ideas we accept.  
I will focus on Kant’s analytical case for his second formulation of the supreme principle, which makes 
reference to humanity as the ground of a categorical imperative.  Kant’s main position is that the worth of 
humanity is a necessary presupposition of all rational willing, of end-setting in general.  Kant says “the 
human being necessarily represents his own existence [as an end in itself]”.18  Why?  Kant holds that the 
most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is that of setting an end.19   He 
infers that any being that sets itself an end is committed to regarding its end as good, as something that 
should be pursued. (See my discussion in Section 3.2 on the meaning of goodness according to Kant.)  
But where does this goodness come from? The act of willing an end is itself a reason for pursuing the end.  
But how could an act of willing be a reason to pursue an end?   
It seems that an act of willing an end could be a reason to pursue that end if we accepted some 
more general principle, something like “ends set through acts of volition should be pursued”.  But that 
more general principle assumes a certain attitude toward persons, as beings whose rational capacity to set 
an end, which Kant identified with their humanity, is itself valuable and capable of conferring value on 
the ends we set.  But since our humanity is not the object of any contingent desire (it is what confers value 
on any object of desire we set as an end), then humanity can only be a necessary object of the will, an end 
any will must set for itself if it is to rationally will anything else at all.  On this interpretation, Kant shows 
that if we think the ends we set are good, then we must regard our capacity to set them, our humanity, as 
having unconditioned goodness.  Kant thus held that the worth of humanity is a necessary presupposition 
of all rational willing, that “The human being necessarily represents his own existence [as an end in 
itself]”.20  Since all rational willing presupposes the worth of humanity, humanity must therefore serve 
simultaneously as the justification of and a constraint on all the ends rational agents can permissibly will. 
                                                          
18 Kant, G 4:429 
19 Kant, G 4:437   
20 Kant, G 4:429 
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Despite his complicated presentation, Kant’s point seems quite plausible. Almost all of us have 
some purposes and an ability to form intentions and act on them.  But we cannot think it is important to 
act for any particular purpose unless we also assume, perhaps tacitly, it is also important that we act for 
some purposes.  In other words, we must suppose that our ability to live purposively, in pursuit of our 
ends, matters objectively if we are also to think that following any specific purpose matters at all.  Our 
purposive capacity is thus more fundamental than, and justificatorily prior to, any particular purpose we 
might seek. 
Does this mean that the supreme principle is a basic principle that our moral practice tacitly 
presupposes, which gives rise to more specific duties, but which cannot itself be derived from any other 
principle?  Some of Kant’s remarks seem to suggest this. In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant writes 
that “Consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason because one cannot reason it 
out from antecedent data of reason, for example, from consciousness of freedom (since this is not 
antecedently given to us), and because it instead forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic a priori 
proposition that is not based on any intuition, either pure or empirical.”21  Moreover, in the Preface to the 
Groundwork he wrote that we “proceed analytically from common cognition to the determination of its 
supreme principle, and in turn synthetically from the examination of this principle and its sources back to 
the common cognition in which we find it used”, which seems to suggest that the only way to argue for 
the supreme principle is by showing that it is presupposed by familiar moral ideas Kant believes we 
accept, though it cannot be deduced from any more generally value or principle that grips us.22   
Does this make Kant’s supreme principle entirely relative to our human practices?  No, it does 
not.  Although I wish to keep the following analogy on a short leash, there is a useful comparison to Hans 
Kelsen’s argument for a legal system’s grundnorm, which he described as a “transcendental-logical” 
presupposition of legal practice.23  Only if this basic norm that underpins a specific lawmaking institution 
is presupposed can the law-creating acts performed according to this institution be objectively valid and 
                                                          
21 Kant, CPrR 5:31 
22 Kant, G 4:392 
23 See my discussion of Kelsen’s basic norm above in Section 2.9. 
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therefore legal.  The basic logic behind this kind of “transcendental argument” is that if you believe X, 
then you must believe X’s necessary presuppositions.  Is this a valid form of argument?  As Paul Guyer 
suggests, there really is not much more that any kind of argument can show; no argument can ever do 
more than show us that if we believe one thing then we must also believe something else.24  Recall from 
the Introduction that this not a special form of argument for moral theory, but also for science too.  In all 
domains it seems we must seek an integrated epistemology. We cannot confirm a moral or a scientific 
proposition without holding some other moral or scientific propositions we accept, at least tentatively, to 
be true.  The form of Kant’s (and Kelsen’s) arguments is that if we value any purpose we set it cannot just 
be because we have set it, but must be because our ability to set it has value. (In Kelsen’s case, it is that if 
we regard a particular decision as legal because it is enacted by some lawmaking institution, it cannot be 
merely because that institution has enacted it, but rather because its enacting it has legal force, and 
whether it has force depends on some independent standard.)  The conclusion follows simply because it is 
implied by certain convictions we have. 
Does this form of argument preclude a deductive justification of the supreme principle?  
Although Kant does seem to say that the supreme principle cannot be deduced from some more general 
principle, that does not imply that it cannot be justified in terms of other ideas that are perhaps different 
aspects of it, which may be compelling or familiar to us, and about which we would not easily abandon 
our beliefs.  I have in mind in particular Kant’s claim that “freedom and unconditional practical law [that 
is, for any finite being, the Categorical Imperative] reciprocally imply each other,” so that being free 
implies we are subject to the demands of a pure, unconditional law, and our subjection to that law implies 
that we are free.25  Kant held that there is an incomparable dignity in elevating ourselves above the laws 
of nature by the free exercise of rational agency, and that this dignity can serve to justify the absolute 
value, or end, that justifies our adherence to the supreme principle.26 In the Groundwork, Kant claims that 
acting in accordance with universal laws of reason is the only way to free oneself from subjection to mere 
                                                          
24 Guyer briefly discusses Kant’s use of so-called “transcendental arguments” in Guyer’s Kant (New York:  Routledge, 2007), 112. 
25 Kant, CPrR 5:29 
26 An excellent discussion of Kant’s conception of practical freedom and its relation to the moral law is Guyer’s “Kant’s Morality of Law and 
Morality of Freedom” in his Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, Chapter 4. 
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laws of nature, and he suggests, for this reason, that lawgiving has unique dignity: “autonomy is therefore 
the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature.”27 This particular quotation does 
not make explicit that Kant is here referring to a normative conception of freedom from the laws of 
nature, which is different from his more notorious and opaque metaphysical conception of noumenal 
freedom of the will.  But Kant later, in the Critique of Practical Reason, argued that metaphysical 
freedom can be established only through recognizing our subjection to the moral law whose ground is a 
fundamental evaluative notion of freedom itself.28  In doing so, he reverted back to a normative 
conception of practical freedom, which he initially distinguished from transcendental freedom in the 
Critique of Pure Reason.  Practical freedom, our ability to act for reasons, is the ordinary capacity most of 
us usually take ourselves to have act for reasons and to forego immediate gratification for the sake of 
prudence.  We are free in that sense because we are not pushed around by our inclinations as passive 
subjects, but recognize some ends as good “in relation to our whole state”. 29   
   What is the value in this sense of practical freedom, in being “free with respect to all laws of 
nature”?  Kant writes at the start of the Groundwork that 
For an object as the effect of my proposed action I can indeed have inclination but never 
respect, just because it is merely an effect and not an activity of the will. In the same way I 
cannot have respect for inclination as such, whether it is mine or that of another; I can at most in 
the first case approve it and in the second sometimes even love it, that is, regard it as favorable 
to my own advantage.30 
Only what is an “activity of the will” is eligible for respect, and the form of activity of the will is making 
choices in accordance with “the mere law for itself,” rather than by mere inclination.  Kant holds that we 
must think of ourselves as free in all our rational judgments in the sense that we must regard our 
judgments as acts we perform under principles, that is, for reasons, not as acts that simply happen to us or 
                                                          
27 Kant, G 4:435–6 
28 See Kant, CPrR 5:29-30 and compare to G 4:446-448.  Kant reverses the argument of the Groundwork by arguing that freedom of the will 
could only be inferred from the “fact of reason”, which is the inescapable conviction that we are bound by the moral law.  He earlier argued that 
the validity of the moral law might be inferred from an independent proof of the freedom of the will.  
29 Kant, CPR A802/B830 
30 Kant, G 4:400 
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that we passively observe. 31 Because Kant understands freedom as action under a principle, freedom is 
opposed to arbitrariness and contingency.  Allen Wood illustrates with a vivid example that brings this 
point closer to common sense.32  If I judge that q based on the evidence that p or q and not-p, then I can 
regard this as a rational judgment on my part only if I am prepared to give it a normative explanation, 
which means I must be able to regard it as the result of my own correct application of the logical rule 
modus tollens. To say that judgment is an exercise of free agency just means that I am not allowed to 
judge in any way I happen to want to judge. Nor, Wood continues, is this free exercise compatible with 
my judgment being compelled by some contingent cause, like my fear that my logic teacher will flunk me 
if I do not give the answer I know he accepts.33  In both cases, the rightness of my judgments would be 
only contingently the result of some other person applying a rational principle, but not the result of my 
own exercise of my faculties in accordance with reason.  In the moral case, to regard myself as free is just 
to regard my judgments about how to act as subject to a universally valid moral principle.  Only in that 
way can I view the judgment as in some sense produced by me, through my own faculties rather than as 
happening to me as if I were a passive object, or a thing.  For Kant, moral laws differ from laws that have 
an external ground in experience, tradition, prejudice, or authority, precisely because they issue from our 
own law-governed rational activity according to principles.34 In that way, Kant saw an incomparable 
dignity in being governed by a supreme practical law that one has freely chosen for oneself.35  
I find Kant’s argument for the supreme principle compelling, but I realize it will not convince 
everyone.  I assume in Chapter 5 that there are perhaps other reasonable arguments for the supreme value 
of humanity that might satisfy others, and in this rest of that chapter, I look more closely at what respect 
for this value, according to Kant, involves.  In particular I show that it justifies the Unity Thesis. As Kant 
says, “Reason relates every maxim of the will as universally legislative to every other will and to every 
action toward itself,” not fundamentally to serve any contingent feeling, or impulse, or authoritative 
                                                          
31 Here I rely on Guyer’s excellent discussion in Guyer’s Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom, 133-36   
32 Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought, 175-176 
33 This is Wood’s example. Ibid 
34 Ibid, 59-60 
35 Kant, G, 4:434, G, 4:435-36 
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decree, or collective advantage, but “rather out of the idea of the dignity of a rational being who obeys no 
other law than that which he at the same time gives”.36  The unity of principle is implied by the dignity of 
autonomous moral legislation.  
                                                          
36 Kant, G, 4:434   
